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ABSTRACT 
Though contemporary evangelical Protestants have shown an increased interest in the 
fine arts, scholars have often seen the aesthetic history of Anglo-American 
evangelicalism as one marked by hostility and indifference.  In contrast to this view, this 
study argues that the history of evangelicalism’s intellectual engagement with the fine 
arts has been complex and varied.  Throughout much of the nineteenth century, 
evangelicals writing in a variety of denominational periodicals carried on a robust inquiry 
into aesthetics.  This study traces the rise of this discourse among Anglo-American 
evangelicals and maps some of the main features of the evangelical theoretical landscape 
between 1830 and 1900 – a high point of evangelical critical activity.  Christians, Critics, 
and Romantics describes how evangelicalism’s contact with Enlightenment thought 
initiated a break with the Puritan aesthetic tradition that contributed to the growth of a 
modern aesthetic consciousness among some eighteenth-century evangelicals.  By the 
1830s, evangelical aesthetic discourse had come under the influence of romanticism.  Not 
only did many evangelical writers define art according to the expressivist principles 
adduced by major romantic critics but some went even further in asserting, after 
Coleridge and the German idealists, that art is an embodiment of a higher reality and the 
imagination an organ of transcendental perception.  Evangelical critics, moreover, valued 
 art for its contribution to the stability and progress of “Christian nations” such as England 
and the United States.  By refining the moral feelings of individuals, fine art helped to 
safeguard the socio-moral cohesion of Protestant “civilization.”  For a time, evangelical 
critics attempted to celebrate art in romantic terms while insisting on art’s subordination 
to traditional Christianity, but such an arrangement ultimately proved unsustainable.  By 
the end of the nineteenth century, a rift had opened up within Anglo-American 
evangelicalism between conservatives and liberals.  This rift, created in part by the spread 
of romantic thought and by various other secularizing trends, had important implications 
for evangelical aesthetic thought.  While liberals continued to advance high claims for the 
spiritual and educational potential of art, conservatives largely abandoned the 
philosophical exploration of art in order to turn their attention to the threats of Darwinian 
evolution and biblical criticism.  Nevertheless, both liberals and fundamentalists retained 
in their respective ways many of the aesthetic assumptions of the romantic tradition.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
EVANGELICALS, AESTHETICS, AND HISTORY 
 
We are of the opinion that the evangelical canon admits of the appropriation of all 
belonging to taste and imagination…. 
 – “The Works of the Rev. Richard Watson,” London Quarterly Review (1854) 
 
In its April 1863 issue, the Southern Presbyterian Review published two consecutive 
articles, the juxtaposition of which would undoubtedly strike modern readers as peculiar 
and even shocking.  The first of these, entitled “The War of the South Vindicated,” 
concluded with a rousing summons, couched in the rhetoric of biblical prophecy, 
charging all Southerners to rally in defense of the Confederate cause: “let the trumpet 
blow in Zion, and let all her watchmen lift up their voice; – let all the people, everywhere, 
old and young, bond and free, take up the warcry, and say, each to his neighbor, ‘Gather 
ye together, and come against them, and rise up to the battle.’”1  If this article’s 
unabashed promotion of a war effort that, if successful, would have preserved intact the 
institution of slavery seems distasteful and offensive, it is rendered even more surprising 
by that which followed.  Immediately opposite to this vindication of the Southern cause 
there appeared the conclusion of a two-part article, begun in the January issue, “On the 
Nature and Uses of Art.”2  Published at the height of the Civil War only three months 
after Abraham Lincoln signed the Emancipation Proclamation and a mere two months 
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before the Battle of Gettysburg, this article examined at length, and at times with 
admirable depth, many of the issues central to modern aesthetics.  Here, in the pages of 
an evangelical periodical, not even a war, it seems, could suppress what appears to have 
been an abiding interest in the minds of its contributors, editors, and readers in art, 
beauty, and the imagination. 
 The following study examines the discourse of aesthetic theory as it was carried 
on in the pages of British and American evangelical periodicals between roughly 1830 
and 1900.  It attempts to illuminate key facets of evangelical thinking about the fine arts 
and to locate these within the larger theological, philosophical, and aesthetic contexts of 
nineteenth-century transatlantic culture.  Articles devoted to aesthetic theory and 
criticism like the one in the Southern Presbyterian Review – as well as numerous 
counterparts in other evangelical publications of the era – remain an understudied part of 
nineteenth-century Anglo-American evangelicalism.  Yet the sheer volume of such 
material seems to invite a reconsideration of the place of aesthetics in the history of 
evangelicalism.  To a far greater extent than has often been realized, a significant 
segment of the nineteenth-century evangelical population participated in, and contributed 
to the emergence of, western culture’s “institution of high art.”3  Amid the many 
evangelistic efforts, moral crusades, and programs of social reform for which they are 
justly famous, numerous Victorian evangelicals nevertheless found time to engage not 
only in the production and appreciation of art in a variety of mediums but also in 
energetic and sustained reflection on the theoretical foundations of such practices.  If the 
large number of critical reviews and philosophical treatises published in a wide range of 
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evangelical periodicals are any indication, art and the aesthetic were issues of great 
importance to many nineteenth-century evangelicals, and they attempted to think deeply 
about them. 
Such a view calls into question popular notions of what many have seen as 
evangelicalism’s chronic case of aesthetic myopia.  It is something of an understatement 
to say that the evangelical Protestant tradition is not exactly known for its refined taste, 
its fervid sponsorship of the fine arts, or the quality or quantity of its aesthetic theorizing.  
Unlike the Roman Catholic, High Anglican, or Unitarian traditions, which, though not 
immune to periodic outbursts of aesthetic anxiety (one recalls Gerard Manley Hopkins’s 
act of poetic immolation as a poignant Victorian example of this), have generally valued 
the fine arts, evangelicalism’s relationship to art and the aesthetic has often been read as 
an extension of Reformation iconoclasm and/or Puritan austerity.  At best, evangelicals 
have tolerated art as a useful didactic instrument for inculcating moral or doctrinal truths, 
while at worst they have shunned it as a worldly distraction or idolatrous snare.  
Evangelical philosophical reflection on art, moreover – when not hampered by the anti-
intellectualism from which many evangelicals have been said to suffer – has been 
severely limited or altogether mundane.   
In fact, the idea that there exists an ongoing tension between evangelical 
Protestantism and a serious interest in the aesthetic seems to find ample confirmation in 
the life-stories of any number of well-known Victorian figures.  Thomas Carlyle, Stephen 
Crane, Emily Dickinson, George Eliot, Edmund Gosse, John Henry Newman, and John 
Ruskin – all of whom grew up in evangelical households, affiliated themselves with 
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evangelicalism for a time, or made claims to evangelical-style religious experiences – are 
only the most famous examples of artists and thinkers whose creative output and 
attention to aesthetic matters appear to have increased as they either openly renounced or 
else drifted away from their evangelical origins.  Gosse’s opposition of the rigid 
Calvinism of his Plymouth Brethren parents to the visceral joys of his budding 
Wordsworthian romance with nature seems the archetypal evangelical predicament: one 
must choose, for one cannot have faith and beauty too.  Interestingly, this predicament is 
only underscored by another sort of narrative.  If the tale of the Victorian intellectual 
whose religious deconversion prepares the ground for a subsequent aesthetic conversion 
is one of the better known stories of the nineteenth century, it is mirrored by another, 
perhaps equally disturbing evangelical tale, namely, that one’s religious conversion to 
evangelical Protestantism leads ineluctably to an aesthetic deconversion.  Here, too, the 
evidence is not far to seek, though the names of the protagonists may be less familiar.  
Perhaps the most useful example of this latter tale is that of Oswald Chambers, whose 
devotional work, My Utmost for His Highest, has enjoyed an abiding popularity since its 
original publication in 1927.  After converting to evangelical Christianity upon listening 
to the preaching of Charles Spurgeon, Chambers initially declared his desire to “strike for 
the redemption of the aesthetic Kingdom of the soul of man – Music and Art and Poetry,” 
and he spent two years studying at the National Art Training School in London.  
Ultimately, however, Chambers left art school for the ministry, and in doing so, 
abandoned his commitment to “the redemption of the aesthetic Kingdom” for good.4 
It has been stories such as these which have often shaped our conceptions of 
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evangelical attitudes towards art and aesthetics.  Writing in the Christian Herald in 1969, 
Clyde S. Kilby, himself an evangelical Professor of English at Wheaton College, summed 
up what he referred to as “The Aesthetic Poverty of Evangelicalism”: “Now when we 
look … to contemporary evangelical Christianity, we find a great oddity.  The people 
who spend the most time with the Bible are in large numbers the foes of art and the sworn 
foes of the imagination…. Evangelicals hear the great ‘I am’ of God, but they are far less 
aware of the ‘I am’ of his handiwork.”5  Kilby’s criticism, it should be pointed out, was 
directed specifically at the post-fundamentalist evangelicalism of the mid-twentieth 
century, and indeed one hears in his lament – and in his subsequent plea for greater 
aesthetic sensitivity among evangelical Christians – clear strains of that neo-
evangelicalism which, since its emergence in the years just after World War II, had set 
about the task of awakening a new generation of evangelicals to a cultural sensitivity and 
rapprochement that had largely been absent among its fundamentalist forbears.  And in 
fact, the decades since Kilby’s aesthetic cri du coeur suggest that his call has not fallen 
upon deaf ears, as evangelicals popular and academic have turned with increasing zeal to 
both aesthetic theory and praxis.6  Yet notwithstanding this recent flood-tide of 
evangelical interest in the arts, observers have often echoed Kilby’s diagnosis of 
“aesthetic impoverishment” when it comes to the evangelical tradition as a whole.  That 
is, the evangelicalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is thought to have been 
as aesthetically impoverished as the evangelicalism of the mid-twentieth.  The popular 
narrative of evangelicalism’s relationship to the fine arts has long been a story of distaste, 
distrust, and disinclination.7 
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Despite its prevalence, however, this narrative is overly reductive in that it fails to 
take into account much of what evangelicals have actually said about art at different 
points in their history.  “There is nothing incompatible with true religion, in the 
attainments of secular wisdom, or the delights of taste,” argued the Old School 
Presbyterian Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review in 1843,8 and for much of the 
nineteenth century such an attitude was very much a part of Anglo-American evangelical 
thought.  Though undeniably funny or repulsive by turn, the crazy Miss Clacks and the 
brooding Mr. Brocklehursts of Victorian fiction, with their single-minded – indeed, one 
might say obsessive – anxieties about the “world,” reveal very little about the realities 
and inner complexities of nineteenth-century evangelicalism and its attitudes towards 
cultural pursuits like art.  Evangelicals were not all guilty of what Dickens memorably 
referred to as “telescopic philanthropy.”9  Far from it.  Like all good caricatures, such 
depictions suggest a portion of the truth, but they do so at the expense of any sense of 
intellectual nuance or any sense of the historical development specific to a given 
community.  Nineteenth-century evangelicals, in fact, thought long and hard about the 
culture in which they lived, and for many, this meant thinking long and hard about the 
nature of art and aesthetics.   
This study, therefore, seeks a more nuanced understanding of evangelicalism’s 
historical and philosophical engagement with the fine arts.  It is an attempt not only to 
recover a largely forgotten tradition of evangelical discourse about the aesthetic but also 
to restore some idea of the peculiar complexities of this history.  In doing so, this study 
builds on the work of a handful of other scholars who, in recent years, have begun in 
 7 
different ways to challenge the popular narrative of evangelicalism’s relative 
estrangement from the fine arts.  Doreen Rosman – whose pioneering Evangelicals and 
Culture (1984) was perhaps the first study to raise the possibility that the prevalent view 
of evangelical suspicion of the fine arts might be open to scrutiny – has rightly criticized 
the scholarly “tendency … to treat the [evangelical] movement as an unchanging entity, 
assuming that the attitudes of any one generation are typical of all time.”10  Focusing on 
British evangelicals between 1790 and 1833, Rosman argues that evangelicalism enjoyed 
during this time a comparably heightened period of cultural and aesthetic engagement.  
Unlike first-generation evangelicals who largely perpetuated the aesthetic views of the 
Puritans, a number of turn-of-the-century evangelicals adopted a favorable, albeit 
extremely cautious, stance towards many “mainstream” cultural practices, including the 
fine arts.  However, this tentative receptivity to art and culture was, according to Rosman, 
curiously short-lived, and she follows several other critics in seeing the remainder of the 
nineteenth century as a period of steady decline for evangelical aesthetics:     
 
Sympathetic and unsympathetic historians alike accept that the pre-
Victorian generation was less philistine than that which followed.  The 
latter, Ford K. Brown writes, “had lost to a distressing extent … the taste, 
culture and intellectual interest that had marked many of the dominant 
Evangelicals of Wilberforce’s generation” among whom “there was 
always a less bigoted Puritanism than developed at the end of the reform 
period and was a notable mark of the Bleak Age”.  His admission provides 
both the incentive to and the justification for a study of evangelicals and 
culture between 1790 and 1833.11   
 
 Yet while Rosman is correct to question monolithic accounts of evangelical 
attitudes towards art, her claims for a hasty evangelical retreat into the aesthetic 
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backwaters of Victorian culture have proven to be short-sighted.  Recent studies by David 
Morgan and Ryan K. Smith, for example, have demonstrated how nineteenth-century 
American Protestant interest in both visual representation and architecture actually 
intensified throughout the period rather than declined, and Graham Howes has noted a 
similar trajectory for British Protestantism.12  This interest in visual representation, as 
well as in other arts such as music and poetry, was supported and encouraged by a 
growing critical establishment whose base of operations was the vast array of religious 
periodicals funded and published by numerous evangelical denominations.  This 
establishment – which included clergymen and academics (especially in America where 
evangelicalism had a strong influence on higher education) but also poets, artists, and an 
emerging class of “professional” critics and editors – supplied nineteenth-century 
evangelical readers with a wealth of critical material and exposed them to both the 
philosophical principles and the vocabulary of modern aesthetic discourse.  In fact, the 
last two-thirds of the nineteenth century marked what was arguably a high point for 
evangelical reflections on art.  Far from simply engaging in reactionary polemics against 
the dangers of fiction or the supposed visual excesses of Catholicism (though such 
polemics remained common-enough fare), critics writing in a vast array of 
denominational periodicals across the evangelical spectrum generated a robust and in 
some cases sophisticated body of philosophical criticism on a variety of aesthetic 
questions.  They eagerly discussed and debated such topics as the nature of art, the 
relationship between art and Christianity, the role of art in society, the essence of beauty, 
and the psychological dynamics of creativity.  Both the extent to which these critics 
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carried their speculations and the ardor with which they pursued them were largely 
unprecedented within evangelicalism prior to the nineteenth century.  Art and aesthetics 
were accorded an intellectual and even spiritual value which they had rarely, if ever, 
enjoyed among the self-professed theological descendants of the Protestant Reformation. 
 
The Rise and Fall of “Evangelical Romanticism” 
This study, then, seeks to chart the rise of a self-conscious aesthetic discourse among 
evangelical Protestants and to map some of the main features of this evangelical 
theoretical landscape at the point of its greatest development during the last two-thirds of 
the nineteenth century.  The central narrative of this essay chronicles the way in which 
Anglo-American evangelicals gradually moved away from the complicated, and often 
ambiguous, aesthetic legacy of their Puritan past towards a more extensive and urbane 
conception of art’s possibilities, as well as towards a greater appreciation of aesthetics as 
an important and legitimate field of inquiry.  Initially, this process was slow-going.  
Despite what appears to have been a broadening of taste among many eighteenth-century 
evangelicals, early efforts at aesthetic theorizing were mostly restricted to a small 
company of innovators like Jonathan Edwards (1703-1758) and John Wesley (1703-
1791).  The writings of Edwards and Wesley are important early examples of the 
evolving aesthetic consciousness of Anglo-American evangelicals, but Edwards and 
Wesley aside, eighteenth-century evangelicals in general had little of theoretical 
significance to say about art.  This lack of reflection on aesthetics may be attributed to a 
number of factors, including both the residual presence of various Puritan anxieties about 
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certain kinds of art and the scorching fires of revivalist fervor, which, in the early and 
heady days of a movement, could often prove all-consuming.  It is worth remembering, 
too, that both our contemporary conception of the “fine arts” and what would eventually 
become the discipline of modern philosophical aesthetics were themselves eighteenth-
century constructs.13  Over time, however, evangelicals, along with their non-evangelical 
intellectual counterparts, learned to speak in the fledgling vocabulary of modern 
aesthetics. 
This gradual evolution of aesthetic interest among evangelicals was in large part a 
result of evangelicalism’s contact with certain facets of Enlightenment thought – first the 
doctrines of Locke and then, most significantly, the writings of the Scottish common 
sense realists.  Through exposure to such thinking, often encountered in college and 
university classrooms (which, in America at least, were dominated by evangelical 
professors well into the nineteenth century), educated evangelicals came to share their 
age’s interest in the many problems of “mental philosophy.”  Typically marking the 
culmination of the college curriculum, the study of mental philosophy sought to 
catalogue and analyze the powers and faculties of the human mind, among which were 
such aesthetically-oriented faculties as the imagination and taste.  Through the many 
college courses and textbooks devoted to the examination of the human mind, 
evangelicals came to see the fast-expanding field of aesthetics as a legitimate and worthy 
form of scientific inquiry.  Furthermore, as theories of faculty psychology stressed, a 
proper education, and ultimately a fulfilling existence, consisted in a balanced attention to 
the individual powers of mind.  The study and appreciation of art and beauty therefore 
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came increasingly to be seen as an indispensable part of human experience. 
The mental philosophy of the Enlightenment, among other factors, helped 
acclimatize evangelicals to the emerging discipline of aesthetics, but it was the critical 
tenets of romanticism – many of which were themselves outgrowths of Enlightenment 
theories of mind14 – that did most to shape the theoretical doctrines of evangelical writers 
throughout the nineteenth century.  For this reason, the evangelical critical encounter with 
romantic aesthetics marks a central – perhaps the central – theme in the story which 
follows.  Sometime around the 1830s, both the philosophy and style of romanticism 
began to exercise a profound influence on diverse segments of Anglo-American 
evangelicalism, affecting everything from homiletics to eschatology.15  In the ensuing 
decades, evangelical conceptions of art and the aesthetic were also effectively 
romanticized, and it is no exaggeration to say that the theory and criticism published in 
evangelical venues throughout much of the nineteenth century was to a great extent either 
an extension of romantic critical theory or else a reaction to the perceived excesses of 
such theory.  As one might expect, the degree of such romantic leanings varied from 
author to author and periodical to periodical.  Some, guided by Coleridge and the spread 
of German idealist thought at mid-century, published full-scale idealist manifestos 
touting art as a vehicle of divinity and the artist as deep-seeing sage; others were content 
simply to laud the healing powers of beauty, to insist on the distinction between poetry 
and science, to look to the imagination as the apex of human powers, or to praise art’s 
potential as an agent for the shaping of individual and social virtue.  And nearly 
ubiquitous was that most prized of romantic aesthetic principles – the belief that, 
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whatever else art is, it is essentially the expression of human emotion.  Just as 
importantly, however, romanticism shaped the style and rhetoric of the aesthetic theory 
and criticism that appeared in the pages of nineteenth-century evangelical periodicals.  
Art, as well as the burgeoning industry of philosophical criticism,16 were treated with a 
“high seriousness” that likely would have surprised an earlier generation of evangelicals. 
Of course, scholars and critics have at times pointed to just such a connection 
between romanticism and nineteenth-century evangelical Protestant approaches to art.  
Diane Apostolos-Cappadona, for example, has described the influence of what she terms 
“Christian Romanticism” on the rise of visual art in the antebellum United States.  
Distinguishing Christian Romanticism from both the prior spirituality of the Great 
Awakening and the growing pantheistic tendencies of much Transcendentalist thought, 
Apostolos-Cappadona sees this unique brand of romanticism as critical to the formation 
of “a distinctive culture a keystone of which was the emergence of an identifiable 
American art.”17  Yet it seems to me that scholarly attention to the contributions made by 
romanticism to evangelical understandings of art and the aesthetic have been somewhat 
imperfect and restricted in scope.  As helpful as Apostolos-Cappadona’s concept of 
Christian Romanticism is, it is limited by its disproportionate association with the liberal 
wing of American Protestantism.  In fact, it appears that for Apostolos-Cappadona the 
two movements are virtually synonymous – an identification not uncommon in scholarly 
accounts of nineteenth-century American Protestant approaches to art.  To be sure, 
scholars like David Morgan – whose brilliant socio-historical study of changing 
American Protestant attitudes to visual imagery in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
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centuries argues that both conservative and liberal understandings of art were shaped by 
romantic conceptions of nurture and “character formation” – have gone some way in 
correcting this imbalance.  But scholarly treatments of romanticism’s effect on 
nineteenth-century evangelical aesthetics have by and large emphasized the liberal 
tradition of Protestantism.18  In reality, however, the romantic aesthetic tradition affected 
even conservative evangelical understandings of art beginning in the 1830s, and even 
theologically “orthodox” evangelical periodicals, when they turned to discussions of 
aesthetics, bore the tell-tale marks of romantic critical theory.   
Furthermore, scholarly accounts of romanticism’s contribution to Protestant 
conceptions of (visual) art in the nineteenth century have often focused largely on 
romantic, and especially Bushnellian,19 conceptions of “nurture” and the role such 
conceptions played in shaping Protestant understandings of art’s moral capacity to mold 
the character of individuals and of the nation.  Thus for Apostolos-Cappadona, an 
emphasis on “nurture” is a key factor in distinguishing the spirituality of “Christian 
Romanticism” from the earlier spirituality of the Great Awakening.20  This focus has 
yielded vital insights into a key dimension of Victorian evangelical aesthetics, and it 
serves as a recurrent theme throughout this study as well.  Nevertheless, even when it 
comes to notions of art’s socio-moral “influence” – an idea often associated with 
Bushnell’s theory of nurture, at least in the United States – Bushnell was as much a 
symptom as a cause.  That is to say, although Bushnell no doubt helped to catalyze the 
idea of art’s influence, both conservative and liberal evangelical understandings of the 
moral power of art, as I argue in chapter 5, were also shaped by a broader moral-aesthetic 
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discourse that predated Bushnell.  In addition, the chapters which follow also concentrate 
on several other areas of nineteenth-century evangelical aesthetic thought that have 
received less attention by scholars, and as a result, they offer what I believe to be a more 
expanded account of romanticism’s influence on evangelical aesthetics.  By examining 
how contributors to evangelical periodicals treated such topics as the nature of art, the 
relationship between art and Christianity, the problems associated with aesthetic 
perception, and the powers of the imagination, among others, I hope to shed new light on 
some hitherto neglected areas of nineteenth-century evangelical thought.  Doing so, 
moreover, will reveal just how systemic was the pressure which romanticism exerted on 
the theoretical criticism of many Victorian evangelicals. 
 Still, from one perspective it may come as no surprise that nineteenth-century 
evangelicals, when they began turning in earnest to theoretical considerations of art, 
embraced the principles of romantic criticism.  As David E. Latané, Jr. observes, early-
nineteenth-century criticism in general often amounted to little more than an “attempt to 
consolidate the innovations of the Romantics.”21  René Wellek, meanwhile, has called 
mid-Victorian theories of poetry “a remote derivative of popularized romanticism.”22  If 
such assessments are substantially true, as I believe they are, then it may seem something 
of a foregone conclusion that those Victorian evangelicals who decided to don the mantle 
of critic and take up their pens would have harbored romantic inclinations.  Evangelicals 
were in fact participating fully in the cultural enterprises of their age.  From another 
perspective, however, the willingness of evangelical critics to embrace romantic theories 
of art was in fact indicative of important theological and philosophical shifts at work 
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within Anglo-American evangelicalism, for romantic aesthetic theory was itself 
implicated in a web of assumptions concerning the nature of God, of human beings, of 
language, and of the world that were potentially at odds with traditional Protestant 
doctrine.  In contrast to traditional Protestant conceptions of the transcendence of God, 
the depravity of human beings, the necessity of supernatural regeneration, and the 
dangers of approaching God through humanly devised means, romanticism increasingly 
stressed the immanence of the “divine” in all things, the innate goodness of humankind, 
the power of natural “influence,” and the supreme value of human creativity.  In the 
context of evangelical history, therefore, aesthetic discourse proved to be yet another 
arena in which the various liberalizing trends of the nineteenth century could be played 
out.    
 The full implications of these trends, however, took time to develop, and the 
aesthetic theory that appeared in the pages of nineteenth-century evangelical periodicals 
was not always and everywhere a simple codification of romanticism.  Sometimes, of 
course, it was.  But in other instances evangelical writers – especially the more 
theologically conservative ones – did not always swallow romanticism whole.  On 
occasion, this evangelical resistance to aspects of romanticism took part in a larger 
Victorian reaction to romantic theory, as when the editor of the London Quarterly Review 
explicitly sided with Matthew Arnold’s Preface of 1853 against what he saw as the 
excesses of romantic expressivism (see chapter three).  At other times, however, one can 
observe evangelical writers attempting to qualify some of the more minatory claims of 
romantic aesthetics by bringing to bear traditional and decidedly unromantic doctrines 
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like the Fall, total depravity, and salvation through Christ alone.  Such critics found 
themselves engaged in a complex process of appropriation and resistance, and indeed, 
Victorian evangelical critics are arguably at their most interesting in those moments when 
they attempted, with varying degrees of success, to balance orthodox theological 
concepts with romantic notions of art.  It was in these moments that a unique effort at 
synthesis emerged, however briefly and however rarely.  Over the course of the 
nineteenth century, however, such efforts to moderate romantic aesthetics by imposing 
traditional doctrinal checks proved ultimately ineffectual.  By the early decades of the 
twentieth century, many evangelicals had opted for one of two extremes: they had either 
abandoned traditional doctrine or they had abandoned philosophical reflection on 
aesthetics. 
 Yet it was not the theoretical tenets of “mainstream” romantic critics and artists 
alone that drove nineteenth-century evangelical aesthetics.  Evangelical thinking about art 
during the period was also shaped by evangelicalism’s continuing negotiations with both 
its own Puritan past and its longtime theological nemesis, Roman Catholicism.  Thus 
another important motif in the present study is the process of de-puritanization which 
evangelicals underwent in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  In one 
sense, this process of de-puritanization was merely the undercurrent of the romanticizing 
trend noted above.  As many evangelicals gradually departed from their earlier Calvinist 
theological roots, they increasingly welcomed romantic understandings of human nature 
and the divine.  This theological de-puritanization, moreover, coincided with, and even 
enabled, a similar movement away from the perceived restraints of the Puritan religio-
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aesthetic tradition.  What is particularly significant about this process in its relation to 
aesthetics was its growing self-consciousness, not only among liberals but also among 
conservative and moderate evangelicals.  Over the course of the nineteenth century, 
evangelicals more and more came to see the aesthetic legacy of Puritanism as the entity 
against which their own aesthetic thought was to be defined.  At times, this self-conscious 
aesthetic de-puritanization necessitated some careful rhetorical maneuvering, especially 
among those conservative evangelicals who sought to retain some identification with 
Puritan theology and piety while distancing themselves aesthetically.  But however this 
process took place, it was rarely neat and tidy, and even as many evangelicals struggled 
to repudiate what they construed as the negative aesthetic legacy of their Puritan 
predecessors, Puritan attitudes continued to guide and inform the way in which other 
evangelical writers thought about art and beauty.       
 The traditional evangelical distaste for all things Catholic also continued to 
impact evangelical conceptions of art in the nineteenth century, sometimes in surprising 
ways.  Evangelicals, of course, were well aware of Catholicism’s claim to aesthetic 
supremacy – a claim which, prior to the Victorian period, evangelicals had been more or 
less happy to concede, wearing their taste for simplicity and their aversion to visual 
images in particular as badges of honor.  Recent studies, however, have described shifting 
Protestant attitudes during the nineteenth century towards the visual, and towards art in 
general, in terms of a process of Protestant “Catholicization.”  Morgan, for instance, has 
documented the movement among Protestants from a purely didactic use of visual 
imagery to a form of “devotional visual piety” akin to that practiced by Catholics.23  
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Smith has noted a similar evolution among American Protestants in their embrace of 
Gothic architecture.  Intriguingly, Smith attributes this process of Catholicization not to a 
decline in anti-Catholic sentiments but rather to anti-Catholicism itself.  Acutely aware of 
what many American Protestants perceived as a growing “Catholic ‘threat,’ Protestant 
denominations adopted one of its most potent, yet seemingly most superficial, 
components – its imposing physical presence.”24  That is, in order to attract converts in an 
increasingly hostile religious free market, American Protestants assumed an “if-you-
can’t-beat-‘em-join-‘em” sort of attitude.  As we will see, both British and American 
evangelical critics were also on occasion more forthright in their aesthetic challenges to 
Catholicism, engaging in self-conscious attempts to assert the superiority of Protestant 
aesthetics and even to claim, in good Protestant (and Whig) fashion, that all that is good 
and true in modern aesthetics could be traced to the liberating effects of the Reformation.  
Yet whether the process was implicit or explicit, nineteenth-century evangelical 
Protestants were increasingly emboldened to challenge Catholicism’s traditional claim to 
aesthetic dominance. 
 The romantically inclined aesthetic theory and criticism which graced the pages 
of countless nineteenth-century evangelical periodicals was thus refined in various ways 
by traditionally evangelical concerns.  Delineated broadly, this body of aesthetic theory 
may be described as “evangelical romanticism.”  Though this term may be said to include 
many of those writers and artists characterized by Apostolos-Cappadona’s similar use of 
“Christian Romanticism,”25 I prefer “evangelical romanticism” both for its greater 
specificity and because it suggests that class of writers which, oddly enough, entertained 
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certain romantic notions of art even as they maintained relatively close ties to the 
spirituality of the Great Awakening.  In addition to suggesting the aesthetic views of 
more theologically conservative evangelicals, the term evangelical romanticism is also 
intended to underscore the extent to which romantic theory informed evangelical 
understandings of a wide variety of aesthetic problems and their customary solutions.  It 
was this evangelical romanticism which dominated the intense period of evangelical 
aesthetic theorizing between 1830 and 1900, and helped to shape both liberal and 
conservative notions of art long afterwards. 
 Ultimately, however, this mid-Victorian evangelical pax aesthetica was not to 
last, for as the nineteenth century drew to a close, evangelicals were forced to confront 
the harsh realities of secularization and modernism.  Under the weight of new scientific 
and philosophical developments, the social and theological framework that had long 
sustained evangelicalism faltered at last, and as a result, the cultural influence which 
evangelicalism had enjoyed in both Britain and the United States began in the 1870s to 
enter a period of decline.  By the turn of the century, the “evangelical united front” which 
had dominated so much of the nineteenth century was near collapse as the gathering 
forces of both fundamentalism and modernism were radically altering the evangelical 
landscape, and with it, evangelicalism’s relationship to aesthetics.26  In general terms, 
formal aesthetic discourse shared the fate of so many other evangelical intellectual and 
cultural pursuits in the early decades of the twentieth century, and for many of the same 
reasons.  Art and aesthetics became predominantly the property of a liberal Protestant, 
and mostly urban, cultural elite, while fundamentalists largely ignored theoretical 
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discourse about the arts in order to turn their attention to the menace of modern science 
and the hermeneutic intricacies of premillennial catastrophe.  As liberal Protestants 
continued to explore art’s spiritual possibilities and praise its cultural virtues in ever more 
expansive ways, conservatives for the most part abandoned aesthetics to a modernist 
intelligentsia.  “Fundamentalists of the first half of [the twentieth century],” observes 
Roger Lundin, “wrote almost no essays of significance on the arts.”27   
 This is not to suggest, of course, that fundamentalist evangelicals of the early 
twentieth century failed to appreciate art or even that they aligned themselves against the 
formal discourse of aesthetics per se.  Fundamentalism itself was not a monolithic entity, 
but rather a mélange of diverse and sometimes disparate elements.  In some cases, the 
absence of aesthetic discourse among fundamentalists was more the result of a narrowing 
of interests triggered by a small conglomerate of perceived threats (evolutionary theory, 
biblical criticism) than of any particular prejudice against art or beauty.  In other cases, 
the strong populist element within fundamentalism was quick to see the excesses and 
pretensions of some fin-de-siècle and High Modernist aesthetics as a source of mockery 
and scorn, while it also rejected the growing tendency among liberal Protestants to 
conflate the aesthetic with the religious – a trend that had been gaining ground during the 
last third of the nineteenth century.  Even so, there is evidence that when fundamentalists 
did think about art, they retained many of the commonplace assumptions that had defined 
the evangelical romanticism of the mid-nineteenth century.  Consequently, though early-
twentieth-century conservatives repudiated the more grandiose claims of liberals 
concerning art and largely discontinued the formal investigation of aesthetics cultivated 
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by their nineteenth-century predecessors, both liberals and conservatives remained, in 
some sense, the joint heirs of evangelical romanticism. 
 
Some Definitions and Parameters 
As the foregoing discussion suggests, the term “evangelicalism” can encompass any 
number of internal variations.  One need only consider the multitude of denominations 
and sub-denominations that have at one time or another been associated with 
evangelicalism – Assemblies of God, Baptist, Congregationalist, Dutch Reformed, 
Episcopalian, Evangelical Anglican, Evangelical Free, German Reformed, Lutheran, 
Mennonite, Methodist, Nazarene, Plymouth Brethren, Presbyterian, and Restorationists, 
among others – to appreciate the complexities of such a label and the attendant problems 
of definition.  Geographical and theological differences, meanwhile, only complicate the 
matter.  It remains, therefore, to delineate as carefully as possible my use of the term 
“evangelical” and the methodological considerations that have determined the particular 
shape of this study. 
 Despite the reservations of some scholars regarding the usefulness of the term,28 
most historians of religion continue to employ “evangelical” as a designation referring to 
a range of Protestant Christians who share certain basic convictions.  In his important 
study, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain, David Bebbington offers what has become the 
“more-or-less canonical”29 definition of this set of convictions.  Evangelicals, according 
to Bebbington, typically exhibit four essential characteristics: “conversionism” (an 
emphasis on a specific moment of saving faith); “biblicism” (a belief in the Bible as the 
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inspired Word of God sufficient for matters of salvation and piety); “crucicentrism” (an 
insistence on the central importance of the Atonement); and “activism” (a desire to share 
the Gospel with others).30  At the same time, in his study Between Faith and Criticism: 
Evangelicals, Scholarship, and the Bible in America, another eminent historian of North 
American Protestantism, Mark A. Noll, has opted for a more descriptive approach that 
examines evangelicalism in terms of a “history of interlocking institutions, personal 
networks, and common traditions.”31  By his own admission, Noll eschews a doctrinal 
classification, and in this his approach differs somewhat from Bebbington’s more 
theologically-oriented definition.  Still, Noll’s strategy by no means excludes those 
Protestant Christians who would readily qualify as evangelicals under Bebbington’s 
rubric, and in fact, in the introduction to his recent Biographical Dictionary of 
Evangelicals, historian Timothy Larsen has suggested that perhaps the most fruitful way 
to establish the parameters of evangelicalism is to combine Bebbington’s definition with 
Noll’s.32  This combined approach is essentially that which has guided my own decisions 
throughout this study.   
It is worth noting, however, that Noll’s more inclusive paradigm is especially 
helpful for a study such as this one in which so much of the primary source material is 
drawn from periodicals.  As is well known, it was common practice for reviewers in the 
nineteenth century to publish their contributions anonymously33 – a practice which makes 
it difficult, if not impossible, to bring external considerations to bear on the precise 
orientation of individual writers who fail to make the kind of explicit theological 
statements that would allow one to place him or her firmly in a particular doctrinal camp.  
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One can, of course, draw useful conclusions about the theological implications of a given 
writer’s discussion of aesthetics, but the precise significance of such statements in 
relation to the individual writer remains unclear.  Is the author’s doctrinal vagueness 
symptomatic of a changing theological position, or a personal crisis of faith perhaps?  Is a 
writer doctrinally specific in other contexts while he or she remains vague when 
discussing aesthetics?  If so, why?  Such questions make a strictly theological definition 
of evangelicalism somewhat prohibitive for a study of this sort.  In addition, it was 
sometimes the case that a known writer whose evangelical credentials might be in doubt 
according to a strict theological standard chose to publish his or her essays in a more 
theologically conservative periodical.  In fact, many theologically conservative and 
moderate evangelical periodicals were far from rigidly authoritarian in their editorial 
policies, and they often served as spaces for intellectual debate and exchange.  It seems 
absurd, therefore, to exclude such discussions from an assessment of evangelical 
aesthetics, if for no other reason than that a significant segment of theologically 
“legitimate” evangelicals would have been exposed to such thinking.  If I have erred to 
one side, then, I have tended to lean towards Noll’s descriptive approach to delimiting 
evangelicalism. 
Even so, this study does not treat all of the many sub-groups which may rightfully 
be said to fall under both Bebbington’s and Noll’s classifications.  In denominational 
terms, the discussion which follows centers almost exclusively on the aesthetic theory of 
Baptists, Congregationalists, Evangelical Anglicans, Methodists, and Presbyterians.  This 
decision was due in part to the historical longevity of each of these groups.  All either 
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predated the rise of modern evangelicalism in the eighteenth century (as in the case of 
Baptists, Congregationalists, and Presbyterians) or else were virtually identical with its 
earliest manifestations (as in the case of the Evangelical and Methodist movements 
within Anglicanism).  All of these denominations, moreover, with the partial exception of 
Evangelical Anglicans, maintained a significant presence in both Britain and the United 
States from at least the eighteenth century.  What is gained by attending to these 
particular groups is a clear focus on those individuals and institutions which arguably 
constitute the historical “center” of Anglo-American evangelicalism.  What is lost, of 
course, is any detailed attention to the numerous other factions within evangelicalism – 
many of them developments of the nineteenth century – which, despite their greater 
distance from the historical “center,” influenced this center in important ways.  I have 
not, for example, attempted any specific or extended examination of the aesthetics of the 
new sects that grew out of the Holiness movement which arose during the latter half of 
the nineteenth century, though the Holiness movement itself exerted an important 
influence on evangelical fundamentalism.34  I have also overlooked those denominations 
that emerged to a great extent as the result of factors peculiar to one side of the Atlantic 
or that otherwise lacked a significant transatlantic presence.  I have given little or no 
attention, for instance, to those groups associated with the Restorationist movement 
inaugurated by Barton W. Stone and Alexander Campbell, which were in large part a 
product of the American West and the populist impulses of the new republic.35 
One denomination, however, deserves special mention here, for although its 
absence from the British evangelical landscape and its often complicated relationship to 
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the American evangelical “center” render it an exception to the parameters sketched 
above, its early and sustained attention to aesthetics makes it of special interest to a study 
like this one.  The German Reformed Church, whose intellectual base of operations was 
its seminary in Mercersburg, Pennsylvania under the guidance of John Williamson Nevin 
(1803-1886) and the German immigrant Philip Schaff (1819-1893), often sought to 
distance itself from the nineteenth-century evangelical mainstream.  Mark A. Noll and 
Cassandra Niemczyk have referred to this body of Protestants as the “self-consciously 
reformed” – a term which reflects the critical stance often taken by theologians like 
Nevin and Schaff towards the “Methodistic” revivalism that characterized much of 
nineteenth-century evangelicalism.  In contrast to what they saw as the individualism and 
emotionalism that plagued Finneyite revivalism, Nevin and Schaff advocated a 
confessional and communal version of Christianity rooted in historic creeds.  They 
stressed an organic conception of the Church, liturgical forms of worship, and what they 
argued was a historically Reformed understanding of the Lord’s Supper – one which saw 
communion in sacramental rather than merely symbolic or Zwinglian terms.  Not 
surprisingly, to many evangelical Protestant observers these positions smacked of 
Catholicism, and the influence of the Mercersburg theology remained limited throughout 
most of the nineteenth century.  Nevertheless, the leading figures of the German 
Reformed Church remained in close contact with mainstream evangelicalism, if at times 
only by way of criticism.  At other times, however, this contact was also personal, as is 
illustrated by the careers of Mercersburg’s two principal figures.  Nevin was educated at 
Princeton under the guidance of Charles Hodge (1797-1878), the leading spokesman for 
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Old School Presbyterianism, while Schaff ultimately joined the faculty at Union 
Theological Seminary, where in 1867 he helped to found the American chapter of the 
Evangelical Alliance.36   
The main organ of Mercersburg Seminary was the Mercersburg Review (later the 
Reformed Quarterly Review), which throughout the nineteenth century published 
numerous articles on aesthetics.  What can be referred to as the “Mercersburg aesthetic” 
differed from the aesthetics of mainstream Anglo-American evangelicalism not so much 
in kind as in degree.  Deeply influenced (due in part to close ethnic ties) by the latest 
currents of thought in contemporary Germany, the Mercersburg aesthetic embodied in 
even more consistent, and sometimes more sophisticated, terms than the rest of 
evangelicalism the insights of German idealist thinking.  It was, as a result, perhaps 
somewhat less critical of certain romantic claims.  Yet strangely enough, this same 
aesthetic could also prove more regular and more rigorous in its efforts to allow explicitly 
theological concerns to pose aesthetic questions and to guide aesthetic reflection.  “We 
desire to show,” wrote E.E. Higbee in the Mercersburg Review in 1874, “how faith in 
Christ influences the imagination or phantasy….”37  In this way, the Mercersburg 
aesthetic sometimes more nearly approximated what we would today understand by 
“theological aesthetics,” or the application of systematic theology to the philosophical 
exploration of art – something which, in the nineteenth century, was as yet relatively rare.  
In its romantic orientation, however, the Mercersburg aesthetic was essentially consistent 
with much of the rest of Anglo-American evangelicalism, and for this reason, I have not 
scrupled – despite the German Reformed Church’s often critical relationship to the 
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evangelical mainstream – to include some discussion of it in the following pages.38 
Ultimately, however, this study is less concerned with the differences which may 
have existed among various evangelical groups when it came to aesthetics than with the 
many ideas which they held in common.  It may, of course, be quite possible, and even 
profitable, to speak – as in the case of the Mercersburg aesthetic – of a “Baptist aesthetic” 
or a “Methodist aesthetic,” and subtle variations in emphasis no doubt existed not only 
among denominations but also within denominations.  A similar concession, moreover, 
may also bear upon what I consider to be another distinctive feature of the present study, 
namely, its somewhat ambitious transatlantic scope – a perspective conspicuously absent 
from other existing treatments of nineteenth-century Protestant aesthetics.  The aesthetic 
views of British and American evangelicals, it is true, sometimes diverged as a 
consequence of the distinctive national identities of each, but only slightly so.  On the one 
hand, the anxious awareness of America’s cultural inferiority to the Old World on the 
part of intellectuals in the early republic and the concomitant sense of a uniquely 
American cultural destiny are historical commonplaces, and American evangelical 
intellectuals, no less than their non-evangelical contemporaries, were keenly aware of the 
special burden which they, as American Christians, faced in helping to forge a distinctive 
culture for the new nation – a culture in which the fine arts were to occupy a special 
place.  On the other hand, British evangelicals also cultivated their own version of 
religio-aesthetic nationalism which, if it differed in some of the particulars, was not 
dissimilar from its American cousin.  Americans, furthermore, when it suited the needs of 
the moment, were quite happy to see themselves as the rightful literary heirs of the great 
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English tradition that included Chaucer, Shakespeare, Milton, and Wordsworth, and thus 
competition with the Old World was based in part on the conception of a shared aesthetic 
past.   
Evangelicalism, moreover, had been from its earliest days a transatlantic 
phenomenon par excellence, with British and American evangelicals maintaining a vast 
network of personal and ideological influence and exchange.  Since the days of George 
Whitefield, evangelical preachers had regularly traversed the Atlantic to bring the fires of 
revival to their English-speaking brethren, a practice which continued throughout the 
nineteenth century.39  These transatlantic missionary tours at times resulted in large 
international movements, as in the case of the Keswick Higher Life Movement, which 
held its first conference in the Lake District of England in 1875 and was to have a far-
reaching effect on twentieth-century evangelicalism in both Britain and the United States.  
During the nineteenth century, the close association between British and American 
evangelicals of various denominations was further facilitated by a growing commitment 
to nonsectarian cooperation.  The Evangelical Alliance was founded in London in 1845, 
while a host of voluntary societies – many of them international in reach – helped to unite 
Anglo-American evangelicals under a common activist banner.  Most important for this 
study, however, was the exchange of information carried on via the transatlantic 
circulation of a growing army of evangelical periodicals.  In some cases, periodicals from 
one side of the Atlantic were republished unchanged and in their entirety on the other 
side of the Atlantic (e.g., the Christian Observer), while in other cases, selected excerpts 
were reprinted, often with approving editorial comments.  In a few instances, as in the 
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case of the British and Foreign Evangelical Review, for example, evangelical periodicals 
intentionally cultivated a global perspective, publishing both original articles by British 
authors as well as reprints drawn from American evangelical magazines.        
To be sure, such denominational and international evangelical cooperation was 
not always a smooth affair.  The nineteenth century was rife with denominational splits, 
internal squabbles were known to plague cooperative ventures like the Evangelical 
Alliance almost from the beginning, and American-style revivalism was not always well 
received among more genteel British evangelicals.40  But in terms of aesthetics, this 
international and inter-denominational network of Anglo-American evangelicals – 
however shaky at times when it came to theology or politics – provided a shared 
discursive context in which the exchange of ideas and resources could flow freely and 
easily.  Whatever the differences that existed between British and American evangelicals 
(or, for that matter, between northern and southern evangelicals in the United States),41 
such differences were not, where aesthetic theory was concerned, as important as the 
similarities.  Thus, while I have made an effort to note internal variations where such 
variations seem to qualify the main line of argument, I have for the most part focused on 
those aesthetic developments that were relatively consistent across both denominational 
and geographical boundaries. 
There was, however, one other internal divide within nineteenth-century 
evangelicalism which has more important implications than either sectarianism or 
nationalism for the story that follows, namely, the widening rift between a “high” 
intellectual elite and a “low” populist majority.  In his seminal study The 
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Democratization of American Christianity, Nathan O. Hatch has described at length the 
profound effects which the wave of popular democratic sentiments that swept across the 
American Protestant landscape in the early years of the republic had on the contours of 
American Christianity.  Those influenced by this populist movement tended to align 
themselves against the norms of “ecclesiastical institutions and high culture,” and the 
opposition that formed between the cultured few and the lowbrow many has continued to 
shape developments within American Protestantism at the deepest level well into the 
twenty-first century.  “The resulting polarization in American Christianity,” writes Hatch, 
“is deeper and more pervasive than the most sharply defined theological debate.”  For 
Hatch, this polarization of elite and populist elements is a distinctively American 
phenomenon,42 and there is little doubt that in a broad sense many American Protestants 
– and many American evangelicals in particular – have tended to gravitate toward 
populist extremes to a far greater extent than their more “respectable” British 
counterparts.  Nevertheless, British evangelicals were not, at least where aesthetics and 
“culture” were concerned, entirely exempt from the kind of polarization that Hatch 
describes.43  In 1882, for example, the Rev. Hugh Price Hughes undertook to defend 
English Methodism against “One of the most deadly libels from which [it] has ever 
suffered,” namely, “the assumption that Methodism is antagonistic to culture and 
inconsistent with it.”  To salvage Methodism, however, Hughes felt it necessary to 
distance Methodism from evangelicals within the Established Church.  Methodism, 
argued Hughes, had been mistaken for “the Evangelical movement within the 
Establishment,” and, he was sorry to admit, “some of the leaders of the Evangelical party 
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in the Church of England did regard secular knowledge with suspicion, and did speak of 
culture in terms of disparagement and dislike.”44  Whatever the accuracy of Hughes’s 
assessment – and there is indeed much here that is open to criticism – it was a tacit 
acknowledgement of the cultural polarization within English evangelicalism.     
For evangelicals, as for much of the rest of western culture during the nineteenth 
century, art and aesthetics served both to reflect the elite/populist dichotomy and to 
reinforce it.  Indeed, it was during the period covered by this study that the split between 
so-called high and low culture fully evolved.  Art and aesthetics played a central role in 
this process, and “Art” itself ultimately came to be taken as a crucial index of cultural 
refinement.45  Popular art might be beneficial for escape or entertainment, but “serious” 
art mattered, and those who could appreciate this latter kind of art were those who 
wielded the cultural capital.  The reasons for this split and for art’s contribution to it were 
many; what concerns us here, however, is the fact that not only were a significant number 
of nineteenth-century evangelicals complicit in fostering this split through their own 
expanding institutions of theory and criticism but also that, as a result, evangelicals 
themselves came to model this split.  That is, evangelicals both accepted and 
recapitulated the distinction between “high” and “low” art.  The Methodist intellectual 
Nathan Bangs, founding editor of the Christian Advocate, revealed something of this high 
cultural sensibility when he criticized the popular tunes of the camp meeting, referring to 
them contemptuously as “ditties” and claiming that they “possessed little of the spirit of 
poetry and therefore added nothing to true intellectual taste.”46  
This observation, simple though it may seem, offers an important corrective to 
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those who would associate the history of evangelical taste almost entirely with what has 
come to be seen as “popular” or folk culture.  The history of evangelical taste is not 
limited to the hymns and spirituals of the camp meeting, the cover art of religious 
weeklies, or the many coming-of-age religious novels whose lasting popularity has 
persisted even to the present, though obviously such artifacts constitute an important part 
of any such history.  But to restrict one’s attention to these aspects of evangelicalism’s 
encounter with art and the aesthetic is to miss the bigger picture.  In reality, many 
nineteenth-century evangelicals were just as likely to affirm Matthew Arnold’s view of 
“culture” as they were to denounce his view of religion.  Anglo-American evangelical 
aesthetics has therefore been subject, for better or worse, to an ongoing dialectical 
struggle of the sort articulated by Hatch generally, and this study is in part an attempt to 
draw attention to the half of this dialectic that has often been overlooked and even to 
insist that this dialectic itself was, and continues to be, a perennial facet of 
evangelicalism’s approach to art.  In fact, one important consequence of this observation 
is the broadened perspective it potentially brings to the rapidly expanding world of 
evangelical aesthetics in the twenty-first century – a world which in many ways remains a 
bifurcated one.  Once again, a contingent of intellectual evangelicals has begun to pursue 
in earnest the philosophical investigation of art, even as another contingent remains 
committed to the aesthetics of popular mass culture.47  But as I hope this investigation 
makes clear, this bifurcation is nothing new; it is instead a part of the enduring aesthetic 
paradigm within which evangelicals have learned to think about art.    
A word remains to be said about the periodical sources on which I have based the 
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following analysis.  Over the past few decades, the study of eighteenth- and nineteenth-
century periodicals has become a fast-growing field, and rightly so.48  Periodicals during 
this period, as now, played an important part in the construction and perpetuation of 
various ideologies, and they shaped the exchange of ideas in profound ways.  The late 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed a number of religious periodical “booms” 
in both Britain and the United States during which the quantity of religious publications 
increased dramatically.  Between 1790 and 1825, the number of religious periodicals in 
Britain alone grew by four hundred percent, while the same period in the United States 
witnessed an explosion of popular print, much of it of a distinctly religious nature.  The 
United States saw another sharp increase in the twenty years after the Civil War, as the 
number of religious publications grew by two hundred percent.  Their widespread 
proliferation marked the dawn of mass media, and they served as key agents in the 
nineteenth-century Protestant effort in both Britain and America to establish not only 
individual “Christian nations” but also a wide-ranging Protestant “civilization,” which, as 
its supporters imagined, might eventually span the globe (see chapter 5).49 
Yet while this study occasionally makes use of some of the insights which the 
increased investigation of periodicals has afforded us, it is not itself primarily an 
examination of the kinds of cultural work done by the periodical form in the nineteenth 
century.  It is, rather, an intellectual history of the aesthetic theory which appeared in 
these venues.  Nor, I should add, have I given any extended consideration to the ways in 
which such characteristic periodical genres as the review or the article – or that other 
omnipresent periodical form, the reprinted excerpt – may have helped to shape either the 
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aesthetic theory itself or the reception of such theory.  These are certainly important 
questions, but in the interests of manageability I have had to put them aside for the time 
being.  I have, however, made an effort to survey a wide range of evangelical periodicals 
from both sides of the Atlantic (see Appendix B).  Obviously, given the sheer quantity of 
Victorian weeklies, monthlies, and quarterlies, the following account is in the end based 
on a small percentage of extant sources, but I believe that these sources are, in fact, 
representative of the general bent of middle-class evangelical thinking about art during 
the nineteenth century. 
 The periodicals treated by this study also ranged from the self-consciously 
academic to the “popular.”  The nineteenth century witnessed the dawn of mass media, 
but it also presided over a process of social and intellectual professionalization that 
resulted in the multiplication of specialized discourse communities, many of which 
published journals and periodicals that reflected their narrow, often academic interests.50  
Just as with today’s publications, Victorian periodicals could position themselves at any 
number of points along this intellectual-popular spectrum.  In some cases, it is even 
difficult to locate a given publication at a definite point on this continuum, for nineteenth-
century periodicals sometimes occupied an ambiguous cultural space that was itself 
situated at the contact zone between the evolving high/low polarities described above.  
This seems to have been especially true of religious periodicals.  As P. Mark Fackler and 
Charles H. Lippy have noted, it is not “always easy to classify [nineteenth-century] 
religious periodicals as being predominantly of academic or of general interest.”51    
Some, like the Old School Presbyterian Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review or the 
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German Reformed Mercersburg Review – periodicals affiliated directly with institutions 
of higher education – were clearly written by, and aimed at, professional theologians and 
clergy.  Such publications were the academic journals of their time, and they typically 
appeared on a quarterly or monthly basis.  Others, like the Southern Baptist Christian 
Index or the Anglican Record, were directed at a more popular audience and so tended to 
be published weekly.  A number of evangelical periodicals, however, occupied a kind of 
middle space, seeking to balance intellectual rigor with widespread appeal.  As such, one 
of their primary functions was to mediate for non-academic or non-professional readers 
the ideas emanating from intellectual circles.52  To mediate, of course, meant not only to 
translate and distill but also to filter and criticize.   
The mediating function of such periodicals provides an important reminder that 
the high/low divide – despite its often profound ideological power – was, and is, a 
relatively fluid distinction.  Still, a number of these periodicals were quite forthright 
about their efforts to expand the intellectual horizons of their readers – to move them, that 
is, more firmly in the direction of “high” culture.  Two Methodist publications, for 
example, one American (the Christian Advocate) and one British (the London Quarterly 
Review), were founded out of a similar conviction on the part of their respective editors 
that too many Methodists were sorely lacking in intellectual sophistication.53  Other 
periodicals, meanwhile, gradually altered their formats over the course of the century to 
reflect a more cosmopolitan perspective.  Before the 1870s, for example, the British 
Baptist Magazine had been primarily devotional and theological in nature.  In the 
December 1879 issue, however, the editors announced an expanded agenda, to 
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commence the following year, which called for substantial articles to be published in 
each issue related to matters “Devotional,” “Literary,” and “Scientific.”  In fact, this 
newly stated agenda only made explicit what had already begun to occur, for the format 
of the Baptist Magazine had been undergoing subtle changes since the beginning of the 
1870s, if not earlier.  From 1880 onward, the Baptist Magazine carried on a more 
extensive interaction with intellectual culture – an interaction that included regular 
attention to aesthetic topics – and the same sort of trajectory is evident in other 
evangelical periodicals of the nineteenth century as well.54  Despite the fact that 
evangelical periodicals covered the spectrum from popular to intellectual, however, the 
aesthetic principles that informed the many essays and reviews published in these venues 
remained remarkably consistent, whether they targeted elite academics or the popular lay 
reader. 
Of course, even if one is relatively certain of a specific publication’s popular 
status, it can still be difficult to determine the precise demographics of a given 
periodical’s audience.  One can only speculate, for instance, as to whether any of the 
periodicals examined here would have made their way into working-class homes, and if 
so, how working-class men and women would have responded to articles on art and 
aesthetics.  Yet these limitations aside, periodicals are well positioned to provide crucial 
insights into the middle-class nineteenth-century evangelical mind and its approach to 
aesthetics.  If, on the one hand, these sources speak to the emergence among Anglo-
American evangelicals of a professional, or quasi-professional, aesthetic discourse and 
thus to evangelicals’ rising participation in western culture’s institution of high art, they 
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also suggest something of the democratic impulse which, for a time at least, led writers 
and editors to the belief that art had consequences for the many.  
 
Mapping the Philosophical Aesthetic Landscape of Nineteenth-Century 
Evangelicalism: Art and the “Protestant Ideology” 
This study follows a mixed chronological-topical approach.  Chapter 2 introduces the 
story of nineteenth-century evangelical aesthetics by offering an overview of the 
background leading up to 1830.  Beginning with the “asymmetrical” religio-aesthetic 
legacy of the Puritans, this chapter traces in broad terms evangelicalism’s encounter with 
certain aspects of the Enlightenment and Enlightenment aesthetics.  In doing so, it lays 
the necessary groundwork for understanding the romantic aesthetic discourse which 
flourished among evangelicals during the nineteenth century.  This chapter is largely a 
work of historical synthesis, and I have relied on a number of excellent secondary 
accounts, especially in treating Puritan aesthetics.  Given what I see to be nineteenth-
century evangelicalism’s continuing dialogue with the Puritan tradition, I have also 
chosen – at the risk of taxing the patience of the specialist – to treat this tradition at some 
length.  Those readers who are familiar with the complicated aesthetic legacy of the 
Puritans may wish to skip ahead either to the second half of this chapter, which sketches 
important eighteenth-century developments (mostly through a small number of close 
readings), or to the main body of the study.   
Chapters 3-5 then transition to a more topical format in order to explore the ways 
in which evangelicals addressed a select number of important aesthetic issues in the years 
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between 1830 and 1900.  Chapter 3 examines how evangelicals struggled to 
conceptualize and articulate the nature of art.  Not only did many evangelical writers 
define art according to the expressivist principles adduced by major romantic critics and 
artists but some went even further in asserting, after Coleridge and the German idealists, 
that art is an embodiment of transcendent reality.  Chapters 4 and 5 together take up the 
questions of art’s ultimate purpose and its relationship to other dimensions of human 
experience.  Chapter 4 investigates the way in which evangelicals sought to formulate the 
relationship between art and Christianity.  More hopeful than their Puritan forbears in 
their belief that art and religion could mutually enrich one another, many evangelicals 
saw art as being both limited and informed by Christianity.  While some saw 
Christianity’s influence on art as operating at the level of aesthetic psychology, most 
evangelical writers saw art and religion as joint agents of moral, social, and even national 
refinement.  Chapter 5 picks up on this program of religio-aesthetic and moral-aesthetic 
nationalism as it examines the ways that nineteenth-century evangelicals theorized the 
moral power of art – again in terms that followed lines of thought sketched by 
Enlightenment philosophers and romantic artists and critics – and the ways in which such 
ethico-aesthetic theories interacted with evangelical conceptions of the “Christian 
nation.”  Not only was art to play a critical role in the shaping of such a nation (whether 
American or English) but art was also taken by some theorists as a reliable index to the 
moral and spiritual health of this nation. 
Chapter 6 concludes the story by documenting the challenges faced by 
evangelical aesthetic thought in the last decades of the nineteenth and early decades of 
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the twentieth centuries.  Even as the challenges posed by modern science and philosophy 
exerted an external pressure on many conservatives, narrowing considerably their field of 
intellectual output, developments within the late Victorian art world also exerted an 
internal pressure that drove some conservatives to abandon reflection on art and 
aesthetics.  Liberals, on the other hand, who largely made peace with the forces of 
modernism, continued the aesthetic tradition that had, for most of the nineteenth century, 
been the province of nearly all evangelical Protestants.  The result was a deep religio-
aesthetic divide within Anglo-American evangelicalism that lasted well into the twentieth 
century. 
Furthermore, the particular aesthetic issues treated in these chapters are generally 
of a certain type.  In the preface to his Short History of aesthetics, Monroe C. Beardsley 
offers a useful tripartite scheme for helping to delineate the field of inquiry for any 
historian of aesthetics.  To begin with, Beardsley observes, “one can ask particular 
questions about particular works.”  What, for example, are the compositional features of a 
given painting?  Secondly, one can also ask questions about the nature or qualities of 
specific artistic genres, as in What are the structural elements of a symphony? or What 
makes an ode an ode?  Finally, “one can ask questions about criticism itself, about the 
terms it uses, its methods of investigation and argument, its underlying assumptions.”  
Questions such as What is Art? or In what sense is art “true”? fall within this final 
category, one that Beardsley terms “philosophical aesthetics.”  It is with some of the 
questions of philosophical aesthetics and the ways in which evangelicals asked and 
answered them that much of the main body of this study is concerned.  At the same time, 
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however, this study also attends to some of the issues related to what Beardsley 
elsewhere refers to as “psychological aesthetics,” or the study of “the causes and effects 
of works of art.”55  This attention to psychological aesthetics is necessary since so many 
nineteenth-century critics were themselves interested in questions of this sort. 
 Yet while thinking in terms of philosophical and psychological aesthetics is 
helpful in identifying those aesthetic questions that have been excluded from 
consideration, these categories themselves remain general ones.  In deciding what to 
include in this study, therefore, I have had to be selective, sometimes ruthlessly so.  There 
are many philosophical and psychological aesthetic questions that nineteenth-century 
evangelicals wrestled with that might have been included here but were not, or which 
appear only sporadically or tangentially throughout.  I have touched only briefly, for 
instance, on evangelical conceptions of creativity, though there are many interesting 
connections between these conceptions and various theological concerns (e.g., the 
creativity of God, the autonomy of the individual, etc.).  The same may be said for both 
evangelical understandings of “taste” – though once again, the idea of taste raises 
provocative theological questions about the role of depravity in aesthetic appreciation – 
and evangelical understandings of “nature,” an issue fraught with lingering ambiguities 
inherited from the Puritans.56   
The philosophical aesthetic questions which this study does focus on are those 
related to what may be referred to as the “Protestant ideology.”  According to this 
ideology, which had its roots in Anglo-American Puritanism, Protestant Christianity, 
morality, and “civilization” were bound together in intricate and mutually supportive 
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ways.  Over time, art and aesthetics were slowly grafted into this ideology, and it was 
art’s relationship to this ideology that in many ways fueled and enabled the rapid growth 
in aesthetic interest among nineteenth-century evangelicals.  The chapters of this study, 
then, examine the various components of this ideology from different perspectives, while 
the study as a whole attempts to document art’s changing status in relation to this 
ideology. 
 A last word is in order concerning what this study is not.  It is not intended as a 
piece of art history or as a critical history of evangelical art and literature.  Scholarly 
studies of this kind would be worthy endeavors, and a number of scholars have already 
made important contributions along these lines.  But the present effort is not of this type.  
My interest here is in the history of a theoretical discourse and its relationship to other 
similar kinds of discourses (e.g., theology and philosophy).  It is a history of evangelical 
approaches to first principles, and consequently, references to specific poems, art works, 
and musical compositions appear sparingly throughout.  This decision stems in part from 
a conviction that aesthetic theory is precisely that which evangelicals have sometimes 
been accused of lacking.  Scholars have long recognized the importance of evangelical 
hymns, poems, novels, and music in the history of evangelicalism; what they have less 
often recognized is the existence of a substantial theoretical discourse underwriting such 
creative works.      
Finally, in the interests of full scholarly disclosure it is worth mentioning here that 
I write as an evangelical in the Baptist tradition.  This project is in many ways a deeply 
autobiographical one, and it began as an attempt both to come to terms with what seemed 
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to be evangelicalism’s conventional discomfort with, and general lack of interest in, art 
and aesthetics, and to place the recent explosion of evangelical interest in aesthetics in 
some kind of historical perspective.  While I am for the most part encouraged by this 
fresh interest in the fine arts, what has seemed absent from the conversation is any sense 
of tradition, any sense of building on past gains or learning from past mistakes.  Despite 
this personal investment, however, my objective throughout this study has been 
descriptive and historical rather than partisan, and though it is impossible for any human 
observer to rise completely above his or her ideological limitations, I have done my best 
to steer clear of polemics.  Especially where art and aesthetics are concerned, it is all too 
easy to adopt silently, and sometimes uncritically, an aesthetic standard of judgment 
(frequently a High Modernist one) which one then uses either to champion or disparage a 
given group.  I am not, I hope, uncritical of either the western aesthetic tradition or the 
ways in which evangelicals have at various times chosen to engage this tradition.  My 
argument, therefore, is not an attempt to promote nineteenth-century evangelicals by 
proving that they were as aesthetically savvy as the romantics.  In fact, from a personal 
standpoint I remain ambivalent about evangelicalism’s adoption of many of the tenets of 
High Romantic aesthetics.  Rather, my desire is that this study will serve not only to 
enrich our understanding of a hitherto understudied aspect of nineteenth-century 
evangelicalism but also, in a much broader sense, to illuminate the problems and pitfalls, 
the discoveries and rewards, inherent in any human attempt to contemplate the holiness 
of beauty and the beauty of holiness. 
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to the view that German idealist thought affected the common sense tradition just as the common sense 
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CHAPTER 2 
ASYMMETRIES AND AMBIGUITIES: FROM PURITANISM TO EVANGELICAL 
ROMANTICISM 
 
Since I have known God in a saving manner, painting, poetry, and music have had 
charms unknown to me before.  I have received what I suppose is a taste for them; for 
religion has refined my mind, and made it susceptible of impressions from the sublime 
and beautiful. 
 – Henry Martyn (British evangelical missionary)  
 
To appreciate fully the character and fate of evangelical aesthetics between 1830 and 
1900, one must begin considerably earlier with the religio-aesthetic tradition of the 
Puritans.  Evangelicalism, which traces its origins to the series of transatlantic revivals 
that shook the Anglo-American world in the 1730s and 1740s, was in many ways the 
direct recipient of the Puritan heritage of theology and piety.  While Puritanism had the 
most immediate influence on those evangelical denominations that located themselves 
within the Reformed tradition, it played an important role in shaping the Wesleyan-
Arminian heritage as well.  John Wesley, who was the fountainhead of the Arminian 
strand of the evangelical tradition just as Jonathan Edwards was of the Calvinist strand, 
spoke highly of the Puritans as models of piety and intellect.  He read widely among the 
Puritans, and he produced among his many characteristic abridgements a collection of 
“Extracts from the Works of the Puritans.”1  Early evangelicals shared with their Puritan 
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predecessors a number of important doctrinal and devotional emphases, including the 
necessity of conversion, the Reformation dictum of sola Scriptura, the real 
substitutionary work of Christ on the cross, and an introspective and heartfelt form of 
piety.2  Yet Puritanism also contributed to evangelicalism a complex, and often 
ambiguous, aesthetic legacy.  When it came to the fine arts, beauty, and the imagination, 
the Puritans bequeathed to their evangelical descendants a complicated constellation of 
problems, latent possibilities, and limitations.   
Under the influence of Enlightenment thought, however, eighteenth-century 
evangelicals began to depart from some aspects of this Puritan tradition even as they 
continued to be shaped by others.  By the early decades of the nineteenth century, many 
educated evangelicals in particular had become interested in the relatively new “science” 
of aesthetics and had, as a result, come to see art as an invaluable component of human 
experience.  This interest in the philosophical questions surrounding art only intensified 
as the aesthetic principles of major romantic critics and artists became widely 
disseminated after the 1830s.  The Puritan tradition would continue to exert its influence, 
both positively and negatively, on evangelical theorizing about art even throughout the 
age of evangelical romanticism.  As late as the 1880s, writers in evangelical periodicals 
were still reacting to the Puritan religio-aesthetic legacy and its implications.  After the 
1830s, however, among middle-class Anglo-American evangelicals the high status of art 
and the existence of a professional, or quasi-professional, critical establishment were all 
but secure. 
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The “Asymmetry” of the Puritan Religio-Aesthetic Tradition 
Puritanism, as is well known, has often been criticized for its alleged hostility and 
skepticism towards the arts, beauty, and the imagination.  Over the last few decades, a 
growing number of studies have sought a deeper understanding of Puritan aesthetics, 
demonstrating that the Puritans entertained far more complex and nuanced conceptions of 
art and the aesthetic than the traditional stereotype would suggest.  Nevertheless, such 
studies have resulted not so much in a grand reversal of our earlier ideas of the Puritan 
religio-aesthetic legacy as in the addition of some necessary and important qualifications.  
If the Puritan tradition is not an exemplar of unmitigated anti-aesthetic sentiment, as 
unsympathetic critics might have us believe, neither are Puritan attitudes towards art, 
beauty, and the imagination likely to appear perfectly congenial to the modern observer.  
Perhaps the most felicitous description of the Puritan aesthetic legacy is to say that it is 
“mixed” – or, to borrow a term from aesthetics itself, “asymmetrical.”  The social and 
theological context in which Anglo-American Puritanism evolved helped to forge an 
imagination which, even as it foreclosed on some aesthetic possibilities, succeeded in 
giving birth to others.  
One clear manifestation of the Puritan tradition’s aesthetic “asymmetry” was its 
divergent approach to various artistic mediums and the discrepant values it seemed 
prepared to assign to each.  The visual arts, for instance, fared poorly among English and 
American Puritans, though the Puritans were by no means the iconophobes that they are 
sometimes made out to be.  It is difficult, in fact, to find among Puritan writers a blanket 
condemnation of visual representation, and many were quite willing to follow Calvin’s 
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lead in affirming that “sculpture and painting are gifts of God” (1.11.12).3  Still, anything 
approaching a sophisticated art culture was comparatively absent from Puritan society, 
and despite their many positive declarations in favor of the visual arts, such declarations 
tended not to generate an abundance of practical applications.  This seeming lack of 
Puritan sponsorship of the visual arts has often been linked to the long and contentious 
debate over the proper role of religious images which had occupied Western Christendom 
off and on since the patristic period – a debate which was reignited first by the Lollards 
and most significantly by the Reformers.4  That Puritan convictions about the use of 
images owed much to the theological battles waged by Reformers like Zwingli and 
Calvin, and that these theological battles helped fashion Puritan attitudes about visual 
representation more generally, seems hardly disputable.  Yet precisely because Puritan 
writers were so careful to distinguish what they took to be the proper and improper use of 
images, it is equally clear that these theological discussions of images cannot by 
themselves account for the particular quality of Puritan visual culture. 
What the Reformers (with the notable exception of Luther) and Puritan divines 
agreed on was that images had no place in the context of worship.  In A Reformed 
Catholic (1597), a careful exploration of the theological points on which Catholics and 
Protestants agreed and disagreed, William Perkins stated quite clearly the Reformed 
position on images in the church: “We [contrary to Rome] hold it unlawful for us to make 
any image, any way to represent the true God: or, to make any image of any thing in way 
of religion, to worship God much the less the creature thereby.”5  Perkins’s treatise is an 
important reminder that the Protestant case against images in the sanctuary, though it 
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rested on Scriptural and patristic precedents (both of which Protestant polemicists were 
quick to cite), was crystallized in the heat of Reformation controversies with Rome, and it 
is therefore not surprising that Puritan discussions of images often involved lengthy 
point-by-point refutations of perceived Catholic errors.  This anti-Catholic polemical 
context in which the Protestant case against the use of images in worship was honed was 
itself significant in that it helped to reinforce the surprisingly durable notion that visual 
art was properly the province of Catholicism, or rather, that art was somehow not 
Protestant. 
Protestant writers typically drew on a handful of inter-related arguments to justify 
their exclusion of images from the sanctuary, many of which showed remarkable staying-
power among some conservative evangelical Protestants well into the nineteenth and 
even twentieth centuries.  At the heart of the Reformation-Puritan case was a deep and 
abiding concern to avoid the sin of idolatry.  With regard to idolatry and the crafting of 
images, the Scriptural locus classicus was the Second Commandment, and Protestant 
writers invariably cited this passage, along with 1 John 5:21, as the first and last word on 
the subject.  Though for the Reformers and Puritans this biblical prohibition was 
considered authoritative, many were nonetheless aware that there remained a certain 
degree of hermeneutic flexibility in this passage that Catholic theorists were wont to 
exploit.  It is possible, for instance, to make any number of theoretical distinctions 
between an image and an idol or between idolatrous and non-idolatrous uses of an image, 
and in fact, Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox understandings of religious imagery 
were, and are, based on just such elaborate distinctions (e.g., between latria and dulia, or 
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between an icon and an idol).  The Reformation position, however, was rooted in an 
adamant refusal to allow distinctions of this sort.  According to many Reformers and 
Puritans, any image used in the context of worship was by definition an idol.  As Calvin 
bluntly put it: “God makes no comparisons between images, as if one were more, and 
another less befitting; he rejects, without exception, all shapes and pictures, and other 
symbols by which the superstitious imagine they can bring him near to them” (1.11.1).  
To the Reformers and Puritans, not all idols were images – there were, in fact, numerous 
forms of idolatry that had nothing to do with visual representation6 – but all images, at 
least in the context of worship, were idols. 
The identification of all religious images as idols was often grounded in a robust 
conception of God’s radical transcendence – a conception which necessarily rendered any 
attempt at representation incomplete and therefore idolatrous.  Because God is infinite 
spirit, it is impossible to contain Him in the finite, material form of an image, and to do 
so is to erect an idol.  “So soon as the mind frames unto itself any form of God,” argued 
William Perkins in his A Warning Against Idolatry (1616), “(as when he is popishly 
conceived to be like an old man, sitting in heaven in a throne with a scepter in his hand) 
an idol is set up in the mind.”7  Similarly, the problem of representing the divine was 
raised directly by Richard Baxter in The Catechising of Families (1682), where he 
inquired, “Is it lawful to make any picture of God?,” to which the appropriate answer is 
“No: For pictures are the Signs of Corporeal things, and it is Blasphemy to think God like 
a Bodily Substance….”8  To attempt to give form to that which transcends all form was, 
quite simply, sacrilege, for images “do as little beseem [God’s] endless glory, as a picture 
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of an Ape, or of a fool doth the excellency of an Emperor.”9 
In addition, the Puritan case against images rested on what has come to be called 
the “Regulative Principle.”  First articulated by English Puritans, the Regulative Principle 
consisted of two complementary injunctions – one positive, one negative.  On the 
positive side, the Regulative Principle held that true worshipers of God were required to 
abide by all of the regulations for worship that were explicitly ordered by Scripture.  On 
the negative side, worshipers were also required to avoid anything which was not 
explicitly enjoined by Scripture.10  Thus, God Himself had prescribed once and for all in 
the pages of the Bible the acceptable forms of worship, and to depart from these forms 
was not only to stand in violation of God’s express commands but also to engage in 
idolatry.  One “way of erecting an idol,” wrote Perkins, “is, when God is worshipped 
otherwise, and by other means, then [sic] he hath revealed in his word.  For when men set 
up a devised worship, they set up also a devised God.”11  Since Puritan writers could find 
no biblical precedent for the use of images in worship – not to mention the multiple 
proscriptions they cited – to introduce them would amount to idolatry.  “[I]t is not his 
will,” Perkins flatly declared, “to accept the worship that is done to him in images….”12  
Indeed, even when human artificers had comparatively good motivations, their efforts 
yielded nothing more than a feigned, and therefore, idolatrous image of God: 
 
Again, an image of a feigned god, is a flat idol in the common judgement 
of all.  Now the image, that is erected to the honour of the true God, is 
[also] an image of a feigned God.  For God will not be honoured by any 
image of man’s appointing, though the honour be never so much directed 
to him in the mind and intention of man: and therefore the thing that is 
honour is indeed a god of a man’s devising, who will hear, be present, and 
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give his blessing in, at, and before images.  Hence it follows, that the 
image which is supposed to be the image of God, is indeed the image, not 
of God, but of an idol: and every image of an idol is an idol.13      
 
God, it is clear, does not particularly value human creativity in worship, and to imagine a 
God that does is itself to misrepresent God and, in effect, to create an idol.  Accordingly, 
any representation of this image-welcoming deity would be nothing but an “image of an 
idol.”  Moreover, as this passage suggests, the term “invention” took on a negative 
connotation in Puritan discussions of worship.  “Our principal care and desire,” wrote 
John Cotton, “is to administer … the ordinances of Christ himself … in their native purity 
and simplicity, without any dressing or painting of human inventions.”14  Visual religious 
imagery was one such invention, and it would therefore be a grave error to introduce it 
into the sanctuary.  Doing so would in fact signal a depraved desire to flaunt human 
imagination at the expense of God’s perfect ordinances. 
Entailed in the Protestant rejection of religious images as idolatrous was a staunch 
denial of the visual – or at least the visual as constructed and “invented” by human agents 
– as a special conduit of the divine.  God, Protestants believed, is simply not “present” in 
visual representations.  To some extent this denial of the divine presence in the visual was 
an effect of the frequently noted Protestant campaign against the “magical” or 
superstitious medieval appropriation of relics and other “charged” objects, including 
images – a campaign which was itself an extension of the Reformed emphasis on God’s 
supremacy and transcendence.15  At the same time, as Perkins made clear, God’s absence 
from the religious image was also a function of God’s sovereign and mysterious will.  In 
a discussion focused on rebutting the Catholic claim that the honoring of religious images 
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is analogous to honoring the image or seal of an earthly magistrate, Perkins highlighted a 
fundamental difference between the two cases – namely, that whereas an earthly prince 
wills the use of certain images as signs of his presence, God clearly does not, “and so are 
not images signs and monuments, either of God’s presence, or pleasure: because God will 
not be worshipped in them, by them, or at them; neither doth he bind his presence or his 
hearing of us to them.”16  Quite simply, God has freely opted out of the visual.  In 
emptying the visual of God’s special presence, however, the Reformers and Puritans 
effectively relocated this presence elsewhere.  As William A. Dyrness has observed, in 
the Reformed tradition God’s presence was to be sought not in the visual image but rather 
in the preached word and in the active lives of the faithful.  This emphasis on God’s 
presence in word and life was in turn rooted in a differing theological conception of “the 
post-resurrection presence of God.”  Whereas for Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox 
Christians the body of Christ remains, in some sense, physically present even now – 
whether in the consecrated Host or in the icon – Calvin and his Puritan descendants 
believed that “Christ has taken his humanity with him to heaven.”  As a result, the Holy 
Spirit works not through the bodily eye but through the eye of faith, which, paradoxically 
perhaps, depends in some measure upon the hearing of the Gospel.17  “If any man be yet 
desirous of images,” wrote Perkins in A Golden Chain (1590), “he may have at hand the 
preaching of the Gospel, a lively image of Christ crucified.”18   
But what of the use in church settings of images which in no way purport to be 
direct or even symbolical representations of the Godhead?  Would paintings, for example, 
that depict key events in the biblical narrative not constitute an appropriate application of 
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Gregory’s influential thesis that images are an educational tool for the unlearned?  A 
number of Reformers and Puritans answered this question in the negative.  Calvin, for 
example, though he granted that certain “historical” images may have some didactic 
value in general, insisted nonetheless that this didactic function must be exercised outside 
of the worship space.  The problem for Calvin was the troubling gravitational pull of 
depravity, for even if historical images presented no special theological difficulties, the 
human propensity for idolatry was such that what began as a proper use would inevitably 
and immediately degenerate into abuse.  “[W]e know too well from experience,” Calvin 
explained, “that the moment images appear in churches, idolatry has as it were raised its 
banner; because the folly of manhood cannot moderate itself, but forthwith falls away to 
superstitious worship” (1.11.13).  Perkins also invoked, among other things, humanity’s 
apparently natural inclination for idolatry in his mission to refute those who try to 
circumvent the plain directive of the Second Commandment by claiming that although 
God may forbid us to represent Him in forms arising from our own imaginations, we are 
free to represent Him in those forms which have a clear Scriptural warrant (depicting the 
Holy Spirit as a dove, for example).  The problem, however, is that whereas “God can at 
his pleasure avoid and cut off all occasions of idolatry, when he represents himself in 
visible forms; so men cannot do, as common experience declares.”19  Unlike God, who in 
His omnipotence can terminate representations when they threaten to become idolatrous, 
human beings are constitutionally unable to exercise such restraint.  Thus, even if all 
other Scriptural and theoretical difficulties could be put to rest, Puritan writers still had 
the seemingly irrefutable facts of human psychology on their side. 
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Yet despite their strong stand on the use of images inside the church, the 
Reformers and Puritans in no way disavowed visual representation in general.  Most 
writers, in fact, discriminated carefully between the “lawful” and “unlawful” use of 
images, while many likewise held forth the conviction that God had graciously bestowed 
the arts on humankind as a gift.  As Calvin wrote: 
 
I am not, however, so superstitious as to think that all visible 
representations of every kind are unlawful.  But as sculpture and painting 
are gifts of God, what I insist for is, that both shall be used purely and 
lawfully – that gifts which the Lord as bestowed upon us, for his glory and 
our good, shall not be preposterously abused, no, shall not be perverted to 
our destruction. 
 
Calvin went on to make a further distinction between “historical” representations, “which 
give a representation of events,” and “pictorial” representations, “which merely exhibit 
bodily shapes and figures.”  The first type, as noted earlier, may be useful for teaching; 
the second, however, was “only fitted for amusement.”  Calvin did not denounce 
amusement per se, though from the context it appears that he valued the utility associated 
with the didactic function of images more highly than those designed for mere pleasure.  
Furthermore, it was the latter sort of image which Calvin believed had primarily, and 
scandalously, adorned the walls of churches (1.11.12), and thus in drawing his 
distinctions Calvin discriminated not only between kinds of imagery but, as Dyrness 
points out, “between pleasure and worship.”20  For Calvin, whatever purely aesthetic 
pleasure was available to human beings had to be experienced outside the sanctuary. 
 Perkins, however, articulated in plain terms what was perhaps the central Puritan 
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distinction regarding images.  This distinction was that between images used for religious 
purposes and those used for “civil” purposes.  In A Reformed Catholic, Perkins found that 
Protestants could in fact agree with Catholics that visual representation is proper in the 
civil domain:  
 
We acknowledge the civil use of images as freely and truly as the Church 
of Rome doth.  By civil use I understand that use which is made of them in 
the common societies of men, out of the appointed places of the solemne 
worship of God.  And this to be lawful, it appeareth; because the arts of 
painting & graving are the ordinance of God: and to be skilful in them is 
the gift of God….   
 
Perkins gave several examples of this appropriate civil function of imagery.  Images may 
be used to beautify homes; they may be stamped on coins; they may be employed as a 
means of remembering deceased friends; and, following Calvin, they may serve to depict 
historical events, including those recounted in the Bible.  Perkins even allowed that 
biblical histories “may be painted in private places.”21  In a sense, then, what the Puritans 
advocated was a firm separation of church and state in the domain of aesthetics. 
This severing of visual art and human invention from the activities of the 
sanctuary would have lasting implications for the ways in which later evangelicals 
approached art and the aesthetic.  Even into the nineteenth century, in fact, many 
conservative evangelicals reiterated the Puritan view that the worship space must be kept 
pure from religious imagery and all human accretions.  By dissociating art from the 
spiritual center of communal life, the Puritans helped to create a channel through which 
future aesthetic developments would inevitably flow.  Since the immediate religious 
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value and status of art in the context of worship was suspect, aesthetic theory and praxis 
would have to take place outside the holy of holies – in the “secular” domain.  Initially, 
of course, the divide between sacred and secular, so commonplace for us today, barely 
existed in the minds of the Puritans.  For the Puritans all of life was sacred, from 
participation in the Lord’s Supper to the plowing of fields.22  Consequently, to expel art 
from the sanctuary was not necessarily to desacralize it.  What this expulsion did do, 
however, was ensure that for many decades to come art would have a certain kind of 
religious significance rather than another.  If the descendants of the Puritans wished to 
cultivate art to a greater extent than the Puritans themselves (which they did), they would 
have to do so for the most part outside of the formal structures of the church.  And 
whatever role they ultimately assigned to art would have to be something other than 
ecclesiastical.   
Furthermore, later evangelical aestheticians would also be confronted with what 
might be termed the “problem of presence” (which, from another perspective, is really a 
problem of absence) in relation to the visual and to art in general.23  On the one hand, in 
the debate over religious imagery the Puritans had denied that images bear any special 
capacity to mediate the presence of God.  On the other hand, all “lawful” uses of the 
visual – civil, historical, and ornamental – were by definition also devoid of God’s 
presence.  Visual representations might be religious in the sense that they could be done 
to the glory of God, as with all morally upright activities, but they could not be religious 
in the sense of maintaining any intimate or singular contact with the divine.  Whatever 
spiritual value art possessed was therefore a function of the artist’s motivation rather than 
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of art’s intrinsic status as a unique theological or ontological object, discourse, or mode 
of perception and production.  As we will see, the aesthetic theories formulated in the 
pages of nineteenth-century evangelical periodicals, influenced as they were by different 
brands of romantic and idealist aesthetics, did much to blur the clear-sighted vision of the 
Puritans when it came to the problem of presence and the religious status of art.  But 
neither could the more conservative evangelical thinkers fully escape the logic of their 
forefathers.  The net result was that nineteenth-century evangelical aesthetics was often a 
strange mix of conservative and progressive elements. 
Yet the Reformation-Puritan debate over religious images cannot by itself account 
for what many have seen as the truncated nature of Puritan visual culture and its 
seemingly underwhelming support of the visual arts.  For one thing, in distinguishing 
between the “civil” and religious uses of visual representation, Puritan writers had, in 
effect, constructed a space in which visual art could theoretically flourish, and to a certain 
extent it did.  Indeed, the alleged visual sparseness of Puritan culture, like much about the 
Puritans, has often been misrepresented.  The Puritans by no means existed in an image-
less vacuum.  Visual representations in the form of woodcuts or drawings – often with an 
accompanying “signification” or interpretation printed below – were common.  In the 
early years of the Reformation, books and Bibles were typically published with a variety 
of illustrations, and even religious drama was tolerated for a time.  Portrait painting was 
also a widely accepted practice.  Two of the most successful English portrait painters of 
the sixteenth century, Hans Holbein and Nicholas Hilliard, were strongly influenced by 
the new Protestant attitudes and consequently developed aesthetics which reflected and 
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embodied this Reformation vision.  The Puritan imagination also found visual expression 
in both gardens and new styles of architecture.24  Still, there is little question that the 
acceptable visual outlets in Anglo-American Puritan culture remained comparatively 
restricted and that the arts of painting and sculpture, for example, failed to develop even 
in the “civil” spaces of societies influenced by Puritanism as they did elsewhere.  But 
why? 
There is, it seems, no simple answer to this question, though historians have 
suggested several possible reasons for the phenomenon.  Dyrness, for example, has traced 
this comparative lack of visual culture to both the “iconoclastic polemics” that seemed to 
intensify in England around 1580 and to the widespread popularity of Ramist logic, 
which replaced older, visual modes of perceiving the world with new diagrammatic 
schemas.25  In addition, Protestant conceptions of painting and other arts were also on 
occasion refracted through the lenses of social justice.  If society is full of impoverished 
and suffering people, some reasoned, then how can one justify spending time and money 
on lavish paintings and other ornamentation?  In some cases, such ethical considerations 
entered directly into the debates over the place of images in the church, as in the case of 
Martin Bucer.  In A Treatise Declaring and Showing …that Pictures and other Images 
are not to be Suffered in the Temples and Churches of Christian Men (translated into 
English in 1535), a work widely disseminated in England, Bucer chastised those who 
would overlook the poor and needy in favor of extravagant church décor: “For suche 
expenses which ought to have been made upo [sic] poore nedy folke (whom as beynge 
the very lyve image of God it was convenyent to have socoured and made our frendes 
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with our lyberalyte) we have wastefully bestowed upon styckes and stones.”26  Bucer’s 
point is ultimately about proper stewardship.  The social demands of poverty must take 
precedence over painting.  To expend time and money on painting and sculpture rather 
than using it to alleviate the pain and suffering of fellow human beings seemed folly of 
the worst sort.   
In strict terms, of course, Bucer’s argument was directed at the specifically 
religious use of images within the sanctuary.  It is easy, however, to see how an argument 
of this sort could be potentially more sweeping than even the theological censure of 
religious images, which had managed amid the heat of sectarian polemics to carve out a 
theoretical space for the civil use of imagery.  In this case, it was unlikely that painting of 
any sort could survive a head-to-head confrontation with human indigence when 
presented in such stark moral-economic terms.  Which of you fathers, if your son asks for 
bread, will give him a portrait instead?  Bucer’s socio-ethical anxieties regarding the 
value of visual art would continue to haunt subsequent Puritan and evangelical thinking 
about the arts.  Should the committed evangelical spend his or her limited resources in 
support of the gospel missionary in Africa or in support of “cultural” development at 
home?  To be sure, such a question may pose something of a false dilemma; many 
nineteenth-century evangelicals, at least, seem to have discovered a way to do both.  But 
they (and some other socially conscious groups) were never quite able to put the question 
to rest.27 
Indeed, according to John Dillenberger, the strong moral cast of Puritanism in 
general may also have contributed to a corresponding devaluation of the imaginative 
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dimension of life.  The Puritan emphasis on the moral potential inherent in all aspects of 
ordinary existence often translated into a decided preference for the humble, the simple, 
the useful, and the unadorned.  Extravagant embellishment was in part an ethical problem 
since it suggested an unhealthy desire for ostentatious self-display and belied a 
preoccupation with this-worldly details.  Dillenberger suggests, furthermore, that this 
penchant for the lowly can be traced back to a similar outlook among the Lollards – an 
outlook which early on received an added impetus from growing socio-economic 
distinctions.  Lollardism was for the most part a lower-middle-class, Anglo-Saxon 
movement that stood over and against the cultural dominance of the Normans.  In this 
context, visual art was associated with the power and riches of the ruling class and was 
therefore viewed with suspicion by the economically and religiously marginalized 
Lollards.  The perspectives engendered by Lollard moralism and by these early class 
distinctions persisted, according to Dillenberger, into the seventeenth century, helping to 
shape Puritan attitudes towards the visual arts and to solidify the Puritan taste for 
simplicity.28   
Though the details of Dillenberger’s thesis are open to criticism – especially in 
terms of the neat, because somewhat loosely articulated, line of influence he sees 
extending from the Lollards to the Puritans29 – the Reformation-Puritan propensity to see 
visual stylistic qualities as expressive of moral qualities clearly played some role in 
shaping Puritan attitudes towards certain kinds of visual art, and perhaps towards visual 
art in general.  Calvin, for example, insisted that even if one were to concede the idea that 
images may serve to instruct the illiterate, one would still be faced with the seeming 
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prodigality and indecency of many Catholic images: “For what are the pictures or statues 
to which they append the names of saints, but exhibitions of the most shameless luxury or 
obscenity?  Were any one to dress himself after their model, he would deserve the 
pillory” (1.11.7).  Moreover, Dillenberger rightly reminds us that Puritan attitudes 
towards visual art were by no means the sole result of theological or moral persuasions 
but were also the product of socio-political factors as well.  Whether finally a function of 
the ethno-economic disparities faced by the Lollards or of the persecution and exile of the 
Puritans in and from Laudian England, early Anglo-American Puritans had good reason 
to associate the spectacle of visual art with the power structures from which they were in 
a great measure excluded.    
In fact, it appears that in contrast to the rest of continental Europe, general 
exposure to the visual arts in England and America was curiously lacking.  Most visual 
art in England had been the property of monasteries, many of which suffered destruction 
at the hands of both Henry VIII and Oliver Cromwell.  “The result,” as Dillenberger 
observes, “was that most individuals never encountered the visual arts ….”  In contrast to 
this, though continental Reformers likewise sought to exclude visual images from church 
settings, much of the continental population nonetheless continued to interact with visual 
art in other facets of life – a phenomenon which grew increasingly less common in 
England after 1580.  In England, what little visual art there was remained in the hands of 
the wealthy aristocracy until the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  Yet even 
the British gentry’s interest in painting and sculpture developed at a pace remarkably 
slower than their continental counterparts.30  For much of the nineteenth century, in fact, 
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it was still relatively common for both English and American periodical writers to 
observe that while the English-speaking world seemed to have the upper hand in poetry 
and literature, it had only recently begun to make progress in the fields of painting and 
sculpture.31 
In the end, however, definitive answers to Puritanism’s complicated attitudes 
toward visual art prove elusive.  It seems likely that the restricted nature of Puritan visual 
culture resulted from the cumulative pressure exerted by several forces – theological, 
social, political, and moral – which together blunted and constrained the impact of the 
visual in Anglo-American society.  Prior to the Reformation, art was primarily a religious 
venture.  If artists themselves were not always theologically orthodox, the highest 
subjects remained the religious ones.  Art itself was closely connected to worship, both 
for the creative artist and the viewer.  At the same time, the Church took an active interest 
in the production and patronage of art, commissioning works to adorn the walls of its 
sanctuaries and amassing expansive (and expensive) collections in papal vaults.  In 
excommunicating visual art, however, the Reformers created an axiological void.  
Protestant thinkers would be forced to discover a new significance for art – one that was 
not religious, or at least not religious in the same way.  It was this complex and 
problematic attitude towards the visual which, specter-like, shadowed the thought of 
many eighteenth-century evangelicals and which continued to shape in more distant ways 
nineteenth-century evangelical conceptions of art and the aesthetic. 
 If the visual arts presented a special problem for the Puritans – a problem that 
provoked a dizzying array of distinctions and subtleties – the activity of the imagination 
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more generally posed similar difficulties.  In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the 
imagination had not yet undergone the romantic transvaluation which would effectively 
raise it to the status of aesthetic and metaphysical super-power, and it was believed by 
many Puritans that the imagination was a mental faculty particularly prone to deception.  
This capacity for deception threatened to interfere with the mind’s ability to apprehend 
truth, both natural and spiritual, and thus it was imperative that the imagination be 
handled with care.32  The root cause of the imagination’s corruption was of course the 
ever-present problem of human depravity.  In A Treatise of Man’s Imaginations (1607), 
William Perkins identified the difficulty in stark terms: “so soone as [a person] beginneth 
to thinke, to reason or conceive of anything, so soone doth he imagine and conceive that 
which is evil … The minde and understanding part of man is naturally so corrupt, that so 
soone as he can use reason, he doth nothing but imagine that which is wicked, and 
against the Law of God.”33  It should be noted here, as Perry Miller reminds us, that for 
the Puritans no human faculty was beyond the reach of depravity, and as such, all aspects 
of the human personality were subject to the ebbs and flows of negative criticism based 
on the needs of the moment.34  But whereas caveats about the misuse of the reason, for 
example, were balanced by the high esteem in which the Puritans generally held this 
faculty, the imagination was less often the recipient of such positive regard.  Indeed, the 
imagination in particular seemed to invite the cautionary admonitions of many a Puritan 
preacher.  
 Despite, or perhaps because of, the Puritans’ profound awareness of the far-
reaching effects of depravity, many writers and preachers placed a high premium on the 
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capacity of the human mind to perceive the cosmos accurately.  The Puritans typically 
upheld a form of epistemological realism in which the mind, when performing properly, 
was believed to have direct access to objects as they truly exist.  (The Puritan affinity for 
Ramist logic lay in the system’s purported ability to render this objective reality in useful, 
schematic terms.)  Thus Puritan writers allowed little or no distinction between the idea 
and the thing-in-itself; truth was a matter of the mind’s right correspondence to the 
object.  As Miller observes: “The Puritans must be numbered among the very few men 
who have ever been certain that they had succeeded once and for all in performing this 
feat.”35  If the Puritan confidence in the perceptive powers of the human mind strikes the 
modern reader as naïve, we must recall that this confidence was ultimately underwritten 
by the longstanding theological conviction that God was Creator of both the universe and 
the human mind, and thus there exists a fundamental accord between subject and object.  
Admittedly, sin could, and frequently did, interfere with this natural harmony, but once 
an individual had experienced the influx of saving grace, the mind was capable of 
functioning properly once again.  Proper perception, furthermore, was itself a kind of 
obligation, for misperception amounted to a distortion of God’s Creation – which, 
significantly, was understood to be basically stable and complete – and thus, in a sense, 
of God Himself.  Honoring God aright demanded that one correctly perceive His works 
as they are, not as one subjectively colors them.   
 Puritan concerns about the imagination were therefore founded upon a desire to 
maintain this epistemological ideal.  The imagination was potentially dangerous because, 
given its special place in the human psychological apparatus, it could disrupt the normal 
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dynamics of natural perception.  When appropriately bound to data gleaned from the 
senses, the imagination served its assigned purpose; when left to its own devices, 
however, the unbridled imagination had the power to lead reason astray, to incite the will 
and affections directly, and to conjure strange and contorted images lacking all 
correspondence with reality.  Such imaginary constructs were nothing less than an affront 
to God since they constituted a deviation from God’s created order and betrayed 
discontent with His sovereign design.  As Richard Sibbes complained, “The life of many 
men … is almost nothing else but a fancy; that which chiefly sets their wits awork and 
takes up most of their time is how to please their own imagination, which setteth up an 
excellency, within itself, in comparison of which it despiseth all true excellency and those 
things that are of most necessary consequence indeed.”36  Just as most Puritans were self-
professed literalists when it came to interpreting Scripture, Puritans like Sibbes also 
encouraged a sort of literalism of perception.  Any departure from reality was indicative 
of a fevered brain.  In fact, in both cases the motive for literalism was the same: a strong 
desire to submit to the reality which God had willed.   
It is not difficult to grasp the particular constraints which a strict adherence to 
such a view can place on one’s conception of art and aesthetics.  For one thing, this kind 
of literalism of perception would seem, at least initially, to lead quite naturally to an 
aesthetic which foregrounds a conception of art as mimesis.  What better way to honor 
the God of Creation than to attend to the divine artistry in detail?  At its most extreme, 
such an approach might yield some form of realism, even hyper-realism.  It is perhaps no 
coincidence that realist painting thrived in seventeenth-century Holland, a country 
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heavily influenced by Calvinism.37  Nor is it particularly unexpected that when England 
eventually did turn its attention to visual art, portraits and landscape paintings were the 
genres at which it excelled.  At the same time, this deference to God’s revelation in the 
created order (and, of course, in the Scriptures) tends to militate against “fiction” – or the 
“imaginative” in our contemporary sense – in all forms, whether visual or literary.  On 
the one hand, then, there exists on this account a latent, and perhaps irreconcilable, 
tension between divine and human creativity.  In the traditional debate over the 
precedence of nature or art, most Puritans would have unequivocally answered in favor of 
nature as the marvelous handiwork of God. 
Strong cautionary statements about the risks associated with a wayward 
imagination were not, of course, unique to seventeenth- and early-eighteenth-century 
Puritans; rather, the Puritans were in many ways merely voicing the suppositions of their 
age.  The Cartesians, for instance, had similarly granted the imagination a low place in 
the scale of intellectual value.38  What the Puritans sometimes added to this negative 
view, however, was a further, religious rationale for distrusting the imagination.  
According to some Puritan writers, for example, the imagination was subject to the 
immediate agency of the devil himself.  It is not necessary for Satan to talk in “an audible 
voice” or to exhibit “things to our bodily eyes,” for he “hath a closer and more secret way 
of access to our Imaginations, in which he can represent the Images of things, and hold 
them before us.”39  Yet whether Satan was infiltrating the imagination directly or an 
individual’s innate sinfulness led inevitably to disorder and distortion, the imagination 
was prone to trickery.  Careless exercise of the imagination not only caused the distortion 
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of natural perceptions but also produced ideas that were liable to be mistaken by the 
deceived or ignorant for genuine spiritual perceptions.  It was this problem of authentic 
spiritual experience – and hence also of its possible counterfeits – which occupied 
Jonathan Edwards in his famous Treatise Concerning Religious Affections (1746).40   
As in the case of visual art, however, the Puritan tradition once again manifested a 
certain asymmetry when it came to the imagination.  Despite the often caustic criticisms 
which Puritan writers leveled against the imagination, it was not understood solely as a 
liability.  Though given to deception, the imagination was, at the very least, a God-given 
faculty with an important (if somewhat prosaic) role to play in normal human 
psychology.  A few Puritan writers, however, went further still in granting the 
imagination a special place in human experience.  Edwards, whose view of the 
imagination in Religious Affections represented the negative side of the Puritan tradition, 
elsewhere allowed the imagination a more positive function in the contemplation of 
spiritual things: “Such is our nature that we cannot think about invisible things without a 
degree of imagination.”41  Another such writer was Richard Sibbes.42  Though Sibbes, as 
we have seen, cautioned readers in A Soul’s Conflict with Itself against the dangers of 
living a life of pure fancy that ignored the realities of the world as God had created it, he 
also believed that it is possible for human beings to “make … fancy serviceable … in 
spiritual things.”  For Sibbes, the imagination possessed the power to adorn truth in ways 
that not only made it more palatable to the human mind but also enabled it to move the 
affections.  A verbal image, for example, as found in poetry and oratory, complements 
and even surpasses a propositional statement in its ability to engage the heart directly.  
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Puritan preachers frequently put this theory to good practical use, for despite the pains 
taken by preachers to let the text interpret itself,43 Puritan sermons were often saturated 
with rich constructs of verbal imagery designed to enliven the imaginations of the 
congregations.44  Edwards’s often-anthologized sermon, “Sinners in the Hands of an 
Angry God,” is only the most famous example of the heights – or in this case, the depths 
– which Puritan verbal imagery could achieve.45  Thus, although many writers in the 
Puritan tradition may have chosen to stress the dangers of the imagination over its 
possibilities, this tradition was by no means uniform in its cautions or univocal in its 
criticisms.      
The asymmetry of the Puritan tradition is perhaps most evident, however, in the 
generally favorable attitude of many Puritans towards other art forms in contrast to the 
visual.  If visual art remained, in Dillenberger’s words, little more than “an appendage, 
not really expressive of humanity’s spirituality,”46 other arts fared much better.  The 
predominantly auditory bearing of Puritan culture, together with Puritanism’s strong 
belief in the cultivation of the intellect, provided a context in which non-visual arts like 
music, and especially poetry, could develop.  Of course, Puritan resistance to the theater 
is almost legendary, and many eighteenth-century Puritans were similarly suspicious of 
the century’s newest genre, the novel (though they were not alone in this).  Generally, 
however, the Puritans “held to a belief in the poet’s high calling.”47  In addition to 
Milton, Puritan society could claim the likes of Anne Bradstreet, Michael Wigglesworth, 
and Edward Taylor, as well as a host of lesser known poets and writers.48   A taste for 
poetry, it seems, was not only common but was also considered a proper part of a liberal 
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education.  In his popular manual for aspiring ministers, Manuductio ad Ministerium, 
Cotton Mather included a section on “Poetry and Style” in which he acknowledged that 
“Poetry … has from the very beginning been in such request, that I must needs 
recommend unto you some acquaintance with it.”  Nor could Mather “wish” upon his 
divinity-student-readers “a soul that shall be wholly unpoetical.”49  If the Puritans can be 
said to have valued any art form above others, it is surely poetry that would claim the 
prize.  Significantly, later romantic critics would also valorize poetry as the highest of the 
fine arts, though for reasons that differed from those of earlier Puritan writers.  Yet such 
romantic claims for the supremacy of poetry no doubt resonated with those nineteenth-
century evangelical critics who discovered in these claims new confirmation of an old 
truth.  
Contrary to popular stereotypes of Puritan austerity, the Puritans also displayed a 
keen sensitivity for the beautiful.  A recent study, for instance, has demonstrated the 
extent to which the concept of beauty informed Puritan notions of sin and conversion, 
while other recent studies have suggested that the visual surroundings of daily life in 
Puritan society were not nearly as colorless as has often been thought.  It turns out, for 
example, that the plain white meetinghouses of New England – long taken as symbols of 
the drabness of Puritan culture – were at times painted in vibrant hues that included red, 
yellow, and green.50  But it was nature, however, which supplied most Puritans with an 
immediate occasion for the experience of beauty.  Calvin had referred to the Creation as 
“this most beautiful theater,” comparing it also to “a large and splendid mansion 
gorgeously constructed and exquisitely furnished” (1.14.20), and many who followed in 
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the Reformed tradition agreed.  Thomas Shepard took up Calvin’s metaphor of Creation 
as theater, insisting that the only possible response to this “stately theater of heaven and 
earth” is to “conclude … that the finger, arms, and wisdom of God hath been here.”51  
The poet Anne Bradstreet similarly confessed that when she beheld the “Trees all richly 
clad,” “Rapt were my senses at this delectable view.”52  The Puritans, then, were by no 
means insensitive to the splendors of nature, and they reveled in the universe as a 
spectacle of God’s glory. 
Yet even as they marveled at the sensory beauty of God’s handiwork, many 
Puritan writers perpetuated the Christian-Platonic belief that such material beauty was but 
a faint shadow of a greater Beauty beyond.  Ultimately, “the Puritan notion of beauty was 
firmly eschatological.”53  Only in heaven will human beings possess the capacity to 
perceive genuine Beauty.  Earthly beauty thus frequently bespoke an absence, a falling 
short, which in turn engendered a longing for something greater.  In this world, wrote 
John Owen, “the view of [Christ’s] beauty and glory does not last.”  In a post-
resurrection state, however, when all impediments have been removed forever, the 
redeemed will be granted “one pure act of spiritual sight in looking on the glory of 
Christ.”54  It is a typical progression in Puritan writings to transition from a meditation on 
worldly beauty through a moment of awareness in which the writer recognizes its 
insufficiency to a final expression of longing for the religio-aesthetic completeness of the 
Beatific Vision.  In some cases, the Puritans chose to sacrifice earthly beauty on the altar 
of heavenly glory, denigrating material beauty for its fleeting charms.  In other cases, 
however, Puritan writers affirmed the legitimacy of material beauty even as they sought 
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to imagine something greater.  According to Bradstreet, for instance, heavenly beauty 
was not an overturning of earthly beauty but rather its proliferation and fulfillment: “I 
wist not what to wish, yet sure thought I,/ If so much excellence abide below,/ How 
excellent is He that dwells on high,/ Whose power and beauty by His works we know?”55  
It is no exaggeration to say that an eschatological-aesthetic gaze – an apprehension of 
authentic Beauty – was the end for which many Puritans strived.  It was this notion which 
Jonathan Edwards would most fully develop in the 1750s while in dialogue with 
Enlightenment aesthetics (see below).    
Just as important for the later history of evangelical aesthetics, however, was 
Puritanism’s approach to “culture.”  The Puritans advocated what was, on the whole, a 
proactive and positive stance towards culture.  In H. Richard Niebuhr’s famous terms, 
Puritanism sought to “transform” culture rather than to withdraw from it.56  God was 
thought to rule over all dimensions of existence, not simply the formally or institutionally 
religious.  As a result, there was, as we have seen, no real distinction between sacred and 
secular in Puritan society.  Reformed thinkers stressed the spiritual potential in ordinary 
life and encouraged all members of society – not just the spiritual “elite” – to think 
theologically about their endeavors.  The Puritans saw all areas of human society – 
government, philosophy, economics, family, and work – through Scriptural and 
theological lenses, seeking diligently to put into practice the Apostle Paul’s exhortation in 
his Epistle to the Colossians: “And whatever you do, whether in word or deed, do it all in 
the name of the Lord Jesus” (3:17).57   
This Puritan emphasis on cultural transformation was itself part of a 
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comprehensive socio-religious vision which linked God, the individual, the church, and 
the nation in a constellation of mutual obligation held together by the concept of the 
covenant.58  The Puritans understood this concept of the covenant to be operative on a 
variety of inter-related levels that extended from the individual through the local 
congregation and finally to the nation.  It was aboard the Arbella in 1630 en route to 
Massachusetts that Governor John Winthrop articulated, in his oft-quoted address, a 
theme that would have important consequences for numerous aspects of later American 
culture: 
 
Thus stands the cause between God and us: we are entered into covenant 
with Him for this work; we have taken out a commission, the Lord hath 
given us leave to draw our own articles …. 
     We shall find that the God of Israel is among us …. For we must 
consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill, the eyes of all people are 
upon us.59 
       
Winthrop’s statement has often been seen as the prototype for later expressions of 
American exceptionalism, but the concept of a national covenant and the sense of 
religious nationalism to which it tended were by no means foreign to English Puritanism.  
Already in 1578, for example, the English preacher John Stockwood had observed that 
God’s “great mercies towards us Englishmen above many other nations make his 
judgments more heavy” for the very reason that “we are like unto the children of 
Israel.”60  This kind of incipient religious nationalism would, oddly enough, provide an 
important context for subsequent evangelical theorizing about art.  If art could find no 
legitimate place in the church proper, it could nevertheless aid in the development of, and 
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serve as an index to, a thoroughly Christian society. 
Yet if the Puritan willingness to see all of culture as a potential space for Christian 
thought and service was theoretically applicable to serious reflection on art and the 
aesthetic, this application remained throughout the seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries more of a possibility than an actuality.  For though the Puritans wrote poetry, 
played music, cultivated gardens, and even on occasion fashioned visual images, they 
rarely approached these activities with formal aesthetic concerns in mind.  Beyond their 
theological proscription of images in the church or their musings on the imagination, the 
Puritans demonstrated little conscious interest in art as a source of special philosophical 
problems.61  As a result, Puritan culture lacked anything approximating a positive critical 
or aesthetic establishment.  In one sense, of course, this general lack of a developed 
aesthetic discourse among the Puritans is not surprising given that such a discourse in its 
modern form was hardly prevalent in the seventeenth century, and it would be 
anachronistic to fault them for failing to participate in a mode of investigation which was 
only beginning to take shape in Anglo-American culture at large.  Something 
approaching a belletristic or aesthetic form of criticism did not appear in America, for 
example, until the middle of the eighteenth century.62  But the absence of such a 
discourse is significant nonetheless, for it is in part the emergence of such a self-
conscious discourse among later evangelicals which distinguished them aesthetically 
from their Puritan predecessors. 
This is not to suggest that either Puritan culture was completely bereft of 
assumptions concerning the nature and purpose of art or that such assumptions did not 
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occasionally find concrete expression among Puritan writers.  But in fact it was the very 
nature of these assumptions which may have made the notion of aesthetics as a distinct 
field of inquiry – had they been able to conceive of such a thing – seem somewhat 
superfluous, for art as a mode of human activity was easily subsumed under the moral-
theological rubric of “utility.”  Indeed, when Puritan writers did gesture towards a more 
positive and reflective approach to art, they invariably stressed its utilitarian function.  
Both poetry and painting, for example, were useful for conveying doctrine in a pleasing 
manner, but the pleasure itself was ancillary to the truth conveyed.  Art, therefore, was 
largely considered as a means to an end, and though writers like Sibbes were well aware 
of the heightened effects which something like the verbal images of poetic language 
could produce, Puritan writers rarely pursued in systematic fashion the questions raised 
by such observations.  In addition, this emphasis on utility and on art’s subservience to 
some other end, whether social or religious, embodied the Puritan quest for humility, 
simplicity, and an art that did not delight in its own artistry.  For most Puritans, art was 
something to be concealed rather than explored and celebrated.63 
To be sure, a utilitarian view of art and a mature philosophical aesthetic discourse 
are by no means mutually exclusive, and in fact the utilitarian emphasis of Puritanism – 
which, it is worth noting, was in one form or another the dominant aesthetic tradition in 
the West until the late nineteenth century – would continue to exert its influence on 
evangelical aesthetics even as Victorian evangelicals helped to foster a theoretical 
establishment that even the most artistically-inclined Puritan could never have imagined.  
What separated the scattered and diffuse statements of the Puritans from the careful 
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aesthetic formulations of nineteenth-century evangelicals, however, was evangelicalism’s 
early affinity for certain aspects of Enlightenment thought.  
 
New Beginnings: The Enlightenment and the Emergence of an Evangelical Aesthetic 
Discourse, 1730-1830 
The evangelicalism that emerged during the 1730s and 1740s has often been depicted as a 
pietistic reaction to the dry rationalism and worldly preoccupations that are said to have 
characterized portions of both the American and British clerical establishments at the end 
of the seventeenth and beginning of the eighteenth centuries.  There is, of course, much 
truth to this view.  Writing near the end of the century, William Wilberforce contrasted 
“the simple and poor,” who “are not liable to be puffed up by the intoxicating fumes of 
ambition and worldly grandeur,” with “the great and the learned,” who, though they may 
be capable of elaborate disquisitions on all matters of philosophy, are in danger of losing 
their souls.  “[W]hat has been required,” Wilberforce maintained, “is not the perception 
of a subtle distinction, but a state and condition of heart.”64  Such statements, however, 
are rather too easily caricatured, and if eighteenth-century evangelicals generally sought 
to reassert the importance of feeling and piety in the practice of religion, many also saw 
the danger of doing so at the expense of intellect and reason.65  Far from being a 
simplistic and reactionary manifestation of emotionalism, evangelicalism was, as David 
Bebbington has argued, largely a product of the “high cultural environment” of the 
Enlightenment.  “Its emergence,” writes Bebbington, “was itself an expression of the age 
of reason.”66  
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This close affiliation with the Enlightenment is crucial for understanding the 
shape and trajectory of evangelicalism throughout the eighteenth century, for the 
Enlightenment had widespread effects on diverse segments of evangelical thought, 
including aesthetics.  Of course, the Enlightenment was itself a heterogeneous 
phenomenon, and Anglo-American evangelicals did not embrace all of its many 
manifestations with equal exuberance.  As Henry May has suggested in The 
Enlightenment in America, the long eighteenth century recognized at least four distinct 
strands of Enlightenment thought – what May terms the “moderate,” “skeptical,” 
“revolutionary,” and “didactic” Enlightenments.67  While evangelicals of the period 
remained hostile to the skeptical and revolutionary forms advanced by Paine, Voltaire, 
Rousseau, and others, they readily accepted crucial aspects of, first, the moderate 
Enlightenment (represented primarily by the thought of Locke), and secondly, the 
didactic Enlightenment (represented by Scottish common sense realists like Thomas Reid 
[1710-1796] and Dugald Stewart [1753-1828]).68   
By the middle third of the eighteenth century, the popularity of Locke’s Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding was well established – before 1760 it had found its 
way into nine individual editions and four collections – and evangelicals, like the rest of 
the Anglo-American world, eagerly embraced its new philosophy.69  Wesley, for 
example, was a careful student of Locke, whose “‘epistemology’ of Christian 
experience,” as Richard E. Brantley has shown, was deeply indebted to Locke’s Essay.70  
Wesley referred to this work as a “deep, solid, weighty treatise,” and it formed a regular 
part of the curriculum at the Kingswood School.71  The great clergyman and hymnodist, 
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Isaac Watts, echoed Wesley’s assessment, calling the insights of the Essay “worthy of 
Letters of Gold” and declaring Locke “the ingenious Director of modern Philosophy.” As 
a mentor and instructor of young ministers, Philip Doddridge likewise recommended the 
study of Locke throughout his lectures, thus helping to ensure the continuation of 
Lockean precepts into the next generation.72  Edwards also knew Locke well, and though 
Locke’s influence on Edwards has sometimes been overstated, the principles of the Essay 
served as a basis for important aspects of Edwards’s thought.73  Locke continued to 
influence the shape of evangelical thought throughout the eighteenth century, and even as 
late as 1863 the conservative Evangelical Anglican periodical, the Record, was still 
appealing to Locke as a bulwark against the growing threat of the “German 
Rationalists.”74 
Significantly, however, this same article also called on the “common sense” of 
Thomas Reid – a call that reflected the extent to which evangelicalism had also 
internalized the thinking of the didactic Enlightenment.  In fact, it was this form of the 
Enlightenment, represented primarily by the philosophy of Scottish common sense 
realism, which would have the most enduring impact on Anglo-American evangelicalism.  
Common sense realism – the most famous advocates of which were Reid and Stewart, 
though many of its important elements can also be traced to Frances Hutcheson (1694-
1747) – was in many ways a response to Lockean epistemology and its subsequent 
modifications at the hands of Berkeley and Hume.  In broad terms, the Scottish 
philosophy argued for the immediate perception of external objects (against what they 
took to be Locke’s representationalist theory) and for the existence in the human mind of 
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certain intrinsic and self-evident concepts that were not the sole product of sensory 
experience, including, among others, those principles necessary for right moral action.  
Because of its positive view of human nature in the form of an innate moral sense, the 
Scottish philosophy initially met with a good deal of resistance among evangelicals, 
particularly those in the Reformed tradition (e.g., Jonathan Edwards) who held firmly to 
Augustinian-Puritan conceptions of original sin, the clear separation of regenerate and 
unregenerate (with different implications for each), and true morality as an outgrowth of 
saving grace.  By the 1760s, however, this opposition had begun to crumble, and 
evangelicals embraced the principles of the new philosophy in rapid fashion.  This was 
particularly true in revolutionary America where the ethical orientation of the Scottish 
system seemed to offer a means of safeguarding public morality at a time of social and 
political turmoil.  Yet even before the outbreak of war, Scottish common sense realism 
had been institutionalized in America’s growing network of young colleges and 
universities, due largely to the influence of John Witherspoon, a Scottish Presbyterian 
who had arrived in 1768 to assume the presidency of Princeton.  During his tenure at 
Princeton, Witherspoon preached the Scottish system in his course on mental and moral 
philosophy to the likes of James Madison and Samuel Stanhope Smith, and he further 
disseminated his ideas in the form of published lectures.  Scottish common sense realism 
became the philosophy du jour not only for evangelicals but also for Americans in 
general until the 1830s, and in many cases, beyond.75    
During the eighteenth century, assumptions stemming from the moderate and 
didactic Enlightenments advanced among evangelicals on nearly every front.  Whether 
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formulating religious, social, scientific, or political views, early evangelicals drew much 
of their inspiration from the principles of the Enlightenment.76  This evangelical openness 
to the new intellectual outlook of the moderate and didactic strands of the Enlightenment 
also constituted a substantial, though not necessarily decisive, break with important 
elements of the Puritan tradition.  If the Puritan tradition continued to cast its shadow on 
emergent evangelicalism, this shadow was often dispelled by the dazzling beam of the 
Enlightenment.  Many of the rifts, for example, which occurred in the eighteenth century 
as a result of evangelicalism’s fresh emphasis on revivalism over and against a strict 
adherence to the fine points of traditional doctrine can be understood on some level as 
disputes over whether Christians ought to embrace the new premises of Enlightenment 
thought.  Do the time-tested creeds of Protestant Christendom represent fixed and stable 
truth, or is knowledge subject to historical development?  Those groups, such as the Old 
Side Presbyterians in America or the Seceders in Scotland that rejected the progressive 
claims of the Enlightenment were content to perpetuate the doctrinal and confessional 
legacy of the Puritans.  Those belonging to the new class of evangelicals, however, 
sought to engage the Enlightenment on its own ground and, in the process, found 
themselves being remade in its image.77 
This is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in developing evangelical attitudes 
toward art and aesthetics.  Indeed, the rise of evangelicalism and the rise of modern 
aesthetics were virtually contemporaneous phenomena.  Both movements owed their 
ascendancy, at least in part, to the force of the Enlightenment.  Though the Puritans, as 
we have seen, were not relentless antagonists of art and beauty, neither did they pursue 
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art and aesthetics with either philosophical rigor or zeal.  Under the influence of the 
Augustans, however, eighteenth-century evangelicals experienced something of a 
revolution in aesthetic consciousness as they gradually came to perceive art and 
aesthetics as sources of special appreciation and concern.   
This revolution was evident first of all in the changing tastes of many 
evangelicals, especially with respect to poetry.  In keeping with the fashionable 
sensibilities of the time, evangelicals enjoyed the poetry of, among others, Alexander 
Pope, Jonathan Swift, and Edward Young.78  John Wesley likewise expressed his 
admiration for the poems of Dr. Beattie, referring to him as “one of the best Poets of the 
age” and wishing only that he possessed more of “the ease and simplicity of Mr. Pope.”79  
Evangelical preferences typically reflected the neoclassicism of the age, and like their 
non-evangelical counterparts, evangelicals discovered in the ancients the exemplars of 
literary craft.  “[W]e should gain nothing,” insisted Robert Hall, a Baptist minister, “by 
neglecting the unrivalled productions of genius left us by the ancients, but a deterioration 
of taste….”80  Evangelical taste evolved in other areas as well.  According to Doreen 
Rosman, “The enjoyment and practice of music was widely regarded as a most 
acceptable evangelical recreation.”81  Both Wesley and Jonathan Edwards took great 
pleasure in singing, and they meditated at some length on the joys of music, though they 
disagreed on precisely what constitutes musical excellence.  (For Wesley, it was simple 
unity; for Edwards, complex harmony.82)  Edwards in particular appreciated music to 
such an extent that he regarded it as a paragon of human intercourse and a foreshadowing 
of the perfect love of heavenly society: “The best, most beautiful, and most perfect way 
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that we have of expressing a sweet concord of mind to each other, is by music.  When I 
would form in my mind an idea of a society in the highest degree happy, I think of them 
as expressing their love, their joy, and the inward concord and harmony and spiritual 
beauty of their souls by sweetly singing to each other.”83  This love of music was also 
shared by the Jowett family of Britain, whose patriarch Henry had been converted by the 
evangelistic efforts of George Whitefield.  Henry’s son John often held musical 
performances in his home, while his brother Joseph, a Professor of Civil Law at 
Cambridge, staged regular performances at Trinity Hall.84  The evangelical interest in 
both poetry and music merged, of course, in what was perhaps eighteenth-century 
evangelicalism’s most enduring contribution to the religio-aesthetic culture of the period 
– its hymnody.  As compositions, hymns are often valued by religious communities more 
for their religious or doctrinal content than for their formal aesthetic qualities; even so, 
the evangelical hymns of the eighteenth century embodied many of the stylistic features 
of the Augustans.  The hymns of Charles Wesley, for example, though they have 
sometimes been read as proto-romantic in their lyrical subjectivity and their passionate 
expression of emotion, were, as Bebbington points out, more reflective of the formal 
standards of neoclassical decorum than of romantic spontaneity.85 
As these examples suggest, “correct taste” was becoming a matter of conscious 
concern among many eighteenth-century evangelicals.  Unlike the Puritans, who 
cultivated, in Dyrness’s words, an aesthetic in which “beauty of the whole design would 
not have been either intended or excluded,”86 evangelicals under the influence of the 
Enlightenment began both to intend beauty and to lament its exclusion.  Wesley, for 
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instance, could apparently justify the omission of some previously well received hymns 
from an updated edition of his Pocket Hymn Book on the basis of aesthetic considerations 
alone:  “These I did not dare to palm upon the world, because fourteen of them appeared 
to me very flat and dull; fourteen more, mere prose, tagged with rhyme; and nine more to 
be grievous doggerel.”  And though a friend had informed him that some of these thirty-
seven pieces continued to be “hugely admired,” he replied that he was “sorry for it,” for 
“It will bring a deep reproach upon the judgment of the Methodists.”  Wesley himself, 
however, would “not increase that reproach by countenancing, in any degree, such an 
insult both on religion and common sense.”87  On rare occasions, evangelicals even 
attributed their new attention to matters of taste to the effects of Christianity itself.  The 
British missionary Henry Martyn (1781-1812) went so far as to suggest that his 
evangelical conversion had supplied him with a fresh appreciation for the fine arts: 
“Since I have known God in a saving manner, painting, poetry, and music have had 
charms unknown to me before.  I have received what I suppose is a taste for them; for 
religion has refined my mind, and made it susceptible of impressions from the sublime 
and beautiful.”88  Anyone familiar with the common refrains of eighteenth-century 
aesthetics will recognize in Martyn’s appeal to the dual categories of the sublime and 
beautiful the influence of Enlightenment thought.  Martyn’s more intriguing suggestion, 
however, concerned the potential of evangelical Christianity, or rather the regenerative 
work of the Holy Spirit, to alter one’s aesthetic perception.  This was precisely the 
argument of Jonathan Edwards (see below), and it was to recur periodically in the 
writings of some nineteenth-century evangelical theorists as well. 
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Despite Martyn’s suggestive reflections, however, reflections which Martyn 
himself failed to develop, the revolution in evangelical taste was a gradual one.  For 
much of the eighteenth century it proceeded largely by fits and starts.  Though poetry was 
almost universally praised, evangelicals continued to denounce the evils of the theater.  In 
the case of Hannah More (1745-1833), as we will see shortly, these denunciations could 
even assume a fresh urgency resulting from the epistemological premises of 
Enlightenment thinkers like Locke.  Evangelicals also harbored deep suspicions towards 
the increasingly popular genre of the novel.  Whatever the evolution of the novel may 
have paradoxically owed to certain tendencies in Puritan thought,89 it was not until the 
nineteenth century that a significant number of evangelicals saw fit to appropriate this 
genre for their own evangelistic and moralistic purposes.  And for all the high praise 
which Wesley and Edwards bestowed upon music, there were still those who, like 
William Cowper, doubted its effects:  
 
 I believe that wine itself, though a man may be guilty of habitual 
intoxication, does not more to debauch or befool the natural understanding 
than music, always music; music in season and out of season, weakens and 
destroys the spiritual discernment, if it is not done in an unfeigned 
reverence to the worship of God, and with a design to assist the soul in the 
performance of it, which cannot be when it is the only occupation.90    
 
In fact, the eighteenth-century alteration in evangelical taste advanced for the most part 
along the lines laid down by the generic asymmetry of the Puritan tradition.  Poetry, and 
to a certain extent music – art forms which the Puritans had also valued and practiced – 
received an added boost from evangelicalism’s exposure to Enlightenment sensibilities, 
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while the appreciation of other arts such as painting and sculpture developed more 
slowly.  Above all, the Puritan tradition’s negative attitudes towards the use of images in 
the sanctuary continued among eighteenth-century evangelicals virtually unabated.  As 
with the Puritans, moreover, this negative attitude was driven by evangelicalism’s 
staunch anti-Catholicism.91  Evidence of Puritanism’s general indifference to the visual 
persisted as well.  In contrast to the multitude of critical pronouncements on poetry which 
appear throughout Wesley’s journals and letters, his reflections on painting and sculpture 
are but few.  “Of pictures I do not pretend to be a judge,” he conceded in his journal after 
a visit to Hampton Court.92  And when, in the 1770s, President Witherspoon of Princeton 
purchased out of his own pocket a collection of prints for the university, the board of 
trustees (made up largely of clergymen) denied him any compensation for his troubles.93  
Yet evidence of the eighteenth-century evolution in evangelical aesthetic 
consciousness was not restricted solely to the level of taste, patronage, and consumption.  
Along with changes in evangelical taste came a newfound interest in, and awareness of, 
aesthetics as a philosophical problem, or rather a collection of philosophical problems.  
This emerging awareness was also a result of evangelicalism’s close connection to the 
moderate and didactic Enlightenments.  The most significant early example of this 
interest was the work of Jonathan Edwards.  Edwards was an innovative thinker who was 
both profoundly shaped by, and profoundly critical of, many important trends in 
Enlightenment thought.  He was familiar with, among many others, the writings of 
Locke, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Hume, and he often engaged them in creative ways.  
Typically, his objectives were traditional and Puritan (e.g., defending the doctrine of 
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original sin), but both the methodology and content of his arguments were also grounded 
in the philosophy of his day.  Edwards explored a number of issues related to aesthetics, 
but by far the aesthetic concept which garnered his greatest attention was beauty, and 
throughout his many writings Edwards meditated at length on the nature of beauty, its 
place in human experience, and its purpose in the divine plan.  Aesthetic concerns 
therefore occupied a central place in his thinking, and with unmatched theological and 
philosophical rigor Edwards produced what was perhaps the first genuine example of a 
sustained and self-conscious evangelical aesthetic discourse. 
Edwards’s most extended treatment of beauty is found in his treatise A 
Dissertation Concerning the Nature of True Virtue, originally composed in 1755 and 
published posthumously ten years later.94  This treatment of beauty, however, as rich as it 
is, was hardly for its own sake.  As the title of the work suggests, Edwards’s main 
concern was actually moral-theological, and the essay was in fact intended as a rejoinder 
to recent developments in eighteenth-century moral philosophy – particularly, the “moral 
sense” school of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson.95  In broad terms, the moral sense school 
had posited a sentimentalist theory of ethics in which every human being was thought to 
be endowed with an internal “sense” capable of enacting spontaneous moral judgments.  
Human beings, therefore, were believed to possess a natural inclination towards the good.  
As noted earlier, however, this confidence in humanity’s innate ability to recognize and 
effect the good stood in stark contrast to Augustinian-Puritan notions of humanity’s 
intrinsic depravity.  According to this traditional theological scheme, human beings were 
naturally incapable of any action that could be considered virtuous or meritorious in the 
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sight of God; “true virtue,” in Edwards’s typically eighteenth-century terminology, was 
possible only for those who had been redeemed by grace.  Though Edwards found some 
aspects of the Hutchesonian ethical tradition compelling, he had no intention of 
abandoning his Augustinian roots, and thus the primary task which Edwards set for 
himself was to show his readers in what true virtue consists and to demonstrate that the 
capacity for such virtue is the sole property of the regenerate. 
From the outset of the treatise, however, it is clear than any discussion of ethics 
must also involve the aesthetic, at least by way of analogy: “Therefore, I suppose, I shall 
not depart from the common opinion,” Edwards writes, “when I say, that virtue is the 
beauty of the qualities and exercises of the heart, or those actions which proceed from 
them.”  To ask what true virtue is is essentially to ask what it is that “renders any habit, 
disposition, or exercise of the heart truly beautiful” (539).  That a discussion of ethics 
would implicate the aesthetic was a reflection of the contemporary moral tradition, or 
“common opinion,” to which Edwards was responding.  A centerpiece of Hutcheson’s 
ethical theory, for example, was the notion that human beings possess both a moral sense 
and an aesthetic sense which function in analogous fashion.  “What is approved by this 
[moral] sense,” wrote Hutcheson in his Short Introduction to Moral Philosophy, “we 
count as right and beautiful, and call it virtue; what is condemned, we count as base and 
deformed and vicious.”96  Just as the aesthetic sense spontaneously and pleasurably 
perceives the beauty of a material object, so the moral sense spontaneously and 
pleasurably perceives and approves benevolent behavior.  Yet not only are the operations 
of the two senses analogous but so are their respective objects of perception, for what 
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beauty and virtuous action have in common, according to the moral sense tradition, are 
the principles of symmetry and harmony.  When, in the case of justice, for example, a 
criminal receives a punishment that accords with his crime or a victim is awarded proper 
compensation for the wrongs she endured, the moral sense takes pleasure in the 
perception of balanced and proportionate action.  On this account, therefore, morality is 
largely a function of certain rudimentary aesthetic principles.97 
Edwards by no means discounts this approach entirely.  He is quite willing to 
allow that human beings possess a kind of moral sense grounded in an innate ability to 
recognize and take pleasure in orderly and harmonious conduct, which God has given to 
all people.  This “natural” moral sense – which, in keeping with eighteenth-century moral 
philosophy, Edwards equates with “conscience” – is in fact indispensable to the proper 
functioning of society.98  What Edwards is unwilling to concede, however, is that natural 
conscience has anything to do with the exercise of true virtue.  True virtue, he insists, 
must always have reference to God, and though he couches his thesis in the terminology 
of metaphysics rather than theology, it is clear that Edwards’s notion of virtue is finally 
theocentric: “True virtue most essentially consists in benevolence to Being in general.  Or 
perhaps, to speak more accurately, it is that consent, propensity, and union of heart to 
being in general, which is immediately exercised in a general good will” (540).  All will 
admit upon reflection, he believes, that on some level the object of one’s virtuous 
benevolence is the being of another.  In rushing to the aid of a friend, for example, one is, 
in effect, willing the good of this friend’s being.  But if such is the case, then it follows 
that “that Being who has most of being, or has the greatest share of existence … will have 
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the greatest share of the propensity and benevolent affections of the heart” (545-46).  
This object, of course, is God himself, the “Being of beings, infinitely the greatest and 
best” (550).  To be sure, benevolence to being in general may lead to virtuous action 
towards “any one particular being” (541), but true virtue cannot begin at the level of the 
particular.  To begin thus would be to accept mistakenly a part for the whole – to sacrifice 
the “highest good” to a merely local good (545).  This had been the fundamental error of 
Hutcheson and his followers.  “[I]t may be asserted in general,” declares Edwards, “that 
nothing is of the nature of true virtue, in which God is not the first and the last” (560).     
Yet as his opening paragraphs make clear, Edwards also agreed with Hutcheson 
and with many eighteenth-century moralists in the belief that there is such a thing as the 
“beauty of virtue.”  “That which is called ‘virtue,’” he writes, “is a certain kind of 
beautiful nature, form or quality” (619).  However, as Norman Fiering observes, Edwards 
concluded that Hutcheson had erred by inverting the proper order of things and 
predicating moral judgments on a kind of aesthetic judgment: “Hutcheson’s close 
comparison of the aesthetic sense and the moral sense … reversed the order of the 
Creation and erroneously made the perception of material relations, such as regularity, 
equality, proportion, and symmetry, the prototype for the perception of intelligent ethical 
relationships.”99  Insofar as the mechanics of the natural conscience were concerned, 
Edwards concurred with Hutcheson’s analysis of the aesthetic, or quasi-aesthetic, 
grounds of ethics.  But such an analysis, he believed, fails to get at the heart of true 
virtue.  Instead, Edwards argues that aesthetic relationships are an embodiment or 
extension of ethical relationships, or, to put the matter in different but parallel terms, that 
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the formal beauty of material objects – what Edwards calls “secondary beauty” – is but a 
dim reflection of a “primary” or “spiritual beauty,” which consists in the willing 
“consent” of one being to another.  In positing this aesthetics of charity – or, to use 
Fiering’s phrase, this “aesthetics of consent” – Edwards effectively relegates Hutcheson’s 
own aesthetics to the level of “secondary beauty,” just as he had demoted Hutcheson’s 
moral sense to the level of natural conscience.100  Let us, however, examine Edwards’s 
theory of primary and secondary beauty more closely. 
 Edwards introduces the notion of spiritual beauty vis-à-vis a discussion regarding 
the proper “object[s] of a virtuous benevolence.”  The first of these, as we have already 
noted, is “being in general” (545).  In addition to being itself, however, there is a “second 
object of a virtuous propensity of heart,” namely, “benevolent being.”  When one not 
only values the being of another but also recognizes in this being the existence of a like 
benevolence to being in general, this recognition “draws forth greater love to him” (546).  
Indeed, it is this benevolent disposition to being in general which one perceives in the 
other that constitutes the beauty of this being: “all spiritual beauty lies in these virtuous 
principles and acts [i.e., those which proceed from a love to being in general], so ‘tis 
primarily on this account they are beautiful, viz. that they imply consent and union with 
Being in general” (548).  Beauty, then, is ultimately a moral and spiritual category.  On 
Edwards’s account, a person is most “beautiful” when he or she is most devoted to God, 
that is, when he or she “does above all things seek the glory of God, and makes this [the] 
supreme, governing, and ultimate end” (559).  In fact, the epithet beautiful is applicable 
in its highest sense only to those who demonstrate this love to being in general, for “This 
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is the primary and most essential beauty of everything that can justly be called by the 
name of virtue” (548).   
No human being, however, can match the expanse of God’s own love towards 
being in general (as Edwards concludes, “divine virtue … must consist primarily in 
[God’s] love to himself” [557]), and thus if true beauty – i.e., moral or spiritual beauty – 
consists in benevolence to being in general, it is God himself who must be truly beautiful 
above all things: “For as God is infinitely the greatest being, so he is allowed to be 
infinitely the most beautiful and excellent…. God’s beauty is infinitely more valuable 
than that of all other beings…” (550-51).  At the heart of Edwards’s moral-aesthetic 
system, then, is an emphasis on the disinterested apprehension of divine beauty.  
Disinterestedness, of course, was to become a staple ingredient in theories of aesthetic 
contemplation after Kant, but as David Morgan notes, Edwards’s version of 
disinterestedness “was not a state of dispassionate observation in the manner that Kant 
and others described … but an abandonment, founded on a self-denying impulse, of the 
soul into divine grace.”  In Edwards’s view, one contemplates the beauty of God for His 
own sake, but this is not an affectively neutral act on the part of the percipient; to the 
contrary, one’s contemplation of God is full of desire and passion.  This disinterested 
perception of God’s beauty, however, has no visual or formal component at all since to 
perceive the primary beauty of God is to perceive His infinite moral benevolence.101 
 In addition to primary or spiritual beauty, Edwards also acknowledges the 
existence of a “secondary and inferior kind of beauty” (561).  This second category 
relates to the beauty of material forms, and it is “not peculiar to spiritual beings, but is 
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found even in inanimate things; which consists of a mutual consent and agreement of 
different things, in form, manner, quantity, and visible end or design; called by the 
various names of regularity, order, uniformity, symmetry, proportion, harmony, etc.” 
(561-62).  Edwards spends an entire chapter exploring the different kinds of secondary 
beauty, and not surprisingly, his ideas are greatly indebted to Enlightenment theories on 
the subject.  As he himself acknowledges, secondary beauty is “the same that Mr. 
Hutcheson, in his treatise on beauty, expresses by uniformity in the midst of variety” 
(562).  In the usual eighteenth-century fashion, Edwards extends this notion of secondary 
beauty to encompass not only what we would think of as typical aesthetic relationships – 
for example, those formal qualities of objects in art or nature – but also such “immaterial” 
things as the “order of society” (568).  Edwards clearly appreciates this secondary beauty, 
despite its “inferiority” to authentic spiritual beauty, and the chapter in which he treats at 
length the nature of this secondary beauty offers solid evidence of evangelicalism’s early 
engagement with Enlightenment aesthetics.  In the specific details of his analysis, 
however, Edwards does little to improve upon the ideas of Hutcheson, and therefore these 
specifics need not concern us here.  Far more important is his conception of the 
relationship between primary and secondary beauty. 
 According to Edwards, “all the beauty to be found throughout the whole creation” 
– viz., all secondary beauty – “is but the reflection of the diffused beams of that Being 
who hath an infinite fulness of brightness and glory” (550-51).  All natural beauty is 
somehow, therefore, a material embodiment of the divine benevolence – of the Beauty of 
God himself.  More specifically, the symmetry one discovers in a material object is a 
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concrete (though distant) reflection of the kind of “consent,” or harmonious love, shown 
by one spiritual being to another.  The relationship of sides and angles in an equilateral 
triangle, for example, is an image of a person’s truly virtuous love to God and of God’s 
supremely virtuous love to people.  “The reason,” writes Edwards, “or at least one reason, 
why God has made this kind of mutual agreement of things beautiful and grateful to those 
intelligent beings that perceive it probably is that there is in it some image of the true, 
spiritual original beauty, which has been spoken of: consisting in being’s consent to 
being, or the union of minds or spiritual beings in a mutual propensity and affection of 
heart” (564).  Edwards thus held to an idealist conception of the relationship between 
material and spiritual beauty, and indeed, his hierarchy of beauty reflects a longstanding 
Christian-Platonic tradition.  His conception owed much to both the Cambridge 
Platonists, with whose work Edwards was familiar, and to the views of Shaftesbury; nor 
was it inconsistent with those Puritan understandings of the beauty of heaven noted 
earlier.  In this way, as Fiering points out, Edwards denied Hutcheson’s view that “the 
beauty of true virtue” is “reducible somehow to … ordinary aesthetic criteria or 
explicable by them.”102  Instead, aesthetic criteria are but earthly emblems of heavenly 
love.    
 It is worth attending briefly to one other conclusion which Edwards draws, if only 
in passing, from his idealist hierarchy of beauty since it hints at an idea that would later 
become widespread among both evangelical and non-evangelical aestheticians in the 
nineteenth century, though in a significantly altered form.  Edwards hypothesizes that one 
reason God has established a hierarchy of beauty intelligible to human beings is because 
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of the sheer pleasure it brings God “to observe analogy in his works” (564).  This 
hypothesis led Edwards to develop elsewhere elaborate typological readings of natural 
objects as “images of divine things.”103  But there is another reason aside from the divine 
joy in analogy which may help to explain God’s purpose in establishing such a hierarchy: 
 
And here by the way, I would further observe, probably ‘tis with regard to 
this image or resemblance which secondary beauty has of true spiritual 
beauty that God has so constituted nature that the presenting of this 
inferior beauty, especially in those kinds of it which have the greatest 
resemblance of the primary beauty, as the harmony of sounds, and the 
beauties of nature, have a tendency to assist those whose hearts are under 
the influence of a truly virtuous temper, to dispose them to the exercises of 
divine love, and enliven in them a sense of spiritual beauty.  (565) 
 
The perception of secondary beauty, it seems, has the potential to increase one’s desire 
for the performance of true virtue.  Natural beauty not only enlivens an individual’s 
apprehension of divine beauty but also helps to move him or her morally.  Though 
Edwards does mention the “harmony of sounds” here, his primary reference – in keeping 
with a well established Puritan tradition – is to the beauties of nature.  He does not, in 
short, develop systematically any special theory of the moral potential of human art, and 
in fact, aside from some illustrations drawn from music and architecture, the fine arts do 
not figure prominently in the treatise at all.  But neither does Edwards exclude them, and 
in principle at least, he gestures towards a conception of art as a vehicle of moral and 
social influence.104 
  At the same time, though, such a theory, in Edwards’s version of it, could apply 
only to “those whose hearts are under the influence of a truly virtuous temper.”  To 
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glimpse secondary beauty as a reflection of primary beauty requires that one be capable 
of first perceiving primary beauty itself.  “It is impossible,” however, as Edwards 
contends, “that any one should truly relish this beauty, consisting in general benevolence, 
who has not that temper himself” (549).  The perception of primary beauty, therefore, just 
like the exercise of true virtue, is available only to those who have been regenerated by 
divine grace.  Human beings in their natural state can, of course, appreciate secondary 
beauty when they see it, but as Sang Hyun Lee points out, “even when man is 
experiencing the ‘inferior’ forms of resemblance, he is not grasping their true meaning, 
since he has no knowledge of the true ground of their beauty.”105  The mere appreciation 
of secondary beauty, moreover, has nothing to do with true virtue, or “truly virtuous 
taste.”  “Who will affirm that a disposition to approve of the harmony of good music, or 
the beauty of a square, or equilateral triangle is the same with true holiness, or a truly 
virtuous disposition of mind?” (573).  If there existed any necessary correlation between 
virtue and the mere ability to perceive secondary beauty, then one’s “delight in the beauty 
of squares, and cubes, and regular polygons in the regularity of buildings, and the 
beautiful figures in a piece of embroidery, would increase in proportion to [one’s] virtue; 
and would be raised to a great height in some eminently virtuous or holy men; but would 
be almost wholly lost in some others that are very vicious and lewd” (573).  Secondary 
beauty – “Mr. Hutcheson’s” beauty – is available to all, though only the regenerate can 
appreciate it to its fullest extent.  True beauty, however, is the sole province of the 
redeemed. 
It is possible, I think, to imagine how an Edwardsean aesthetician might have 
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played out certain aspects of Edwards’s theory of beauty in the context of human art.  It 
seems consistent with Edwards’s premises, for example, to suggest that when it comes to 
taste, one would have to talk in terms of a “two-tiered aesthetic.”  Both the regenerate 
percipient and the unregenerate percipient would both be able to grasp the formal beauty 
of an art object, but only the regenerate percipient would be capable of “appreciating” 
this beauty fully as a reflection of divinity.  The precise significance of a piece of art, 
therefore, would differ according to whether or not one is truly redeemed.106  In addition, 
for the regenerate at least, something like a theory of art’s salutary moral influence would 
be warranted.  In fact, the status of art might actually rise on this account since it would 
be seen as a means of edification and of disposing one “to the exercises of divine love.”  
In appreciating the beauty of art one might better appreciate the beauty of God.   
Whatever the possibilities of Edwards’s reflections for a full-fledged theory of the 
fine arts, however, his specific influence on the later history of evangelical aesthetics was 
strangely limited.  The one element present in Edwards’s aesthetic thought that did 
survive into the nineteenth century, at least to some extent, was the emphasis on spiritual 
regeneration as a prerequisite both for full aesthetic contemplation and for the moral 
benefits of aesthetic experience.  As we will see in chapters 3-5, one does occasionally 
meet with nineteenth-century evangelical critics who, following Edwards and Henry 
Martyn, posited some kind of connection between regeneration and taste.  For the most 
part, however, eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century evangelicals failed to develop 
Edwards’s explicitly theological reflections on aesthetics in any systematic fashion.   
Why evangelicals – especially those in America where Edwards loomed large as a 
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controversialist and then, briefly, as president of the College of New Jersey – failed to 
capitalize on the aesthetic insights of Edwards is difficult to say.  One reason for this 
failure may have had to do with the fact that the immediate custodians of the Edwardsean 
theological tradition, theologians like Samuel Hopkins and Joseph Bellamy (both 
students of Edwards), opted to stress the moral dimensions of Edwards’s thought rather 
than the metaphysical, the aesthetic, or the broadly symbolic.  This process arose in part 
from the felt need to ameliorate the “harsh” tenets of traditional Calvinism in response to 
the moral polemics of a growing legion of eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century anti-
Calvinist critics, and one can trace this movement in the United States through the New 
Divinity writings of Hopkins and Bellamy to the New Haven theology of Nathaniel 
Taylor and beyond.107  Thus, nothing like Edwards’s form of idealism would reappear in 
aesthetic contexts among evangelicals until the middle third of the nineteenth century, 
and then the direct source of such ideas was quite often not the theistic idealism of 
Edwards but rather the idealism of German philosophy, which, if it could at times be 
pressed into the service of Christianity, lacked the clear theological distinctions of 
Edwards’s system.108  On occasion, nineteenth-century evangelical critics posited 
something close to Edwards’s theistic idealism, but such occasions were infrequent, and 
Edwards himself was rarely, if ever, cited as a precedent.109  Indeed, one wonders if the 
metaphysical, Neo-Platonic aesthetics of Edwards were either too abstruse and 
impractical to be of much immediate use, or too at odds with the increasingly empiricist 
direction of contemporary Enlightenment aesthetics to hold any sway once the imposing 
presence of Edwards himself had passed from the scene.  This disproportionate attention 
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to the moral aspect of the Edwardsean heritage even found expression in the decisions of 
Edwards’s later editors.  There is evidence, for example, that when in subsequent decades 
the works of Edwards were reprinted, often in abridged form, the more “aesthetic” 
portions were sometimes eliminated.  When the American Tract Society republished its 
edition of Edwards’s Treatise on the Religious Affections in the nineteenth century, 
absent were those passages which focused on “the disinterested contemplation of divine 
beauty.”110   
At the same time, however, this heightened focus on the ethical aspects of 
Edwards’s writings contributed, ironically, to the gradual deconstruction of Edwards’s 
entire system of morality.  Whereas Edwards had attempted to co-opt Hutcheson’s 
ethico-aesthetic system in the interests of Calvinist orthodoxy, it was this Hutchesonian 
system which eventually came to displace for many evangelicals Edwards’s theory of 
“true virtue.”  Nineteenth-century evangelical theologians, furthermore, also set about the 
business of retooling Reformed doctrines of the will, a process that facilitated the 
growing eighteenth- and nineteenth-century emphasis on moral freedom and human 
autonomy.  For his part, Edwards had tried to appropriate the insights of modern 
aesthetics within a more or less orthodox system of Reformed theology.  As this system 
gave way, however, so, too, did Edwards’s particular aesthetic insights, for in the end, 
Edwards’s aesthetic thought was inseparable from his theology.  As evangelicals turned 
to the ethics and aesthetics of the Scottish philosophy, the peculiar religio-aesthetic 
theorizing of Edwards no doubt seemed like an exercise in obscurantism. 
Still, Edwards’s methodical explorations into the aesthetics of beauty are an 
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important record of eighteenth-century evangelicalism’s growing attention to the 
problems of philosophical aesthetics.  And although Edwards’s specific contributions to 
the later history of evangelical aesthetics were limited – indeed, his name rarely, if ever, 
turns up in nineteenth-century evangelical discussions of art and beauty – his general 
awareness of and receptivity to many of the developments in modern aesthetics helped to 
establish a pattern of engagement for later evangelical theorists.  Aesthetics had become a 
serious philosophical and theological issue, and evangelicals would increasingly learn to 
appreciate and value the importance of this kind of thinking.   
Another example of this growing attention to aesthetic matters may be seen in the 
fresh interest which writers such as John Wesley showed in issues of language and style.  
Here, too, such interest was a direct consequence of evangelicalism’s internalization of 
Enlightenment tenets.  In his preface to A Collection of Hymns, for the Use of the People 
Called Methodists (1780), Wesley addresses “the poetry” of the hymns which he and his 
brother Charles have included in the volume to follow:  
 
(1.) In these Hymns there is no doggerel, no botches, nothing put in to 
patch up the rhyme, no feeble expletives.  (2.) Here is nothing turgid or 
bombast on the one hand, or low and creeping on the other.  (3.) Here are 
no cant expressions, no words without meaning.  Those who impute this to 
us know not what they say.  We talk common sense, whether they 
understand it or not, both in verse and prose, and use no word but in a 
fixed and determinate sense.  (4.) Here are, allow me to say, both the 
purity, the strength, and the elegance of the English language, and, at the 
same time, the utmost simplicity and plainness, suited to every capacity.111 
 
These are undoubtedly high claims for any poet or hymnodist to make, but issues of 
accuracy aside, Wesley’s stylistic standards are consistent with those established by 
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Locke in Book III of his Essay.  Since human language is susceptible to imprecision and 
abuse, Locke had urged “those who pretend seriously to search after or maintain truth … 
to study how they might deliver themselves without obscurity, doubtfulness, or 
equivocation” (3.11.3).112  The proper use of language demands, above all, clarity and 
accuracy.  It is worth noting that Locke’s standards – though they sprang from empiricist 
premises rather than from theological or ethical considerations – were themselves 
congenial to the tradition of the Puritan “plain style,” a fact which may help to explain 
the relative ease with which evangelical writers took to such standards.  Yet whatever the 
case, it is clear that Wesley derived his criteria for good poetic style from contemporary 
Lockean notions of linguistic exactness.   
This emphasis on the precision expected of poetic diction stands in contrast to 
some later romantics who would value poetic language for its density and suggestiveness 
rather than for its clarity (not to mention those eighteenth-century theorists of the sublime 
who, like Burke, singled out linguistic obscurity as one prominent source of sublimity).113  
If anything, in fact, Wesley was more rigorous in his application of the canons of 
Lockean diction than Locke himself, for what is most striking about this passage is 
Wesley’s attempt to apply these standards of plainness specifically to poetic style.  For 
Locke, poetic language was precisely that species of discourse which relied for its effects 
on the playful, or metaphorical, use of language.  It was, in effect, the intentional misuse 
of ordinary language for the purposes of pleasure, and it therefore represented the 
antithesis of the kind of scientific clarity and precision prescribed by Locke for the 
purposes of ordinary communication.  This opposition between the poetic, or 
 110 
metaphorical, and the empirical uses of language is evident in the oft-cited passage from 
the Essay on “wit” and “judgment,” in which Locke observes “that men who have a great 
deal of wit, and prompt memories, have not always the clearest judgment or deepest 
reason”:   
 
For wit lying most in the assemblage of ideas, and putting those together 
with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any resemblance or 
congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable visions in 
the fancy: judgment, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side, in 
separating carefully, one from another, ideas wherein can be found the 
least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by similitude, and by 
affinity to take one thing for another.  This is a way of proceeding quite 
contrary to metaphor and allusion, wherein for the most part lies that 
entertainment and pleasantry of wit, which strikes so lively on the fancy, 
and therefore is so acceptable to all people: because its beauty appears at 
first sight, and there is required no labour of thought to examine what truth 
or reason there is in it.  The mind, without looking any further, rests 
satisfied with the agreeableness of the picture and the gaiety of the fancy; 
and it is a kind of affront to go about to examine it by the severe rules of 
truth and good reason, whereby it appears that it consists in something that 
is not perfectly conformable to them.  (2.11.2) 
 
As Locke suggests, poetry (or wit) is, by definition, the opposite of clarity, and though he 
does not openly disparage poetry here – it is pleasant enough as far as it goes – neither 
does he hold it in particularly high esteem.  Some writers during the period did explicitly 
criticize poetry for what they believed was its propensity to obscure the clear light of 
knowledge, but even those who did not move to such extremes felt pressure to measure 
their poetry by the Lockean rule.114  Clearly, Wesley belonged to this latter group, for 
what he seems to have prized was, in Lockean terms, a poetry that was closer to judgment 
than wit, that is, a poetry which conveyed to its readers and/or hearers a fixed and 
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determinate meaning in which the play of language was minimized and the 
communication of stable truth maximized.  Given that Wesley’s chief creative outlet was 
hymnody rather than poetry of a more generally belletristic sort, it is not surprising 
perhaps that such a poetic would have appealed to him. 
 Yet just as important as any specific principles of style was the growing 
awareness among evangelicals of style itself as a distinct concern.  Evangelicals were 
beginning to show an increased attention to the manner of literary objects as distinct 
(though not separate) from matters of content – if not quite for its own sake, then at least 
with an eye to the enjoyment which it seemed to afford.  This interest in the pleasures of 
style was part of a gradual movement during the eighteenth century towards a conception 
of the “aesthetic” as a singular category of experience, and once again, it was Locke who 
helped to inaugurate this movement.  As we have seen, Locke’s psycholinguistic 
distinction between the synthetic-metaphorical nature of wit and the analytic-literal 
nature of judgment contributed to the growing belief, earlier hinted at by Francis Bacon, 
that art and science constitute two discrete types of discourse.  This idea would prove a 
mainstay of romantic aesthetics, manifesting itself in a series of related binaries 
(heart/head, imagination/understanding, emotion/intellect).  At the same time, this 
distinction also prepared the way for the related notion that whereas science serves to 
advance the claims of knowledge, art exists primarily for the sake of pleasure.  Art and 
poetry may still offer a kind knowledge, but their immediate end is thought to be a unique 
kind of experience.115 
To be sure, Wesley’s theory of poetic diction as formulated in the preface to his 
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Hymn Book resists any simplistic dichotomy between science and art, or knowledge and 
pleasure.  Indeed, his theory makes the task of distinguishing poetry in general from other 
“mundane” forms of communication problematic.  If poetic language is to be held to the 
same standards of usage as other forms of discourse – if poetry must, in a sense, be 
“scientifically” precise – then it is not immediately clear what poetry is or how, and 
whether, poetry is unique.116  Nor is it perfectly clear on Wesley’s account how the sort 
of pleasure or experience offered by poetry differs, if at all, from other kinds of pleasure.  
This difficulty, however – if it is, in fact, a genuine difficulty – was by no means peculiar 
to Wesley but was instead typical of the didacticism of the age.  The emphasis on poetry 
and art as a unique sort of (emotional) experience implied by Locke’s differentiation 
between wit and judgment took time to develop, not only among evangelicals but also 
within Anglo-American culture at large.117 
Nevertheless, other passages in Wesley’s writings suggest that he viewed stylistic 
beauty as an independent source of enjoyment which could be fruitfully, though perhaps 
not finally, distinguished from theological or ethical matters.  We have already noted, for 
example, his decision to excise thirty-seven hymns from an updated edition of the Pocket 
Hymn Book not on the basis of inferior doctrine but solely on the basis of what Wesley 
believed to be their aesthetic shortcomings.  Similarly, in one of his journal entries 
Wesley recorded his impressions of Homer’s Iliad, taking care to praise Homer for his 
craft and his “beauty of expression”: “What an amazing genius had this man!  To write 
with such strength of thought, and beauty of expression, when he had none to go before 
him!”  Significantly, after calling attention to the stylistic supremacy of Homer and even 
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alluding to him in the usual eighteenth-century fashion as a kind of “original genius,” 
Wesley moves almost immediately to a moral assessment of his work.  In this, Homer 
fares considerably worse, for although “a vein of piety runs through his whole work, 
[even] in spite of his Pagan prejudices… one cannot but observe such improprieties 
intermixed, as are shocking to the last degree.”118  As with the Puritans, then, one’s final 
evaluation of an aesthetic object must include the moral.  Wesley, however, is perhaps 
more willing than were many Puritans to hold the aesthetic and the moral qualities of an 
art object in temporary isolation.  The quality of Homer’s expression is no less beautiful 
or authentic for the ethical improprieties which Wesley finds intermixed throughout.   
As the writings of Edwards, Wesley, and others suggest, eighteenth-century 
evangelicals had begun to develop the kind of self-conscious aesthetic discourse that had 
been lacking among their Puritan predecessors.  One of the most important factors 
serving to catalyze this growth was the psychological orientation of much eighteenth-
century philosophy.  The birth of evangelical aesthetics, as with so much of modern 
aesthetics generally, was largely a result of the eighteenth century’s systematic attempts 
to catalogue the individual powers of the human mind.  This interest in the difficulties of 
“mental philosophy” and in the resulting theories of faculty psychology can be traced in 
part to the influence of Locke.  In setting out to explore “the discerning faculties of a 
man, as they are employed about the objects which they have to do with” (1.1.2), Locke 
bequeathed to his descendants a methodology which, even as the precise details of his 
system gave way to the critiques of Hume, the Scottish realists, and finally to Kant, 
placed the philosophy of art on a new footing.  Not only did he lay the groundwork for a 
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renewed consideration of such aesthetically significant powers as the imagination and 
taste but he also helped to ensure more broadly that human psychology would provide the 
intellectual context within which the problems of modern aesthetics would be thought for 
decades to come.119       
This methodology may have been particularly decisive in legitimating art, and the 
philosophical consideration of art, in the minds of those evangelicals whose sensibilities 
had been shaped by the aesthetic ambiguities of Puritanism, for the Enlightenment’s 
careful exploration of the powers of the human mind ultimately lent a kind of “scientific” 
sanction to the study of aesthetic questions.  “Manifold are the advantages of criticism,” 
noted Lord Kames in his influential Elements of Criticism (1762), “when… studied as a 
rational science.”120  Prior to the Darwinian controversies of the 1860s, evangelicals held 
“modern science” (and especially Bacon) in the highest esteem,121 and the idea that art 
was, paradoxically, a proper object of science, may have offered just the sort of rationale 
that some evangelicals needed to leave the aesthetic ambiguities of Puritanism behind.  
This is not to suggest, of course, that the scientific investigation of the aesthetic faculties 
of the human mind promptly dispensed with all Puritan anxieties concerning art or the 
imagination.  In fact, many of the aesthetic concepts advanced by Enlightenment 
aestheticians were themselves subject to ambiguity and were therefore just as capable of 
confirming Puritan prejudices as they were of displacing them.  But what the new 
methodology allowed for was, at the very least, a modicum of critical distance, which, in 
light of the tenets of the new psychology itself, required that faculties like the 
imagination and taste, and the objects to which such faculties are directed, be granted 
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fresh consideration. 
This psycho-aesthetic bent is evident, for example, in John Wesley’s essay, 
“Thoughts upon Taste,” first published in the December issue of the Arminian Magazine 
in 1780.  The essay, as he notes, was occasioned by a reading of Alexander Gerard’s own 
“Essay on Taste,” which Wesley “entered upon … with great expectation” in light of 
Gerard’s established credentials as an expert on the subject (465).122  Gerard’s essay had 
originally appeared in 1759 after having been awarded a prize from the Edinburgh 
Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Sciences, Manufactures, and Agriculture – a fact 
to which Wesley alludes.  A second edition was published in 1764, and a third edition 
was issued in 1780 (the year of Wesley’s essay), which included a new section on “the 
standard of taste.”  Gerard’s essay has been called “the most elaborate investigation of 
the faculty of taste during the eighteenth century,”123 and it appears that it may have been 
this very elaborateness which frustrated Wesley.  For although Wesley concedes that the 
book remains the best available on the subject, he nonetheless expresses disappointment 
with Gerard’s reflections: they are neither well organized nor “well digested,” and “there 
are assertions almost in every chapter, which are exceedingly disputable.”  Yet his 
biggest complaint is that Gerard has failed to offer any “just definition of the subject” 
(465).  It is possible for a reader to walk away from the text, Wesley claims, without 
having any clear answer to the question, “What is taste?” (466).  The accuracy of this 
claim may be debatable, but Wesley’s call for precise definition is characteristic of his 
usual Lockean attitude toward linguistic precision.  Wesley, moreover, was a master of 
abridgements, and thus the essay ought also to be read in light of his usual habit of 
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distilling information in order to make it available to a wider audience (recall its 
periodical origins). 
The bulk of the essay, then, consists of Wesley’s attempt to clarify the nature of 
taste, to catalogue its various manifestations, and to offer suggestions for how it might be 
improved.  In doing so, he retraces ground covered by other eighteenth-century 
philosophers of taste, though in a highly simplified form.  He does not, for example, 
explore the nature of beauty, as Hutcheson and Gerard had done, and though in passing 
he distinguishes taste from both the “imagination” and “judgment,” he does not attempt a 
detailed examination of the relationship between taste and other powers of the mind.  On 
the whole, his essay takes its bearings from the Hutchesonian tradition generally, though 
Addison turns out to be his most frequent point of reference.  Following in the footsteps 
of Hutcheson, who, as we have seen, had expanded Locke’s sensory apparatus beyond 
the merely bodily to include both the moral and aesthetic “senses,” Wesley defines taste 
as “a faculty of the mind, analogous to the [physical] sense of taste.”  It is “that internal 
sense which relishes and distinguishes its proper object.”  “By relishes,” he continues, “I 
mean perceives with pleasure; for in the common acceptation of the word, we are not said 
to have a taste for displeasing, but only for pleasing objects.”  For Wesley, then, taste 
appears to include both an affective and a cognitive element, though it is the experience 
of pleasure which ultimately distinguishes the operations of the taste from the operations 
of the understanding.  Interestingly, Wesley seems actually to posit the existence of 
several tastes, or rather “species of taste.”  If taste is directed to a “proper object” of 
pleasure, and there are, in fact, a variety of pleasing objects in the world, then there must 
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be different types of taste corresponding to different objects: “And as various as those 
objects are, so various are the species of taste” (466).  Wesley plays somewhat freely 
with the term “object,” a point which introduces some possible confusion into his theory.  
At times Wesley seems to suggest that “object” may refer to individual, irreducible 
elements, i.e., to specific objects (“metaphysics” or “flowers, meadows, fields, or 
woods”).  Throughout much of the essay, however, Wesley writes not about particular 
objects but about classes of objects.  Thus he observes, for example (as both Hutcheson 
and Edwards had done), that some people have a taste for “objects of the understanding,” 
such as mathematical formulas or speculative ideas.  Once again, such a taste does not 
consist in the mere cognitive apprehension of such formulas but rather in the special 
pleasure one takes in contemplating them: “when we say, a man has a taste for the 
mathematics, we mean by that expression, not only that he is capable of understanding 
them, but that he takes pleasure therein” (467).  Here, though, “object” refers not to, say, 
a particular mathematical formula like the Pythagorean Theorem but rather to a certain 
type of object.   
Wesley continues with this classification by types.  In addition to objects of the 
understanding, Wesley isolates two other classes of objects, each of which appears to 
have its corresponding species of taste, or “internal sense.”  The second species of taste is 
an aesthetic one, or “that which relates to the objects that gratify the imagination” (467).  
At this point, he relies heavily on the “ingenious thoughts of Mr. Addison,” particularly 
his “Essay on the Pleasures of the Imagination” (466).  Addison had suggested that the 
imagination takes pleasure in three sorts of objects – the grand, the novel, and the 
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beautiful – and Wesley follows this scheme exactly: “Thus we are accustomed to say, a 
man has a taste for grandeur, for novelty, or for beauty; meaning thereby, that he takes 
pleasure in grand, in new, or in beautiful objects, whether they are such by nature or by 
art.”  Yet his use of Addison also represents, in the context of Wesley’s reading of 
Gerard, a reversion of sorts, for Gerard had posited a total of seven internal “senses.”  
The first three were those corresponding to the classes of objects suggested by Addison – 
novelty, sublimity (Addison’s “grandeur”), and beauty – but Gerard had also assigned 
senses to imitation, harmony, ridicule, and virtue.124  Wesley appears, then, to prefer 
Addison’s simpler taxonomy to Gerard’s more expanded one.  Even so, within Wesley’s 
tripartite, Addisonian system, it turns out, “there is an unbounded variety… some having 
a taste for grandeur, some for beauty.  Some again, have a taste for one kind of beauty; 
and others for another.  Some have a taste for the beauties of nature; others for those of 
art.  The former for flowers, meadows, fields, or woods; the latter for painting or poetry” 
(467).  Such an approach, if pushed to an extreme, could result in the theory that there 
exists a special taste or sense for every individual object.  A rose, for example, may have 
a peculiar beauty of its own which distinguishes it from the beauty of a sunset, or, for that 
matter, from the distinctive beauty of a violet.  In this case, one would have to speak in 
terms of a “rose-taste,” a “violet-taste,” and so on.  That this was what Wesley had in 
mind, however, is doubtful.  Gerard, too, had employed the word “taste” rather freely, 
using it to refer to both the internal senses individually, as well as to their coordinate 
action: “Any one of the internal senses, existing in vigour and perfection, forms a 
particular species of taste … but all of them must at once be vigorous, in order to 
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constitute taste in its just extent.”125  Thus, Wesley’s many “species of taste” are at least 
theoretically resolvable on some level into the single “faculty” of taste, though unlike 
Gerard, Wesley makes no effort to clarify the details of this resolution. 
Finally, it is worth noting briefly that Wesley, like Edwards and the 
Hutchesonians, also accepts the existence of a moral sense, or a taste “whereby we relish 
the happiness of our fellow-creatures, even without any reflection on our own interest, 
without any reference to ourselves.”  What is interesting, however, is that Wesley makes 
little effort in this essay to qualify this benevolism in light of the doctrines of grace or of 
original sin.  Unlike Edwards, who went to great lengths to subordinate Hutcheson’s 
theory of the moral and aesthetic senses to his own system of divine grace, the most 
Wesley will venture on this score is that “there is something still in the human mind, in 
many, if not in all, (whether by nature, or from a higher principle,) which interests us in 
the welfare” of others (467).  One ought not make too much of this perhaps.  For one 
thing, Wesleyan Arminianism, as Calvinist critics frequently pointed out, left greater 
room for natural human abilities, and in this way Wesley’s reluctance to situate the moral 
sense definitively in the realm of grace or nature is not unexpected.  Wesley had, 
moreover, earlier criticized Hutcheson along more Edwardsean lines.126  For our 
purposes, Wesley’s most important declaration regarding the moral sense may have been 
his proclamation of its superiority to the aesthetic sense.  As with Edwards, and in fact 
with many in the eighteenth century, morality still trumped the aesthetic: “Is not this taste 
of infinitely more value, than a taste for any or all the pleasures of the imagination?” 
(467). 
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Wesley’s conception of taste, despite its potential to fracture into numerous 
particulars, is ultimately an objective one, as was Gerard’s.127  He is apparently 
untroubled by the problem of discrepant tastes which so exercised Hume.  Each species 
of taste relishes what is “truly excellent in its kind” (468), and for this reason tastes can 
also be improved.  The remainder of the essay is thus taken up with Wesley’s advice for 
the rectification of taste, and indeed the last portion of the treatise shifts to an almost 
exclusive focus on aesthetic taste.  (One is left to wonder what counsel Wesley may have 
offered for the improvement of moral taste – something which, by his own premises, he 
should have done).  Much of Wesley’s advice is typical eighteenth-century fare (read the 
ancient writers, talk with men of genius [469]), and need not concern us here.  One 
passage, however, deserves comment.  In discussing what he terms a “correct” or “fine 
taste” – one in which an individual “relishes whatever, either in the works of nature or of 
art, is truly excellent in its kind” (468) – Wesley asserts that Addison’s definition of fine 
taste must be revised.  Addison had restricted the faculty of fine taste to the beauties of 
writing, but Wesley argues that this concept should be expanded to include anything that 
is beautiful in either nature or art.  He then concludes: “Such a taste as this is much to be 
desired, and that on many accounts.  It greatly increases those pleasures of life, which are 
not only innocent, but useful.  It qualifies us to be of far greater service to our fellow-
creatures” (468-69).  For Wesley, it seems, aesthetic pleasure has become a force for 
good; it now has an important social and moral dimension.  Unlike many Puritans, who 
tended to view aesthetic pleasure as an ancillary concern, or as a kind of added bonus 
above and beyond whatever the intellectual and rational benefits available in art, Wesley 
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appears to attribute socio-moral significance to pleasure itself.  This idea, of course, was 
not unique to Wesley, and it was, by 1780, fairly widespread.  Lord Kames, for example, 
had suggested as much in his Elements of Criticism (1762), a text whose popularity 
endured well into the nineteenth century.128  Edwards, as we have seen, also suggested 
something along these lines, though he was careful to qualify this suggestion, insisting 
that such a notion might only apply to those who, by the enabling power of grace, are 
capable of grasping primary beauty.  Wesley, however, makes little or no attempt in this 
instance to restrict this idea to the regenerate.  The socio-moral effects of art are at least 
potentially available to all, regardless of one’s state of grace.  Though this lack of 
qualification on Wesley’s part may have been more a sin of omission rather than of 
commission, the suggestion of aesthetic pleasure as a means of cultivating morality apart 
from the intervention of divine grace would eventually play a decisive role in nineteenth-
century evangelical aesthetic thought. 
Wesley’s “Thoughts upon Taste” reflects the widespread eighteenth-century 
interest in aesthetic questions as a subset of problems in mental philosophy.129  By the 
end of the eighteenth century, this interest had assumed institutional form in college and 
university courses on “mental and moral philosophy.”  In the United States, these 
courses, which were typically taught by college presidents and taken during one’s senior 
year, represented the pinnacle of a student’s academic career.  The content of these 
courses, most of which was derived from the Scottish realists well into the nineteenth 
century (who, incidentally, were far more interested in aesthetics than Locke had ever 
been), addressed aesthetic problems such as beauty or imagination in terms of the 
 122 
dynamics of mind.130  Textbooks, for example, customarily included sections on “taste” 
and “imagination,” which in turn led to discussions of beauty, sublimity, creativity, and a 
variety of artistic genres.  Though it would still be some time before American instructors 
were delivering specialized lectures devoted wholly to aesthetics, as had been done in 
Germany since at least the turn of the century,131 it was in courses such as these that 
middle-class evangelicals would have first encountered the philosophical study of 
aesthetics. 
Eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century British evangelicals would have 
likewise been exposed to the problems of aesthetics through courses on mental 
philosophy, though their institutional experiences were more varied as a result of the 
religious tests that were in place at Oxford and Cambridge well into the nineteenth 
century.  Such tests, which excluded dissenters and nonconformists from taking degrees, 
were not finally abolished until 1871.132  One result of these tests, however, was the 
forging of closer ties between the universities of Scotland, where religious tests were 
non-existent, and the dissenting academies of England, particularly in the eighteenth 
century.  As Anand C. Chitnis observes, “From the early eighteenth century the Scottish 
universities and the English dissenting communities demonstrated several common 
approaches.”  During this period, the curriculum in English dissenting schools focused on 
the liberal arts.  “As in the Scottish philosophy classes,” writes Chitnis, “for example 
those of Dugald Stewart at the end of the century, the emphasis was on the cultivation of 
moral and intellectual powers.”  By the early nineteenth century, a number of dissenting 
academies had, for various reasons, moved away from the liberal arts curriculum that had 
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earlier defined them, but an important effect of this change was that more and more 
dissenters opted to study in Scotland itself.  Thus British evangelicals, too, were directly 
influenced by the mental philosophy of the Scottish Enlightenment.133      
The eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century study of mental philosophy also 
supplied evangelicals with one further ideological component which helped to place the 
study of art and aesthetics in a new light, namely, the concept of psychological “balance.”  
The faculty psychology of the day held that each human power ought to be cultivated to 
its fullest extent.  Some powers (e.g., the passions), of course, might be rightfully 
subordinated to others (e.g., reason) in accordance with the natural constitution and 
proper regulation of the human mind, but no power or faculty ought to be ignored 
completely.134  In America, this criterion of mental balance was articulated clearly in the 
Yale Report of 1828.  According to the Report, “as the bodily frame is brought to its 
highest perfection, not by one simple and uniform motion, but by a variety of exercises, 
so the mental faculties are expanded, and invigorated, and adapted to each other, by 
familiarity with different departments of science.”  A proper education, noted the Report, 
sought “a proper balance of character.”135  As one of the foremost American institutions 
with close evangelical affiliations in the early nineteenth century, the logic of the Yale 
Report would have been familiar to a broad base of evangelical students.  While the 
immediate intent of the Yale Report was to vindicate the continuing ideal of the liberal 
arts, and in particular, the study of the classics,136 its logic afforded a broad justification 
for the study and appreciation of the fine arts.  The failure to cultivate the aesthetic 
dimension of the human personality would be to threaten the ideal of psychological 
 124 
balance.  As we will see in the next two chapters, nineteenth-century evangelicals not 
only appropriated this logic to defend the claims of art but also used it to point out the 
shortcomings of the Puritan aesthetic tradition. 
Yet if, as I have argued, the moderate and didactic Enlightenments served to bring 
about a change in the aesthetic consciousness of eighteenth-century evangelicals, to shape 
many of their specific aesthetic ideas, and to normalize for them the philosophical study 
of art, it was also the case that Enlightenment doctrines could be used in some cases to 
reinforce timeworn Puritan suspicions.  Terence Martin, for instance, has argued that the 
Scottish philosophy of common sense actually served, at least initially, to energize 
longstanding American anxieties concerning the exercise of the imagination.  According 
to Martin, the widely shared distrust of fiction throughout much of the nineteenth century 
can be attributed in large part to the dominant metaphysics of common sense realism.137  
In a similar vein, an interesting British example of the negative impact of Enlightenment 
principles on evangelical aesthetics is Hannah More’s “Preface to the Tragedies,” in 
which More draws implicitly on empiricist epistemology to shore up the traditional 
Puritan case against the evils of the theater.  The Preface is arguably a complex piece of 
theory on many levels, and it speaks to a variety of tensions (e.g., between the moral and 
aesthetic) that would be well worth examining in their own right.  Here, though, I want to 
draw attention to the psychological bases of More’s case against the theater and the way 
in which these bases, rooted in Enlightenment theories of mind, lent new weight to old 
antipathies.   
The occasion of More’s Preface was her apparently controversial decision to 
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include in a volume of her collected works some tragic dramas composed early in her 
career, prior to her conversion to evangelical Christianity.  On the one hand, More wishes 
to explain to those readers familiar with her later censures of the stage why she has 
chosen to reprint such pieces.  Her answer, in short, is that to suppress them would have 
been perceived as “disingenuous.”138  On the other hand, More also sees this occasion as 
an opportunity to express concisely the principled disapproval of the stage which 
represents her mature position.  She is not, however, simply interested in pointing out the 
dangers inherent in “bad” plays, which, she believes, are already obvious to any virtuous 
person; instead, she undertakes “the unpopular task of animadverting on the dangerous 
effects of those which come under the description of good plays; for from those chiefly 
arises the danger (if danger there be), to good people” (504).  More, in short, wants to 
demonstrate why even the good plays are bad.  Her case in support of this unenviable 
thesis draws on a range of arguments, some of which reiterate well established critiques 
of the theater that any Puritan would have recognized.  What may seem “good” to the 
non-Christian, for example, may betray its true darkness to the renewed mind of the 
redeemed (506).  It is also necessary for those Christian viewers who would insist on 
their exemption from the negative effects of the stage, or who would argue that to the 
pure all things are pure, to recall their obligation to their weaker brothers and sisters not 
to be a “stumbling-block” (510) – an argument made all the more poignant by More’s 
suggestion that one’s observation of audience response (laughter, applause, etc.) is a 
determining factor in how one processes the action onstage (506).  Tragedy, moreover, is 
a particularly dubious dramatic form in that it takes as its central principle the pagan ethic 
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of “honour” rather than the Christian virtues (504). 
It is clear, however, that the bulk of More’s case rests on her psycho-aesthetic 
argument for the nefarious effects of witnessing a dramatic performance.  Despite her 
passing assertion that tragedy as a genre is rooted in pagan morality, the danger of the 
stage lies for More almost entirely in its status as a sensory spectacle.  In fact, she is 
perfectly willing to allow that the private reading of a play can be a beneficial experience 
for the reader; watching a play, however, involves serious risks: “I think, then, that there 
is a substantial difference between seeing and reading a dramatic composition; and that 
the objections which lie so strongly against the one, are not, at least in the same degree, 
applicable to the other.”  But why does material that would otherwise be deemed “safe” if 
read in private constitute a danger when viewed as a performance?  More’s implicit 
answer to this question has to do with the immediacy of the sensations – and of visual 
sensations in particular – experienced during a dramatic performance.  Dramatic poetry 
“may be read with safety, because it can there be read with soberness.  The most 
animated speeches subside into comparative tameness, and … produce no ruffle of the 
passions, no agitation of the senses, but merely afford a pleasant, and, it may be, a not 
unsalutary exercise to the imagination” (508).  Whereas reading necessitates reflection 
and thus employs the reason, dramatic performances circumvent the reason and act 
immediately on the senses, dazzling and overwhelming them.  Indeed, the difficulty with 
dramatic spectacles is their powerful but non-rational appeal to the passions, for they 
threaten to efface the kind of clear ideas expressed in propositional form that served as 
the gold standard for so many eighteenth-century thinkers.139  Contrasting one’s 
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experience of listening to a sermon with one’s experience at the theater, More notes the 
difference in their methods of presentation.  Whereas the Sunday sermon offers 
“humbling propositions,” it is the purpose of the theater “not only to preach, but to 
personify doctrines…”:  
 
Doctrines, not simply expressed, as those of the Sunday are, in the naked 
form of axioms, principles, and precepts, but realized, embodied, made 
alive, furnished with organs, clothed, decorated, brought into lively 
discourse, into interesting action; enforced with all the energy of passion, 
adorned with all the graces of language, and exhibited with every aid of 
emphatical delivery, every attraction of appropriate gesture…. Is not the 
competition too unequal?  (508)   
 
Such criticisms, of course, are not inconsistent with earlier Puritan attacks on the 
stage.  The influential Platonic-Augustinian tradition, moreover, had always viewed 
indulgence of the bodily senses with profound suspicion.  It is interesting in this light to 
note the decision by the editor of the first American edition of More’s collected works to 
append to her Preface the conclusion of Jeremy Collier’s “Short View of the Immorality 
and Profaneness of the English Stage” (1699).  In the opinion of the editor, it seems, 
More’s critique carries on a noble tradition of anti-theatrical sentiments, and in fact there 
is nothing in Collier’s conclusion that is at odds with the thrust of More’s argument.  Like 
More, Collier also observes that the stage “cherishes those passions, and rewards those 
vices, which ‘tis the business of reason to discountenance” (qtd. in More 510).  On one 
level, then, More’s disapprobation is hardly surprising, and there is nothing particularly 
novel in her intentions.   
Yet More’s case is not merely a rehashing of time-tested religious arguments 
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against the stage; rather, it is a case deeply informed by its Enlightenment context.  Her 
contradistinction, for example, between “the naked form” of the sermon, which consists 
of “axioms, principles, and precepts,” and the “semblance of real action” encountered in a 
stage production that leads to “a kind of enchantment” (508), draws upon the sort of 
science-art/intellect-emotion dichotomy suggested by Locke and others.  The effect of 
dramatic performances, according to More, is akin to Locke’s conception of the effects of 
wit, in which “beauty appears at first sight, and there is required no labour of thought to 
examine what truth or reason there is in it.”  As does Locke, More isolates the aesthetic 
(though her ultimate concern remains a moral one) – implicitly acknowledging its 
singular affective power – only to locate its threat precisely in this power.  This 
paradoxical dynamic can be traced as far back as Plato, but its immediate incarnation in 
the Preface is a direct result of eighteenth-century developments.   
In the same way, More’s concern for the sensational dimension of dramatic 
productions acquires much of its urgency from its subscription to an empiricist 
philosophy of mind.  Locke, as is well known, had argued in the Essay that all human 
knowledge is originally a product of one’s experience.  The human mind does not come 
equipped with innate ideas but must instead gather information from the world around it.  
Simple ideas, which serve as the basis for all our more complex ideas, are those which 
the mind arrives at involuntarily via sensation, reflection, or both.  Such simple ideas, 
moreover, cannot be altered once they have been received by the mind: “These simple 
ideas, when offered to the mind, the understanding can no more refuse to have, nor alter 
when they are imprinted, nor blot them out and make new ones itself, than a mirror can 
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refuse, alter, or obliterate the images or ideas which the objects set before it do therein 
produce” (2.1.25).  This model of empiricist psychology, in which the mind is passively 
subject to impressions from without, led in turn to the striking conclusion that “the 
personality is formed by its sensations,”140 and although Locke’s theory of the active 
composition of complex ideas may have preserved some room for agency in the 
intellectual process, human identity was, in a real sense, largely a product of sensory 
experience.  In fact, this notion was reinforced by another of Locke’s famous postulates, 
the “association of ideas.”  Some ideas, Locke believed, “have a natural correspondence 
and connexion with one another”; others, however, are connected solely as a result of 
chance or custom.  It is one of the purposes of education to sever such habitual 
associations, for they have “such an influence and [are] of so great force to set us awry in 
our actions as well moral as natural, passions, reasonings, and notions themselves, that 
perhaps there is not any one thing that deserves more to be looked after” (2.33.5, 9). 
It is not difficult to see how such a model of mind could serve to exacerbate 
traditional Christian anxieties regarding the senses.  One could, in effect, be carried off to 
hell by the intensity of one’s perceptions and associations.  Once confronted with a given 
sensory experience, one’s mind and personality would be inevitably shaped by the 
encounter.  Since sensory impressions were received passively by the mind and, once 
there, could not be eliminated by any natural act, the only solution was to avoid such 
impressions altogether.  More’s allegiance to this empiricist model, and her fears 
regarding its negative consequences for those who would frequent the playhouse, are 
clear:  
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We cannot be too often reminded, that we are, to an inconceivable degree, 
the creatures of habit.  Our tempers are not principally governed, nor our 
characters formed, by single marked actions; nor is the colour of our lives 
principally determined by prominent, detached circumstances; but the 
character is gradually molded by a series of seemingly insignificant but 
constantly recurring practices, which, incorporated into our habits, become 
part of ourselves.  (505) 
 
Such habits, once formed, can “silently eat out the very heart and life of vigorous virtue” 
(505).  This is a traditional Christian concern expressed in the framework of 
Enlightenment empiricism; it is, in a sense, an empiricized Christianity.  Even as More’s 
“animadversions” perpetuate a legacy of Puritan castigation and critique, they inscribe at 
the same time many of the debates in Enlightenment epistemology and aesthetics.  
More’s Preface, furthermore, demonstrates how the effects of evangelicalism’s contact 
with the Enlightenment were not always immediate, nor especially revolutionary.  Even 
aesthetic “developments” could be put to conservative uses.   
As More’s Preface also suggests, the effects of the Enlightenment on evangelical 
aesthetic thought manifested themselves slowly and erratically over the course of the 
eighteenth century.  In the last two decades of the eighteenth century, articles like 
Wesley’s “Thoughts upon Taste” were relatively scarce.  On the one hand, of course, this 
is partially explainable by the fact that evangelicals were just beginning to awaken to the 
possibilities of the periodical form, and thus the absence of such articles is not necessarily 
a reliable measure of the state of evangelical aesthetic discourse.  On the other hand, 
neither did evangelicals of the period generate much aesthetic reflection in other 
mediums – a point which suggests that evangelicals were still struggling to find a 
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philosophical voice when it came to art.  Statements like Henry Martyn’s about the 
psycho-aesthetic effects of conversion, for all its suggestiveness, were exceedingly rare, 
and rarer still was the sort of explicitly theological reflection on aesthetics practiced by 
Edwards.   
To a certain extent, this absence must be seen in the context of social history.  In 
the United States, for example, evangelicals during the nationalist period were confronted 
with the task of negotiating the political aftermath of the Revolution.  Those 
denominations, moreover, such as Baptists and Methodists, which had strong populist 
elements and which stood outside of the Congregationalist-Presbyterian establishment in 
New England, or which seemed to threaten in various ways the social stability of the 
dominant culture (as with Methodists in the South), were engaged in battles of their own 
that likely helped to squeeze out widespread interest in “cultural” pursuits that were 
easily associated with hegemonic control.141  Something similar may be said with regard 
to the socially suspect position of eighteenth-century Dissenters in Britain and of 
Methodism’s uncertain relationship to the power structures of the Anglican Church 
(though in this latter case there is some evidence that British Methodists were engaged 
during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in a full-scale attempt to achieve 
“respectability”142 – a phenomenon that may actually have contributed to British 
Methodism’s growing interest in aesthetics).   
However, this absence must also be attributed in part to the residual influence of 
Puritan sensibilities on the minds of many evangelicals.  “[I]t is not surprising,” wrote 
one early student of the Evangelical Movement in Britain, “to find Evangelicals deficient 
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in any appreciation of art and the aesthetic side of life.  Some went further, and, with the 
Puritans, looked upon beauty as the snare of the evil one, a siren voice luring them from 
the strait path of righteousness.”143  That many eighteenth-century evangelicals persisted 
in such a mindset is undeniable.  At the same time, however, such a statement does not 
represent the whole story.  The difficulty with this view is not its absolute falsity but 
rather its failure to give due weight to eighteenth-century evangelicalism’s discontinuity 
with the Puritan religio-aesthetic tradition.  The yeast of the Enlightenment may have 
been slow to exercise its leavening effects on evangelical aesthetics, but it was 
nonetheless sure for all that.144 
In fact, the Enlightenment was instrumental in dislodging evangelicals from the 
strictures of the Puritan tradition and in leading evangelicals toward the mature aesthetic 
discourse that was to appear in evangelical periodicals of the mid-to-late nineteenth 
century.  It is virtually impossible, for example, to account for a poem such as the 
following, which appeared in the pages of the Arminian Magazine in 1784, apart from the 
growing evangelical awareness of Enlightenment mental philosophy and its implications 
for aesthetics.  Entitled “On Imagination,” this paean to the creative faculty – which 
participated in a well established eighteenth-century tradition of poetic reflections on the 
imagination dating back to Mark Akenside – would have been unthinkable to a Puritan 
writer only a century before: 
 
Thy various works, imperial Queen, we see, 
How bright their forms! how deckèd with pomp by thee! 
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Thy wondèrous acts in beautèous order stand, 
And all attest how potent is thy hand. 
 
Imagination! who can sing thy force? 
Or who describe the swiftness of thy course? 
Soaring through the air to find the bright abode, 
Thè empyrèal palace of the thundèring God. 
……………………………………………… 
Such is thy powèr, nor are thine orders vain, 
O thou leader of the mental train: 
In full perfection all thy works are wrought, 
And thine the sceptre o’er the realms of thought.145 
 
“Leader of the mental train” suggests the anonymous poet’s familiarity with the 
associational and empiricist psychology of the Enlightenment, but such a poem – with its 
unqualified praise of the imagination as an “imperial Queen” capable of finding out “Thè 
empyrèal palace of the thundèring God” – also offers a foretaste of the romantic bent of 
so much later evangelical criticism and theory.  In this way, this particular poem is a 
crucial, if unusual, example of evangelical aesthetics in transition, and it captures in 
miniature the very progression that I have sought to trace throughout this chapter.  
Thanks to the Enlightenment, the Puritan tradition had been left behind, and the age of 
evangelical romanticism was beginning to dawn.  “The Christian relaxes in the temperate 
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use of all the gifts of Providence,” wrote Wilberforce in 1797.  “Imagination, and taste, 
and genius, and the beauties of creation, and the works of art, lie open to him.”146   
This same transition is also apparent in the growing number of essays and reviews 
devoted to philosophical criticism that appeared in early-nineteenth-century evangelical 
periodicals.  During the first decade of the new century, the British Eclectic Review was 
founded, which was perhaps the first evangelical periodical to feature regular discussions 
of aesthetic topics.  In the 1810s, essays and reviews treating aesthetics began to appear 
with increasing frequency in other periodicals as well.  In 1812, the Christian Observer, 
the famous mouthpiece of the Clapham Sect, reviewed two tomes of (not surprisingly) 
Scottish aesthetics, Archibald Alison’s Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste 
(reissued in 1811) and Dugald Stewart’s Philosophical Essays, which included lengthy 
sections on beauty and sublimity.  The same decade also witnessed the publication of a 
protracted debate on the place of fiction and an inquiry into “Sacred Poetry.”147  By the 
1820s, it was not uncommon to meet with articles on art and aesthetics in both British 
and American evangelical periodicals.  As William Charvat has demonstrated, moreover, 
it was Scottish aesthetics which guided the critical perspective of these periodicals until 
the third decade of the nineteenth century.148  To be sure, the first three decades of the 
nineteenth century still proved to be slow going for some evangelical theorists and critics.  
As Doreen Rosman argues, though “the traditional charge of philistinism” is not quite 
applicable to British evangelicals between 1790 and 1830, “even … the most cultured 
evangelicals” found it difficult “to reconcile their enjoyment of the arts with their 
faith.”149   
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 After the 1830s, however, the small aesthetic sparks that had been lit by 
evangelicalism’s engagement with the Enlightenment were finally fanned into flame.  
Once again, the reason for this was partly a social one.  As Noll observes of American 
evangelicals, “by the 1830s … a new era had begun.  While the single-minded pietism 
that fueled early evangelical mobilization never passed away, it was increasingly joined 
by other concerns.  The business of organizing Christian civilization took its place 
alongside the business of saving souls.”150  British evangelicals, meanwhile, were 
similarly invested in the business of organizing Christian civilization – a main facet of 
which was the propagation of an aesthetic culture underwritten by the theoretical 
exploration of art.151  Here, at least, one portion of the Puritan tradition survived intact: 
the desire to construct a nation and a culture that was (Protestant) Christian through and 
through.  For the Puritans, however, art had occupied no significant place in this vision, 
though its inclusion had, of course, always been a hypothetical possibility.  This interest 
in organizing Christian civilization, moreover, coincided with, and was perhaps a 
reflection of, a growing desire for “respectability” among those denominations like the 
Baptists and Methodists who had traditionally occupied positions of “dissent,” broadly 
conceived.  An increased interest in “high” aesthetic culture may be seen as one 
manifestation of this newfound longing for respectability.  
Most importantly, though, it was during the 1830s that evangelicalism came under 
the new influence of romanticism,152 and the philosophical aesthetic discourse that now 
appeared regularly in the pages of numerous evangelical periodicals reflected and 
refracted this new romantic ideology.  This romanticization of evangelical aesthetics 
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injected a new energy and a new confidence into the mature aesthetic discourse of 
evangelical writers and editors.  At the same time, however, this romanticization was also 
in many ways an extension of the trends that we have traced throughout this chapter, for 
as Henry May has observed, the aesthetic legacy of the Scottish philosophy was itself a 
finally ambiguous one.  It could lead, on the one hand, to the reinforcement of negative 
attitudes towards the imagination, while it could lead (and did lead), on the other, to that 
“imperial Queen” of romanticism – the Imagination (capital I).153  Guided by the vibrant 
light of the romantics, many evangelical critics also turned with new self-awareness 
against the Puritanism of their ancestors, and if they did not always denounce Puritanism 
in toto, they were quite content to throw the Puritan aesthetic tradition – or, rather, their 
own projections of it – under the bus in order to bolster their own aesthetic vision.  It is to 
some of the main features of this new, de-puritanized “evangelical romanticism” as it 
flourished after 1830 that we now turn. 
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CHAPTER 3 
EXPRESSING THE IDEAL: CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF ART AND THE 
IMAGINATION 
 
Poetry is neither a formal investigation nor a logical demonstration of truth, but it is – if 
it be worthy of its name – its highest and most memorable expression.  It seizes on all 
that is pure, beautiful, and good, dwells familiarly in the realm of the ideal, and connects 
it with the primary and universal instincts of the race. 
—“The Poems of Lewis Morris,” Baptist Magazine (1890) 
 
Near the conclusion of an 1867 review of E.S. Dallas’s treatise on aesthetics, The Gay 
Science, J.H. Rigg, a British Methodist who would later edit the London Quarterly 
Review,1 finally loses patience with what he takes to be Dallas’s inveterate predilection 
for the vague and mystical.  According to Dallas, the glory of art is its “Secrecy,” for, as 
he contends, the “field of art is the unknown and unknowable.”  In Rigg’s view, however, 
Dallas’s happy acquiescence to the impenetrable mystery of art leaves much to be 
desired: 
 
Why has not Mr. Dallas long before this stage of his book come away 
from the haze of generalities, and defined with something like precision 
what the sphere of art includes?  To say that it is the sphere of pleasure is 
but flourishing an unknown quantity before our eyes.  What have poetry 
and the arts in common?  Why may they be classed together?  What are 
their common objects?  What is the region which they occupy in 
common?2 
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While Rigg’s frustration is directed specifically at the peculiar vagaries of Dallas, the 
questions he raises represent a perennial difficulty in modern aesthetics, for any attempt 
to articulate a coherent philosophy of art must ultimately confront a single basic problem: 
how to understand and define Art.  Or, as James Rogers bluntly frames the issue in the 
opening line of another article in the London Quarterly Review: “What is Art?”3   
To the ears of some contemporary aestheticians, grand inquiries like these may 
sound suspiciously essentialist,4 but in the minds of countless nineteenth-century writers, 
both evangelical and non-evangelical, it was assumed that questions regarding the 
foundational nature of art might reasonably admit of an answer.  This is not to suggest, of 
course, that Victorian writers were unaware of the difficulties associated with defining 
“Art” or that they approached the matter blithely.  As the American Sidney Dyer 
observed in the Baptist Quarterly: “That there is such a thing as poetry, no one will for a 
moment question.  We see it, we hear it, we feel it … but when we ask the critic what it 
is, a new confusion of tongues takes place, as the various schools give their conflicting 
responses.”5  Dyer’s allusion to Babel is surely an apt one, yet Babel aside, almost 
without exception these very same writers did not hesitate to venture their own 
definitions of art or poetry or painting, and even those authors who gingerly avoided 
raising the issue in explicit terms in the end formulated more or less distinct conceptions 
of the nature and function of art amid other speculations or amid the exigencies of 
practical criticism.  Victorian articles and reviews abound with statements commencing 
with such tell-tale phrases as “Art is…,” “Poetry is…,” or “Music is….” 
For evangelicals after the 1830s, art was increasingly a serious business.  In her 
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study of British evangelical attitudes towards art and culture between 1790 and 1833, 
Doreen Rosman notes: “All the available evidence suggests that evangelicals approved of 
art both as an embellishment of society and as a profession proper for Christian pursuit.”  
Ultimately, however, she concludes that for evangelicals “Art might be a desirable 
embellishment of society but it was no more than an embellishment … a toy to be 
contrasted with true religious treasure.”  Art could serve as a comparatively innocent 
source of pleasure suitable for relaxation or amusement, but aside from its diversionary 
and ornamental uses, it had very little to do with the serious side of life or pressing 
matters of eternal concern.  Whether this perspective represented a majority-view among 
evangelicals or only a particular segment of a diverse population is difficult to say, and 
Rosman is careful to note the relative paucity of source material;6 but what is certain is 
that such a view of art contrasts sharply with the view later advocated by many 
evangelical writers at mid-century.  Consider, for example, the rhapsodic conclusion to 
Rogers’s “The Science and Poetry of Art,” published in 1855: 
 
for Art is not, nor ought to be regarded as, the frivolous embellishment of 
an idle and voluptuous existence, but the fine inspiration of a thoroughly 
accomplished understanding, – an understanding not severed from the 
heart, and commencing only with the rigid formalities and iron 
mechanisms of worldly science, “purchasing knowledge by the loss of 
power;” but fed, and warmed, and brightened, and endued with genial 
sagacity by the living soul that flows through and impregnates its whole 
substance and activity.  As long as there are faculties in man which find 
their aliment and satisfaction in nothing else than ideal semblances of the 
good, the true, and the beautiful, so long will Art remain a profound 
necessity of human nature ….7 
 
There is an unmistakable gravitas in this passage that would likely have surprised an 
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earlier generation of evangelicals trained to view the fine arts with either levity or 
indifference, if not downright hostility.  No longer is art a “frivolous embellishment”; 
rather, it has become, as Rogers solemnly declares, “a profound necessity of human 
nature.”  Playful adornment has given way to “fine inspiration” and a “living soul,” and 
art seems somehow to have descended from on high, “trailing clouds of glory” as it came. 
 Of course, a passage like this one represents one end of the evangelical spectrum 
of opinion concerning art.  Not all nineteenth-century evangelicals abandoned an older 
view of art, nor were all evangelical suspicions that art was but fleeting and temporal 
allayed.  Yet the fact that such a passage existed at all in the pages of a periodical like the 
London Quarterly Review points to a critical shift in evangelical conceptions of art.  This 
shift, as we have seen, may be attributed largely to the general diffusion of, first, 
Enlightenment, and later, romantic ideas throughout the nineteenth-century Anglo-
American world.  Indeed, by the 1850s a number of evangelical critics in both Britain and 
America were avowed Coleridgeans (at least in aesthetics if not necessarily in theology) 
who asked and answered questions about the essence of art within a conceptual 
framework inherited from the British romantics and from moderate forms of German 
idealism.  And even those evangelicals who proved unwilling to follow Coleridge into the 
ethereal regions of Teutonic speculation accepted as normative many another aesthetic 
doctrine derived from romantic poets and critics – most prominently, perhaps, the notion 
of art as self-expression.  By the middle of the nineteenth century, evangelical aesthetics 
had, in effect, become romanticized, and as a result, the question, What is Art?, found for 
evangelicals both new significance and new answers. 
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Art as a Function of Mind: Evangelical Expressivism 
M.H. Abrams has summed up the aesthetic orientation of romanticism as one in which 
theorists “pose and answer aesthetic questions in terms of the relation of art to the artist, 
rather than to external nature, or to the audience, or to the internal requirements of the 
work itself.”  This tendency to think about art in terms of the mental processes of the 
artist was in many ways an extension of the empiricist mental philosophy of the 
Enlightenment.  Romantic critics, however, introduced important innovations that led to 
revised understandings of the nature of art, the artist, and the imagination, and thus the 
romantic turn inward can also be seen as “a radical shift … in the alignment of aesthetic 
thinking.”8  Within a genetic theory of this sort, art necessarily becomes a function of the 
peculiar consciousness of the artist; whatever else it might be, it is invariably subjective.  
“Poetry is the spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings,” wrote Wordsworth in the oft-
quoted statement from his Preface to the Lyrical Ballads.9  By the middle-third of the 
nineteenth century, many writers who embarked on a formal exploration of aesthetics in 
the pages of evangelical periodicals were operating squarely within this framework.  In 
1845, for example, an author reviewing Leigh Hunt’s Imagination and Fancy in the 
Congregationalist British Quarterly Review approved of Hunt’s “calling poetry ‘the 
utterance of a passion’” since “it refers us back at once to the poet’s mind.”10  James 
Rogers argued in a similar vein concerning art in general: “Thus we are thrown back 
upon the human mind, its powers and laws, both of perception and activity, for the origin 
of Art.”11  Even the Old School Presbyterian Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review – 
which, under the longtime editorship of Charles Hodge, was known for its tough 
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Reformed polemics and its longstanding allegiance to Baconianism12 – acknowledged the 
intrinsically subjective nature of art in terms of the special processes of human 
psychology.  Though beauty is “an objective quality in nature,” it is nevertheless subject 
to alteration by the human mind, a process that reaches its culmination in art: “We have 
already stated how the apprehension of the objective beauty of nature is modified, when 
it comes to be blended with the thoughts and feelings of the mind itself.  Now it is 
obvious that this subjective element must be more predominant in that class of beauties 
which it is the object of poetry, and of art generally, to reproduce.”13  This acceptance of 
the premise that aesthetic problems are best handled in the context of the powers and 
laws of the human mind affected evangelical understandings of the nature of art in 
significant ways.   
To begin with, evangelicals gradually came to embrace and advocate the romantic 
doctrine of art – and especially poetry – as self-expression.  As early as 1823, in fact, at 
least one evangelical periodical was gesturing towards the rudiments of an expressivist 
theory of poetry: “In treating of the imitative arts,” noted the Presbyterian Christian 
Advocate, “poetry lays claim to a high place.  It may be called the melody of the mind.”14  
Here, the writer attempts to walk a fine line between the classical and neoclassical 
conception of art as imitation and the more recent view of art as an outgrowth of the 
poet’s psyche.  Poetry’s primary classification is still as a species of imitation, but 
imitation has itself commenced an inward turn.  By the 1830s, the notion of art and 
poetry as self-expression was appearing with increasing frequency in many evangelical 
treatises and reviews.  In his Lectures on General Literature, Poetry &c. delivered in 
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1830 and 1831, James Montgomery, who was perhaps the nineteenth-century evangelical 
poet par excellence, defined poetry as “the shorthand of thought,” arguing that 
“Language… is a dead letter till the spirit within the poet himself breathes through it, 
gives it voice, and makes it audible to the very mind.”  Language, Montgomery 
continued, must spring “from a full mind.”15  For a writer in the Eclectic Review, the best 
poetry arises “when hand, and head, and heart are all free to exercise spontaneous 
thought, and give utterance to unfettered feeling.”16  Evangelicals, it seems, were proving 
quite receptive to the introspective focus in aesthetic theory inaugurated by the romantics 
– a point, in fact, which was noticed by at least one contemporary observer.  A “great 
change” has “taken place in modern poetry,” noted an author in the Quarterly Christian 
Spectator, a change “which [has] turned the eye of the poet from external objects to the 
world of passions within.”  Poetry, the author avers, arises “in the deep and mystic 
recesses of the human soul,” and in a move that was as yet relatively rare among 
evangelicals in the United States in 1833, the author bows to contemporary German 
aesthetics by citing Friedrich von Schlegel’s view of poetry as consisting in “invention, 
expression and inspiration.”17    
These statements from the 1830s serve as a valuable index to evangelicalism’s 
relationship to “mainstream” developments in transatlantic aesthetics.  When one 
M.C.H., writing in the Wesleyan-Methodist Magazine in 1831, assured his audience that 
“It would be idle to argue that all poetry, of whatever class, must emanate from the 
original and inward music of the mind” because “On this point there can be no dispute,” 
he not only sounded remarkably like Hazlitt18 but was also two years ahead of John 
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Stuart Mill’s description of poetry as “the expression or uttering forth of feeling” in his 
essay “What Is Poetry?”19  By the time Mill published his thoughts on the nature of 
poetry, such thoughts had already become axiomatic, as M.C.H.’s refusal to enter into 
first principles on the matter makes clear.  By the 1830s, then, many evangelicals were 
well beyond the point of expressing any hostility or apathy to art in general.  It does not 
appear, moreover – in the case of poetic theory at least – that they were subject to the 
intellectual and cultural lag sometimes attributed to them.  Rather, if Mill’s essay can be 
seen as evidence of the broad dissemination of romantic expressivism, then Anglo-
American evangelicals appear to have kept time with their non-evangelical 
contemporaries.20 
As the century progressed, the view that poetry and art are essentially an 
outpouring of the artist’s mind became standard fare among evangelical writers – the 
effusiveness with which this view was sometimes posited growing in proportion to its 
status as aesthetic truism.21  Upon his appointment to the Professorship of Rhetoric and 
English Language and Literature at Princeton College, James C. Welling delivered an 
inaugural address on “The True Sources of Literary Inspiration” (an address later 
published in the Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review in 1871) in which he plainly 
aspires to the same level of eloquence that he maintains can only come from within: “The 
well-head of eloquence, if it is to flow in copious and limpid streams, must gush up from 
the depths of the soul; the spray of the fountain that is fed by a force-pump glitters for a 
moment in the sun, and then runs dry.  We can express only the Beauty and the Force that 
are in us – which we have made an integral part of our nature.”22  This fountain metaphor 
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(despite its oddly industrial reference to the force-pump), so typical of romantic 
declarations on the nature of poetry and the poetic process, also underscores another key 
element in the expressivist theory of art adopted by evangelical writers, namely, that art 
and poetry are the expression of emotion.  Poetry is not the enunciation of propositions, 
doctrines, or abstract truths available to the reason or to scientific method but rather the 
outpouring of the artist’s feelings, heart, imagination, or soul.  “It has been well remarked 
that ‘sentimental feeling is the first requisite in lyric poetry,’” observed the Christian 
Spectator.23  The Methodist Christian Advocate and Journal and Zion’s Herald agreed: 
“Poetry is the offspring of a mind heated to an uncommon degree; it is a kind of spirit 
thrown off in the effervescence of agitated feeling.”24  Yet it was an author in the British 
Quarterly Review who perhaps best demonstrated the identification of poetry with 
emotion: 
 
We feel convinced that, so long as the human heart exults with rapture, or 
droops with sorrow – palpitates with hope, or is overwhelmed with despair 
– melts with love, or rages with jealousy – glows with anger, or is 
maddened with revenge – is, in short, the subject of those innumerable 
feelings to which it can find utterance only in the language of the bard – so 
long will there be materials for poetry of the highest class.25 
 
In a broad sense, when viewed against the backdrop of evangelical intellectual 
history and piety, it is not particularly surprising that an aesthetic theory which 
emphasized the centrality and sincerity of the emotions and of experience would have 
seemed amenable to many nineteenth-century evangelicals.  Since the time of the first 
transatlantic revivals in the eighteenth century, evangelicals had stressed the importance 
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of heartfelt religion over and against a cold formalism.  Evangelicalism was often 
described as “vital religion,” or a “religion of the heart,” and though many evangelicals 
took care to avoid simplistic dichotomies between the “heart” and “head,” passionate 
commitment had always been at the center of evangelical identity.  Passionate 
commitment, furthermore, was also by definition personal commitment, and even the 
most establishmentarian denominations had tended to stress the individualized nature of a 
person’s encounter with God.  In matters of faith, argued William Wilberforce in 1797, 
“the point of importance is, the internal disposition of the mind.”26  This emphasis on 
both sincere feeling and personal experience accounts to a great extent for the rich 
tradition of evangelical hymnody – a tradition which, at least implicitly, had sought to 
make room for individual creativity and expression.  Evangelicals, for instance, had been 
the first to abandon the regimented psalm-singing associated with Sternhold and Hopkins 
in favor of original hymns.27  In addition, the pietistic stress on the necessity of vital faith 
was also reinforced by evangelicalism’s early affiliation with the basic tenets of Lockean 
epistemology, which helped to underscore even further the significance of individual 
experience, while anticipations of certain aspects of expressivism could be found in the 
writings of the leading proponents of the Scottish philosophy.28  Such observations may 
thus help to explain in part why romantic notions of art as an expression of emotion met 
with a welcome reception among many nineteenth-century evangelicals.  Yet while an 
indigenous openness to personal experience and heartfelt emotion, as well as a familiarity 
with Enlightenment philosophy, may have provided fertile ground for some romantic 
theories, it was the rising influence of romanticism and of romantic critical theory that 
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brought about the profound alterations in the critical thought and vocabulary of 
evangelical critics. 
This is perhaps nowhere more evident than in the evangelical willingness to see 
art anew in terms of the special principles of romantic psychology.  It is important to 
recall that the expressivist theories advocated by prominent romantic poets and critics 
were rarely an entirely solipsistic affair.  Poetry, that is, was not a matter of simple 
effusion, an unmitigated and unmodified eruption of the heart; rather, art and poetry were 
viewed as the special products of an interchange between the artist’s imagination and the 
world of sense perception.29  Blake, it is true, consistently deplored what he perceived as 
mind’s subservience to nature, and he undoubtedly came closest to conceiving of the 
relationship between nature and the imagination in unilateral terms.30  Yet Blake, 
however, was surely one of the more radical romantics in this regard, and it was left to 
Wordsworth to state what was a more moderate and perhaps more typical position of the 
British romantics.  For Wordsworth, the mind-nature relationship was one of cooperation 
and “alliance”: empirical reality is never completely effaced but is instead “acted on and 
transformed by the feelings of the poet.”31 
 In this respect, evangelical theorists were by and large Wordsworthian (and, as we 
will see, Coleridgean) rather than Blakean.  That a significant number of mid-nineteenth-
century evangelical critics nonetheless accepted the idea that art and poetry are the 
products of the mind’s special interaction with the objects of perception is abundantly 
clear.  “The poet aims not merely to paint the scenes of nature, but to invest them with the 
thoughts and feelings which they excite in his own mind; and to clothe them with the 
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power of awakening sympathetic emotions in the bosom of others,” explained the 
Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review in 1849.32  In a similar vein, “Personification is 
the life of poetry,” argued the Methodist Christian Advocate and Journal: “The poet 
looks upon nature, not with the philosopher, as composed of certain abstractions… but he 
breathes upon them, and they quicken into personal life, and become objects, as it were, 
of personal attachment.”33  At times, in fact, poetry in the abstract came close to being 
defined not as a particular genre of writing, a peculiar use of language, or even the 
specific aesthetic product generated by the artist’s emotional interaction with objective 
reality but as the psychological relationship between mind and object itself.  “The fact is, 
the poetic principle does not so much exist in a given object, as in the point and light in 
which we view it, and our capacity to draw on the powers of imagination to array the 
imperfect and real with the semblance and perfections of an ideal existence.”34  Poetry 
has here merged with, and even become, a special sort of hermeneutic, and though this 
critic is yet far from Blake’s absolutism of the Imagination, the balance between mind 
and nature has tipped in favor of the artist’s mind. 
 In granting preeminence to the transformative powers of the artist’s mind and 
emotions, nineteenth-century evangelical critics were in effect modifying, and even 
overturning, ideas that had long been held by many Puritans and eighteenth-century 
evangelicals.  For most Puritans, what had counted was an objective and accurate 
apprehension of the natural world.  An overly subjective interpretation of reality was a 
sign not of imaginative genius but of a disordered fancy; it was a dangerous departure 
from God’s created order.35  This principle served as a crucial guide in matters of 
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theology and philosophy, but many Puritans had also been reluctant to abrogate this 
standard entirely when it came to art.  Though Puritan poetry was frequently loaded with 
a variety of metaphors and conceits, such figurative devices were often seen as an 
adornment of reality rather than as a reinterpretation of it.  In other cases, Puritan writers 
had allowed that the imaginative adjustment of reality was essential to poetry, but as a 
result, they had simply treated it (not unlike Locke) as a species of play, which was 
acceptable in its place but was not to be taken seriously.  Edward Leigh, for example, had 
defined poetry in A Treatise of Religion & Learning (1656) as “an art of deceit, which 
measureth expressions, not by the truth of the subject, but by the strength of the 
imagination working upon it.”  He had even suggested that it “principally serves for 
venting extraordinary affections.”  Yet for this reason it was best described as “the luxury 
of Learning.”36  By the 1830s, however, evangelical writers had united with the romantics 
in celebrating poetry and art for their ability to refashion the created order of God via the 
metamorphic power of the individual imagination.  This re-creation, moreover, was no 
playful “luxury”; instead, it was a profoundly serious activity.  Significantly, the Puritan 
emphasis on the objective apprehension of the natural world lived on until at least the 
1860s in nineteenth-century evangelicalism’s commitment to common sense realism and 
Baconian science; art, however, had become, by definition, that which existed in 
opposition to this kind of scientific perception.  
A frequent corollary of this understanding of art was the tendency to disparage, 
displace, or redefine one of the central concepts in the western aesthetic tradition: 
imitation, or mimesis.  To be sure, the concept of imitation had never been a stable one – 
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one only need recall how quick Aristotle was to rethink Plato’s usage – but the term had 
nevertheless endured as a perennial presence in western aesthetics well into the 
eighteenth century.  Romantic expressivist theories, however, did much to challenge the 
traditional stress on art as imitation.  At times, theorists opposed imitation and expression 
absolutely, as when John Keble criticized Aristotle’s conception of poetry: “Aristotle… 
considered the essence of poetry to be Imitation… Expression we say, rather than 
imitation.”37  Other romantics retained the term but revised its sense to fit more neatly 
within a theory that prioritized the artist’s mental contribution to the art object, as when 
Hazlitt suggested in Plotinian fashion that the poet mirrors the inner self.38  In the main, 
though, imitation became useful as a purely negative term, as a means of signifying what 
true art is not.  Though imitation had rarely been synonymous with ultra-realism or the 
precise duplication of empirical reality, in its juxtaposition to the forming powers of the 
active mind it now came to represent passivity and mechanism, and in a certain sense, 
mindlessness.   
It is thus further evidence of the romantic influence on evangelical aesthetics – 
and on evangelical conceptions of the essence of art in particular – that many evangelical 
writers reiterated this negative conception of imitation in their descriptions of art.  “The 
extensive province of Imitation is very sterile; – it produces nothing,” noted an allegorical 
foray into “The Empire of Poetry,” by Fontenelle, reprinted in 1831 in the Southern 
Baptist magazine, the Christian Index.39  Genuine art is not a faithful reproduction of 
facts in which the mind of the artist reflects nature with mimetic precision; rather, the 
reverse is true.  Nature is said to reflect the mind and emotions of the artist: “the highest 
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poetry is not that which most closely imitates nature in its descriptions; but which 
suggests the highest thoughts and the purest emotions by its pictures of nature.”40  
Writing in the Southern Presbyterian Review in 1863, Joseph LeConte illustrated the 
extent to which evangelical periodicals had come to embrace the view of art as an active 
expression of mind and emotion, as well as the corresponding distaste for any theory that 
smacked of mechanical passivity.  Taken as a whole, LeConte’s aesthetic was far from 
being an uncritical regurgitation of romantic expressivism.41  When it came to imitation, 
however, his disdain was as poignant as any:  
 
Pure imitative art is mechanic art, and that, too, of the lowest kind.  It 
requires neither sense of beauty nor imagination, but only accurate 
measurement.  It exercises neither imagination nor feeling, but only the 
understanding.  The copyist of nature bears the same relation to the true 
artist, which the ordinary manufacturer of the steam engine does to its 
great inventor and creator, James Watt.42 
 
LeConte’s attack on imitation, so replete with the binaries central to romantic 
aesthetics (imagination/understanding, mechanic/organic, feeling/intellect, 
imitation/creation), exemplifies the tendency of one strand of the romantic tradition to 
conceptualize imitation in terms that could serve as a useful foil for expressivist theories 
– a move which ultimately stripped mimesis of the richer meaning it had held in classical 
and neoclassical thought.  Not all evangelical writers, however, were as rigid in their 
repudiation of imitation as was LeConte; some opted instead to follow an alternative line 
of romantic thought which sought to retain the notion of art as imitation by redefining it.  
For LeConte, imitation and copy were clearly synonymous: both terms signified the sort 
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of facsimile that could be generated by the passive reception of sensory data.  For those 
evangelicals who knew their Coleridge, however, the matter was not so simple.  
Coleridge had attempted to preserve the concept of imitation by linking it to the active 
powers of the Imagination.  Imitation, in Coleridge’s sense, involved the conscious 
shaping power of the artist, whereas copy was nothing more than mechanical realism.  At 
the same time, according to Coleridge, artists ought not imitate objects in all of their 
sensuous minutiae but must work instead to grasp their ideal essence or spirit.  Following 
Coleridge, some evangelicals were in fact beginning to entertain the notion that perhaps 
art had transcendental significance.        
 
Art as Ideal:  The Emergence of an Evangelical Aesthetic Idealism 
Whatever the idiosyncrasies marking the aesthetic theories of various evangelical 
authors, nearly all of them prior to the close of the nineteenth century were convinced 
that art was somehow “ideal.”  For most nineteenth-century evangelical critics, in fact, 
the notion of the ideal was the sine qua non of any definition of art.  “If there is one word 
by which we would test an artist or a critic, a single term in which we could sum up the 
essence of a mind, or the end and purpose of a life, it should be the word ideal …. And 
shall art alone be destitute of this vision and faculty divine?”43  At other times, in keeping 
with the romantic preoccupation with the grounds of art in the mind of the artist, 
evangelical writers shifted their focus to the mental process of idealization: “Although 
real life is the source of inspiration, every true artist throws a certain degree of 
idealization into his work.  Without this, it cannot be a work of art.”44  Yet whether the 
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emphasis was placed on the ideal as an object of perception or on the activity itself, 
evangelical critics were largely united in the belief that art is essentially ideal. 
 In insisting on art’s “ideal” character, evangelical critics were in one sense 
participating in a well established tradition of thinking about art.  Like “imitation,” the 
concept of the “ideal” has a long history in western aesthetics.  It has frequently been 
associated, for example, with the beauty of classical Greek sculpture, it guided the 
approach of early-sixteenth-century painters like Raphael, and it played a prominent role 
in the neoclassical theories of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  As Abrams 
explains, prior to the nineteenth century the term was often used to account for the 
departure of various art objects from the observable forms of nature.  Specifically, the 
western tradition had typically discussed the ideal nature of art in terms of what Abrams 
calls the “empirical ideal.”  There are several distinct, though related, versions of this 
idea within the western aesthetic tradition, but in general the empirical ideal refers to the 
representation of an object or entity, the particulars of which have been “reassembled to 
make a composite beauty, or filtered to reveal a central form or the common denominator 
of a type, or in some fashion culled or ornamented for the greater delight of the reader.”45  
Thus, an artist may paint a rose, for example, by combining the best characteristics of 
several individual roses existing in the material universe, or alternatively, the artist may 
render a rose by both excising the blemishes and accentuating the beauties of a single 
model.  In this conception of the ideal, the emphasis is on what is taken to be always and 
everywhere the same – what is most general, universal, basic, familiar, and common to 
all members of a species as they exist in the world.46   
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Rosman has noted a similar fascination with the ideal among British evangelical 
writers prior to 1830.  Late-eighteenth- and early-nineteenth-century evangelicals, she 
argues, harbored a deep “sympathy for classicism,” a point which suggests that these 
writers understood the ideal in a basically neoclassical, or empirical, sense.47  Yet even as 
these evangelical critics were busy sympathizing with the canons of neoclassical criticism 
and taste, other theorists, particularly in Germany, had begun to employ the term ideal in 
a much different sense.  For German idealist philosophers like Schelling and Hegel, the 
ideal denoted something far more extensive than it had in the criticism of the British 
neoclassicists; or perhaps more precisely, the ideal took on a considerably different 
valence within the complicated context of post-Kantian metaphysics.  These idealist 
systems generally posited the history of the universe as a teleological process in which 
the “Absolute” (variously defined as the identity of subjectivity and objectivity, as 
totality, or as “self-thinking Thought”) gradually aspired to greater self-consciousness.  In 
order to achieve this ultimate state of self-awareness, the Absolute proceeded through a 
series of stages (again, variously defined) in which it manifested, or objectified, itself in 
nature and in the creative activity of humankind.  In the broadest sense, “ideal” referred 
to subjective consciousness, mind, or “spirit” over and against objective nature, 
unconscious process, or the “real,” and it was through the evolution of human 
consciousness that the Absolute came to know itself.  In some cases, however, as in the 
aesthetics of G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831), the ideal acquired a more specialized meaning.  
In Hegel’s aesthetics, the “Ideal” became a unique term signifying the material 
embodiment of the Idea, or the Absolute apprehended as beauty in art.48  It is important to 
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note that when it came to describing the practical techniques of idealization in the 
creation of art, German idealist philosophies did not always exclude the sorts of 
approaches implied by the “empirical ideal,” but the ideal itself became a far weightier 
concept metaphysically. 
Careful attention to the manner in which a number of mid-nineteenth-century 
evangelical writers appropriated the term “ideal” makes it clear that evangelical 
understandings of the ideal had undergone an important transition since the period 
analyzed by Rosman.  A growing number of evangelical critics had begun to appropriate 
the insights of idealist philosophy in their discussions of art.  While some evangelical 
writers continued to employ “ideal” in a roughly neoclassical sense, for others the ideal 
had become associated with the transcendental, or the “spiritual”; it had, in short, become 
part and parcel of an aesthetic idealism. 
 The growth of aesthetic idealism among some Victorian evangelicals coincided 
with the general diffusion of German thought during the middle third of the nineteenth 
century.  Before the 1830s, most British and American evangelicals, as we have seen, 
were committed philosophically to the principles of Scottish common sense realism.  
Evangelicals had found common sense realism to be an especially effective apologetic 
tool, for in its strong affirmation of a mind-independent reality, common sense realism 
enabled, in the words of Sydney Ahlstrom, “an all-out attack on both materialism and 
idealism, as well as the pantheism that either type of monistic analysis could lead to.”  
Furthermore, according to the principles of common sense realism, the universe not only 
exists independently of the consciousness of human beings but is also distinct from 
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(though not independent of) God Himself, a point that helped to reinforce traditional 
understandings “of God’s transcendence, and made revelation necessary.”49  Common 
sense philosophy would continue to play an important role in the thinking of many 
conservative evangelicals well into the twentieth century.  Gradually, however, various 
forms of post-Kantian philosophy began to impact the thought patterns of some 
evangelicals.  Idealism had already gained some traction in Britain through the writings 
of Coleridge, while Emerson and the Transcendentalists began advocating similar 
doctrines in America during the 1830s.50  In addition, German ideas were being brought 
to America by a growing number of prominent theologians and scholars who undertook 
advanced study in German universities, as well as by a steady stream of German 
immigrants.  By the 1840s, favorable references to Kant were appearing in publications 
like the Methodist Quarterly Review, and by the 1850s German philosophy had made 
significant headway in the halls of both British and American academia and in many 
artistic circles.51  Writing in the Southern Presbyterian Review in 1851, one observer 
hailed Boston as the literary epicenter of America but also added: “in no spot on our 
continent is there so strong a German influence as at and around Boston.”52   
In some instances, therefore, the evangelical exposure to German thought was 
direct.  It was not uncommon, especially during the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
for evangelical periodicals to review treatises published by German authors.  At least one 
denomination, moreover, the German Reformed, remained in close contact with 
developments in Germany as a result of ethnic ties.  When it came to aesthetics, however, 
it was German thought as transmitted by Coleridge that exercised the greatest influence 
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on evangelical thought.  Coleridge had been widely read in his native Britain, as well as 
in America – thanks in part to Congregationalist James Marsh’s 1829 American edition 
of Coleridge’s Aids to Reflection, to which he appended a laudatory introduction, and to 
the publication in 1854 of The Complete Works of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, edited by 
W.G.T. Shedd, a Presbyterian professor of church history at Andover Theological 
Seminary (and later Union Theological Seminary).  In the United States, the influence of 
Coleridge’s thought was initially confined primarily to the Northeast until after the 
1830s,53 but even the Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review – long a bulwark of 
Scottish realism – was by the middle of the nineteenth century conceding the far-reaching 
effects of Coleridge and of idealist philosophy, and advocating its cautious investigation 
by students.  “If any one author,” wrote a Princeton contributor in 1855, “has exercised a 
stronger moulding influence on a certain class of minds in our country, that have grown 
up within the last twenty years, than Coleridge, we have yet to learn who he is.”54  To be 
sure, not all denominations, or individuals within denominations, welcomed idealist 
philosophies to the same degree,55 but by the 1850s idealism had made significant inroads 
within evangelicalism, and Coleridge in particular had become the closest thing some 
evangelical critics had to a patron saint of aesthetics. 
 One of Coleridge’s more influential attempts to formulate the nature of art was his 
1818 lecture “On Poesy or Art.”  Grounded in the aesthetics of Friedrich Wilhelm von 
Schelling (1775-1854), this lecture marked a key moment in the Coleridgean mediation 
of German thought.  Its brevity also made the lecture comparatively accessible, and 
evangelical critics seem in some cases to have borrowed directly from the terminology 
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and concepts utilized therein.  “On Poesy or Art” therefore serves as an important 
backdrop for the emergence of an aesthetic idealism among evangelicals.  Coleridge 
begins his lecture by advancing what was to become an oft-quoted definition of art, 
emphasizing art’s intermediate position between the ideal world of mind or “spirit” and 
the material world of sense.  “Now Art … is the mediatress between, and the reconciler 
of nature and man.  It is, therefore, the power of humanizing nature, of infusing the 
thoughts and passions of man into everything which is the object of his 
contemplation….”56  The idea that art possesses both rational and material elements was 
a common feature of eighteenth-century British criticism – it can be traced back at least 
as far as Addison57 – but Coleridge’s understanding of this idea moves far beyond that of 
the eighteenth-century empiricists.  For Coleridge, the essence of art lies in a subjective 
appropriation of objective reality, a passionate modification of the objects of perception.  
Art begins when the human mind is confronted by an image or images in nature; 
however, the human artist possesses the power to mold and recombine these images 
according to a unifying idea that originates within.  Art, therefore, represents the fusion 
of the objective and subjective, or “the union and reconciliation of that which is nature 
with that which is exclusively human” (330). 
 As Coleridge makes clear, however, the artist’s “humanizing” of nature is neither 
a purely mechanical manipulation of sense data (in the empiricist tradition) nor a 
unilateral application of mind to matter.  Though the ideas which the artist impresses 
upon nature originate somehow within the human mind, they are also, paradoxically, a 
consequence of the artist’s perception of the essence of nature itself.  Artistic ideas, 
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therefore, are simultaneously a matter of both apprehension and projection, and art is 
both imitation and expression.  “We all know that art is the imitatress of nature,” declares 
Coleridge (330).  Immediately, however, he questions the meaning of both “imitate” and 
“nature.”  First, as noted above, there is a difference between “imitation” and “copy.”  A 
copy is akin to the imprint of a seal upon hot wax; an imitation, on the other hand – and 
all genuine art is a form of imitation – involves a productive tension between likeness and 
unlikeness.  Too much likeness, as in the case of wax models of the human figure, results 
in nothing but disgust since we find ourselves both jolted by the absence of life in a form 
where we would normally expect to find it and frustrated by the realization that we have 
been deceived.  Proper imitation, by contrast, “begin[s] with an acknowledged total 
difference, and then every touch of nature gives you the pleasure of an approximation to 
truth” (331).   
Secondly, Coleridge questions whether the artist must imitate everything in 
nature.  To this he replies that the artist must imitate only the beautiful.  Coleridge’s 
description of the beautiful occupies but a short paragraph, and it reads like a galloping 
survey of western accounts of beauty from Plato to Kant.  What is important, however, is 
that Coleridge conceives of beauty, at least in the case of living entities, in non-formalist 
terms – “in the living organic[,] [beauty] is not mere regularity of form” (331) – that is, it 
exists independently of any single material embodiment.  Art, then, does not imitate the 
forms of nature (natura naturata) but rather the idea or essence (natura naturans) behind 
it: “The artist must imitate that which is within the thing, that which is active through 
form and figure, and discourses to us by symbols – the Natur-geist, or spirit of nature … 
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for so only can he hope to produce any work truly natural in the object and truly human 
in the effect” (333).  Art is ideal, Coleridge contends, in that it embodies in an individual 
object a universal idea – an idea which, moreover, finds its incarnation via a process that 
is at the same time analogous to the grand forward motion of the Natur-geist operating in 
and through the dynamic development of nature.  Indeed, “nature itself would give us the 
impression of a work of art, if we could see the thought which is present at once in the 
whole and in every part” (330). 
 How is it possible, though, for human beings to perceive the ideal, to grasp the 
inward essence of nature?  Human beings, Coleridge suggests, can apprehend the inner 
spirit of nature because of the fundamental bond that exists “between nature in the higher 
sense and the soul of man” (332) – a theory Abrams has referred to as “psycho-natural 
parallelism,” though Coleridge himself preferred the term “consubstantiality.”58  For 
Coleridge, “to know is to resemble” (333) and hence the soul(s) of humankind must bear 
an ontological affinity to the spirit of nature and, in fact, to God Himself; to grasp the 
essence of nature is in part to recognize the spiritual kinship of all things.  Such rhetoric, 
of course, can tend towards the solipsistic, as well as towards the monistic or pantheistic 
– criticisms frequently leveled against varieties of idealism in the nineteenth century, not 
least of all by evangelicals themselves.  Coleridge, however, was no Berkeleyan, and he 
was well aware of the dangers inherent in an unrestrained and unqualified idealism.  
Following Schelling, his aim was to “reconcile” the objective and the subjective – a goal 
which ipso facto assumed that objective nature exists independently of the individual ego.  
“For of all we see, hear, feel, and touch the substance is and must be in ourselves,” writes 
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Coleridge.  And yet, “there is no alternative in reason between the dreary (and thank 
heaven! almost impossible) belief that everything around us is but a phantom, or that the 
life which is in us is in them likewise…” (333).  Too much likeness, after all, ends in 
shock and disgust; for Coleridge, rather, it was about “likeness in the difference, 
difference in the likeness, and a reconcilement of both in one” (331).  Nor, it is worth 
adding, was Coleridge a pantheist.  It is true, as J. Robert Barth observes, that Coleridge 
experienced an ongoing “conflict between his ‘dynamic philosophy’ and his Christian 
faith,” but pantheism was a system that Coleridge “shunned all his life.”59  Whatever 
pantheistic demons Coleridge may have wrestled with had apparently been exorcised 
once and for all in the “Eolian Harp.”  One wonders, in fact, whether it was Coleridge’s 
reputation as a Christian thinker that helps to account for the relative ease with which 
some evangelical writers took to Coleridge’s idealist aesthetics. 
 We are now in a better position to catch the Coleridgean echoes, not to mention 
the wholesale borrowings, in the aesthetic theories of a number of evangelical authors 
during the latter half of the nineteenth century.  Two articles in particular, both published 
in Britain in 1855 may serve to illustrate the extent to which evangelical periodicals had 
become a forum for full-scale idealist manifestoes in the Coleridgean vein.  The first of 
these, Rogers’s “The Science and Poetry of Art,” which appeared in the London 
Quarterly Review, does not mention Coleridge specifically, though the article is aglow 
with Coleridgean concepts and turns of phrase – many of them seemingly lifted directly 
from passages in “On Poesy or Art.”  Consider, for instance, the article’s opening 
paragraph: 
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What is Art?  It is the ideal reflection of Nature.  Not the mere literal 
imitation of its actual presentment; nor the production, by mechanical 
means, of effects supposed to be equivalent to those of Nature…. No: Art 
is the reflection or mimetic exhibition, of the appearances or sensible 
impressions of Nature, according to the ideas, spirit, and design of 
Nature.60 
 
In its juxtaposition to the “ideal” – to the “ideas” and “spirit” of Nature – mimesis has 
undergone a process of “spiritualization.”  Rogers, in fact, contrasts the spiritual imitation 
proper to genuine art with a “mere literal imitation” carried out by “mechanical means,” 
and he even goes so far as to give as his example “the coloured wax casts of Madame 
Tussaud” (403) – an illustration that differs only in its specificity from Coleridge’s 
reference to “waxen figures” as an instance of what he means by “copy.”   
 With this prologue in place, Rogers proceeds to develop a theory of aesthetic 
idealism akin to Coleridge’s.  Art, he notes, is a product of the imaginative activity of the 
human mind.  We are daily surrounded by the raw sensory materials that constitute the 
building blocks of art – sounds, lines, colors, etc. – but it requires the organizational 
facility of the human mind to transform these into art.  “[S]ome intelligent act, as of 
selection, arrangement, and subordination, must be required to bring these scattered 
materials within the scope and dominion of Art.”  It is to the dynamics of human 
psychology, Rogers contends, that we must therefore look “for the origin of Art” (404).  
Hence art is the embodiment of an idea that takes its rise, at least in part, in the 
imagination of the artist.  It stands, as Coleridge had put it, “between a thought and a 
thing” (330).  “Be the material what it may,” Rogers explains, “the subject first has a 
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place in the mind of the artist, whence it springs into outward existence, clothing itself 
with a sensuous form, which is but a transcript … of the form in which it arose in the 
imagination” (406).  Art is thus once again an expression of the consciousness of the 
artist. 
 As with Coleridge, however, underlying this theory of the actualization of the 
ideal through form is a larger metaphysics of nature.  If we could but discern it (a 
qualification also stipulated in “On Poesy or Art”61), we would be able to see nature as 
the manifestation of “one cosmical idea.”  We would be able to see it, that is, as a 
revelation of the mind of God.  In one of his most obviously Coleridgean passages, 
Rogers articulates the metaphysical groundwork for his theory: 
 
It would be an easy task to multiply examples of the manner in which 
every divine idea reveals itself in Nature.  Every thought of God, in the 
mystic language of Philosophy, is a word, a self-substantiating fiat; at 
once purpose, and execution according to the purpose.  Nature itself, in the 
highest sense, namely, that of a spiritual power, or Natur-geist, (natura 
naturus,) is but a phrase significant of that general idea or design of which 
the entire frame-work of phenomena (naturæ naturata) is the form, the 
organism, and result. 
 
Once established, this basis serves as a model for the kind of human imaginative 
endeavor that gives birth to art.  The term “Art,” Rogers observes, is most properly 
applied to those works of humankind that “are developed by a process analogous to that 
of Nature, – works wherein a central and sovereign idea is projected in a form which it 
prescribes and assumes for itself as its own proper heritage and nature …” (405).  While 
the language here is clearly Coleridgean, it should be noted that it is at times difficult to 
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determine the author’s precise position concerning the metaphysical relationship between 
the Natur-geist he sees operating in nature and the similar geist he posits in the act of 
human creation.  The difficulty turns on the word “analogous.”  Unlike Coleridge, Rogers 
makes no explicit reference to any ontological affinity between the human spirit and the 
divine spirit at work in the world.  Consequently, it is possible to read this article as a 
diluted form of Coleridgean idealism, one in which the author’s metaphysics of nature 
does not extend ontologically or transcendentally to human artistry but serves merely as a 
kind of picture or mirror-image of this process.62  Yet whether one understands Rogers’s 
metaphysics in a Platonic sense or not, it is clear that his theory of art draws deeply from 
the wells of Coleridgean aesthetics. 
 What this article in the London Quarterly Review left to its readers to infer, 
however, was made absolutely clear in another essay published the same year in the 
Eclectic Review.  The essay, entitled “Art: Its Prospects and Aspirations,”63 opens by 
declaring the centrality of the ideal to a proper conception of art.  Art is not mere 
imitation (and quite significantly, imitation is here associated, at least initially, with the 
approach of the Dutch realists) but is instead concerned with the depiction of what Sir 
Joshua Reynolds called “ideal beauty.”  The writer, however, clearly means to move 
beyond Reynolds’s understanding of this idea, and though he quotes Reynolds’s Third 
Discourse at some length, what interests him is its “transcendental tendency” (131).  
Reynolds, in fact, is really more of a prefigurement of the author’s conception of ideal art 
than the reality.  For the reality, it turns out, we must look to Coleridge: 
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Coleridge had a true and profound insight into the character of art when he 
defined a picture as an intermediate something between a thought and a 
thing.  The thing and thought stand respectively for the outer world of 
matter and the inner world of mind.  The thing or object is received and 
taken from visible nature into the inner mind of the artist, and there being 
elaborated and combined with his individual idiosyncrasy of thought and 
feeling, comes forth a second time into actual existence under the new and 
created form of art.  The primary element, the raw material, is nature, the 
forming power is mind, and the ultimate product art.  Nature enters the 
mind a fact, a reality, issues forth a fiction, a poem, an ideality.  (132) 
 
Significant here is not only the author’s understanding of art as a union of spirit and 
matter, which he supports by referring directly to Coleridge’s statement in “On Poesy or 
Art” that “art itself might be defined as of a middle quality between a thought and a 
thing,” but also the writer’s careful articulation of what one quickly recognizes as 
something akin to the psychological dynamics associated with Coleridge’s “secondary 
Imagination” as described in chapter 13 of the Biographia.64  Art is fundamentally 
creative, fresh, original; the artist is no slave to sense but possesses an “originating 
power” (133) that allows him or her to introduce something truly new into existence.  
Indeed, what gives art special value is precisely its ability to embody the human mind.  
“Art is not mere copyism of nature,” the writer contends, following the contours of 
Coleridge’s argument in “On Poesy or Art” exactly, “… but it is a new and creative 
principle in the world, operating on old materials, and out of existing elements fashioning 
a beauty and an excellence which nature strives after but never attains” (132).   
 Yet if art is essentially creative and expressive, in typical idealist fashion it is also 
a kind of heightened, even transcendental, perception; it is, in short, “imitation” in the 
Coleridgean sense of the term.  The artist does not simply conjure the ideal, nor does he 
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or she cobble it together by way of mere association or abstraction; in contrast, it exists as 
a mind-independent entity waiting to be grasped by the artist: “The latent ideal is lying in 
partial concealment beneath each form and function; … the poet and artist … out of 
scattered fragments must complete the perfect whole … through imagination, calling into 
new birth the type which nature had all but lost” (138-39).  The artist, then, sees through 
nature to its ideal form.  As we will observe shortly, the author takes this conception of 
the “latent ideal” in an explicitly theological direction and in doing so plays something of 
an evangelical variation on Coleridge’s theme.  At the same time, however, unlike 
Rogers, the writer in the Eclectic Review follows Coleridge directly in positing clearly the 
existence of a “psycho-natural parallelism,” or “consubstantiality,” as a means of 
underwriting the high epistemological claims of his theory: 
 
The mind reads nature, as we have said, through kindred sympathy of 
spirit; and it is thus, through intimate communion with her essence, that 
man, by force of his creative power working in the spirit of nature and his 
own spirit, gives birth to beauteous forms which nature has not yet 
realized.  If it be said that this is a departure from nature, we deny it; but 
rather its consummation and fulfillment.  (133) 
 
The author is careful here, as Coleridge was, to avoid the trap of hyper-subjectivism, but 
the metaphysical supposition of a common “spirit” operating in both objective nature and 
subjective consciousness – and thus, of the union of the ideal and the real, mind and 
nature, in and through the activity of the artist – is nevertheless clear. 
 The type of romantic idealism exemplified by these two articles continued to play 
a prominent role in evangelical definitions of art on both sides of the Atlantic for the 
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remainder of the nineteenth century.  The view of art as a mediator between the 
“spiritual” and material, for example, appeared with increasing regularity after the 1850s.  
“[I]t is the mission of the artist,” declared the Mercersburg Review in 1859, “guided by a 
genial imagination and the laws of taste, to shape and transform … rude material until it 
is best adapted to represent the particular thought or idea, which has been fermenting in 
his mind.”65  Art is unique, suggested an article published in the Presbyterian Quarterly 
Review in 1862, precisely because of its hybrid nature: “[Art] lies between the rational 
and the sensible, dealing with both, but giving a result that differs from both.”66  Even an 
article on “Practical Aesthetics” published in the British Quarterly Review in 1880 
eschewed the anticipated pragmatic direction of the title in favor of a romantic idealist 
perspective (not surprising perhaps, given the fact that one of the volumes under review 
is a text by Schiller): “In all ideal creations it is the interfusion of … spiritual qualities in 
their due order of rank and superiority with the sensuous feelings, controlling and 
controlled, which infused the unity of conception into the dead materials, until the whole 
glows with the Promethean spark of creation.”67  Not unlike Shelley’s efforts in his 
Defense to convert the Platonic into the supremely practical, “Practical Aesthetics” has 
here become the Promethean and vice versa.    
As with Coleridge and the author in the Eclectic Review, evangelical thinkers 
were usually careful to avoid the pitfalls of an overly subjective idealism, taking pains to 
affirm the objectivity of the ideal.  “[N]ature … does not create the poetic fire,” insisted 
William A. Knight in an admirable attempt to hold on to the balance between the 
objective and subjective poles within the imaginative act.  “It only evokes it from the 
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depths of the human spirit to which it has made appeal.  Nor, on the other hand, does the 
poet project his own subjectivity upon nature, covering it with an ideal robe of glory that 
has been altogether wrought within himself.  He is, before all things else, a seer.”68  
Knight’s statement demonstrates the way in which a concern to preserve objectivity (with 
a little help from romantic conceptions of genius) could, somewhat ironically, generate 
rather exorbitant claims for the importance of art and the epistemological reaches of the 
artist.  Still, though a concern for objectivity may have helped to assuage the 
epistemological anxieties of some writers, other evangelical theorists could prove as 
ambiguous as their non-evangelical counterparts when it came to specifying the nature of 
the ideal itself.  While most were convinced the ideal realm was objective, some were 
apparently unsure as to precisely what the object was.  This was especially true from the 
late 1870s onward as the rhetoric of romantic idealism became naturalized and as art and 
religion came increasingly to be seen as twin manifestations of humanity’s higher 
consciousness.  It was not uncommon, for example, for writers to slip into a vague 
Platonic vocabulary when discussing the ideal realm and the transcendental nature of art: 
 
Poetry is the language of mental or spiritual exaltation.  The poet is lifted 
above the common level of human experience.  He dwells amid permanent 
realities.  He has the power of penetrating beneath the momentarily 
changing phenomenal form to apprehend the real and unchanging 
substance; of rising above the realm of the transient and the mutable into 
the changeless and the eternal….  [H]e who makes a loophole through 
which to look into the invisible world of truth, beauty, and spiritual forces 
is a poet.  Poetry, then, is invisible and spiritual beauty shining in upon us 
through appropriate material forms.69 
 
Such is the opening salvo of an article on “Christian Lyric Poetry” published in 1879 in 
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the Primitive Methodist Quarterly Review and Christian Ambassador, an article that is at 
least as thinly Platonic as it is explicitly Christian.  W.M. Reily, writing in 1881 in the 
Reformed Quarterly Review, displayed his Platonic credentials openly when he asserted 
that “the artist regards his object, not as a material thing, but as the reflection of an idea, 
and … this latter is of significance to him only in so far as it brings him nearer to the Idea 
of ideas, which Plato designates as Eternal and Divine.”70  The following year, T.W. 
Hunt glided almost imperceptibly from the language of “God” to that of “the infinite” as 
he registered his support for Plato and Cousin: “Beauty centres in God and is worshipped 
in him.  Art is the representation of the infinite, and must therefore be religious in 
character and aim.”71  By 1893, a writer in the Methodist Review was employing the 
characteristic terminology of German idealism in referring to the “absolute”: “The 
absolute reveals itself to human intelligence by an appeal to our sense of the beautiful, 
while in art the mind seeks to imitate the beautiful in nature, and thus gropes after 
thoughts of the absolute.  Thus do we find a basis for the metaphysical in aesthetics.”72  
Some evangelicals had, oddly enough, managed to find in art a basis for the 
metaphysical, though not always for the distinctively theological. 
  Yet not all evangelicals who accepted the basic parameters of an idealist 
aesthetics were satisfied by the sort of vague talk of the “absolute” exemplified by the 
writer in the Methodist Review.  While some thinkers were content to speak of the 
transcendental, ideal reality embodied by art in somewhat ambiguous and impersonal 
terms, others took pains to adjust the principles of aesthetic idealism to the requirements 
of evangelical theological orthodoxy.  “Man would be … in error were he to worship the 
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ideal,” insisted a writer in the Presbyterian Quarterly Review.  “It is not the ‘good,’ the 
‘beautiful’ and the ‘true’ that should bound the thoughts and measure the devotion of the 
soul.”  The author, however, does not dismiss these ideals outright; rather, what he 
objects to is the tendency of idealist thought to treat these ideals as self-existent, 
impersonal abstractions.  Christians, on the other hand, grasp these ideals in and through 
a personal God: “Worshipping him we apprehend and love these ideals; not as qualities 
which float in our own fancy, or seem to exist in some unseen altitude ‘very far away,’ 
but in conscious Deity – the creating, governing, loving God.”  At the same time, the 
writer is anxious to deny extreme forms of idealism (e.g., Berkeley’s) which see the 
material world as entirely mind-dependent.  Once these qualifications have been made 
clear, however, the author is free to advance a basically idealist conception of art.  “If we 
love art, it is because within it is a beam from the source of beauty.  If we love song, it is 
a symbol to the ear of utterance unheard – of life, love, care and Fatherhood in heaven.”  
In fact, by transferring “the doctrine of idealism to the Will of the Creator” – all reality is 
in essence a projection of God’s mind – the author secures for the material world a 
symbolic, even sacramental, status.  Both nature and art become potential expressions of 
the personal God of the Bible.  While not identical, the theistic – indeed, the explicitly 
Christian – idealism of this particular writer looks back in some ways to the thought of 
Jonathan Edwards.73 
 This writer’s effort to graft orthodox theological principles derived from 
revelation onto a system of aesthetics that is broadly idealist (or vice versa) suggests one 
way in which some evangelical writers sought to be philosophically progressive and 
 189 
theologically conservative at the same time.  For the writer in the Presbyterian Quarterly 
Review, idealism was tenable insofar as it could be rooted in the personality of the 
biblical God.  For a different group of writers, however, idealism could be substantiated 
on the basis of another theological category: eschatology.  The ideal does not merely 
exist as a supersensuous entity, a Platonic form, or a timeless idea in the divine 
consciousness but rather affords a shadowy vision of the heavenly existence that awaits 
the Christian.  Located within a concrete history of redemption, art thus provides a 
glimpse of future perfection.  “The last and highest use of poetry,” concludes an author in 
the Christian Observer in 1866, “is to breathe energy, by breathing inspiration into our 
languid and labouring existence, and to serve as a bright and blissful substitute for a lost 
Paradise.  It brings back the glory that has departed, and calls in, before its time, the glory 
that is to come.”74  At times, in fact, the artistic process and the activity of the 
imagination could themselves be characterized in terms of redemption, as in the case of 
the 1855 Eclectic Review piece examined above.  In his discussion of landscape painting 
(which, the author declares, “is worthless if it be not ideal”), the writer considers the 
example of a tree.  No perfect tree exists in nature, though “At its birth there was a certain 
ideal stamped on its nature, towards which … it has every moment of its life been 
tending.”  It is the province of art and the artist to grasp this ideal where nature has failed: 
“By that insight which alone constitutes the artist [sic] mind, he must seize on the ideal, 
the essential and saving beauty, and working in the creative spirit of nature, remove the 
curse under which she labours, restoring a pristine excellence, or at least anticipating a 
future perfection.”75  The process of idealization is therefore a mode of eschatological 
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perception as well as a means of restoring in percipients a sense of prelapsarian 
perfection.  “The artist’s business is the idealisation of the actual, to show us nature as 
God made it, not as it is perverted by sin.”76  Ironically, it is the doctrine of the Fall – so 
central to evangelical theology – which for these writers assigns to art a deep significance 
and value.  It is an aesthetic version of the felix culpa.77 
 
From Devilish to “the vision and the faculty divine”: The Imagination Reconsidered 
These discussions of artistic idealization in terms of redemption and eschatology suggest 
something of the transformation that had taken place in evangelical conceptions of the 
imagination since the time of the Puritans.  For many Puritans, the imagination was a 
faculty that needed to be held at arm’s length, for it was liable to distort one’s natural and 
spiritual perceptions when not strictly controlled.  Some positive notion of the 
imagination’s relationship to spiritual realities was not, to be sure, totally foreign to the 
Puritan tradition.  Jonathan Edwards, we may recall, acknowledged the difficulty of 
contemplating the “invisible things” of religion “without a degree of imagination,” thus 
raising the possibility that the imagination may serve as an organ of spiritual perception, 
at least for those who have been regenerated by the Holy Spirit and who submit to the 
revealed truths of Scripture.78  On the whole, though, such statements were frequently 
matched among the Puritans by those which cast the imagination in a negative light and 
warned of the dangers of overindulgence.  Edwards himself not infrequently spoke of the 
imagination in this way.  By the middle of the nineteenth century, however, many 
evangelical critics had joined the romantic chorus in praise of the imagination not only as 
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a faculty of artistic creation but also as an organ of transcendental perception.  “[W]e dare 
to claim for the true, childlike, humble imagination,” ventured the minister and novelist 
George MacDonald in the pages of the British Quarterly Review in 1867, “such an 
inward oneness with the laws of the universe that it possesses in itself an insight into the 
very nature of things.”  MacDonald’s theory of the imagination, which he developed at 
great length, was no anomaly.  It was attractive enough to evangelical readers, it seems, 
that a portion of the essay was reprinted two years later in another evangelical periodical, 
the Christian Ambassador.79  In fact, nothing perhaps illustrates the evangelical affinity 
for romantic aesthetics as clearly as the transition of the imagination in evangelical 
thought from “devilish” to, as Wordsworth put it in The Excursion, “the vision and the 
faculty divine.”80 
 The shift among Anglo-American evangelicals from Puritan distrust to the 
romantic exaltation of the imagination as a sort of über-faculty capable of penetrating and 
embodying the spirit of nature and the cosmos was, on one level, yet another 
consequence of evangelicals’ investment in the mental philosophy of the Scottish 
Enlightenment.  During the latter half of the eighteenth century and the early decades of 
the nineteenth century, the imagination went from being a chiefly associative and 
aggregative faculty that operated on stored sensory data according to the mechanical laws 
of mind identified by empirical philosophers to a creative and visionary faculty that 
possessed the ability to conjure up genuinely new ideas and to grasp intuitively the 
metaphysical unity of all things.81  Romantic theories of the imagination, therefore, were 
to some extent an offshoot of certain emphases in Enlightenment psychology, and 
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Scottish philosophers like Dugald Stewart, whose writings were familiar to most 
educated nineteenth-century evangelicals, were instrumental in developing such theories.  
Given the pervasiveness of the Scottish philosophy among evangelicals at the turn of the 
nineteenth century, it is little wonder, then, that evangelical thinking about the 
imagination more or less mirrored this same pattern of development.   
 Some idea of this development as it occurred under the auspices of the Scottish 
philosophy can be glimpsed in a review of Stewart’s Philosophical Essays, published in 
1812 in the Christian Observer.  Stewart, for his part, was well aware of the common 
prejudices against the imagination as a faculty prone to evil, especially during the 
formative years of childhood.  In addressing these prejudices, Stewart offered one of his 
more provocative suggestions, namely, that the way to avoid an overactive and misguided 
imagination was not to eliminate completely all imaginative experiences during 
childhood (as many advised) but rather to train the imagination early through proper use.  
Stewart, in short, counseled more imagination, not less.  (Interestingly, almost one 
hundred years later Edmund Gosse would speculate along similar lines that if his rigidly 
Calvinist parents had indulged his early desire for fictional tales, his own crisis of faith 
may have been in some measure averted or abated.82)  The reviewer in the Christian 
Observer finds this position especially appealing: “It deserves … to be seriously 
considered, whether the ordinary practice [of suppressing the imagination] has not been 
established upon contracted and erroneous views of human nature; and whether it does 
not, in effect, augment the evil which it proposes to correct.”83  The reviewer is careful to 
note that he is not issuing a firm opinion at this point on the validity of Stewart’s views – 
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something he hopes to do later – but his tentative support of Stewart points to the 
increasing openness of some evangelical writers to the positive benefits of the 
imagination. 
 By the middle of the century, this tentative openness had been transformed among 
many evangelical critics into a full-fledged support, and it was in some measure the 
Scottish philosophy that continued to drive this metamorphosis.  As late as 1861, a writer 
in the Presbyterian Quarterly Review was describing the function of the imagination in 
terms that closely resembled Stewart’s discussion in his Elements of the Philosophy of the 
Human Mind – so closely, in fact, that the writer even pirates Stewart’s own example of 
Milton’s garden of Eden to illustrate the combining power of the imagination.  The 
imagination, the author goes on to assert, is that “great faculty” involved in “the 
construction of new wholes…. She endows inanimate nature with life.  She causes the 
motionless to move, the mute to speak, the passionless to beam with intelligence.”  The 
imagination, moreover, is the idealizing faculty: “She makes the idea more than it is in art 
and nature, and then goes on to ideal beauty, which no art can compass, and no object in 
nature can fully realize.  Thus the imagination gives more than is returned to her, and 
then goes on to the creation of ideal beauty which she does not expect to be fully 
realized.”84  While this author’s discussion of the imagination is initially couched in the 
conventional terms of eighteenth-century empirical philosophy – something Wordsworth 
also did in his “Preface to Poems (1815),” much to the chagrin of Coleridge85 – the 
imagination ultimately finds itself knocking on heaven’s door.  It is capable of conceiving 
(though art itself is not necessarily capable of embodying) a beauty that rises above the 
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imperfect beauty found on earth.  Thus the imagination is a faculty of transcendent 
vision, of supra-worldly perception – or rather, it is almost such a faculty.  For in this 
case, the writer’s theological convictions prompt him to stop short of granting the 
imagination full access to heaven; the imagination must be content for the moment 
merely to listen at the door: “The conception of the artist is imperfect.  Measured 
according to certain imperfect standards, it may be considered perfect; but can it be that a 
being so depraved as man, living in an atmosphere so impure, and surrounded with 
objects so deformed, can have the highest ideas of beauty?  It is not possible.  The 
standard on earth and in heaven are different.”  There remains, therefore, a fundamental 
gap between divine beauty and earthly beauty that cannot be bridged, even, it seems, for 
the redeemed.  Earthly “perfection” is merely the culmination of earthly existence, not 
the beginning of heavenly “perfection”: “But who does not believe that in a redeemed 
state, with the spirit regenerated, and the physical world purified by fire, there will be 
visions of beauty, such as yet never have tenanted the human mind, and objects of beauty, 
such as yet have never greeted the human eye?”  Even so, earthly beauty is not to be 
ignored.  It is a gift of God intended for humankind alone, and in seeking the beautiful in 
art, we learn of the “benevolence” of God even as our nature is “refine[d] and 
elevate[d].”86     
 The writer in the Presbyterian Quarterly Review was in many ways poised 
between an eighteenth-century conception of the imagination and a nineteenth-century 
one, or rather, his version of the romantic imagination was more Wordsworthian than 
Coleridgean.  Yet even as he formulated the workings of the imagination according to the 
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empirical terminology of the Scottish Enlightenment, he was gesturing towards a 
Coleridgean understanding of the imagination as an organ of quasi-divine creation and 
spiritual insight.  In fact, however, some evangelical writers had described the 
imagination in such terms even earlier.  In 1849, the Eclectic Review invoked the 
increasingly popular distinction between Fancy and Imagination as a way to criticize 
James Fergusson’s understanding of poetry: 
 
 He does not see, that [poetry’s] office, in its highest and truest working, is 
the apprehension of Truth – of truth, of another order simply, from that of 
science: truth peculiar to itself, intangible, subtile; truth, of equal value 
with that apprehended by science, but of which science takes no 
cognizance.  This misapprehension becomes very palpable, when he 
alludes to imagination, as discoursing ‘of golden mountains, eternal 
springs, shoreless seas, and such like things;’ and of man’s imaginings, as 
contradistinguished from ‘God’s truth.’  For, in fact, the essential 
imaginings of poetry are God’s truths: just as much as the law of 
gravitation.  And that action of poetry to which he here makes particular 
allusion, forms but a very subordinate, secondary one; belongs to its 
outward vesture and symbolism; falls within the province of fancy not of 
actual imagination, at all.    
  
The reviewer’s immediate point of reference for this distinction was Ruskin’s chapter on 
the “Penetrative Imagination” in volume 2 of Modern Painters,87 which had been 
published three years earlier, but the differentiation of Fancy and Imagination had 
originated in the late eighteenth century (Stewart, for instance, had posited a similar 
scheme in 1792) and had received its most famous romantic exposition in Coleridge’s 
Biographia Literaria.  We have already observed a Coleridgean conception of the 
imagination at work in the Eclectic Review article published in 1855, and a number of 
direct references to Coleridge’s version of this distinction appear in evangelical 
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periodicals beginning in the 1860s.  J.H. Rigg, for instance, explores both Coleridge’s 
and Wordsworth’s views of the imagination at some length in his review of Dallas’s The 
Gay Science.  Coleridge, Rigg concedes, is hampered by “his obscurity,” as well as “the 
almost insane jargon of mysticism which mars his writings,” but if one is able to translate 
his insights “with a reference to the Platonic idealism with which Coleridge was so 
deeply imbued,” then “their meaning is worthy of respect.”  Though Rigg is not uncritical 
of either, he ultimately concludes that where the imagination is concerned, “we shall 
perhaps find that Coleridge and Wordsworth have come nearer to the true idea 
appertaining to the word than any other authorities.”  Significantly, however, the problem 
of depravity which had so exercised the writer in the Presbyterian Quarterly Review has 
been effectively muted, or else dropped altogether.  Moving fairly seamlessly – perhaps 
too seamlessly, one might argue – from Platonic idealism to Christianity, Rigg casts 
Coleridge as a broadly Christian philosopher, who “according to his wont, appropriates 
Scriptural language to describe” earthly things “as ‘the example and shadow of heavenly 
things.’”  The language is certainly not inconsistent with Edwardsean typology, and Rigg 
notes that such things may be “discerned by the illuminated soul,” but it is the 
Coleridgean Imagination rather than the Edwardsean “spiritual sense” that is held to be 
the source of such illumination: “Imagination, according to Coleridge’s philosophy, is the 
power of mind, the act, the quickening, the illumination, wherewith reason recognises in 
the outward and sensible the analogies of that which is spiritual, and thereby enables the 
understanding to gain a glimpse of their meaning.”88 
 From the late 1860s onward, explicitly romantic statements regarding the powers 
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of the imagination were common in many evangelical periodicals.  Henry N. Day, writing 
in the American Presbyterian and Theological Review in 1867, contrasted his own 
romantic theory of the imagination, in which the artist bodies forth ideal conceptions, or 
(as he phrased it in richly oxymoronic terms) “spirit-forms,” that rise from within, to 
older mechanical theories: “No genuine work of art was ever a patch-work of 
combination.  No poet, in his artistic processes, ever summoned before him, by an act of 
reproductive memory, the forms which had been previously given him in his observations 
and studies, and then set himself to selecting and combining.”  In truth, Day continues, 
“The artist shapes, he idealizes first; he first determines his artistic activity in a specific 
direction, and embodies it in a pure ideal, a proper spirit-form into which enters no 
matter….”  For Day, in fact, material embodiment of this ideal was a secondary process – 
one that may or may not take place at all.  Day’s prioritizing of the conceptual element 
over the material is typical of much romantic theory, though interestingly, his reflections 
also hint at some later twentieth-century arguments concerning the ontology of art, in 
which art is said to exist as a mental rather than a physical object.89  Furthermore, as the 
imagination gradually became less mechanical and material, it became ever more 
“spiritual.”  Evangelical writers increasingly followed Coleridge, Ruskin, Emerson, and 
others in describing it in overtly religious terms.  The Congregationalist, quoting 
Wordsworth, assured its readers in 1878 of the imagination’s spiritual import both in the 
present life and in the life to come: “we may be sure that ‘the vision and the faculty 
divine’ will also have to do with our life in God hereafter.’”90  Three years later, W.M. 
Reily described the imagination, or “fancy” (he used the terms interchangeably), in the 
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pages of the Reformed Quarterly as follows: “one of the most legitimate and essential 
functions of the fancy is to see into the soul of nature, of which the universe is the full 
expression, but which is, in some sense, present and manifest in every part, that soul 
which must be regarded as the on-going and actualization of the divine creative word, 
and as such the revelation of the divine thought and will.”91  Not surprisingly, Reily’s 
article is liberally seasoned with references to Plato, Carlyle, Coleridge, Cousin, and 
Emerson, among others.  It is a statement by James T. East in the Wesleyan-Methodist 
Magazine in 1900, however, that offers what is perhaps the best measure of the vast 
ground which the imagination had traversed even among theologically conservative 
evangelical thinkers over the course of the nineteenth century.  “Any starving of the 
imagination would be a calamity,” East contended, “for ‘the very design of imagination is 
to domesticate us in another, that is, in a celestial nature.’”  Interestingly, it is clear that 
East holds to a fairly orthodox understanding of Protestant doctrine.  The God of which 
he speaks throughout is obviously the personal God of the Bible, not the “Absolute” of 
Fichte, Schelling, or Hegel, and he highlights the place of the atonement and of 
regeneration by the Holy Spirit in the life of Christians.  Yet in addressing the nature of 
the imagination and of beauty, both earthly and heavenly, it is to Emerson that East turns, 
if only briefly.  Even Emerson, it seems, had by the turn of the century been successfully 
baptized into the ranks of British Methodism.92   
Admittedly, not all nineteenth-century evangelical critics followed the general 
path charted here.  Some theologically conservative writers, like the author in the 
Presbyterian Quarterly Review, continued to express reservations about overly inflated 
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views of the imagination that appeared to downplay or eliminate the need for grace as a 
prerequisite for spiritual perception.  Such critics were perhaps more wary than East of 
making peace with the “spiritual” rhetoric of American Transcendentalism.  Others 
continued to caution readers against the psychological dangers of an overactive 
imagination – an argument that showed extraordinary longevity, particularly in 
evangelical discussions of fiction.93  Still, the romantic evolution of the imagination 
among evangelical critics into a spiritual organ for perceiving ideal reality was significant 
both aesthetically and theologically.  In terms of aesthetics proper, romantic theories of 
the imagination helped to elevate evangelical conceptions of both art and the artist.  The 
imagination allowed one to “see into the life of things,” and thus art was not simply a 
species of ornament or recreation but rather a new type of “truth.”  Art became something 
that was worth taking seriously.  In theological terms, however, the imagination’s gradual 
conversion into a kind of spiritual instrument was indicative of the fact that traditional 
conceptions of grace and regeneration were growing obsolete among some members of 
the evangelical population.  In fact, it is no coincidence that the rise of the evangelical 
romantic imagination paralleled the decline of Puritan understandings of the self as 
inherently depraved and subject to the sovereignty of God.  Though often described in 
quasi-religious terms, the romantic imagination did not rely on supernatural grace in 
order to function as an organ of heightened perception.  True, not all people were equally 
endowed with imaginative power – not everyone could perform at the level of 
Coleridge’s “Secondary Imagination” or Ruskin’s “Penetrative Imagination” – but the 
power of the imagination was nevertheless “natural” rather than supernatural in its 
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operations.  Indeed, for Coleridge the Primary Imagination was so basic that simple 
perception was impossible without it.  In many cases, of course, the objects of the 
imagination’s perception had themselves shifted into a “natural” register, with the result 
being something like Carlyle’s “natural supernaturalism.”  In other cases, the imagination 
was seen as a truly metaphysical faculty whose objects of perception were the ideal forms 
of the divine.  Now, however, rising above one’s earthbound state did not require a prior 
act of condescending grace on the part of God.  The imagination had become, in the 
words of Ernest Lee Tuveson, “a means of grace.”94  Furthermore, as a creative faculty 
the romantic imagination was rooted in basic assumptions about the nature of human 
freedom, assumptions that would have been scandalous to the Puritans and to Edwards.  
It is not insignificant, for example, that Coleridge spent a great deal of time defending the 
freedom of the will as the “spiritual” dimension of the human personality not subject to 
the mechanistic laws of nature.  In fact, Coleridge was familiar with at least some of 
Edwards’s writings, and tellingly, his view of Edwards became increasingly negative 
over time.95  The artist had become a symbol of human autonomy, a being that possessed 
the ability to transcend the mechanical laws of nature and to “create” freely after the 
manner of God.96  In first welcoming and subsequently disseminating romantic claims 
concerning the powers of the imagination, many nineteenth-century evangelical critics 
were thus moving swiftly away from the religio-aesthetic tradition of the Puritans.  On 
the one hand, this meant an increased esteem for the imagination and the fine arts; on the 
other hand, it signaled the further dissolution of traditional Protestant orthodoxy.97     
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Anti-Romantic Reactions: Evangelical “Classicism” and the “Terra Firma of 
Common-Sense” 
One interesting measure of just how influential romantic views of art had become among 
many nineteenth-century evangelical critics is the strength of the reaction to such views 
exhibited by another segment of evangelical writers.  Even as some evangelical critics 
were beginning to rely more heavily on the language of idealism, others were voicing 
doubts about some of the key tenets of romantic aesthetic theory.  Some critics, for 
example, seem to have grown tired of what they perceived as the moral and aesthetic 
excesses to which the theory of expressivism had led.  They were usually measured in 
their criticisms and rarely, if ever, objected to expressivism in toto.  Rather, their strategy 
was to propose that self-expression, while indispensable to true art, was in the end 
subordinate to other, more important concerns.  Ironically, one of these concerns was 
none other than the ideality of art.  “[I]dealisation,” argued H. Buxton Forman in the 
London Quarterly Review, “must always be regarded as a higher function of art than 
mere expression.”98  Whereas a number of evangelical critics had followed Coleridge and 
other romantics in transcendentalizing the ideal, others (re)turned to a more “classical” 
conception of the ideal as a way to oppose the excesses of romantic expressivism.  For 
these anti-romantics, the ideal functioned as a rallying point and a means of protesting 
what they saw as the growing subjectivism of much romantic art.      
Joseph LeConte, for instance, provides a clear example of this sort of approach to 
the ideal.  LeConte does not locate the ideal in simple opposition to self-expression but 
instead suggests that expression is subservient to the ideal.  Expression is a necessary and 
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valuable ingredient in all good art, but for an art object to qualify as “high art,” it must 
also move beyond expression to something more essential: “Thus, we might briefly say 
that there are in all art, as well as in nature, two elements: the sensuous, or emotional, and 
the aesthetic.  The first is some times called expression, life, power, passion, naturalness; 
the second, beauty, grace, unity, ideality.  Now, in a high art the latter is always 
predominant; in a low art, the former is always predominant.”99  LeConte here 
encapsulates the conventionally “romantic” (expression, life, power, passion, naturalness) 
and “classical” (beauty, grace, unity, ideality) aesthetic virtues respectively, and though 
he ultimately grants priority to the latter, he nevertheless recognizes the fundamental 
importance of the former.  
LeConte’s aesthetic represents a concerted effort to temper what the author sees 
as some of the more immoderate impulses within romantic aesthetics without entirely 
abandoning its central premises.  An article published in 1854 in the London Quarterly 
Review, however, opted for a more aggressive line in arguing not only for the supremacy 
of the classical ideal over and against expressivism but also for the classical ideal over 
and against the kind of historical determinism which the author understood to be latent in 
the idealist theories of art and history that exerted such a profound influence on 
nineteenth-century thought.  Appearing in the same publication only one year before 
Rogers’s heavily Coleridgean “The Science and Poetry of Art,” the timing of this article 
underscores the manner in which many evangelical periodicals, far from being one-
dimensional or ideologically partisan, served as spaces of critical negotiation and ongoing 
debate.  Authored by Thomas M’Nicholl, the editor of the Review, and entitled “Modern 
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Poetry: Its Genius and Tendencies,” this piece undertakes in the course of reviewing a 
volume of poems by Alexander Smith and the long poem Balder by Sydney Dobell “to 
offer some brief remarks upon the leading characteristics of modern poetry.”  In general, 
M’Nicholl’s view of modern poetry is not particularly favorable.  He concedes that “there 
is so much to elicit admiration” in recent verse, but insists, too, that there is “still more 
that is fatal.”100  In its basic preference for aesthetic principles that run contrary to many 
of those advocated by writers in the romantic tradition (despite assurances from 
M’Nicholl that he genuinely values the efforts of Keats and Shelley), this article as a 
whole offers an interesting point of contrast to many of the developments we have 
observed thus far.   
M’Nicholl sets out to counteract an idea of poetry that had gained currency as a 
result of the developing historical consciousness of the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries – the idea that poetry is a product of “the spirit of the age.”101  He 
admits that “true poetry may, in some faint degree, reflect the spirit of the age which 
gives it birth” (240), but ultimately his purpose is to drive home the fact that “the method 
of true art is not altered by the genius of an age” (241).  The doctrine that poetry is an 
outgrowth of the zeitgeist – yet another partial byproduct of various German idealist 
theories of history – had been for some romantics an enabling idea.  It was, in fact, 
preached rather easily at times in exultative or triumphalist tones, as when Shelley 
reveled with his usual rhetorical flamboyance in the thought that “Poets are the 
hierophants of an unapprehended inspiration” who “are themselves perhaps the most 
sincerely astonished at its manifestations, for it is less their spirit than the spirit of the 
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age.”102  For Shelley, the idea was finally an empowering one: the poet is a socially 
relevant figure precisely because he is in tune with the pitch of time; he is poised at the 
leading edge of progress.  Clearly, however, there is an implicit determinism in the notion 
that poets and artists are the unconscious conductors of the intellectual currents of an age, 
and for M’Nicholl writing in 1854, the idea had become less of an empowering one and 
more of an oppressive one.  In fact, two developments stemming from this notion had 
begun to trouble some Victorian critics.  One of these was the claim that only poetry 
which embodies the particular ethos of the age is “true” poetry.  Only “modern” subjects, 
that is, are fit subjects for authentic verse.  What had seemed to Shelley an aesthetically 
and politically liberating notion has here, in effect, been hardened into a poetic dogma 
and transformed into a normative criterion.  The other, perhaps darker, development was 
the growing realization that to claim that poetry is a product of the spirit of the age was to 
accept the historicist consequence that poetry could be nothing more than a product of its 
age.   
Over and against these perspectives, M’Nicholl turns to something like the 
classical ideal to reaffirm the universality and objectivity of art: 
 
The nature of art is essentially objective and constructive.  A poem, like a 
painting, is strictly a composition, whose materials – selected almost in 
whatsoever place you will – are faithfully combined by the aesthetic 
faculty, – a faculty that is neither wholly intellectual nor wholly moral, 
that acts in great measure like instinct, but needs the co-operation of 
science and intelligence.  (241) 
 
There is little here that would have troubled the staunchest of neoclassical critics.  To 
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begin with, there is nothing transcendental about M’Nicholl’s understanding of the 
idealization process: it is a matter of “composition” only, and though the author allows 
room for a certain amount of “instinct” in the artistic process (common enough in 
eighteenth-century theories of invention), his model is finally more akin to neoclassical 
theories of association than to romantic conceptions of the creative imagination.  (It is not 
insignificant, in this respect, that M’Nicholl summons in support of his argument the 
popular eighteenth-century dictum ut pictura poesis [“poetry is like a painting”] – a 
dictum that had often been replaced by romantic critics in England and Germany with a 
belief in the fundamental kinship of poetry and music.103)  “Poetry,” he continues, 
“depends far more on the essential than the accidental; on the permanent than the 
temporary; on man himself than national costume or political conditions …. The best, 
and even the most popular, poems in the world, are those which are least shaped or 
coloured by the spirit of the author’s age” (241).  There is, in short, little in art that is 
personally subjective or historically relativistic.  Art is universal and objective in the best 
neoclassical sense of these terms. 
Indeed, the article as a whole is something of an anti-romantic tour de force.  Not 
only does M’Nicholl stand firm on the classical ideal but he also seizes the opportunity to 
ridicule the excesses of the Byronic poet and the pitfalls of expressivist theories: 
 
It is evident that the modern bard esteems no ordinary theme deserving of 
his song; and so he turns to glorify himself, and worship his own art by 
way of exercising it.  His rhapsody is all about genius, – its sorrows, 
ecstasies, divinity, and might; what it can do if it only pleases, and what it 
scorns to do for so miserable an audience as humanity can furnish.  No 
longer holding “the mirror up to Nature,” he sits and turns it fairly on 
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himself, and finds trace of thunder in every scar, and demon-beauty in 
every fantastic lock; the blue of his eye suggests (to him) the unutterable 
depths of heaven, and in the curl of his lip he reads and practises contempt 
for the paltry world of prose.  (245) 
 
So much for the extremes of romantic individualism.  Near the end of the article, 
M’Nicholl drives home his point by issuing a stern warning to “the new generation of 
poets”: “But let the new generation of poets beware … how they permit the expressional 
parts of poetry to overlay its more substantial elements” (256).  Poetry’s more substantial 
elements, of course, are those which reflect the general, universal, and ideal.  
 Viewed from the broader perspective of Victorian criticism, however, M’Nicholl 
(and LeConte as well) is far from being a lone voice of aesthetic conservatism or some 
kind of avatar of classicism.  In fact, in his concluding paragraph, almost as an 
afterthought it seems,104 he tips his hand by referring the reader to the preface of a 
recently published volume of poems by one Matthew Arnold – the text now commonly 
referred to as the “Preface of 1853.”  M’Nicholl suggests in addition that the reader also 
consult the preface to Henry Taylor’s “Philip van Artevelde.”  Both of these essays, he 
informs us, “will teach [young poets] … how to avoid the false heroics of Byronic 
poetry,” and in this he is surely correct.  In the Preface of 1853, for instance, Arnold 
insists on “the subordinate character of expression” in any theory of poetry and argues for 
the continuing validity of classical models.  The ancients “knew what they wanted in Art, 
and we do not.”  Action and subject matter, not expression, are the indispensable 
conditions of all good poetry.  As one critic has put it, “Arnold’s Preface to the 1853 
edition of his poems was basically a rejection of romantic subjectivism,”105 a rejection 
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clearly affirmed by M’Nicholl.  Arnold and M’Nicholl are also consonant in their 
rejection of any theory that restricts the province of poetry to “modern subjects” alone, 
for Arnold is anxious to assure his readers that he has not eliminated “Empedocles” from 
the present volume of poems simply “in deference to the opinion which many critics of 
the present day appear to entertain against subjects chosen from distant times and 
countries: against the choice, in short, of any subjects but modern ones.”106  Taylor’s 
preface is an even more pronounced attack on the excesses of romantic subjectivism.  
Byron and Shelley are explicitly denounced, and Taylor laments that wisdom, intellect, 
understanding, and truth have been rejected in favor of the intensity of feeling and the 
vibrancy of imagery.  According to the modern school of verse against which Taylor 
argues, poetry “was to be, like music, a moving and enchanting art, acting upon the 
fancy, the affections, the passions, but scarcely connected with the intellectual faculties.”  
Significantly, Taylor criticizes Byron for failing to represent the character of humankind 
in terms of the ideal: “There is nothing in them [Byron’s representations] of the mixture 
and modification, – nothing of the composite fabric which Nature has assigned to 
Man.”107   
Thus the classicism of M’Nicholl was a decidedly Victorian classicism – a 
reaction in part to the extremes of romanticism – that was gaining ground among some 
critics at mid-century.  The formulation “Art is ideal,” when understood in its classical 
sense, seemed to provide a useful means of avoiding both the Scylla of hyper-
subjectivism and the Charybdis of hyper-determinism that had become associated with 
certain romantic theories of art and history (and art in history), which continued to exert 
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such a profound influence on the evangelical mind at mid-century.  In a sense, then, this 
writer’s recuperation of the classical ideal was both reactionary and progressive at the 
same time – a point which provides another, perhaps unexpected, piece of evidence that 
nineteenth-century evangelicals were far more aesthetically engaged than is sometimes 
believed.  Nonetheless, this move demonstrates yet again how pervasive romantic 
assumptions about art had become. 
M’Nicholl had criticized the extremes of romantic expressivism openly, and he 
had, indirectly at least, offered an alternative vision of the “ideal” that was largely 
stripped of the metaphysical drapery of German idealism.  Some critics, however, opted 
for a more caustic and direct attack on the doctrines of idealism.  Writing in the Primitive 
Methodist Quarterly Review, Henry J. Miller bewailed what he referred to as “The 
Teutonization of English Literature.”  Not published until 1885, the article was a 
somewhat belated response to the influence of German thought on English aesthetics,108 
and its satirical, dismissive tone gives it a decidedly reactionary quality.  But it is a clear 
example of a targeted reply to the presumed intemperance of romantic aesthetic idealism.   
Especially interesting is Miller’s explicit juxtaposition of idealism, which he racializes as 
German and repeatedly characterizes in terms of ephemeral substances like “gas” and 
“vapor,” to common sense, which he identifies as essentially English and depicts as solid 
and grounded.  “How comes it to pass,” he asks, “that we English, eminently a practical 
and hard-headed race, having once got our feet well planted on the good substantial terra 
firma of common-sense, have voluntarily stepped from our coign of vantage to trust 
ourselves to the unknown perils of the quaking bog of a priori mysticism?”  Regrettably, 
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the English “have allowed a huge sea of Teutonism to submerge [them], every wave of 
which is highly charged with Transcendental gas.”  Miller is, in effect, reaching back to 
what he imagines were the good old days (i.e., before the 1830s) of pre-romantic 
philosophy and art when the realist epistemology of Reid and Stewart reigned, and to his 
credit, his sense of the historical evolution of English thought is quite accurate.  “[L]et us 
examine,” Miller suggests later in the essay, “any poem, novel, or essay of (say) the year 
1823, side by side with a like composition of the year 1883, and we shall soon see what a 
wide gulf separates the two, both in conception and in execution.”  The reasons for this 
difference are, for Miller, quite clear: 
 
 In the days of our fathers it was the fashion for our literati to bring to bear 
upon the consideration of any given subject, not only the resources of a 
wide and varied culture, but an inexhaustible fund of shrewd common-
sense, an unqualified hatred of epicene or sentimentality and affectation, a 
power of taking broad views, a terseness and vigour in giving them 
expression, and a consummate generalship in marshalling their thoughts.  
In these degenerate days, since we have become thoroughly Teutonised, 
we have altered all that.  English habits of thought have sunk, drenched 
and overwhelmed under the successive deluges of Kantism, Fichteism, 
Hegelism, and Schopenhaverism which have poured down upon us.  A 
perpetual drizzle from the land of Vapourdom has soddened us to the 
bone.  The tutelary genius of our literature, Ixion-like, has been embracing 
a cloud, and is chilled to the innermost marrow by the dampness of the 
encounter. 
 
Thus he concludes, “No sublime, grandly imagined epic, no genuine drama, holding the 
mirror up to nature, not even a sweet, simply idyll, or the rudest of pulse-quickening 
lyrics, can exist in an atmosphere so rarefied.”  Interestingly, even the transgressions of 
Byron fare comparatively well amid this suffocating miasma of German philosophy.  
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Whereas for M’Nicholl Byron had represented all that was wrong with English poetry, 
for Miller he becomes a touchstone of sincerity when contrasted with German thought.  
The self-expressions of Byron were at least somewhat genuine, but in German idealism 
“the magnified, attenuated, distorted ‘I’ is never in the ordinary moods of ordinary 
mortals.  It is for ever high up in the clouds, or above them, amongst the Infinites.  The 
only nouns it takes any cognizance of are the abstract ones.  The vacant vision takes in 
the ideal afar off, but sees nothing of the actual close at hand.”109  Better the solid 
English ego of Byron than the diffuse transcendental ego of the Germans. 
 It is clear, however, that despite Miller’s passion (and at times his clever humor), 
his argument was too little too late, for his own editor felt it necessary to attach a brief 
footnote to the conclusion of his article, which served to cast doubt on Miller’s thesis: 
“While admitting there is more or less reason in Mr. Miller’s drastic criticism, we cannot 
help thinking his views somewhat extreme and one-sided.  It, indeed, surprises us no little 
that a writer of such perspicacity and vigour can see nothing but gross and unmitigated 
evil in the Teutonization of English Literature.—ED.”  Of course, if the editor’s footnote 
in one sense subverts Miller’s position, it only confirms it in another.  English literature 
and aesthetic thought had in fact been “Teutonized,” and many evangelicals, like the 
editor of the Primitive Methodist Quarterly Review, were far from seeing this 
development as a “gross and unmitigated evil.”110  
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Aesthetic Apologias: The Question of Purpose and Art as a Unique Mode of 
Discourse 
The question What is art? bears an intimate relationship to questions about the purpose 
and value of art in human experience and in society.  A theory which views art in terms 
of embellishment or ornamentation will arrive at a radically different, and far more 
restricted, answer to the question, What are the ends of art?, than a theory which sees art 
as an embodiment of ideal reality or as an expression of the artist’s mind and emotions 
(or some combination thereof).  Not surprisingly, as evangelical conceptions of the 
essence of art underwent a significant theoretical shift after the 1830s, so too did 
evangelical understandings of the value and purpose of art.  Whereas many earlier 
evangelicals had valued art largely for its diversionary and didactic qualities, a number of 
nineteenth-century evangelical theorists came to see art as a unique mode of discourse 
capable of making a distinctive, and indeed an indispensable, contribution to life and 
society.    
During the Victorian period, both evangelicals and non-evangelicals largely 
agreed that what could not be justified with reference either to morality or eternity could 
hardly be justified at all.  (Even Oscar Wilde, who did his level best to overturn nearly 
the entirety of the western tradition’s answer to the question of art’s purpose, could not 
finally escape the question itself.)  At the same time, this serious attention to the question 
of purpose grew in urgency as a result of the claims issuing from a growing sector of the 
Anglo-American world that art and poetry lacked all practical value.  Utilitarians, for 
example, with whose aesthetic views evangelicals have sometimes been compared, 
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denounced all poetry as falsehood and sought, like Plato, to exile it from the republic.111  
Rapid industrial and technological advancements, together with the spread of the 
scientific spirit into the deepest recesses of the Victorian psyche, compelled many to see 
art as little more than a plaything in contrast to the mighty achievements of science.112  
Charles Darwin is perhaps only the most famous example of a nineteenth-century 
intellectual whose devotion to science engendered a corresponding distaste for the 
Shakespeare he had once enjoyed.  Indeed, the social and intellectual progress so dear to 
the nineteenth century seemed by its very nature to entail the inevitable abandonment of 
art and poetry, as Macaulay famously argued.113   
In addition to these widespread cultural concerns regarding the purpose and value 
of art, evangelical critics in particular faced another set of complicating factors which 
made the consideration of art’s ends all the more crucial.  The most important of these 
factors was the residual influence of Puritanism’s “asymmetrical” religio-aesthetic 
legacy, which left some evangelicals uncertain about art’s ultimate status.  Other vestiges 
of this Puritan tradition received fresh emphasis within the context of nineteenth-century 
revivalism, merging with typically evangelical concerns to generate the potential for 
renewed doubts about the value of art.  Was it possible to square a prolonged attention to 
aesthetics with the need for every individual to participate in evangelistic efforts for the 
salvation of souls, to engage in social activism (can there really be poetry amid so much 
poverty and vice?), and to use one’s time wisely in the light of eternity?  Such 
considerations raised difficult questions about whether pursuing the fine arts was 
consistent with the kind of behavior befitting a committed evangelical.  It is little wonder, 
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then, that in this context many nineteenth-century evangelical critics were forced to 
rethink and rearticulate the purpose and value of art. 
Nineteenth-century evangelical defenders of art did not always agree on why art is 
valuable or on precisely how valuable it is; however, that they believed it to be valuable 
and to have an essential purpose in human life is abundantly clear.  Though many took 
pains to qualify carefully the extent of art’s influence,114 few, if any, evangelical writers 
were inclined to suggest that art is fundamentally useless or that human existence would 
be just as good, or better, without it.  In fact, many evangelical writers advanced robust 
claims for the necessity of art.   
When it came to the question of art’s fundamental purpose, the western aesthetic 
tradition had for the most part relied for its answer on Horace’s well-known maxim, “to 
please and instruct.”  A number of nineteenth-century evangelical critics took this 
principle as their starting-point, though depending on the individual perspective of the 
writer, critics sometimes leaned heavily to one its poles.  Surprising, perhaps, given the 
puritanical stereotypes sometimes applied to evangelicals, is the extent to which many 
evangelicals stressed the pleasure end of the Horatian equation.  As early as 1814, John 
Foster, writing in the Eclectic Review, betrayed some impatience with the text under 
review for having labored so thoroughly to defend the notion that the purpose of art is 
pleasure, something Foster takes to be self-evident: “Perhaps the main purpose is still no 
more than to maintain and illustrate the principle or position, that the immediate object of 
poetry is to please; on which point, if any one has continued sceptical, in despite of the 
loads of paper that have been wasted on this frivolous topic, it would have been perfectly 
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just to abandon him to the consequences of his obdurate perverseness.”115  This 
commitment to pleasure as the primary end of art also led a number of evangelicals to 
reiterate the common distinction between the fine arts and the so-called mechanic arts, or 
between beauty and utility.116  The fine arts (poetry, music, painting, sculpture, etc.) were 
devoted to beauty and pleasure; the mechanic arts (e.g., carpentry) served directly 
practical ends.  This distinction – a product of eighteenth-century aesthetics – was 
foundational to the concept of “high art,” and in affirming it evangelical critics were in 
effect locating themselves in the “elite” art world of the day.  The conviction that a small 
cluster of human activities existed for the sake of human pleasure also registered the 
distance of nineteenth-century evangelical critics from their Puritan forbears.  Though 
most evangelical writers were far from relinquishing a belief in art’s “utility,” the 
willingness of some evangelicals to see art in terms of the pleasure it affords constituted a 
marked departure from those Puritans for whom pleasure was an ancillary concern at 
best. 
Still, few early-to-mid-century evangelicals advocated art for purely hedonistic 
reasons.  Many who deferred to the classical dictum understood that the best art 
maintained a productive tension between pleasure and instruction: 
 
The business of poetry, however, (and we affirm it unqualifiedly), being 
both to please and to profit, he who aims solely to please spends his 
strength upon fancy-articles, fit only for the bazaar-market: and he who 
aims solely to profit, at the peril of not pleasing, will lose his labour in 
proportion, because the reading public – “the few” as well as “the many” – 
will not please to be profited, unless they can profit by being pleased.117 
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If anything, evangelical critics tended to stress the moral side of the equation by valuing 
art as a moral instrument.  This was in keeping with the trajectory of much Victorian 
theory and criticism in general,118 though this emphasis ought to be seen as well within 
the context of evangelicalism’s aesthetic engagement with romanticism.  It was in part 
the changed conception of art among evangelicals brought about by the general 
acceptance of romantic theory that enabled evangelicals to view art with a new degree of 
(moral) seriousness – a seriousness which in turn laid the groundwork for expanded 
claims concerning art’s purpose and value.  If art is nothing more than embellishment, 
then it is difficult to see it in terms of anything more than amusement, something for 
which evangelicals had conventionally harbored rather ambivalent sentiments.  
Amusement, it seems, was a little like sleep: it provided a useful means of refreshment 
when confronted by the inevitable weaknesses of the human constitution, but the less of 
such refreshment one required the better.  However, once evangelicals began to embrace 
the notion that art is something more than ornamentation or the playful use of language or 
color, they began at the same time to see it as more central to human experience.  “They 
undoubtedly entertain a very mean and degrading opinion of the polite arts,” asserted the 
Christian Advocate and Journal and Zion’s Herald in 1831, “who consider them merely 
as subservient to amusement, or at most, to that cultivation of mind which emollit mores, 
nec sinit esse feros.  The history of the world evinces that they have all a much higher 
and more beneficial influence upon the disposition and happiness of man.”119  When it 
came to justifying art, the strategy of some evangelicals was not so much to alter their 
view of amusement – a fact made clear by J.H. Rigg’s insistence in 1867 that “we have 
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no right to indulge in mere amusement or pleasure, merely for the sake of amusement or 
pleasure”120 – as to alter their view of art.  “Mere” amusement, in fact, was exactly that 
which true art is not.  Writing in the New School American Presbyterian and Theological 
Review in 1867, Henry N. Day echoed Schelling’s claim that aesthetics represents the 
apex of philosophy: 
 
 The philosophy of Beauty, of the embodiment of idea in matter, is the true 
philosophy of life – a philosophy of higher significance, of higher interest, 
of higher importance, than the abstract science of the real, or of the good – 
just as the embodiment of the soul in the body is more to us than the 
nature of the soul or the nature of the body, in themselves…. The science 
of the Beautiful, not only has a just claim to rank coordinately, on 
scientific grounds, with that of the True and that of the Good, but it is the 
culminating science of this most generic class of sciences – last in its 
development in the growth of philosophy, but highest and most important 
every way to us.121 
 
As a result of the romantic influence on evangelical aesthetics, however, 
evangelical conceptions of the way in which art serves as a moral instrument were subject 
to redefinition as well.  “The true vocation of the poet,” suggested an author in the 
Eclectic Review in 1845, “unquestionably is to animate the human race in its progress 
from barbarism towards virtue and greatness.  He is appointed by Providence to arouse to 
generous exertion, and to console in distress.”122  The rhetoric and tone are as important 
here as the sentiments.  Art and poetry are moral instruments, to be sure, but there is 
nothing here to suggest instruction or didacticism in the classical sense; rather, the poet’s 
job is to “animate” and “arouse.”  I will return to the relationship between art and 
morality in more detail in chapter five; for now, however, it is sufficient to note that 
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though most evangelicals stressed the moral role of art in society, a new understanding of 
this role had begun to emerge as a consequence of the diffusion of romantic principles. 
From a theoretical standpoint, however, the Horatian answer to the question of 
art’s ends had always been potentially vulnerable to the attacks of both the positivist and 
the puritan.  A potential difficulty with the classical formula concerns the issue of art’s 
uniqueness.  Art, for instance, is not the only form of human discourse that can serve as a 
vehicle of morality; in fact, even if one grants that a primary objective of art is moral 
development, it is not immediately obvious that art provides the most effective means of 
cultivating this development.  Would not the sermon, for instance, be a more efficient 
method of conveying moral truths?  And if one takes Horace’s “instruction” to refer to 
something like scientific knowledge, then would not a scientific paper be more 
appropriate than poetry?  The criterion of pleasure, it turns out, raises similarly difficult 
questions.  Art may, in fact, be a source of pleasure, but then so are games, conversation, 
eating, and even (at least for the heavenly-minded) the sermon.  Detractors of art, 
therefore, whether utilitarians or puritans, simply needed to suggest that art serves no 
special purpose in order to cast doubt on its ultimate value.  A question facing nineteenth-
century critics, then, was whether art is somehow unique, either in the ends to which it 
addresses itself, or, if it does in fact share an end (e.g., moral instruction) with another 
form of discourse, then in the mode by which it achieves this end.  W.M. Reily stated the 
problem succinctly in the Reformed Quarterly Review: “Can necessity be predicated of 
art?... In other words, Is art an essential element in the divine order of the universe, or is 
it only by accident, it finds the place we see it assuming?”123 
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A number of evangelical critics did, in fact, make an effort to distinguish art from 
other forms of discourse.  The theory that art operates in a peculiar way to advance the 
causes of morality was one such attempt.  In many cases, however, it was the romantic 
understanding of art as a product of the emotions that provided the grounds for such a 
distinction.  During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a rather strict 
dichotomy between art and science had evolved in which art was viewed almost entirely 
in terms of feeling, while science was viewed wholly in terms of intellect or reason.  
Wordsworth, for instance, had made such a distinction in the Preface to Lyrical Ballads.  
The proper opposite of poetry is not prose, as was commonly held, but rather “Matter of 
Fact, or Science.”124  By the middle of the nineteenth century, this distinction had become 
commonplace, and it is therefore not surprising that evangelical critics for the most part 
accepted it as normative.  Henry Drummond, a close associate of Edward Irving in 
Britain, bluntly articulated this opposition between art and science in his Letter to 
Thomas Phillips on the Connection between the Fine Arts and Religion, and the Means of 
Their Revival (1840): “The number of persons who really love and really estimate the 
highest productions in the fine arts must be very small, for they are matters of feeling, 
and not of logic.”125       
This basic premise could be appropriated in a variety of ways.  It was, for 
example, often taken to mean that since art is a product of the artist’s emotional 
interaction with the objects of perception, it offers a singular vision of reality, a special 
kind of “truth” different from the kind proffered by science.  “The real mission of art,” 
claimed an article in the Eclectic Review in 1848, “is not that of a moralist or a 
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metaphysician; but the interpretation of truth, more subtile, and less readily conveyable; 
the truth appreciable by feeling, not by simple intellect.”126  Certain truths, or rather kinds 
of truth, are available only to the heart or the imagination, which are themselves organs 
of vision capable of grasping this special sort of knowledge.  Indeed, aesthetic perception 
is not only emotional but also synthetic.  Whereas science values a basically atomistic 
form of apprehension that breaks complex sense perceptions into elementary parts, 
aesthetic perception is holistic.  “The artist has as keen an eye as the philosopher to 
penetrate the inner nature and truth of things,” noted the Mercersburg Review, though he 
or she accomplishes this “by a species of inspiration or intuition, and not by the hard 
study, and tedious experiments of the man of science.”127  This idea, of course, had its 
roots in the aesthetic speculations of the eighteenth-century British empiricists, a history 
evident in the terminology employed in an 1832 article in the Christian Advocate and 
Journal and Zion’s Herald: “[I]t is the delight of poetry to combine and associate; of 
philosophy to separate and distinguish.”128  Ultimately, art’s holistic approach to the 
world grasps a knowledge that is finally irreducible and untranslatable: “But … how 
much is there in every susceptible heart, how much in every thoughtful mind, 
untranslatable into the technical idiom and common-place prose of every-day 
existence?”129   
The art/science binary also served to underwrite another kind of argument 
wielded in defense of art – what might be termed the whole-person argument.  The 
whole-person argument was a direct result of the eighteenth-century interest in mental 
philosophy, combining as it did faculty psychology with assumptions about God’s 
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creative purposes to arrive at the conclusion that art addresses a special, God-given need 
within human beings.  In its basic form, the logic of the argument typically ran as 
follows: Observation confirms that human beings possess some special faculty (taste, 
imagination, an aesthetic sense, etc.) which responds to beauty; one can assume that 
because it exists, God intended it to exist, i.e., He created it; because He created it, He 
must also have intended it to find at least partial fulfillment here on earth;130 art is the 
proper means of this fulfillment.  In a discussion of the “Poetical Elements of the Bible,” 
for example, an author in the Southern Presbyterian Review suggested that God chose to 
inspire the biblical writers to compose large portions of the Bible in poetry rather than 
prose precisely because poetry addresses a specific dimension of humankind’s 
psychological makeup: “There is no power or passion, no taste or sentiment, no instinct 
or aspiration of the soul of man, for which God has not made an adequate provision, to 
which he has not addressed an appropriate appeal.”131  Even more concise was the 
statement of John M. Titzel in the pages of the Reformed Quarterly Review in 1891.  Our 
love of the beautiful has been given to us by God, argued Titzel, and “To gratify it 
properly can, therefore, never be wrong, but on the contrary, must always be 
commendable…. In the fact alone, therefore, that we have been endowed with the 
capacity for enjoying its productions, Art may be said to have its full justification.”132  
This, however, is not the extent of the argument.  What makes this argument the 
whole-person argument is the added belief, rooted in the principle of psychological 
harmony that often accompanied the theory of mental faculties, that to deny this aspect of 
human nature is to endanger one’s psychic wholeness and sense of fulfillment.  
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“Undoubtedly, the best man, the most useful to his species,” suggested the Primitive 
Methodist Quarterly Review and Christian Ambassador, “is he whose character is most 
equally balanced; and the most complete life is that which has been lived, so to speak, 
symmetrically.”133  In this context, art plays a crucial role in keeping one balanced.  
(Darwin’s self-confessed predicament is worth recalling here since it helps to 
demonstrate the possible appeal of this argument in context.)  “[F]ine art is normal and 
necessary to man,” explained the Methodist Quarterly Review in 1874.  “The æsthetic 
faculty is as actual and valid a part of man’s nature as is his reason or his ethical faculty.  
Without this faculty man must be an alien and stranger in the universe of beauty where he 
finds himself.”134  The British Quarterly Review asserted that “aesthetic culture becomes 
of great value in widening our intellectual sympathies, and supplying us with a corrective 
to those systems, whether of philosophy or religion, which, imparting an exaggerated 
development to certain elements of human nature, at the expense of other kindred 
elements, deprive each of that expansion essential to the symmetry of the whole.”135  
Human fulfillment requires equal development of the whole person, and since taste, 
imagination, and the love of beauty are part of this person, art – that which makes a 
special address to these faculties – is, in fact, necessary.  It is not difficult to appreciate 
the persuasive power, and thus the popularity, of the whole-person argument among 
nineteenth-century evangelical critics.  Not only does it posit that art appeals to a 
particular aspect of the human character, thereby suggesting that it either does what 
nothing else can do or else does it better, but it also attributes this arrangement to the will 
of God Himself.  “The Sun of righteousness has risen with healing in His wings for our 
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whole life,” declared E.E. Higbee in the Mercersburg Review in 1874.136  The argument 
thus gives divine sanction to art’s unique contribution to human existence.  
Since the standard dictated by the whole-person argument was mental balance, 
the argument could also be used at times to caution against the over-development of the 
aesthetic faculty.  Too much of the aesthetic was just as bad as too little.  Balance, 
moreover, should not be confused with equality.  True harmony might involve the proper 
subordination of some faculties to others.  Thus, William G.T. Shedd, writing in 1864, 
warned that “The aesthetic nature, unlike the rational or the moral, may be too much 
developed.  The development of the taste and imagination must be a symmetrical one, in 
order to be a just and true one…. The true proportion, in this instance, is a subordination 
of the imagination and taste to the purposes and aims of the rational and moral 
faculties.”137  Shedd’s statement was a fairly typical one, as we will see in the next 
chapter.  Yet even though the aesthetic faculty might be subordinated, in the interests of 
balance, to the rational and moral, this same standard of balance also required that the 
demands of the aesthetic faculty be met fully. 
The belief that art is somehow unique – whether in its means of moral formation, 
its mode of perception, its access to a special kind of knowledge, or its appeal to a 
particular mental faculty – could often lead to far-flung claims regarding the value and 
purposes of art.  It was but a short hop from the idea that art is different from science to 
the belief that art is better than science.  Already in Drummond one catches a hint of 
aesthetic elitism.  Logic and science are for the masses; only the few can genuinely 
appreciate art.  If the positivists tended to elevate science above “mere” art, evangelical 
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apologists for art sometimes followed Shelley down the path of zealous 
overcompensation.  “Let it ever be borne in remembrance,” proclaimed a writer in the 
British Quarterly Review with something like prophetic ardor, “that, to the dry utilitarian, 
who looks only to the profit of the passing hour, – paintings and statues, as well as 
palaces and temples, are things which we can do without; probably in a famine or a 
plague the artist might be deemed among the most valueless members of the community, 
yet all of this, not because his works are below, but above price.”138  “Feeling is the 
mighty fact of life,” asserted another passionate protector of art in the Methodist Review.  
“He who would have ingress and egress with lives must feel.  And the poets have felt.  
They among them wear the world on their heart.”139  In general, the frequency and 
magnitude of such claims among evangelical writers increased as the century progressed.  
Gradually, in fact, these earnest defenses of art began to carry some evangelicals, perhaps 
unwittingly, to the very edge of doctrinal propriety and beyond, as when an author in the 
Primitive Methodist Quarterly Review and Christian Ambassador mused in 1879 that the 
hymns of the Church may express a religious truth and faith that transcends the dry 
propositionalism of the historic creeds.  “The heart is often more liberal and more 
orthodox than the head,” the author opined.  And in an ecumenical gesture that no doubt 
would have seemed radical to many theologically conservative evangelicals, he displaced 
dogma and sectarian differences in favor of a “mere Christianity” of the heart mediated 
by “Christian Lyric Poetry.”  The fact that even evangelicals had allowed non-evangelical 
hymns into their worship “must be accepted as indicating that there may be a faith of the 
heart deeper and more spiritual than that of the head.  Our deepest convictions are not 
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always expressed in the creeds which we honestly profess.”140  This kind of claim, though 
still rare among conservative nineteenth-century evangelicals, was nonetheless little more 
than an extrapolation of the aesthetic principles embraced by evangelicals across the 
theological spectrum.    
There were, of course, other arguments employed by Victorian evangelical critics 
in defense of art, some of which we will encounter in subsequent chapters.  Whatever the 
details of their various arguments, however, nearly all evangelical theorists between 1830 
and 1900 were convinced that art was worthy of defense.  Art, surely, is more than mere 
amusement; rather, it has a vital role to play in human life and society.  This conviction 
was largely an effect of the romantic influence on evangelical aesthetics, and it was 
reflected above all in the new tone adopted by many evangelical apologists for art.  
Passion, urgency, conviction – these are the tonal qualities which mark many of the 
discussions of art in the evangelical periodicals of the era.  Indeed, this generally 
heightened sensibility may finally have been one of romanticism’s more powerful 
legacies to nineteenth-century evangelical aesthetics.  Unlike many critics of the period, 
the Methodist painter James Smetham could not, in the end, admit that there was 
anything unique about art in contrast to science, and he offered what amounted to a 
modest and restrained defense of art.  Yet even Smetham could not resist the heartfelt 
moment of descriptive fervor: “Knowledge and joy pour from [art] in a silent stream, 
wherever there are eyes to behold.”141 
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CHAPTER 4 
WHAT HAS THE GOSPEL OF CHRIST TO DO WITH THE GOSPEL OF ART? 
 
The province of taste in the matters of religion is a subject of a good deal of practical 
interest.  It is a subtle matter, not generally well understood, and especially liable to be 
abused. 
 – “Esthetics in Religion,” Christian Advocate (1867) 
 
Unlike the widening rift between science and religion which troubled many a late-
Victorian intellectual, the ostensible tension between art and religion is an old one.  
“What has Jerusalem to do with Athens?” Tertullian famously asked.  Almost from the 
beginning, it seems, Christian thinkers had struggled with the question of what role, if 
any, art and “culture” ought to play in the lives of believers.  As detractors throughout 
history have been fond of pointing out, the earliest Christians seemed to express little 
interest in art beyond a few rude and highly symbolic etchings on the walls of first-
century catacombs, a fact which some have been quick to accept as evidence of an 
intrinsic antipathy between the worldly claims of art and the claims of undefiled religion.  
Moreover, the periodic eruption of iconoclastic movements in Christian history – first in 
the eighth century and again during the Protestant Reformation – serve as reminders of 
the way in which Christianity has been subject to repeated and unresolved tensions 
between aesthetics and faith, between the alternating convictions that beauty is a 
sacrament and beauty is a snare. 
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 This ancient problem of art’s precise relationship to religion seems to have 
resurfaced in the nineteenth century with a new sense of urgency.  As Hilary Fraser has 
noted, the nineteenth century “saw a proliferation of religio-aesthetic theories designed to 
reconcile the claims of Christianity and beauty, morality and art.”1  Although Fraser’s 
study does not address evangelicals specifically, it is clear that they, too, contributed their 
fair share to this proliferation.  A brief survey of article titles drawn from denominational 
periodicals between 1830 and 1900 suggests just how preoccupied evangelical critics 
were with this longstanding question of art’s relationship to religion: “Influence of the 
Christian Religion on Poetry,” “The Necessity of a Religious Literature,” “Poetry: Its 
Social Uses and Religious Influences,” “Art and Religion,” “Esthetics in Religion,” 
“Christianity and the Fine Arts,” “Modern Literature and Christianity,” “Christianity and 
Art,” “The Relation of Art to Religion,” “Relationship of Christianity to Art,” “The 
Aesthetic in Religion,” and “Reciprocity of Art and Religion.”     
 Why exactly did nineteenth-century thinkers on both sides of the Atlantic – 
evangelical and non-evangelical – feel the need to theorize at such length the connections 
between religion and art?  To some extent, such theorizing may simply have been a 
byproduct of an increased exposure to art itself, most notably to visual art, especially 
after the 1850s.  As methods of transportation became more affordable and reliable in the 
nineteenth century, members of the British and American middle classes began traveling 
abroad to a wide variety of destinations, including continental Europe and the Holy 
Lands.  Ministers, in fact, made up a significant proportion of these travelers.  Such trips 
raised the aesthetic awareness of middle-class sightseers by bringing them face to face 
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with the great art of western culture.  At the same time, for those who could not afford to 
leave home in search of art, art could often be brought home via new reproductive 
technologies that allowed the cheap and widespread dissemination of mass-produced 
prints.  So-called high art could be found as never before on the covers of magazines and 
on numerous middle-class coffee tables.  Many nineteenth-century evangelicals, it seems, 
were at last taking full advantage of the allowance made by Puritanism for the “civil” use 
of visual art, increasingly importing such art into the home as a means of domestic 
beautification.2  If Ruskin’s puritanically-minded mother still insisted on facing the 
family’s paintings towards the wall on Sundays,3 art nevertheless occupied a prominent 
place in the Ruskins’ evangelical home the other six days of the week.  Such changes in 
the material conditions of aesthetic exposure may have led more thoughtful writers (like 
Ruskin himself) to question these developments in light of what the majority of 
Victorians agreed were humankind’s all-important religious duties.   
A number of intellectual developments also contributed to a renewed interest in 
the relationship between art and religion.  One may cite, among other factors, the 
dramatic claims on behalf of art by romantic theorists in England, Germany, and 
America, especially those which seemed to suggest a close link between religious and 
aesthetic perception.  Such claims tended to blur conventional distinctions between the 
religious and the aesthetic, leading to fresh concerns about both the relations and the 
distinctions between the two.  The emergence of what many perceived to be ritualist 
movements within the confines of Protestantism – most notably Tractarianism in Britain 
and the Mercersburg theology in the United States – also prompted a reconsideration of 
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the role of the aesthetic in worship and in church life.  As Charles Spurgeon, the famous 
Baptist preacher, complained in 1876, “the gentlemen of aesthetic taste are aping the 
ritualism against which it should have been their first business to protest.”4  Meanwhile, 
the growing consolidation of aesthetics itself as a distinct field of inquiry may have led 
quite naturally to questions about art’s relationship to other dimensions of human 
experience, especially religion. 
All of these developments contributed to a sense among many in the nineteenth 
century that the relationship between art and religion was in need of closer scrutiny.  
There was one other factor, however, which also lay behind this need to re-examine the 
nexus of art and religion, namely, the lingering influence of Puritanism.  It is worth 
noting at the outset that this was not a strictly “evangelical” problem, narrowly 
considered.  It was, after all, Matthew Arnold, who, marshaling his own version of the 
whole-person argument in which “true human perfection [is] a harmonious perfection,” 
singled out Hebraism-Puritanism-Nonconformism as the source of too many “incomplete 
and mutilated men” in both England and the United States.  For Arnold, the persistent 
ethos of Puritanism was a widespread problem that threatened the best of national culture.  
Still, if the ghost of Puritanism haunted many a Victorian home, it was confessing 
evangelicals who arguably bore a special relationship to this spirit, as Arnold himself 
testified.  For whether or not his assessment of Puritanism was just (ironically, it may 
have been too one-sided), Arnold was correct in seeing Nonconformists as the proper 
“successors and representatives of the Puritans.”5  As the rightful theological and pietistic 
heirs of Puritanism, Anglo-American evangelicals felt uniquely the weight of this 
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tradition and its ambivalent relationship to art. 
As we saw in chapter 2, Puritanism had created a climate of uncertainty and 
ambiguity surrounding the fine arts, which continued to influence eighteenth-century 
evangelicals even as a new aesthetic consciousness was beginning to dawn.  Though by 
the middle of the nineteenth century much of this ambiguity had been dispelled, in part 
by the triumph of romanticism, some vestige of it, I think, can been seen underlying the 
proliferation of religio-aesthetic theories described by Fraser.  What seems to have 
motivated evangelical critics’ formal interest in the question of art’s relationship to 
Christianity was, among other things, some residual anxiety about the potential for a true 
rapprochement.  Consider, for instance, one Dr. Leyburn’s trepidatious preamble to an 
1861 plea in the Christian Advocate and Journal for greater attention to the “esthetic 
element”: “I am aware that there are some persons who may think it almost profaning a 
religious newspaper to occupy even a small portion of it with gossip about art and artists; 
but they must excuse your correspondent if he cannot sympathize with them.”6  The 
problem here is that of a potentially fundamental – one might even say, universal – 
incompatibility between art and evangelical Christianity.  Four years later, another author 
in the same periodical put the matter even more starkly: “Another cause of this neglect 
[of “esthetic culture”] is a misapprehension in regard to the relation between beauty and 
religion.  In the minds of some, religion is dissociated from beauty, and high esthetic 
culture is regarded as wrong.”7  As we will see, nineteenth-century evangelical writers – 
or the more conservative ones at least – discovered new reasons to resurrect certain 
“puritanical” arguments as a means of fending off what they took to be some of the more 
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extreme implications of romanticism, but that is not the issue here.  In these passages 
from the Christian Advocate, the problem is not one of excess but of outright rejection.   
It is crucial to note, however, that for these critics in the Christian Advocate, and 
for a significant number of others, the specter of Puritanism had for the most part been 
reduced to a vague force “out there” among the evangelical masses.  Whatever the 
puritanical proclivities of the ordinary evangelical on the street, so to speak, these writers, 
like Matthew Arnold, “cannot sympathize with them.”  Clearly, an internal rift was 
emerging within evangelicalism itself between the educated proponents of “high” culture 
and the more popular-minded many, who (if we accept the above statements as an 
accurate representation of popular evangelical sentiments) persisted in their puritanical 
sensibilities and skepticism regarding art.  An article on “Poetry and the Spiritual Life” 
published in the southern version of the Methodist Review in the mid-1890s offers some 
sense of just how deep this rift had become over the course of the nineteenth century.  
Recounting an episode not unlike the one described by Edmund Gosse in Father and Son, 
in which an evangelical orator at a London conference had referred to Shakespeare as “‘a 
lost soul now suffering for his sins in hell,’”8 Edwin Mims (M.A., an instructor at 
Cornell) explained how, after a young speaker at “one of the leading churches of 
Southern Methodism” had “referred incidentally to Shakespeare” during his talk, a 
controversy ensued when a “prominent member” of the church delivered a diatribe on the 
injurious effects of Shakespeare to religion and morality.  Unfortunately for the speaker, 
he discovered, according to Mims, that “he was largely in the minority.”  By contrast, 
Mims himself lamented this form of anti-aesthetic, or anti-cultural, religious populism, 
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arguing “that the Church has not realized what a valuable ally is to be found in the great 
poetry of the world.”9  It appears, then, that evangelical attitudes towards the question of 
art’s relationship to religion were also in part a function of this high/populist divide.  
Puritanical suspicions concerning art’s contaminating influence on religion remained 
alive in the minds of many “average” evangelicals, while those harbingers of evangelical 
“high esthetic culture” increasingly argued that the claims of art and the claims of 
religion need not be at odds.    
When it came to the question of art’s relationship to Christianity, this growing 
faction of evangelical cultural elites differed from their seventeenth- and eighteenth-
century predecessors in at least two ways.  First, reconciliation (to use Fraser’s term) 
became the conscious objective of evangelical theorists.  For many Puritans, and even for 
many eighteenth-century evangelicals, the tendency had been to elevate pure religion at 
the expense of art.  Moreover, the question of art’s relationship to religion, if and when it 
surfaced as a conscious dispute, had been approached largely in negative terms, that is, 
the emphasis had been placed primarily on determining the proper religious limits of art.  
Images must not be used in the sanctuary, for example, nor should preachers draw 
attention to their homiletic craft through the use of excessive embellishments.  Of course, 
the Puritan tradition did not altogether lack a body of more positive reflections on art’s 
connection to religion, but even these reflections were frequently boxed in by negative 
strictures.  In short, Puritan writers were predominantly interested in “defending” 
religion, but they showed little special interest in “defending” art.  By contrast, a number 
of mid-nineteenth-century evangelical critics typically set out to demonstrate the way(s) 
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in which art and religion might peacefully coexist.  Even these “high” cultural critics, as 
we will see, agreed with the Puritans that Christianity does impose some important limits 
on art, but unlike many Puritans they also viewed the question of art’s relationship to 
Christianity in the positive terms of mutual reciprocity.  In fact, the second difference, 
related to the first, was the newfound optimism with which many evangelical critics 
approached this task of reconciliation.  Though Christians throughout the centuries had 
often found it difficult to maintain a healthy balance between the claims of art and the 
claims of religion, many nineteenth-century critics held fast to the sanguine expectation 
that they could succeed where others had failed.  Art and Christianity, these critics were 
convinced, might mutually enrich one another. 
Of course, what I have thus far been referring to as “the question of art and 
religion” is, from a theoretical standpoint, an assortment of closely related, though 
distinct, sub-problems.  Some of these sub-problems are more purely and technically 
“aesthetic” in nature, others less so.  There are phenomenological or philosophical 
problems associated with aesthetic and religious perception, for example, or with the 
capacity of art to represent transcendent reality, or with the metaphysical status of 
Beauty.  There are theological questions about God’s role as Creator, about the position 
of art in the divine plan, or about whether art can rightly qualify as a consecrated 
endeavor.  These and many other issues comprise the enduring problem of art and 
religion, broadly defined.  Yet as with debates regarding the essential nature of art, 
nineteenth-century discussions of the relationship between religion and art were often 
carried on in unapologetically abstract terms.  Though critics of the period argued over 
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any number of particulars that might fall under the general rubric of religion and art, 
nineteenth-century critics were not afraid to operate in the sometimes rarefied atmosphere 
of capitalized nouns.  If in nineteenth-century treatises ART and RELIGION sometimes 
seem like personifications of two great social or ideological forces, it is because this is 
precisely the way many critics viewed them.  “It has for many years been a general 
observation among literary persons, that the flowers of Parnassus cannot thrive in the 
garden of Religion,” remarked an author in the Christian Observer early in the century.10  
Indeed, this critic’s rather clumsy attempt to formulate the matter in something like 
mythological terms captures nicely the Victorian penchant for viewing the problem of art 
and religion as a recurring historical conflict between two ahistorical modes of human 
consciousness.  “It now hardly needs to be said,” wrote H.M. Du Bose in the southern 
Methodist Review late in the century, “that we hold it as an established fact that the two 
civilizations of the Jews and the Greeks represent specific tendencies – the one toward 
the ideals of faith, the other toward the ideals of art.”11  This dualistic scheme, of course, 
was not Du Bose’s at all but rather Matthew Arnold’s, a point which underscores how 
evangelical critics had, by century’s end, come to see the problem of religion and art in 
distinctively Victorian terms. 
This chapter examines the ways in which Victorian evangelical critics attempted 
to theorize the relationship between art and Protestant Christianity.  It begins by 
describing how evangelical critics came increasingly to define their own aesthetic views 
over and against what they believed to be those of the Reformation tradition, and in 
particular, the Puritans.  Ironically, when it came to art, educated evangelicals sometimes 
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reiterated the anti-Puritan sentiments of many nineteenth-century intellectuals (sentiments 
which would ultimately find characteristic expression in the famous pronouncements of 
H.L. Mencken).  What had begun in the 1730s and 1740s and had evolved slowly over 
the course of the eighteenth century now emerged as an overt and self-conscious position: 
Puritanism, in short, became for some evangelical writers a kind of aesthetic straw man 
that could be attacked as necessary.  For some critics, these attacks were carefully 
confined to aesthetics, and the trick was to find a means of defending the Puritans’ 
theology and piety while repudiating their attitudes towards art.  Other critics, however, 
showed little concern for Puritanism as a whole and attacked the Puritan religio-aesthetic 
tradition openly.   
The chapter then turns to an analysis of some of the specific ways in which 
evangelical critics thought about the nexus of art and religion.  In general terms, the 
religio-aesthetic ideal for many evangelicals was a “conciliatory” one in which art and 
religion were imagined as existing in a kind of productive tension.  Many evangelical 
writers looked to walk a fine line between the extreme of Puritanism (or what they 
increasingly characterized as the extreme of Puritanism), in which art was portrayed as 
being in inherent conflict with Christianity, and the other extreme represented by the 
more grandiose forms of romanticism, in which art was associated with an unorthodox 
and doctrinally vague “spirituality” or “divinity.”  Within this religio-aesthetic via media, 
moreover, a number of evangelical theorists argued that the proper relationship between 
orthodox Protestant Christianity and art is a subordinationist one.  In this view, art was 
seen as both limited by Christianity and at the same time uniquely empowered by it.  
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Such a theory was no simple didacticism (though moral concerns remained at the center 
of evangelical conceptions of art); for many evangelical thinkers, the currents passing 
between art and Christianity ran far deeper than the conventional belief that art could 
serve as a means of teaching religious doctrines to the illiterate masses.  Rather, 
Christianity was believed to provide both the psychological and social conditions for 
genuine art to flourish.  It was the addition of this latter claim of empowerment that most 
clearly separated nineteenth-century evangelical conceptions of art’s relationship to 
Christianity from earlier Puritan conceptions.  As we will see, however, this vision of 
religio-aesthetic harmony was often difficult to maintain in practice, and it was constantly 
in danger of being pulled apart both by the strong tug of the romantic principles that 
many evangelical critics had come to accept and by the gnawing sense among some that 
the dream of a Protestant culture, in which art would find its greatest fulfillment, was not 
to be.  
 
Aesthetic Skeletons in the Protestant Closet: Evangelicals and Protestant History 
Nineteenth-century evangelical critics were keenly aware of the fact that, when it came to 
art, there were some potentially embarrassing skeletons in the Protestant closet.  In 
particular, three periods in Christian history were the source of a great deal of unease 
among those evangelical writers interested in defending the claim that art and religion are 
essentially compatible: the early church, the Reformation, and Puritanism.  If one is 
tempted to say that these moments are tantamount to Protestant history en masse, one 
would not be far off the mark.  For evangelicals, these were the theologically significant 
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periods of Christian history – the periods in which biblical Christianity was seen to exist 
in its purest form, free from the Romanist accretions and Scholastic subtleties of the 
Middle Ages.  The difficulty, however, was that there appeared to be in each of these 
periods an inverse relationship between doctrinal purity and aesthetic interest.  Art, it 
seemed, flourished most when Christianity was most polluted by error and worldliness;12 
or, to put the matter in slightly different terms, the more aesthetically inclined 
Christianity became, the more religiously impure it became.  “As Christianity became 
artistic,” argued T. Harwood Pattison in the Baptist Quarterly Review, “it became 
corrupt.”13  History thus offered prima facie evidence for the essential incompatibility of 
art and Protestant religion.  A number of evangelical critics, however, confident in the 
belief that art and Christianity are not natural antagonists, rose to the challenge, and they 
set about the task of accounting for what seemed their substantial deviation from the 
attitudes of their forbears.   
 Nineteenth-century evangelicals developed a handful of key strategies for dealing 
with Protestantism’s putative historical aversion to the fine arts.  One such strategy, 
applied to the period of the early church, was simply to suggest that the usual claims 
regarding the alleged anti-aesthetic prejudices of first-century Christians had been unduly 
exaggerated.  “The new religion [i.e., Christianity],” claimed W.F. Taylor in the Baptist 
Quarterly Review, “did not array itself against the love of art.  There is much to disprove 
the sweeping assertion that Christianity in its effort to crush paganism became bitterly 
hostile to those forms of beauty by which the pagan religion was taught.”  One piece of 
evidence proffered by Taylor on this count was the plain fact that nowhere does the 
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Apostle Paul provide a scriptural condemnation of art, even in those passages in which 
one might most anticipate him doing so.  Specifically, Taylor referred to Paul’s 
injunction in 1 Corinthians 8 to avoid meat sacrificed to idols, noting that “while he 
commanded abstinence from this meat for the sake of others, not a word did he say 
against the idol itself.”  Taylor then shifted from a scriptural defense to a historical one, 
asserting that “there are abundant facts to show the prevalence of art among the gentile 
Christians in the earliest years of the Church.”  Among these facts, Taylor cited what 
many detractors had seen as the proverbial exception that proved the rule – namely, the 
“decorations” painted in the catacombs of Rome – as well as the apparent acceptance of 
art by some of the Church Fathers, “of whom not all feared its effect upon the purity of 
the faith.”14  Not surprisingly, this particular tack seems not to have been common during 
the period.  For one thing, it is doubtful that most readers would have been comfortable 
with a biblical interpretation that came dangerously close, however inadvertently, to a 
defense of idolatry; and though Taylor’s basic method of arguing from Scripture would 
have carried a good deal of weight among evangelicals, it is likely that a great majority of 
readers (especially those who continued to abide by some form of the Regulative 
Principle15) would have found his argument from silence less than compelling.  Taylor’s 
historical case, moreover, while correct enough in its basic facts, nevertheless leaves one 
with the inescapable impression that the author is grasping at straws.   
 A more nuanced, and more common, version of this tactic – used with respect to 
both the early church and the Reformation – was to argue that the early Christians and 
Reformers were not opposed to art in principle but only to its misuse.  “The appropriation 
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of [music] to the service of vice,” asserted the Presbyterian Christian Advocate in 1823, 
“is a perfect perversion of its original purpose, for it was first used to express the devout 
feelings of the heart.”16  With regard to the early church, James Smetham posited that 
although “early Christians … would not admit into their communion anyone who 
practised [art, and specifically painting]” – a stricture necessitated by art’s prior 
association with paganism – these same Christians “with unconscious inconsistency … 
carried in their hands lamps and vessels on which lyres, and palms, and lambs, and 
crowns were painted or embossed.”  In doing so, the early church thus tacitly 
acknowledged art’s “essential principle.”17  What early Christians could not admit in 
practice, alleged Smetham, they nevertheless admitted in spirit.  An article published in 
the Methodist Quarterly Review in 1877 applied a similar logic to the aesthetic views of 
the prominent Reformers.  After surveying selected passages concerning art from the 
writings of major Reformation figures like Luther, Zwingli, and Calvin, C.W. Bennett 
concluded that such passages “all go to show that with these earnest men there is a real 
appreciation of the beautiful – indeed, a true love of art.  The whole force of their protest 
is directed against the shameful prostitution of sacred art to vulgar and unworthy 
ends….”18  Indeed, nineteenth-century evangelical critics made good use of this 
argument, not only as a means of explaining what seemed to be the less-than-stellar 
historical record of Protestantism concerning the fine arts but also as a starting-point for 
their own attempts at religio-aesthetic reconciliation.  If, historically, Protestantism had 
never rejected the arts per se, then there were no authoritative grounds for good 
Protestants to do so in the nineteenth century either. 
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  The argument that Protestants had never in principle objected to the fine arts 
seemed plausible enough when brought to bear on the periods of the early church and the 
Reformation.  At the very least, one could always point, as Taylor attempted to do, to the 
Roman catacombs, or rehearse the humanist credentials of Reformers like John Calvin.  
There was, too, at least one major exception among the Puritans that seemed to present 
the possibility of a similar kind of argument: John Milton.  Thus, writing in 1841, an 
author in the Eclectic Review tried to draw a distinction between kinds of Puritans.  
Questioning those who had uncritically cast aside Shakespeare simply because he had 
written for the stage, the author blamed such prejudices on the exaggerated views of 
“‘precious Master [Philip] Stubbes,’ whose vagaries have contributed more to cast 
unmerited obloquy on the early Puritans than any abuse of their enemies; and who, 
mistaking want of taste for Christian zeal … recommends ‘Fox’s Book of Martyrs as the 
only legitimate ‘recreation’ for Christian men.”  In contrast, Milton, who praised and 
admired Shakespeare, was in fact “a greater, a more consistent Puritan.”19  The 
underlying issue, of course, is who constitutes the true Puritan exception – Stubbes or 
Milton – and we can only speculate as to how convincing readers of the Eclectic Review 
in 1841 found this argument.  Yet Milton notwithstanding, the Puritans in general seemed 
to present a particularly difficult case.  How was one to handle what appeared to be an 
open Puritan hostility to art and the aesthetic?   
Neil Harris has noted that, when it came to art, mid-nineteenth-century American 
clergymen “seemed particularly concerned with repudiating what they considered was an 
unfortunate though historically necessary Puritan inheritance.”20  This was just as true of 
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British evangelicals as it was of American, and evangelicals on both sides of the Atlantic 
set about this task in various ways.  Surely one of the stranger attempts among 
nineteenth-century evangelicals to contend with the Puritan tradition was the effort made 
by some writers to aestheticize the Puritans themselves – to suggest, that is, that though 
the Puritans may have been averse to aesthetic pursuits, they themselves constituted a 
form of “living art” or “living poetry.”  One example of this aestheticization of the 
Puritans was Harriet Beecher Stowe’s novel The Minister’s Wooing (1859).  In this 
novel, Stowe casts as a central character the historical figure, Dr. Samuel Hopkins – one-
time student of Jonathan Edwards and heir apparent of the Edwardsean theological legacy 
in America.  Hopkins is in many ways a stern and imposing figure, spending countless 
hours locked up in his study wrestling with the nuances of Calvinist theology in the hopes 
of one day producing his own theological magnum opus.  The cornerstone of his 
theology, and his own personal aspiration, is the concept of “disinterested benevolence.”  
According to this view, one must disinterestedly seek the glory of God and the greatest 
good in all things, even if this entails one’s own eternal damnation.  Caring little for the 
preoccupations of this world, he is heavenly-minded to the point of forgetfulness, and 
aside from the great theological and ethical questions of the moment, it is only his 
unrequited love for the young (and highly idealized) character of Mary Scudder which 
moves him to action.  He is almost, Stowe seems to imply, as unapproachable as the 
radically transcendent God he serves.  Stowe’s aestheticization of the Puritans, however, 
extended beyond the mere fact of her choice of Samuel Hopkins as a main character for 
her story.  For while the novel is in many ways critical of Hopkinsianism and of the 
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Puritans in general, Stowe nevertheless sees in the Puritan tradition and in the figure of 
Hopkins a certain “romance”: “you will find, if you will follow us, that there is as much 
romance burning under the snow-banks of cold Puritan preciseness as if Dr. Hopkins had 
been brought up to attend operas instead of metaphysical preaching, and Mary had been 
nourished on Byron’s poetry instead of ‘Edwards on the Affections.’”21  The Puritans, 
Stowe suggests, harbored a “burning” poetical spirit even if this spirit did not manifest 
itself in the production of formal art objects.  Underneath the Edwardsean exterior there 
lived an operatic and Byronic soul. 
 Nor was such a view confined to the more obviously aesthetic medium of fiction.  
This tendency to aestheticize the Puritans appeared in critical contexts as well.  An author 
in the British Quarterly Review, for instance, while conceding that “Poetry declined” 
during the age of the Puritans, nonetheless undertook a defense of the Puritans which 
culminated in a kind of aesthetic appreciation of Puritan courage: 
 
If the theatre was shut, the place of religious assemblies was open; if the 
brilliant creations of Shakespeare and the elder dramatists were viewed 
with devout horror, the songs of Zion and the sublime strains of prophet-
bards resounded night and day both in the council and the field …. Future 
generations will testify to their worth, and pronounce upon their virtues.  
Truly their lives were a great epic.22         
 
A writer in the British Baptist Magazine of 1857 adopted a similar position: “Poetry in 
those old Puritans!  Why not?  They were men of like passions with ourselves.  They 
loved, they married, they brought up children; they feared, they sinned, they sorrowed, 
they fought – they conquered.  There was poetry enough in them, be sure, though they 
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acted it like men, instead of singing it like birds.”23  As these passages demonstrate, the 
aesthetic concept most often applied to the Puritans was that of sublimity.  (Even Stowe, 
who favored the term “romance” in the passage cited above, tended towards a certain 
sublimity in her characterization of Hopkins and especially in her depiction of his 
ultimate willingness to relinquish his claims on Mary so that she can marry the wayward 
James.)  Early British theorists of the sublime had often included great acts of moral 
courage and conquest in their lists of sublime objects,24 and consequently, the sublime 
provided a useful means of bridging the gap between aesthetics (which the Puritans 
seemed to lack) and morality (at which the Puritans excelled).  By effectively 
“sublimating” the Puritans, evangelical critics could convert what appeared to be an 
aesthetic defeat into an aesthetic victory.  The Puritans did not need to write poetry 
because they lived it.  And while the Puritans may have been opposed in some measure to 
the fine arts, no one could justifiably claim that they were opposed to the aesthetic per se.   
This argument was sometimes deployed in conjunction with another kind of 
argument, which proved to be one of the more popular ones among nineteenth-century 
evangelical writers seeking to overcome the difficulties of Protestant aesthetic history – 
what might be termed the “exigency argument.”  Promoters of the exigency argument 
claimed that during periods of fierce theological crisis – viz., times during which the very 
truth of the Gospel was in danger of being perverted by error – it was permissible, even 
requisite, to employ extreme measures that would otherwise be unacceptable in times of 
peace.  These extreme measures included the temporary suspension of aesthetic pursuits 
(which, again, were not in themselves necessarily hostile to religion) in the interests of an 
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all-encompassing defense of biblical truth.  J. Milner Macmaster, for example, in an 1879 
discussion of Milton in the Baptist Magazine, applied this argument to the Puritans: 
 
It requires some charity, some historic imagination, to judge these men 
aright.  They made their mistakes, and were punished for them; but let it 
be remembered that a course of action which would be fanatical now may 
have been prudent then.  When the Puritans rejected music, painting, and 
architecture as aids to religion, they were engaged in a death-struggle with 
a giant superstition, which had made the means the end.25 
 
There was a strong undercurrent of anti-Catholicism in the exigency argument, as this 
passage attests.  The “death-struggle” which evangelical critics like Macmaster nearly 
always had in mind was either the battle against paganism in the early church or, in the 
case of the Reformation and the era of Puritanism, the errors of Roman Catholicism 
(which, for many evangelicals, had a “pagan” quality of its own).  Yet the brilliance of 
the exigency argument resided in the fact that it allowed evangelical critics to read the 
religio-aesthetic dynamics of key moments in Protestant history as an anomaly rather 
than as evidence of an intrinsic antinomy between art and evangelical Christianity.  One 
could thus affirm the positive religious zeal of the Puritans, for instance, as universal and 
exemplary, while simultaneously dismissing their anti-aesthetic extremism as extremism, 
as a peculiarity of the historical context.  “Now the Puritan spirit was evidently a healthy, 
natural, and necessary reaction against the abuses of the times…,” argued Joseph 
LeConte in the Southern Presbyterian Review.  “But, like all reactions, it has gone much 
beyond the line of truth and the limits of reason.”26  Thus the exigency argument 
provided critics and readers with both a reason to appreciate the religious “extremism” of 
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the Puritans and a reason to move beyond this tradition when it came to aesthetics.  Just 
as importantly, however, the presence – and presumably the persuasiveness – of this 
argument in the nineteenth-century evangelical mind helps to illuminate the later stance 
towards art taken by many fundamentalist evangelicals in the final decades of the 
nineteenth and early decades of the twentieth centuries.  For in the end, the exigency 
argument could cut both ways: if it could legitimate a departure from the Puritan aesthetic 
heritage in times of comparative theological harmony, it could just as easily warrant a 
fresh suspension of aesthetics during periods of renewed theological and cultural strife.   
 Still, the beauty of the exigency argument was that it provided what for most 
evangelical readers would have been a sensible explanation for the perceived aesthetic 
deficiency of Protestantism (and of Puritanism in particular) by placing its seeming anti-
aesthetic extremism in a meaningful context.  In its purest form, the exigency argument 
rested on a principle of proportionate action and reaction.  Extreme threats called for 
similarly extreme responses.  At times, however, some nineteenth-century evangelical 
critics ignored the delicate balance of the exigency argument in favor of a more overt and 
aggressive break with the Puritan aesthetic tradition.  An author in the Baptist Magazine 
spoke plainly about what he took to be the aesthetic errors of Puritanism:  
 
The Puritan party made a mistake in their treatment of poetry, akin to that 
into which they fell when dealing with music and painting.  They attacked 
the arts themselves, instead of confining their strictures to the abuse of 
them.  They overlooked the fact that a true poem or a great picture appeals 
to the Divinely implanted instincts of man’s nature.  So their efforts were 
unsuccessful.27 
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Here, the writer wielded for the purposes of criticism the central premise of an argument 
which, as we have seen, had often been utilized by other evangelical authors in defense of 
the aesthetic views of both the early church and the Reformation.  Whereas other critics 
had suggested that the Reformers, for instance, had not objected to the arts in principle 
but only to their misuse, this critic in the Baptist Magazine ventured the idea that this is 
precisely the crucial distinction which the Puritans had failed to make.  At the same time, 
the author seems to have had in mind something like the whole-person argument 
discussed in the previous chapter.  There exist “Divinely implanted instincts” in the 
minds of human beings which people ignore at their own peril.  The Puritans, however, 
did just this.  Thus, unlike Macmaster’s position in the Baptist Magazine a year earlier, 
which had effectively argued that the Puritans were operating under a special 
dispensation when it came to aesthetics, the general effect of this passage was to suggest 
that there was, in truth, no good reason for the anti-aesthetic extremism of the Puritans.  
They had made a mistake, plain and simple.     
 As this passage in the Baptist Magazine makes clear, there was, from the middle 
of the nineteenth century, an intensifying current of anti-Puritanism within evangelical 
aesthetics, whether expressed in the comparatively guarded framework of the exigency 
argument or announced in more transparently negative terms.  Even the efforts of some 
critics to aestheticize the Puritans involved, in the end, a tacit admission that the Puritans 
had shunned both art itself and any kind of sympathetic critical discourse about the arts.  
Indeed, when it came to aesthetics, Puritanism served as the foil for Victorian evangelical 
thinkers in a way that the early church or the Reformation rarely did.  By the end of the 
 266 
century, it seems, some evangelicals were just as likely as Arnold to bemoan what they 
took to be the excesses of their Puritan forefathers.  This anti-Puritan movement, 
moreover, took place at the levels of both theory and praxis.  If one but looks to the 
specific characteristics (not to mention the sheer quantity) of the art objects produced by 
evangelicals during the nineteenth century – to the character of their hymns, to the Gothic 
influence on Protestant architecture, to the rash of sentimental novels28 – one can see 
tangible evidence of this de-puritanization.  Even early twentieth-century fundamentalist 
evangelicals – who largely abandoned any serious interest in the philosophy of art and 
who sometimes viewed “high esthetic culture” with a certain amount of ambiguity – 
could welcome the efforts of a Warner Sallman to an extent that seventeenth-century 
Puritans, and even eighteenth-century evangelicals, never could have.   
In fact, this aesthetic de-Puritanization can be seen in the context of a larger and 
more protracted process of theological reconsideration.  As noted in chapter 2, the 
Calvinist theology of the Puritans had been under similar scrutiny since the eighteenth 
century even among historically Reformed denominations.  Wesleyan Methodism, of 
course, had embraced Arminianism from its inception, but by the early decades of the 
nineteenth century even some staunchly Calvinist denominations had begun to alter their 
theological bearings in favor of what they took to be a softened version of Reformed 
theology.29  As evangelicals gradually moved away from the Puritans theologically, they 
also moved away from them aesthetically, and vice versa.  In a broad sense, then, the 
gradual erosion of Puritan theological authority in the nineteenth century contributed to a 
milieu in which those critics interested in new aesthetic ventures could distance 
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themselves, albeit carefully in some cases, from the Puritan tradition without fear.   
The extent to which Puritanism in particular had become the bugbear of 
nineteenth-century evangelical aestheticians may be seen by contrasting these attitudes 
with those of some evangelicals regarding the aesthetic legacy of the Reformation.  
Victorian evangelical critics were, quite frankly, divided when it came to the 
Reformation’s effects on art.  While some felt compelled, as described above, to defend 
what they conceded were the excesses of the Reformation when it came to art, others 
took to the offensive and attempted to recast the Reformation as the engine driving the 
positive developments of modern aesthetics.  Some evangelical writers asserted that, far 
from having had an impoverishing effect on art and aesthetics, the Reformation had 
actually liberated them.  Not surprisingly, the target here was typically Roman 
Catholicism, and specifically, the Catholic claim to aesthetic superiority.  “Roman 
Catholics,” noted an author in the Eclectic Review, “have always boasted that their 
religion has been uniformly and exclusively favourable to the growth and development of 
the Fine Arts.”  This boast, however, was one which “Protestants have too easily 
received, and too quietly borne.”30  C.W. Bennett recited the typical charges concretely 
and succinctly.  Catholicism had always insisted “that Protestantism was greatly wanting 
in aesthetic susceptibility – indeed, that it was essentially iconoclastic in spirit; that it 
caused a fearful destruction of works of art in the times immediately following the great 
schism, and that it ushered in a period of fearful art decadence.”31  In response to such 
claims, evangelical critics argued that Roman Catholicism, with its rigid hierarchical and 
authoritarian structure, had in reality oppressed and retarded the development of art.  
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Freedom, these critics suggested, is the necessary condition for the blossoming of true art, 
and it was not until the Reformation abolished the medieval Catholic hegemony that such 
freedom could truly flourish.  “It is capable of proof,” wrote T. Harwood Pattison in the 
Baptist Quarterly Review, “that only when the religion of the Caesar was in its decline, 
when the first stirrings of the Protestant Reformation were felt, did art learn the greatness 
of her might, and breathe the air of freedom.”32  Bennett agreed: “The Reformation, so far 
from being the cause of the decadence of sacred art, was a protest against the spirit which 
was destroying the very capacity for high art.”33  Contrary to the allegations of Catholic 
critics, the Reformation had in fact redeemed art from the bondage of Catholic 
oppression.   
This argument is of special importance for a number of reasons.  First, it suggests 
that a negative factor driving the increased aesthetic interest among nineteenth-century 
evangelicals was, as Ryan K. Smith has argued in his study of American Protestant 
architecture, anti-Catholicism.  This increased interest was not, as has sometimes been 
thought, the result of an increasingly harmonious intercourse between Catholics and 
Protestants but rather an attempt on the part of evangelicals (and Protestants more 
generally) to prove their dominance.34  Paradoxically, as evangelicals inched closer to an 
arena of thought and practice in which Catholics were conventionally thought to have had 
the upper hand, they did so, at least in part, out of a desire to push back against 
Catholicism.  Nineteenth-century evangelical aesthetics was therefore poised, sometimes 
precariously, between the Puritans at one theological pole and Roman Catholics at the 
other.  Secondly, the very fact that aesthetics had now emerged as a site of religious 
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contestation provides yet another measure of the significant aesthetic transformation 
within evangelicalism.  For many Puritans and eighteenth-century evangelicals, the 
proscription of certain kinds of art – or at least their strict regulation – would have served 
as a marker of religious and theological superiority.  The authentic Protestant would have 
shunned certain kinds of art not only as “worldly” but also as “idolatrous” and 
“Catholic.”  By the nineteenth century, however, though caveats about the idolatrous 
potential of art and the aesthetic excesses of Catholicism persisted, the focus had in some 
measure shifted, and evangelicals were willing, even anxious, to meet Catholics head-to-
head on the battleground of aesthetics.  The objective was no longer to claim 
Protestantism’s religious supremacy via the rejection of aesthetics but to claim 
Protestantism’s religious supremacy via the embrace of aesthetics.  Protestantism could 
be said to trump Catholicism, inter alia, insofar as it supplied the necessary conditions for 
the creation of authentic art.   
Finally, it is of profound importance that those evangelical critics attempting to 
see something aesthetically positive in the Reformation tended by and large to 
characterize this positive contribution in terms of individual freedom, rather than, say, in 
terms of a unique theological contribution.  Describing what he took to be the post-
Reformation advances made by Protestants “Both in sacred and secular music,” Bennett 
attributed these advances to “that peculiar and darling principal of Protestantism – the 
unrestrained freedom of individual genius.”35  On the one hand, evangelicals were 
therefore perpetuating in the domain of aesthetics what has been famously termed a 
“whig” version of history.36  As we will see later on, this created in various ways an 
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intricate ideological web linking Protestant Christianity, aesthetics, narratives of progress, 
and even nationalism.  For the present, however, it is sufficient to note that this 
propensity to celebrate individual freedom as a, or the, pivotal aesthetic legacy of the 
Reformation also coincided with and reinforced the romantic conceptions of art and 
creativity which nineteenth-century evangelicals had come to embrace.  By reading the 
Reformation as the origin of that sort of individualism which may be said to underwrite 
the view of art as self-expression, such critics discovered implicit sanction for their (new) 
aesthetic views.  Individual genius, it seems, was a deeply and thoroughly Protestant 
notion.37  
Nineteenth-century evangelical critics, therefore, had taken to the offensive.  In 
fact, when viewed against the backdrop of the Puritan tradition’s lack of positive interest 
in exploring or legitimating art, even evangelical “defenses” of the Protestant tradition 
amounted to a sort of offensive maneuver.  Judging by the articles published in 
evangelical periodicals after the 1830s, educated evangelical Protestants had high hopes 
that evangelical Christianity could provide the necessary framework within which “high 
esthetic culture” could truly prosper. 
 
 Reconciliation, Subordination, and the Ideal of Productive Tension 
When it came to theorizing the relationship between religion and art, many mid-
nineteenth-century evangelical critics advocated what I have referred to as a 
“conciliatory” view.  Such a view, in theory, holds that there is no intrinsic conflict 
between art and religion.  As a writer in the Mercersburg Review put it in 1859, “[T]rue 
 271 
Christianity is never hostile to the art of any nation or age, except as it is misapplied or 
untrue to itself.”38  If this proposition seems hardly shocking to modern readers, it is 
important to remember that the confidence with which Victorian evangelical writers 
supported this idea represents a leveling of many of the ambiguities of the Puritan 
tradition.  For many Puritans, the question of art’s relationship to religion would have 
been surrounded by an aura of ambivalence. Yet it was not only the Puritans who found 
such a proposition dubious.  Strangely enough, one of the most influential statements in 
history concerning the incompatibility of art (in this case, poetry) and religion came from 
the pen of a critic who was himself no Puritan in either his aesthetic or his religious 
views.  Samuel Johnson had suggested in his “Life of Waller” that there can be no such 
thing as sacred poetry.39  This statement triggered a number of protests throughout the 
nineteenth century from evangelical (and non-evangelical) critics, and the indignation 
with which many evangelical writers challenged Johnson’s remark is proof positive that 
they saw no innate disharmony between the two.  “Poetry and religion are too commonly 
supposed to be unfriendly to each other,” wrote an author in the Baptist Magazine in 
1890.  “Dr. Johnson is responsible for an opinion which seems to us as shallow as it is 
injurious, and which is held by many who repeat it as a mere parrot cry.”40  This 
statement marked the culmination of a long tradition of negative reaction by evangelical 
critics to Johnson’s statement.  Historically, times may have existed when art and religion 
stood in opposition to one another, but there need be no inherent conflict between them. 
 That evangelicals were coming to embrace an ideal of harmonious co-existence 
between art and Christianity is especially apparent in the growing willingness of some 
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critics to defend the visual arts.  As early as 1840, Henry Drummond had declared that 
painting is the highest of the fine arts: “In its power of acting directly upon the feelings of 
mankind at large, painting takes precedence of all the arts.”41  In general, statements like 
Drummond’s were less common before the 1850s and 1860s, and even after this time 
evangelical critics were more likely to grant precedence to poetry rather than to painting 
or sculpture.  In part this was due to the comparative favor which poetry had always 
enjoyed in the Protestant tradition, even among the Puritans.  “When we examine the 
history of the Phonetic arts – music, poetry, and oratory,” noted C.W. Bennett in 1877, 
“we find that the record of Protestantism is especially honourable….”42  But this 
tendency to see poetry as “the queen of the fine arts,” as John M. Titzel put it in the 
Reformed Quarterly Review in 1891,43 had also received an added impetus from romantic 
theory, which had often stressed the primacy of lyric poetry, both historically (the 
primitivist anthropology of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries argued that poetry 
was the original language of humankind) and in order of importance.  “Lyric poetry,” 
wrote Sidney Dyer in the Baptist Quarterly in 1867, “was the first in the order of time, 
and is yet held by every ninety-nine out of a hundred as first in importance…. [It is not] 
the result of reflection, but of passion or emotion.  It expresses what is felt.  It is but the 
outgushing of man’s emotional nature.”44  Despite this continued preference for poetry, 
however, evangelicals increasingly overcame their longstanding suspicions of the 
visual.45  This may have been due in some measure to the widespread influence of 
Ruskin, whose theory of painting urged a just representation of the “facts.”  Such a theory 
no doubt resonated with some evangelicals’ ongoing attachment to common sense 
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philosophy, thus helping to defuse further evangelical anxieties regarding the visual.  
James Smetham, for instance, who undertook a lengthy defense of painting à la Ruskin in 
1862, asserted that “There is no single man to whom art in England owes so much.”  
Smetham also praised the “preaching pictures” of Holman Hunt and the Pre-Raphaelites, 
and called for more such “sacred art” in England.46  Clearly, even visual art and 
Protestant Christianity could now get along. 
At the same time, however, many evangelical critics also held that art and religion 
exist in a hierarchical tension with one another.  Put simply, art was seen as being, in a 
sense, subordinate to Christianity.  “We must insist, therefore, first of all, that art should 
always be subordinate to religion,” declared T.H. Pattison in the Baptist Quarterly 
Review.47  As evangelical critics understood it, this relationship of subservience did not 
imply any diminution of value; rather, only when art was properly subordinate to the 
claims and directives of religion could it find its proper fulfillment.  “All science, all 
politics, all art, all literature must lie low at the feet of religion, pure and undefiled, before 
they will find their true place and use,” explained Smetham.48  Echoes of the Augustinian 
ordo amoris and of the medieval “Great Chain of Being” are unmistakable here, and it 
was precisely the logic of these longstanding Christian-Platonic forms of thought which 
implicitly governed many nineteenth-century evangelical discussions of art’s connection 
to religion.49   
 This notion of religio-aesthetic hierarchy thus supposed that religion bears 
simultaneously both a negative and positive relationship to art.  On the one hand, religion 
acts in multiple ways as a kind of aesthetic horizon, establishing various limitations or 
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boundaries for art – the most basic of which is the assertion that art and religion are 
categorically distinct – and policing these boundaries accordingly.  Zealous champions of 
art have at times associated this policing function with Puritanism (or with Plato for that 
matter), and of course, to a certain extent this is true.  The extreme Platonic or Puritan 
view, was, in a sense, the religio-philosophical policing of art to the point of extinction.  
Yet the mere act of establishing religious boundaries for art’s social or metaphysical 
scope does not itself constitute Puritanism, or the puritanical.  This is a critical point 
when it comes to understanding nineteenth-century evangelical aesthetics.  Not only was 
evangelical aesthetic thought assuming an increasingly romantic outlook but there was 
also a marked anti-Puritanism among a growing cadre of evangelical aestheticians.  Thus 
any view which takes nineteenth-century evangelical strictures on art (e.g., that art is 
incapable of bringing about salvation) as evidence of an unmitigated Puritanism is 
ultimately amiss.  Aspects of Puritanism may be said to have survived in the substance of 
the particular limitations which many evangelical theorists believed Christianity placed 
on art – there remained, for example, some genuine concern that art ought to take care not 
to slip into the sin of “idolatry” – but overall these limitations should be read in the 
context of the negative tension inherent in the subordinationist viewpoint to which many 
Victorian evangelicals aspired.  The sheer quantity of ink which nineteenth-century 
evangelicals spilled on the question of art’s relationship to religion is enough to 
demonstrate that evangelicals were interested in far more than a by-then-familiar 
recitation of art’s dangers.   
To be sure, many evangelical critics were in agreement that if art could not be 
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made subservient to religion, then it was art that would have to go.  In this, at least, 
evangelicals seemed to be at one with their Puritan predecessors.  But these statements, 
too, must be read in their nineteenth-century context.  What often necessitated such 
statements regarding the abandonment of art as a theoretical possibility (though the entire 
subordinationist theory was in a sense designed to ensure that it was only a possibility) 
was the increasing tendency on the part of some progressive nineteenth-century 
intellectuals to see art as a point of contact with the “divine” that could be had apart from 
institutional and doctrinally-specific forms of Christianity.50  Many nineteenth-century 
evangelical writers were therefore engaged in a tenuous attempt to walk a razor-thin line 
between what amounted to a de-aestheticized spirituality and a hyper-spiritualized 
aesthetic.  If romanticism had offered evangelicals a newly elevated conception of art, it 
also threatened at the same time to displace orthodox Christianity altogether – to 
destabilize the desired religio-aesthetic hierarchy.  To appreciate this complex dynamic of 
evangelical appropriation and resistance, one must therefore read evangelical statements 
about the religious limits of art in the dual context of evangelical anti-Puritanism, on the 
one hand, and the sometimes exorbitant claims for art advanced by other prominent 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century thinkers on the other.  Whether it was the contention 
of German idealists that art was the key to repairing humanity’s alienation from the 
natural world or the suggestion by Matthew Arnold that poetry could serve as a substitute 
for lost religion, art assumed a religious, or quasi-religious, significance largely 
unparalleled prior to the nineteenth century.  When seen in this light, statements that at 
first glance may appear puritanical and passé turn out to be a plea for moderation.  A 
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number of evangelicals, then, were just as apt to protest the excesses of those thinkers 
who in various ways looked to art as a new kind of religion as they were to protest the 
excesses of the Puritan.  In contrast to both the Puritan and those who would make of art 
a substitute for orthodox Christianity, many evangelical critics persevered in their faith – 
sometimes even in the face of evidence to the contrary – that art could indeed be made 
properly submissive to the yoke of Christianity and that, when it became so, human 
beings would then and only then know its true glory.   
In fact, ostensibly “negative” statements about art’s limitations must always be 
read in the context of corresponding positive statements about the social, moral, religious, 
and aesthetic value and potential of art, and it is the existence of this positive pole which 
distinguishes a “conciliatory” view of art and religion from that of the extreme Puritan.  
For if in the subordinationist view Christianity in one sense limits art, it is also that which 
enables, informs, and gives art meaning.  “Let the scholar settle the just subordination of 
literature to Christianity,” observed one critic in 1823, “then Christianity will approve 
and exalt his pursuits.”  This same article, in fact, had earlier quoted Henry Martyn’s 
reflections on the way in which his conversion to Christianity had infused him with a 
deeper appreciation for art and beauty.51  Pattison expressed this seeming paradox in the 
Baptist Quarterly Review in explicit terms: “Art, which, must be subordinate to religion, 
and limited by it, must also receive from it its constant inspiration.”52  This positive 
relationship could be, and was, formulated in a myriad of ways, but nearly all evangelical 
writers were agreed that it was Christianity which uniquely empowered art and allowed it 
to flourish.  “Such is the nature of the principles of the Gospel,” noted a writer in the 
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American Baptist Magazine in 1835, “that they readily interweave themselves into every 
serious subject of thought, imparting a peculiar modification to all.  Their presence or 
absence will give a very different aspect to everything that has relation to the important 
interests of time, and to our condition in the life which is to come.”53  All cultural 
endeavors, argued E.E. Higbee in the Mercersburg Review in 1874, are subject to 
Christianity’s influence: “In fine, the whole realm of practical, theoretical, and aesthetical 
activity has felt its presence and power.”54  Thus, evangelical critics did far more than 
simply deny that there was any intrinsic hostility between art and religion; they actively 
asserted the positive relationship between the two.   
For many evangelicals, then, the relationship between art and religion was finally 
an “uneven” one: just as the God of orthodox Christianity can do without human beings 
but human beings cannot do without God, so Christianity can do without art but art 
cannot, in the end, do without Christianity.  When art assumes its assigned place in the 
great chain of religio-aesthetic being, then its value is extensive indeed; when, however, 
it presumes to disrupt this hierarchy, chaos is the predictable result.  Such, at least, was 
the ideal conception of the relationship between religion and art envisioned by many 
nineteenth-century evangelical critics.55  In 1861, a contributor to the Presbyterian 
Quarterly Review captured this ideal of productive tension in an article on “Aesthetics.”  
Neither the puritanical nor a vague transcendentalist view of art ought to be indulged; 
rather, the truth lies in a golden mean, a hierarchical tension:  
 
The example of our Puritan fathers should not be imitated ….  [But also] 
We would not stimulate to the displacement of religion that we may 
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enthrone art …. But there is a happy mean to be preserved, in which the 
spiritual shall not be overborne by the purely aesthetic, and the aesthetic 
not wholly excluded from the higher spiritual.  The predominant power is 
in religion.  Aesthetics are subordinate.56   
 
Of course, maintaining such a delicate balance in practice was oftentimes another matter 
altogether.  By the 1870s and 1880s, this balance was beginning to break down as the 
divide between liberals, who were increasingly prepared to accept the romantic 
spiritualization of art, and conservatives widened.  However, it is to an examination of 
some of the theoretical details associated with this ideal of productive tension to which 
we now turn, beginning with the notion of Christianity as aesthetic horizon.        
 
Maintaining the Religio-Aesthetic Balance I: Christianity as Aesthetic Horizon 
Evangelical discussions of the ways in which Christianity acts as a limiting factor on art 
tended to center on a handful of issues which, for the purposes of analysis, can be 
reduced to three general heads: (1) art and religion as distinct phenomenological entities; 
(2) art’s relationship to evangelical conceptions of salvation; and (3) art’s idolatrous 
potential.  In the wake of various forms of romantic thought and amid the growing 
challenges to traditional orthodoxy issuing from scientific and philosophical quarters, the 
nineteenth century had witnessed a widespread reconsideration of each of these topics, 
either implicitly or explicitly, and had in many cases settled on less-than-orthodox 
solutions.  Throughout much of the period, however, a number of evangelical critics 
fought to maintain more traditional positions on these issues.  Yet even within such 
traditional defenses one can see that the ground was beginning to shift.  
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Art and Religion as Distinct Entities 
The issue of art and religion as distinct phenomenological entities was at the core of the 
efforts of some evangelicals to resist the more grandiose implications of nineteenth-
century romantic thought and to maintain a productive aesthetic balance between the 
opposite poles of Puritanism and extreme romanticism.  Moreover, the position of many 
evangelical critics on this issue helps, in turn, to explain the positions which these writers 
adopted on the questions of art and salvation, and art and idolatry.  In contrast to the 
tendency of a number of prominent nineteenth-century thinkers to blur the traditional 
distinctions between art and religion, a contingent of evangelical critics struggled to 
preserve the uniqueness of each. 
 As noted earlier, the nineteenth century witnessed a steady progression towards 
the conflation of art and religion – towards a propensity to see aesthetic experience as 
fundamentally religious and to see religion as fundamentally aesthetic.  This development 
has a complex history of its own,57 but we may note here briefly that this religio-aesthetic 
merger manifested itself on at least three distinct though interconnected fronts.  To begin 
with, there appeared a sophisticated body of post-Kantian aesthetic and philosophical 
thought which stressed the possibility of supersensuous, or transcendental perception.  
Schelling, for example, argued that the Absolute (which he increasingly identified with 
“God”) could be apprehended through an “intellectual intuition,” while Hegel believed 
that the nature of the Absolute could be revealed through logic.  These systems both 
participated in, and fostered, the gradual process of immanentization which many 
scholars have observed in nineteenth-century thought.  The world was now saturated with 
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“spirit” and “divinity,” and what had traditionally been a matter of grace, revelation, or 
faith entered the domain of metaphysics, intuition, and imagination.  The eternal could be 
apprehended in the temporal, the infinite in the finite, the idea in form, and consequently, 
such systems accorded art an important place in the progressive self-awareness of 
Absolute Spirit.58  As we saw in the previous chapter, some evangelicals had already 
begun to move in this direction by the 1850s, sometimes with less-than-orthodox results, 
but in the middle-third of the century a significant number of evangelical critics were still 
wary of what they saw as the potential theological dangers inherent in this view. 
Secondly, the conflation of art and religion emerged as a defensive strategy for 
preserving religion in the face of what seemed to be indisputable “scientific” evidence 
that the traditional factual claims of religion were false.  If religion was not scientifically 
true, then perhaps it could still be valued for what Arnold called its “unconscious 
poetry.”59  It might, in short, be possible to “save” Christianity by aestheticizing it.  Some 
within the evangelical tradition had themselves begun to adopt similar measures as a 
means of dealing with seemingly difficult or offensive doctrines.  Though they did not 
carry their thinking to the extent which Arnold did, both Horace Bushnell and Edwards 
Amasa Park effectively turned to a more “poetic” understanding of evangelical 
Christianity in what they believed was a noble effort to sustain or preserve it.60  In doing 
so, they initiated a trend that would become a defining characteristic of one branch of 
liberal Protestantism around the turn of the twentieth century.   
Finally, the fusion of art and religion transpired on a social level as well, that is, 
art and religion gradually came to be seen as exercising similar social functions.  Already 
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in 1833, the Christian Quarterly Spectator was suggesting that Christianity and poetry 
have similar ends: “The tendency and aim of Christianity is the same with the legitimate 
and highest efforts of poetry, – to interest man in man, – to lift him above the grossness 
of material things, – to spiritualize his nature, and fit him for a higher and nobler 
existence.”61  The idea became widespread that art and beauty could go some distance in 
elevating the poor and remedying social ills.  For some thinkers, parks were just as 
important, if not more important, than preaching.  In an essay published in 1882, for 
example, H.O. Barnett asked how it was that the poor could be raised up “to enjoy 
spiritual life.”  Barnett, however, explicitly rejected the usual evangelical answer to this 
question.  Preaching had failed, she argued, so new methods must be sought.  Of the six 
new methods offered by Barnett, five of them were aesthetic in nature or had a strong 
aesthetic component.  Specifically, the poor ought to be exposed to flowers, to high-class 
music, to afternoons in the country, to the stories of great lives, and to the Beauty of Art.  
“Picture galleries,” she contended, “can become mission halls for the degraded.”  
Elsewhere, Barnett did qualify her statement somewhat, admitting that “Pictures will not 
do everything.  They will not save souls.”62  For Barnett, too, one senses that art was still 
a means to religion (though not in the evangelical sense) rather than an alternative form 
of religion.  Still, she had nevertheless raised the possibility that art may be a viable 
alternative to preaching the Gospel – a scandalous suggestion for the vast majority of 
evangelicals.  In fact, she had failed to mention the Gospel as conservative evangelicals 
would have understood it at all.  If Barnett stopped short of equating aesthetic experience 
with salvation, she had issued a real challenge to traditional evangelical views.  And 
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though many evangelicals would have agreed with Barnett that art can serve as a 
meaningful source of moral and social refinement in elevating the affections of the 
people, they would likely have been uncomfortable with the degree of faith which she 
seemed to place in art at the relative expense of the Gospel. 
 Ultimately, however, each of these manifestations was made possible on some 
level by a single underlying factor, namely, the readiness of so many in the nineteenth 
century to define religion according to the criterion of feeling.63  It was Schleiermacher, 
with his definition of religion as a “feeling of dependence,” who inaugurated the 
nineteenth century’s formal philosophical reflection on this idea, though its roots can 
doubtless be traced back to various forms of pietism and even, in a sense, to the Great 
Awakening and to the Evangelical Revival.  Revivalism itself may arguably have helped 
to reinforce this notion on a practical level (though evangelical revivalists rarely, if ever, 
relinquished doctrinal concerns completely).  Whatever its origins, however, this 
understanding of religion in terms of feeling is crucial because, as noted in the previous 
chapter, there was an important axis of thought running through the nineteenth century 
which pitted art against science as unique forms of discourse suited to the feelings and 
the intellect respectively.  Art was the discourse of emotion, science the discourse of 
reason.  Consequently, if religion, too, was more emotion than fact – recall here Arnold’s 
claim that the emotion once attached to the failed facts of religion may be transferred to 
the “ideas” of poetry64 – then it seemed that a natural alliance existed between art and 
religion over and against science.  In many cases, however, this natural alliance became 
not an alliance but a oneness, as any attempt at a qualitative distinction between religious 
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and aesthetic emotions slipped into the background.  Clive Bell’s Art (1914) may be seen 
as an endpoint in this relentless march towards religio-aesthetic oneness: art and religion 
alike “have the power of transporting men to superhuman ecstasies; both are means to 
unearthly states of mind.  Art and religion belong to the same world … The kingdom of 
neither is of this world.”65  Rudolf Otto’s painstaking efforts in The Idea of the Holy 
(1919) to untangle this religio-aesthetic knot of affectivity offers just one example of how 
widespread this fusion had become throughout the Anglo-Saxon world.66  In fact, much 
of the nineteenth-century debate between theological conservatives and theological 
liberals can be framed as a struggle over how one ought to locate religion on the 
art/science axis.  Is religion closer to art/emotion or to science/intellect?    
Evangelical critics did not dispute the art/science dichotomy; in fact, it was so 
deeply embedded in nineteenth-century ideology that it had in many cases passed beyond 
the limits of critical vision.  Evangelicals, moreover, were far from denying that religion 
was addressed in large part to the heart.  A number of evangelical writers, however, 
especially before the 1870s, did insist that there remained an important qualitative 
distinction between religious and aesthetic emotion.  Edward Irving, for instance, despite 
his otherwise romantic leanings, nevertheless emphasized that “poetry, and philosophy, 
and science, and sentiment, and every other more noble function of the soul, cannot, in 
their own strength, exalt themselves into religion.”67  “We are always grieved when we 
see these imaginative Christians,” confessed the Christian Advocate and Journal and 
Zion’s Herald in 1829.  “They are certainly substituting the shadow for the substance.  
They feel a glow of imagination, and mistake it for the glow of devotion.  They seem to 
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love God just as they love the mountain, or the waterfall, or any sublime object.”68  A 
letter to the editor of the Christian Index complained in 1832 of many people’s penchant 
for mistaking aesthetic for genuinely religious feeling: “Many apparently do not 
distinguish between the pleasure arising from mere taste, and that satisfaction derived 
solely from humility …. Their worship is more poetical than godly.”  Indeed, “the 
pleasures of taste, are often mistaken for the spirit of devotion….”69  Henry N. Day, 
whose writings on aesthetics show a familiarity with many of the tenets of idealist 
thought, nevertheless decried in 1847 the “aesthetic mysticism” of the age: “Nor … are 
we the dupes of that philosophical mysticism which would identify the true artistic spirit 
with the religious sentiment; which, in true pantheistic consistency, recognises in every 
creative genius a real incarnation of the Deity, and only there ….”70  It was not the intent 
of such statements to deny that aesthetic experience could initiate religious feelings of 
devotion; evangelical writers were in fact strong advocates of the idea that an aesthetic 
appreciation of nature, for instance, could lead to enhanced worship of the Creator.71  
Rather, the goal was to preserve what evangelicals understood to be a distinction in kind: 
aesthetic feelings might lead to religious feelings, but the two are not identical.    
Thus theologically conservative writers, particularly those working within robust 
intellectual or confessional traditions, or those who remained close to the philosophy of 
Scottish common sense, such as the Old School Presbyterians at Princeton, fought hard to 
preserve an essential distinction between religion and art by affirming the “scientific” or 
cognitive content of religion.  In his highly critical review of Horace Bushnell’s God in 
Christ, for example, Charles Hodge staunchly rejected Bushnell’s claim that “a great part 
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of [Christianity’s] dignity and efficacy consists in the artistic power of its form….”  
Bushnell had argued at length for a non-dogmatic view of the Atonement.  Not only does 
the work of Christ exceed the limits of human language but abstract doctrinal formulae 
are themselves incapable of truly moving the human spirit.  Rather, the suffering of 
Christ acts as a kind of aesthetic object, apprehended by the feelings, which is intended to 
produce a subjective impression within us of the abiding love of God and of hope for the 
future.  The “matter” of Christ’s work “does not lie in formulas of reason, and cannot be 
comprehended in them.  It is more a poem than a treatise.  It classes as a work of Art 
more than as a work of Science.  It addresses the understanding, in great part, through the 
feeling or sensibility.”72  For Hodge, by contrast, the doctrines of Christianity were more 
rational than aesthetic, while the effects of religion were the result of the Holy Spirit and 
of truth rather than of aesthetic perception or imagination: 
 
It is among the first principles of the oracle of God, that regeneration and 
sanctification are not aesthetic effects produced through the imagination.  
They are moral and spiritual changes, wrought by the Holy Ghost, with 
and by the truth as revealed to the reason.  The whole healthful power of 
the things of God over the feelings, depends upon their being true to the 
intellect.  If we are affected by the revelation of God as a father, it is 
because he is a father, and not the picture of one.  If we have peace 
through faith in the blood of Christ, it is because he is a propitiation for 
our sins in reality, and not in an artistic form merely.73 
 
Religion, according to Hodge, must be clearly distinguished from aesthetics.  One cannot, 
as Hodge accused Bushnell of doing, reduce the supernatural power of religion to mere 
aesthetic effect. 
The conservative evangelical insistence on a clear-cut distinction between 
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religious and aesthetic emotion, or between the modes by which religion and aesthetics 
operated, could, if extrapolated to its furthest extent, end in the total dissociation of the 
two.  It could, in short, fall back into a kind of puritanical attempt to quarantine art.  An 
article published in the British Quarterly Review in 1875, entitled “Religious Art,” came 
close to advocating just such an approach.  The author’s thesis, somewhat shocking for its 
time, was that “religious art” is an “expression … entirely without meaning.”  The author 
admitted that art had a divine origin but nonetheless scoffed at the notion that art itself 
could be, in any meaningful sense, religious: “Religion then, and art, though equally 
divine in origin and human in their sphere, are in their mode of influence and action 
totally distinct, and any purpose to combine the two must end in damage, failure, and 
confusion.”74  This position was, however, exceedingly rare; rather, nineteenth-century 
evangelical critics most often clung to their optimistic conviction that art could, in fact, 
have a meaningful religious dimension without itself becoming religion and that religion 
could, in turn, work alongside, and in some cases through, the aesthetic without being 
reduced to the aesthetic.  J.S. White noted in 1887, “it may be remarked that if religion 
has a sphere of its own, the converse must be equally true … that is to say, there is a wide 
field in which art may be exercised without any direct bearing on religion.”   White’s 
observation suggests how the same logic used to safeguard the singularity of religion 
could, if spun a certain way, simultaneously supply the rationale for an incipient 
aestheticism.  However, White himself had not yet relinquished the Victorian dream of 
wholeness.  Analytical distinctions need not, and ought not, imply an actual separation: 
“But though distinct, they are not unrelated.  There is no natural or necessary antagonism 
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between them.”75  Bushnell’s error was not his suggestion that Christianity appealed to 
the senses or feelings but that it appealed only or predominantly to the senses or feelings.  
Thus, after Henry N. Day condemned the “aesthetic mysticism” of the age, he could 
nevertheless conclude that “it may be true for all this, that Christianity must work through 
the taste, as it must work through the intelligence.”76  And even Charles Hodge, who 
inclined heavily towards a “scientific” view of religion, acknowledged that “The 
revelations of God are addressed to the whole soul, to the reason, to the imagination, to 
the heart, and to the conscience.”77 
 
Art and Salvation 
To some, the question of how art relates, if at all, to salvation would seem a strange 
inquiry indeed – a peculiar consequence of what appears to be evangelical Christianity’s 
preoccupation with the Atonement, with the process of conversion, or with the felt 
obligation to evangelize.  However, for those conservative nineteenth-century evangelical 
critics who sought to maintain a productive tension between Christianity and art, the 
question was not only natural but – given the propensity of some influential Victorian 
thinkers to find in art and the aesthetic a substitute for what seemed a crumbling 
orthodoxy – necessary as well.  Convinced that all are sinners in need of God’s 
redemptive grace, conservative evangelicals were, and are, committed to spreading the 
Good News of the Gospel that Christ’s death has atoned for sinners’ rebellion against 
God.  Only those who are “converted” can hope to enter heaven.  To the conscientious 
evangelical, there was no more important task in life than to share this basic message 
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with others.  For Victorian evangelicals, moreover, conversion also had an important 
social dimension.  Political legislation and education could be helpful tools in the quest 
for social amelioration, but no such efforts would ultimately succeed if people’s hearts 
and minds remained hopelessly unregenerate.  For this reason, as Perry Miller observed, 
revival “was the one clearly given truth” of nineteenth-century American society, and 
though British evangelicals, according to Richard Carwardine, sometimes viewed 
American-style revivalism with a healthy dose of skepticism, they hardly doubted the 
necessity of revival itself.78   
Given the prominence of conversionism within evangelicalism, then, it seems 
almost inevitable that sooner or later the question of art’s relationship to the sort of 
saving grace uniquely manifested in the moment of conversion would have arisen.  This 
conversionist emphasis, furthermore, found itself increasingly in danger of being 
supplanted by “secularized” forms of salvation.  Already in the late 1840s, for example, 
liberal-minded writers like Bushnell were rejecting the conversionist model of orthodox 
evangelicalism.  In place of the traditional stress on a moment of decision, Bushnell 
substituted a theory of Christian “nurture,” in which the spiritual “characters” of children 
were thought to be unconsciously shaped by the ordinary domestic influences of family 
and society.79  Furthermore, as noted above, art was more and more being peddled as a 
panacea for all sorts of spiritual and social problems.  It is therefore not surprising that a 
number of evangelical critics felt compelled to address the question of art’s relationship 
to salvation. 
In contrast to those who saw art in salvific terms, many conservative evangelical 
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critics agreed that art and/or aesthetic experience did not, and could not, by themselves 
constitute a form of salvation.80  Art and beauty could serve a variety of noble ends, but 
they were incapable of accomplishing a work that is reserved for the Holy Spirit alone.  
To many evangelicals, the idea that art and the aesthetic were a form of salvation would 
have seemed downright naïve.  The real human problem was sin, and no art, however 
beautiful or arresting, could eliminate this blot or bring peace with God.  An author in the 
London Quarterly Review gave this position pointed expression in 1854.  Reacting to the 
idea that “Only Art can elevate: the Gospel is Art,” he reiterated forcefully that the only 
Gospel is the Gospel of Christ: 
 
 Nature does not save man from sin and misery; nor Art; nor Civilization; 
nor Commerce…. As servants to a community, purified by a spiritual 
power, they are of priceless value, and indescribable ornament; but as 
lords of man’s heart, or the stay of his hope, they are usurpers, and their 
reign ends, as do usurpations…. Nothing is gospel for man that does not 
go into his nature, down to the root of his leaning to sin; and create within 
him a clean heart and a right spirit.  Lover of Nature! lover of Art! lover of 
Civilization! lover of Commerce! we join you all.  But if you would see 
the beauties you admire in the fairest posture, and wielding the utmost 
influence, join us in pointing all men, in great earnest, to Him who is 
“exalted a Prince and a Saviour, to give repentance and remission of sins,” 
– to make the individual “a new creature,” and the whole earth a land of 
rest.81  
 
Similarly, in a telling article on the “Characteristics of Wordsworth’s Poetry” published 
in 1869, a writer in the Wesleyan-Methodist Magazine somewhat reluctantly 
acknowledged that Wordsworth, despite his incontrovertible genius, had erred in 
attributing to Nature what can only be rightly attributed to God, namely, the granting of 
grace unto salvation: “He erred … in asserting for Nature a power which she does not 
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possess; a power to lead back, by her mere teachings and influences, man’s sinful, far-
wandered spirit to truth, and God, and peace; a work this which only the good Spirit can 
do, and which He does by other and far different means.”82  When viewed in the broad 
context of nineteenth-century evangelical aesthetics, this statement is significant in that it 
registers the unwillingness of some evangelical critics to capitulate completely to 
mainstream romanticism.  Victorian evangelicals may have been, to a great extent, 
“romantics” when it came to aesthetics, but until at least the 1870s, and often longer, 
many nonetheless clung to quite unromantic doctrines like the essential depravity of 
humankind and a belief in salvation through Christ alone.83  A number of evangelicals 
were in fact devoted readers of Wordsworth, but in the end they could not condone his 
theological vagueness nor sanction his tacit claim that the beauty of Nature in itself 
contains the power of salvation. 
In fact, some evangelical critics seem to have stepped up their denial of art’s 
salvific potential as the century drew to a close, perhaps in response to the increasingly 
expansive claims of writers like Barnett.  A number of articles from the early 1880s, for 
example, reiterate the point that there can be no salvation in art.  Discussing “Christianity 
and Art” in the Christian Advocate in 1880, B. Hawley insisted that “The real wants of 
men on earth are to be met in Christ, who is the brightness of the Father’s glory, and the 
express image of his person, and in the appointed and significant ordinances of 
Christianity.”84  W.J. Dawson, a critic in the Wesleyan-Methodist Magazine, thought he 
saw in Tennyson’s poem The Palace of Art a confirmation of this very idea.  The poem, 
Dawson explained, testifies to the fact that “The need for some diviner salvation than art 
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can offer, haunts with persistent bitterness the human spirit sheltered in its selfish 
splendour.”85  Even Henry J. Van Dyke, Jr., whose later espousal of theological 
liberalism in the 1890s led to trouble with the American Presbyterian hierarchy, still 
found it appropriate in 1883 to sound a similar refrain in the Princeton Review: “Nor can 
we hope to save this man, and such as he, by any moral ministry of art, however pure and 
strong.  Poems and pictures will not deliver him from the kingdom of darkness into the 
kingdom of light ….  There must be first a quickening, an awakening, a new birth in the 
inner nature of man, so that he shall know the good, desire it, seek it….”86  Barnett and 
Arnold notwithstanding, the idea that art could in any way redress the real spiritual 
problem of humankind – sin – was to many evangelicals not only misguided but 
dangerous. 
Yet if conservative evangelical critics in particular firmly rejected the idea that 
one could find an alternative form of “salvation” in art, they were sometimes more 
ambiguous when it came to the related question of whether it was possible for art to play 
an effectual role in bringing sinners to Christ, that is, whether the Holy Spirit could work 
through art to convince a person of his or her need for salvation traditionally conceived.  
One article, published in the Eclectic Review in 1841, answered this question with a 
resounding, “Maybe.”  The article – a review of The Administrative Economy of the Fine 
Arts in England by Edward Edwards and A Letter to Thomas Phillips, Esq., R.A., on the 
Connexion between the Fine Arts and Religion, and the Means of their Revival by Henry 
Drummond – rather tentatively allowed that art may, on occasion, serve as a locus of 
divine grace: “In the mere way of instrumentality, a glorious picture, a noble statue, a 
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magnificent edifice, or a sublime piece of music, may on some rare occasions have even 
reached the soul of a sinner.  The Almighty who would have all men to be saved, is not 
limited in His operations.”  The writer, however, was conscious of the fact that he was 
advancing a potentially controversial view of the matter.  “We are fully aware that much 
difference of opinion may exist on this subject.”  Several pages later he conceded that it 
is only “in very rare instances” that “the Holy Spirit of God has made use of certain 
exquisite productions to affect the understanding, or influence the heart.”87  Since God is 
sovereign and is therefore not restricted in His mode of operation, art may at times 
provide an occasion for the intervention of divine grace.  On the whole, however, art, the 
author suggested, bears no reliable or consistent correlation to salvation.  But why?   
There were at least two reasons for this tendency to dissociate art and salvation.  
To begin with, the Eclectic Review writer criticized Edwards and Drummond for failing 
to keep in view “the usual means of promoting [true religion’s] success according to the 
word of God.”  For evangelical Protestants, this “usual means” referred to the preaching 
of the Word itself.  Drummond, for instance, had made the rather traditional claim that art 
could serve as a missionary tool, a means of instructing the “heathen,” the poor, and the 
illiterate.  For good Protestants, however, this sounded an awful lot like Catholicism or 
Tractarianism, and in fact the writer accused Drummond of being “a zealous Puseyite.”  
Proclamation, not painting, was the means which God had sanctioned for the 
dissemination of the Gospel, and to introduce another method of evangelization was to 
substitute human methods for God-ordained ones.  “Fancy him making all conceivable 
exertions for the benefit of the plastic arts at home, and the diffusion of christianity 
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abroad … in rendering the walls of the Islington seminary frescoed like catholic 
convents, or adding to the clergymen and schoolmasters in India, Jamaica, and New 
Zealand, a corps of artists from the Royal Academy!”88  Such a perspective, of course, 
echoed similar Puritan anxieties about the dangers of “invention,” as well as the Puritan 
desire to adhere strictly to the letter of Scripture (i.e., the Regulative Principle).  Here, at 
least, it is evident that aspects of the Puritan tradition had survived intact.  Indeed, many 
conservative evangelicals tended to see any means of conversion other than the biblically 
mandated one of preaching the Gospel as representative of the kind of extra-biblical 
accretions associated with Catholicism.89  “Religion is not taught by the painted 
semblances of Christ, but by the word and work of Christ Himself,” argued an author in 
the British Quarterly Review.90  Consequently, though the Holy Spirit could work 
through other means such as art, such means were not the appointed ones and were 
therefore undependable. 
Even more important, however, was the reviewer’s apparent anxiety that even a 
theory which posits a wholly instrumental connection between art and salvation – one 
which sees art merely as an occasion for the supernatural intervention of the Holy Spirit 
rather than as an alternative form of redemption – may nevertheless slide imperceptibly 
into the belief that it is art itself which communicates grace.  Or perhaps more accurately, 
the author expressed fear that the emotions generated in an aesthetic encounter may too 
easily, and too often, be confused with those which attend upon a genuine experience of 
supernatural grace.  Once again, the problem was the potential conflation of art and 
religion.  Noting the “enervating and ostentatious display of intellectual emotion” which 
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the British people, he believed, were too frequently guilty of when viewing works of fine 
art abroad, the reviewer cautioned readers against placing too much stock in this kind of 
experience: 
 
Intellectualism is never to be despised, as we have repeatedly intimated; 
but neither must the fact be forgotten, that it may be, and generally is an 
entirely distinct affair, from the vitality of that knowledge which converts, 
and which alone saves a soul.  We have seen the most secular and even 
sensual minds more deeply moved than we would venture to describe, 
before the Transfiguration of Raphael, in the Vatican … and yet these very 
individuals, when the spectacle has terminated, have returned like the dog 
to their own licentiousness again, or like the sow that was washed to her 
wallowing in the mire!  Such religious impressions, if deserving that name 
at all, are but the contortions of a corpse when in contact with the wires of 
a galvanic battery; the illusive and horrible imitations of a genuine 
quickening of the inner man!91  
 
It is perhaps no coincidence here that “imitation” yet again connoted the absence of 
genuine “spirit.”  The horror of the Coleridgean copy remained.  But it was not now 
“spirit” in any vague Emersonian sense but the Holy Spirit of orthodox Christianity.  The 
aesthetic apprehension which seemed at first blush to be the most vital of “spiritual” 
experiences could, in the end, turn out to be a religious Frankenstein. 
 Thus, a number of evangelicals sought to distance art and the aesthetic from the 
reception of what, in theological terms, is referred to as “efficacious grace” (also known 
as “special” or “saving grace”).  Certainly aesthetic experience held no such power in 
itself, but neither was it a guaranteed site of such grace.  Even the vision which art 
affords of the “ideal” was not, as an 1891 article in the Record made clear, sufficient for 
salvation.  Noting a recent sermon preached by the Bishop of Manchester at Manchester 
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Cathedral, the Record pinpointed both the problem and the solution: 
 
In the course of his sermon his Lordship said there was a particular form 
of self-worship which was very popular in the city of Manchester.  “We do 
not want religion,” some people among us said; “we can ascend on the 
wing of art into the region of the beautiful and true.”  God forbid that he 
should deny that art had the power of raising men into the sphere of the 
ideal, or that he should deny that art, if it be true and great, had the power 
of enlarging and purifying the emotions.  But it was one thing to get a 
fugitive glimpse of the ideal, and a very difficult thing to make that the 
permanent influence in the formation of human character …. Generation 
after generation, as wealth increased, and, with it, luxury, lust, and pride, 
man needed … more than merely a fugitive glance at the ideal.  He needed 
nothing less than the continual inflowing of the light, grace, and power of 
the Divine Spirit of wisdom and love, which Jesus came to embody in His 
own Person and to naturalize in our race.92 
 
This perhaps helps to account for what, from a present-day viewpoint, may seem a 
curious omission in a number of mid-nineteenth-century evangelical discussions of art, 
namely, the absence of a clear evangelistic emphasis (in the traditional sense of this 
term).  This stands in stark contrast to the rationale employed by many contemporary 
evangelical novelists, for example, who not infrequently cite evangelism as a primary 
objective of their writing.93  For many nineteenth-century evangelical critics, however, 
the correlation between art and salvation, or art and conversion, would have seemed, at 
best, a dubious one.  Art could not accomplish what only Christianity can. 
Yet even so, the strongly guarded contention by the author in the Eclectic Review 
suggests that the firm resistance to the idea of art’s salvific potential was in fact 
beginning to weaken.  Why could art not, in rare instances, provide an occasion for 
efficacious grace?  Further evidence of this weakening is apparent, for example, in an 
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article which appeared in 1876 in The Sword and the Trowel; A Record of Combat with 
Sin and of Labour for the Lord” – a publication founded by Charles Spurgeon.  
Contemplating in true romantic form “The Advantages of Cultivating the Love of 
Nature,” one G. Rogers concluded that “It is impossible to cherish the love of nature and 
of sin at the same time…. What man on his way to gratify worldly ambition or to revenge 
an insult, could see any beauty in a landscape, or any glory in a setting sun?”  This 
statement has something of an Edwardsean ring to it insofar as it implies that sin may 
interfere with the proper aesthetic perception of natural beauty.  At the same time, 
however, it is clear from the context that Rogers also meant to suggest that natural beauty 
could itself play some role in mitigating sin: “The moral influence of the love of nature is 
not less in its favour than its conduciveness to health and to mental refinement.”  
Significantly, the editor found himself conflicted on this point, and he inserted a footnote 
to this effect: “We are not quite sure of this [impossibility of loving sin and nature at the 
same time]: but our revered friend speaks for himself … and the exceptions to this rule 
must be very few, if indeed there be any.—ED.”94  The editor, it seems, may have been 
just as uncertain about his uncertainty as he was about Rogers’s thesis, yet this very 
ambivalence provides a clear indication of the ongoing tension between traditional 
evangelical orthodoxy and the claims of romantic aesthetics.  The article from the Record 
cited above betrayed a similar ambiguity regarding the religious value of the “ideal,” so 
central to nineteenth-century conceptions of art.  On the one hand, the author seems to 
allow that the ideal has real transcendent value.  It is a true, though “fugitive,” glance into 
the supra-worldly, Platonic realm of “the beautiful and true.”  On the other hand, this 
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fugitive glimpse is not itself a source of saving grace.  This particular view of things was 
not, in fact, inconsistent with evangelical understandings of grace and salvation, and 
indeed the author in the Record was careful to maintain an implicit distinction between 
the doctrines of efficacious and “common” grace.95  The difficulty, however, was that not 
all critics were as theologically cautious as this one, and the belief that art is “ideal” was 
itself a factor in closing the gap between religion and art, thereby helping to bend and 
ultimately break the evangelical ideal of productive tension.   
Complicating the question of art’s salvific potential, moreover, was the fact that 
some nineteenth-century evangelical critics had, since at least the 1840s, been chiseling 
away at the “problem of presence” which evangelical aesthetics had inherited from the 
Puritan tradition.  Although conservative critics were disinclined to see art as an 
evangelistic tool, a growing number seemed willing to speak of art as a manifestation of 
God generally.  Beauty, not only in nature (an idea that had long been accepted by 
Protestants) but also in human art, was a unique revelation of God.  “All aesthetic beauty 
thus discovers a God – a being perfect in character, and worthy of universal homage and 
love…,” wrote Day in 1847.  “It leads up in its own proper tendency, to the perfect living 
Creator and governor of all.  It displays him to the soul with a power peculiar to itself; – 
not in the inanimate form of abstract influence and deduction; not in the repelling, 
overwhelming terrors of mere rigorous sovereignty and dominion; but in the bright, 
attractive, wooing character of a God of perfect loveliness.”96  The Biblical Repertory 
and Princeton Review concurred two years later: beauty “is the utterance of the divine, 
which gives its eloquence to the voice of nature.  It is the expression of the divine, which 
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lends its highest effulgence to the beautiful in poetry and art.”97  Some critics, like James 
Smetham, continued to reiterate “that Divine power is no more inherent in [art] than in 
other modes of mere expression and communication,”98 but many evangelical critics were 
gradually learning to see art, if not as a means of accessing God’s saving grace, at least as 
a contact point with God Himself.99  “Why should not God reveal himself through 
inspired art as well as through inspired oratory and literature?” asked the Methodist 
Review in 1894.100  The question was largely rhetorical. 
 
Art and Idolatry 
It is in evangelical discussions of art and idolatry that the long shadow of the Puritan 
tradition may perhaps be glimpsed most readily.  As we saw in chapter 2, the problem of 
art’s idolatrous potential had always lain at the heart of Protestant aesthetics.  Since the 
Reformation, the charge that Catholicism’s patronage of the arts had plunged the Church 
into idolatry had been at the forefront of Protestant attacks on Roman Catholicism.  On 
the one hand, nineteenth-century evangelical critics remained conscious of these dangers 
and thought it important to reiterate some of the traditional Protestant sanctions 
concerning art’s idolatrous potential.  In fact, the campaign to avoid conflating art with 
religion was, in one sense, an attempt to avoid a certain kind of idolatry.  On the other 
hand, these same critics largely denied that art itself – even painting and sculpture – was 
intrinsically idolatrous.  Aesthetic idolatry remained an unfortunate theoretical 
possibility, especially in certain contexts, but this possibility ought not deter one from 
enjoying what the fine arts have to offer.  If a number of conservative evangelical critics 
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repeated the substance of Puritan cautions about art’s capacity for idolatry, they were not 
about to shun art altogether.  By the close of the century, a number of evangelicals, both 
liberals and conservatives, were even arguing for the introduction of art, or rather a 
certain kind of art, into their worship spaces. 
 By far the most typical caveat of nineteenth-century evangelical writers – one 
which they shared with the Puritans – concerned the issue of art’s capacity to represent 
God, or the divine.  To attempt to represent God in art was sheer folly since no human 
being could apprehend God in His fullness.  “The truth is,” wrote Pattison in the Baptist 
Quarterly Review, “that in religion, more than in any other study, science and art are alike 
powerless to fathom what is unfathomable, and to depict what will never submit to 
portraiture …. Religion, so far from being helped, may be, and in many cases is, harmed 
by representation.”101  The Eclectic Review thought “the unhappy idea of representing 
God in a work of Art … a modern invention” since the early Christians had largely 
avoided images, and when they did employ them, they did so only symbolically.102  For 
many evangelical critics, this proscription applied not only to attempts to represent God 
the Father but also to representations of Christ as well.  As David Morgan has noted, 
“Many clergy in late-nineteenth-century America” expressed “disappointment … in 
artistic depictions of Christ,” even though such depictions were increasingly common.103  
“Christ is beyond the reach of art.  The finite and restricted human mind and hand cannot 
efficiently describe Divinity in human form,” declared a writer in the British Quarterly 
Review.104  The Christian Index denounced all household paintings of Christ as being in 
bad taste, for “The infinite, divine perfections of Christ can not be represented upon 
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canvas, nor sculptured in marble and it is impious to attempt it.”  For good measure, the 
periodical repeated its opinion in another article the following year: “No human artist can 
draw and paint the correct likeness of Christ as he was intended to be worshipped.”105  As 
Protestants had long been fond of arguing, the attempt to represent Christ “upon canvas” 
was idolatrous precisely because it was impossible to represent Him completely.  A 
partial representation was a false one, and false representation was idolatrous.  “Let no 
Christian today fancy that the subtle powers of idolatry are obsolete,” W.F. Taylor 
solemnly warned in the pages of the Baptist Quarterly Review.  “When once we imagine 
pictures of Christ in any way stir the heart to faith and love, when they become a means 
of devotion, then it is inevitable that our conception of him will be influenced by the 
picture – that is, by the attributes of him which it reveals.”  In the end, human beings 
must reconcile themselves to the fact that “The painter’s art cannot equal the Christian’s 
spiritual vision.”106 
 Some critics were also conscious of the shortcomings of language when it came to 
representing or capturing spiritual realities. An author in the Christian Index, for instance, 
acknowledged that the “spirit which pervades the heart when engaged in offices of 
humiliation and prayer, can never be well expressed, by the feeble power of verse.”107  
Another critic in the Eclectic Review questioned the wisdom of attempting to render 
Scripture in verse: “It cannot be denied, and it need not be concealed, that all attempts to 
versify portions of Holy Writ, must fail in the main purpose of poetry, which is, so to 
adorn or dignify its themes, that by the new light thrown upon them, they may be exalted 
beyond any previous conception of their beauty or their grandeur, which obtained in 
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ordinary minds.”  “[D]ivine themes,” the author continued, “are necessarily degraded by 
human interpolations.”  Nevertheless, such statements ought not to be read as a denial of 
the deep intercourse between art and religion.  For the writer in the Christian Index, some 
religious feelings may be beyond expression.  Poetry may be unable to render the 
heartfelt emotion experienced during prayer, but, the author insisted, poetry can capture 
the feeling of gratitude one feels after prayer.  And for the author in the Eclectic Review – 
who initially sounded rather Johnsonian – it may be true that Scripture is degraded by 
versifying, but “human compositions are necessarily exalted by the felicitous introduction 
of sacred illusions.”108  Christianity may improve art, though art may not improve on 
Christianity. 
 Some nineteenth-century critics also continued to caution readers against the 
“natural” tendency of human beings to love the Beauty of the art object rather than the 
God of Beauty.  “Men are prone to idolatry,” argued the Christian Index, “and image 
worship is idolatry.  The more perfect and beautiful the picture as a work of art the more 
danger in that direction.”109  B. Hawley warned readers of the Christian Advocate that “It 
is easier to reverence and adore what is seen than what is unseen; and all idolatry has its 
beginnings in a recognition and worship of secondary causes and visible causes, rather 
than of the unseen First Cause.”110  Some critics continued to maintain as well, in keeping 
with the Puritans, that art had no place in the sanctuary.  Arguably, it was this aspect of 
the Puritan tradition that had the most lasting impact on evangelical conceptions of art.  
The Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review, for example, doubted sincerely that 
cathedrals had any place in the Protestant aesthetic: 
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We may imagine that our faith, in its higher spirituality, is above all 
visible symbolism except what we have in church and sacraments – we 
may fancy that we are capable of using indifferently all, any, or no art, and 
that we are far beyond the poetic period in these respects – but, 
notwithstanding all this, when we consider the native tendencies of our 
minds to form an idol, and the insidious sway which every religious 
symbolism has acquired over the hearts of its subjects, we cannot but 
tremble at the idea of the Protestant world generally making experiment 
with genuine cathedral art. 
 
This article, in fact, went so far as to resuscitate the Puritan distinction between 
“religious” and “civil” images.  Calling for the ejection of “whatever goes by the name of 
rich, gorgeous, [or] elegant … [from] our churches,” the author nevertheless allowed that 
such things may be appropriate for “civil style.”111  It is worth noting, however, that 
while the distinction was descended directly from the Puritan tradition, even within 
“civil” space Puritan simplicity was no longer the norm.   
 Although nineteenth-century evangelical critics continued to counsel their readers 
to be wary of the idolatrous potential of art, it is clear that they were, on the whole, far 
less anxious than their predecessors about art’s idolatrous tendencies, or, perhaps more 
accurately, they were far more interested in arguing this problem away.  What about the 
Second Commandment? asked a writer in the Presbyterian Christian Advocate in 1823.  
“This command,” the writer noted, “we have heard seriously urged against the whole of 
the engraver’s art.”  But it must be remembered that this portion of the command “is 
coupled with the additional injunction, ‘thou shalt not bow down to them nor worship 
them;’ and that it was to prevent this abuse, that the whole prohibition was given.”  
Moreover, the author continued, “May it not be safely affirmed, that it is impossible not 
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to form in our minds, the images of interesting visible objects when absent”?  Thus, an 
exhaustive application of this prohibition would seem not only to preclude the art of 
engraving but the action of the mind itself.112   
At the same time, as Morgan has described, American Protestant visual culture 
experienced an important shift after the 1860s.  Instructional books for use in Sunday 
school classrooms, “picture cards” awarded to Sunday school students, and illustrated 
“lives of Christ” increasingly featured reproductions of religious fine art.  American 
Protestants – primarily liberals, but also some conservatives – were well on their way to a 
“devotional” use of visual art once reserved for Catholics.  British Protestants, as Graham 
Howes notes, were likewise welcoming “religious art” in ever greater numbers.113  J.S. 
White, writing in the Primitive Methodist Quarterly Review and Christian Ambassador in 
1887, reflected this trend.  He conceded that all Protestants must reject the worship of 
pictures and images, “But it would be utterly irrational and unjust to condemn all 
religious art as bad and pernicious in its influence because of such vulgarities and 
inanities.”114  Victorian evangelical critics were, in short, relying once again on the use-
misuse argument.  It was not images per se that were problematic but only the worship of 
these images.  What largely differentiated nineteenth-century evangelicals from their 
forbears was their optimistic belief that one could, in fact, live in a state of perfect tension 
between undervaluing and overvaluing art; i.e., one could appreciate and value images – 
even religious ones – without slipping inevitably into worshiping or misusing them.  
What for the Puritans had been a matter of near certainty was to nineteenth-century 
evangelicals only one possibility among many.   
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Indeed, by the 1880s some evangelicals were also calling for an increased 
attention to aesthetics inside the sanctuary.  B. Hawley, for instance, remained cautious 
about art’s idolatrous possibilities, and he continued to reiterate the usual evangelical 
condemnations of Romanism.  The question, however, was no longer whether art ought 
to play a role in Protestant worship but rather what kind of art Protestants should 
cultivate: “When, therefore, there is such a blending and use of art as to aid to intelligent, 
pure, and acceptable worship, whether it be painting, statuary, architecture, or music, it is 
well to cultivate and use it.”115  By 1902, the Primitive Methodist Quarterly Review was 
close to suggesting that the aesthetic was essential for true worship: “A visible symbol 
reminding one of a far off love is a sacred tie which cannot easily be broken.  The soul is 
assisted by sense …. Harmoniousness of design and taste assist reverent worship.”  “True 
reverence,” the writer continued, “is the offspring of a correct imagination.”116  This 
writer, in fact, was dangerously close to inverting the religio-aesthetic hierarchy which so 
many mid-Victorian evangelicals had sought to maintain.  To be sure, there were still 
many evangelicals who would have been uncomfortable with this sort of statement.  
Nevertheless, the religio-aesthetic topography had clearly changed, and anxieties about 
art’s idolatrous potential had been relegated to the corner of the map. 
 
Maintaining the Religio-Aesthetic Balance II: Christianity as Aesthetic Condition 
While many evangelical critics between 1830 and 1900 agreed that religion imposed 
certain restrictions on the practice and appreciation of art and the aesthetic, they were 
most enthusiastic in their proclamations that Christianity informed, enabled, and 
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empowered art – in short, in their belief that Christianity was a prerequisite, or condition, 
for genuine artistic production and valuation.  Critics saw this relationship of 
empowerment as functioning in multiple ways on the levels of both (religious) 
psychology and socio-cultural ideology.  Christianity’s aesthetic influence, that is, was 
understood to extend to both the individual mind and the milieu. 
 To begin with, some nineteenth-century evangelical writers believed Christianity 
had profound implications for aesthetic perception (aesthesis).  Full aesthetic perception, 
argued a number of critics, is available only to the Christian – an idea that recalls 
Jonathan Edwards’s theory of aesthetic perception discussed in chapter 2.  This was so 
because taste, like the other human faculties, is corrupted by sin.  Sin, in fact, helped to 
explain the perennial difficulty of critics in fixing a universal “standard of taste.”  “Were 
man in the primitive state of innocence, wisdom, and purity, in which he was first 
created,” suggested J.T.D. in the Christian Advocate and Journal in 1844, “probably 
there would be no difficulty in the case; for then his judgment would at once apprehend 
the propriety or impropriety, the suitability or the unfitness of things, and his pure and 
chaste habits of ratiocination and action would reject whatever was revolting to the most 
exalted standard of purity and propriety.”117  A similar viewpoint was articulated by the 
Rev. J.M.P. Otts in the Southern Presbyterian Review in 1866: “Taste is fallen, vitiated, 
darkened by sin.  The ideal beauty was defaced and obscured by the fall…. The finer 
traces of the beautiful are with difficulty found in the shattered image; hence the great 
diversity in the details of the application of the fundamental principle of taste.”118   
Since sin was held to be the root of the problem, only evangelical Christianity 
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could thoroughly cleanse “the doors of perception.”119  In an 1812 review of Archibald 
Alison’s Essays on the Nature and Principles of Taste in the Christian Observer, for 
example, the reviewer noted Alison’s rather conventional position that “the cultivation of 
taste is calculated to promote religious sentiment” – a position that was reinforced by 
Alison’s heavily associationist psychology of beauty.  That the appreciation of a sunset, 
for instance, might prompt one to praise the God who made it was a tradition as old as the 
Psalms – one which nearly all but the strictest atheist would have readily embraced in the 
nineteenth century.  The writer in the Christian Observer, however, suggested that the 
religio-aesthetic chronology ought to be reversed:  “[W]e endeavour to establish a far less 
dubious, and therefore more important, doctrine which is, the necessity of religion for the 
highest enjoyments of taste.”120  It is Christianity which empowers and shapes aesthetic 
perception, and in fact, the sort of aesthetic experience leading to devotion described by 
Alison is only possible to those whose perception has already been refined by grace and 
by Scripture.  Wordsworth, noted a writer in the Christian Spectator in 1827, was 
unsurpassed in his descriptions of “the facts of natural Theology,” but he fell short of the 
“illimitable tract of eternity” because he overlooked the fact that Christian grace must, to 
some degree, precede perception: “It has long been a maxim with very respectable 
naturalists and poets that the contemplation of nature leads the mind intuitively to God.  
But why not reverse the process?  Why not let the full light from eternity first pour upon 
the mind – before it fastens upon the wonders of the material creation?”121  Twenty-five 
years later, the Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review implied in a similar vein that if 
one admits God’s grace into the picture, then and only then can the claims of 
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Wordsworth’s “Tintern Abbey” have validity: “It is only when natural objects are bathed 
in the light of the Sun of Righteousness that the beholder can attain ‘A sense sublime/ Of 
something far more deeply interfused ….’  Nature has been looked on with other eyes by 
the sons of God, than by the common children of this world.”122  “[R]eligion furnishes 
the conditions favorable to the full development of man’s aesthetic nature,” wrote an 
author in the Christian Advocate and Journal in 1865, and because of this, “He views the 
clover-field as the work of a divine Artist, and that Artist [as] his dearest friend.”123  
Hence, religion enables a certain kind of aesthetic perception which in turn enlivens 
religious experience.   
While such critics argued that Christianity affects the mode of aesthetic 
perception, others suggested that Christianity alters the objects of perception, namely, by 
making the supersensible available to human apprehension.  By extension, in expanding 
the possibilities of human perception, Christianity may also be said to expand the reach 
of art as well.  In 1833, a writer in the Quarterly Christian Spectator strongly objected to 
the view sometimes expressed that religion stifles the poetic imagination.  To the 
contrary, the effect of Christianity “is not to cramp or paralyze man’s intellectual powers, 
but to quicken and invigorate them.  We may go still farther.  It has given more than it 
has taken away: it has not circumscribed, but enlarged the field of poetic invention.”  The 
influence of Christianity on poetry, the writer continued, “carries the poet beyond where 
the eye of sense can penetrate….”124  Compared to the panoramic view which 
Christianity affords art and poetry, non-Christian art, by contrast, seems dull and 
circumscribed. 
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Such statements concerning the empowering effects of Christian faith on aesthetic 
perception continued in some quarters throughout the nineteenth century.  As noted in the 
last chapter, however, the Edwardsean idea of a regenerated aesthetic vision gradually 
gave way to the “spiritualized” faculty of the romantic imagination, which possessed the 
power of “deep” insight irrespective of traditional grace.  Whereas a number of 
evangelical critics before the 1870s had attempted to qualify Wordsworth’s claim to “see 
into the life of things” by bringing explicitly Christian theological considerations to bear, 
a less modified version of Wordsworthian romanticism eventually prevailed among many 
evangelicals during the last third of the nineteenth century.     
 For a time, however, the liberation of aesthetic perception at the hands of 
Christian faith also coincided with a similar liberation at the level of artistic production 
(poiesis).  It was sometimes posited, for example, that those artists who had not 
themselves experienced a “saving faith” were doomed, when dealing with sacred subjects 
in particular, to produce art objects that lacked spiritual and aesthetic authenticity.  
Anyone can compose “secular” music, contended Thomas Hastings in 1844, “But in 
relation to religious subjects the case is far otherwise.  Vital religion, though a precious 
reality to every one who embraces it, is not well understood by those who have never 
learned its nature by personal experience.”  For Hastings, following Edwards, mere 
notional apprehension is not enough; indeed, mere notional apprehension of religious 
themes appears to lead to actual aesthetic blunders: “we hazzard nothing in saying, that 
the men whose lives are devoted to the secular drama are not the individuals who, in the 
oratorio, the sacred concert, the choir, or the organ loft, will enter, even with dramatic 
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propriety, into the sweetness and tender solemnity of religious themes.”  If secular artists 
and performers could represent sacred subjects apart from genuine personal faith, “if 
expressive tones, with corresponding sentimentalities, are so easily obtained from the 
irreligious, …. why, let us at once invite the prima donnas into the choir, and all will 
soon be right.”125   
As Hastings’s argument suggests, evangelical discussions of the effects of 
Christianity on poiesis were intimately linked, once again, to the romantic conception of 
art as an expression of emotion.  Art is an outpouring of a person’s inner self.  Only 
Christianity, however, can penetrate, expose, and heal the deepest recesses of the human 
soul; only Christianity is fully capable of rightly ordering our affections.  In fact, it is the 
very subjectivity of art which makes it most alive to Christianity’s shaping power.  A 
critic in the Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review, writing in 1852, demonstrated how 
orthodox Christianity could, in a sense, improve upon Wordsworth’s conception of the 
proper object of the poet: 
 
The soul of man, as Wordsworth has told us, is the “haunt and main 
region” of the poet’s study and the poet’s song.  But the soul of man has 
depths which had never been sounded, sensibilities which had never been 
awakened, mysteries which had never been brought to light, and paths 
which the eye of man hand not pondered, until those depths were 
explored, those sensibilities stirred, those mysteries revealed, and those 
paths pointed out, by a supernatural revelation from God.126  
 
A writer in the Christian Advocate and Journal even hinted that it was Christianity which 
had engendered the sort of romantic subjective lyricism with which nineteenth-century 
poetry had become almost entirely identified.  “As to Christianity, its influence … in 
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modern poetry has been immense….”  It had, in effect, “giv[en] value to the individual, 
and ma[de] his personal conviction a precious thing before God.”127  The implication here 
was that a poem like The Prelude, with its assumption that the unique perspective of the 
individual poet may somehow translate into universal appeal, would have been utterly 
impossible apart from Christianity.  The lyric voice, it would seem, owed its existence to 
Christianity. 
 Evangelical critics also saw Christianity operating at the socio-cultural level.  As 
we will see in more detail in the next chapter, over the course of the nineteenth century 
art increasingly became part of a broad Protestant ideology which saw Christianity, 
morality, and “civilization” collaborating in intricate and mutually sustaining ways.  One 
strand in this ideological web held that it is Christianity which helps to construct the kind 
of culture or civilization in which genuine art can prosper.  The president of Yale, Noah 
Porter, writing on the topic of “Modern Literature and Christianity” in the Christian 
Advocate in 1873, noted the way in which a nation’s or an epoch’s literature is 
inextricably bound to its religion: 
 
It follows that if a people or an age is capable of literature, this literature 
must hold intimate relations to the religious faith and life of the people or 
the age …. A religion which is founded in the nature of man and is 
adapted to his wants, which commends itself to his conscience and 
transforms and purifies the springs of his action, cannot but act for good 
on both the matter and form of literature.128 
 
Or, as a writer in the Methodist Review put it in 1894: “As soon as Christianity became a 
creative, regenerative, and formative power in society new literatures, new laws, new 
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sciences, and a new art began to appear and to develop toward perfection.”129  
Evangelical critics saw Christianity not only in terms of personal salvation but also as a 
progressive force of cultural renewal.  Usually, it was evangelical Protestant Christianity 
in particular which these critics envisioned as supplying the means of cultural and 
aesthetic progress.  As James Smetham posited, “One would think that the more pure the 
form of religion, the more complete would be the development of the entire range of 
human faculties.  In science, in poetry, in general learning, Protestantism has justified this 
supposition.”  Smetham regretted the fact that visual art had lagged behind these other 
advancements, but his faith in the strength of Protestant Christianity gave him hope that 
visual art, too, would eventually come into its own.130  Occasionally, however, critics in 
evangelical periodicals conceived of Christianity’s cultural influence in broader terms, as 
when, in 1895, William G. Beardmore allowed Catholic history a place in Christian art’s 
march of progress: “For more than six hundred years Christendom has been the foster-
parent of the noblest and most enduring forms of art.”131   
In fact, this Victorian understanding of Christianity as an engine of progress was a 
natural extension of the longstanding Puritan and postmillennial emphasis on the 
transformation of culture.  Postmillennialism fit well with Victorian myths of progress 
since it posited that the last age – the millennium – would be gradually ushered in not 
only by the proclamation of the gospel but also by the gradual reformation of society in 
accordance with God’s laws.  By these means, the forces of darkness would ultimately be 
defeated and the pax Christiana would dawn, after which time Christ would return.  As 
George Marsden has pointed out with regard to American evangelicals, especially prior 
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to the Civil War: “American evangelical postmillennialists saw signs of the approach of 
the millennial age not only in the success of revivals and missions, but also in general 
cultural progress.”  Indeed, “evangelicals generally regarded almost any sort of progress 
as evidence of the advance of the kingdom.”132  Art, as a valuable aspect of human 
culture, was therefore swept up in this tide of Christian and cultural optimism.  The 
culture which Christianity fostered would in turn give rise to an art that would effectively 
surpass all that had gone before.  An author in the Presbyterian Quarterly Review, for 
instance, reflected on the superiority of the art produced under the auspices of Christian 
civilization to that produced by the Greeks.  Recalling the moment he stood before 
Thorwaldsen’s Christ in Copenhagen, the author wrote: “We felt, as we stood in its 
presence, that Christianity had demonstrated her artistic supremacy, and that the Greek, 
so great in the power of transcribing sensible objects, in setting forth form and sensuous 
beauty, nay, in the ideal of the Divine, – must, after all, bow to the loftier spirituality 
which our religion gives to art.”  The Greek artist, the author continued, had “worshipped 
form”; had he, however, known “the true God … his [art would have] been glorified by a 
larger, purer conception.”133  In one way, this seems yet another incarnation of the 
familiar eighteenth-century debate over the relative artistic status of the Ancients and 
Moderns.  The author in the Presbyterian Quarterly Review had clearly decided in favor 
of the Moderns.  Here, though, religion had become the deciding factor.  Christianity, in 
short, had provided modern western culture with a new form of the ideal which had, 
almost inevitably, resulted in an art of which the Greeks, despite all of their pagan 
splendor – or perhaps because of it – could not have dreamed. 
 313 
The Religio-Aesthetic Ideal and Some Early Signs of Fatigue in the 1870s 
Although many evangelical critics continued to see art as both limited and empowered by 
Protestant Christianity until the end of the nineteenth century – indeed, T. Harwood 
Pattison’s explicit statement of subordination in the Baptist Quarterly Review was issued 
in 1886 – beginning in the 1870s there were signs that this religio-aesthetic ideal was 
beginning to break down, in practice if not yet in theory.  On the one hand, an expanding 
body of theological liberals had begun to identify Christianity almost entirely with moral 
and cultural progress.  A majority of evangelicals before the 1870s had been willing to 
see cultural advancement as a function of Christian influence, but they insisted that 
Christianity and culture were distinct.  Now, however, this distinction was evaporating: 
the postmillennial emphasis on cultural progress remained, but it was increasingly 
emptied of its transcendent, eschatological content.134  On the other hand, some 
conservative evangelicals were beginning to express doubts about whether Christianity 
was truly an agent of aesthetic empowerment, as so many nineteenth-century critics 
wanted to believe.  At least some evangelical critics were no longer naively optimistic 
about the possibility of a religious-aesthetic-cultural synthesis.   
Signs of this conservative fatigue can be seen in an article on “Christianity and the 
Fine Arts,” authored by the Rev. K. Colman and published in 1871 in the Christian 
Advocate.  In this essay, Colman agrees that, in theory at least, Christianity ought to 
create a culture conducive to good art.  In fact, he articulates this position with admirable 
clarity: “Christianity is the great teacher, and again the great civilizer.  There cannot fail 
to be a close relation between general civilization and all its parts.  Christianity is 
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civilization’s foundation, fine art its cornice and turrets, and there can be no uncertain 
connection between the two.”  Still, Colman asks, “Is not the influence of Christianity 
upon fine art quite generally overestimated?”  He then enumerates the many reasons for 
doubting the easy affinity of Christianity and art.  To begin with, “The religion of the 
Bible is preeminently utilitarian,” by which Colman means that Christians ought to be 
about the practical business of saving souls and doing good.  True, “Utility may 
recognize the importance of supplying a God-given craving after the beautiful, but it has 
thus far found more pressing human needs.”  Furthermore, the doctrines of Christianity, 
with their “transcendent grandeur,” themselves supply in some measure our “longing for 
beauty.”  Consequently, there is little need to turn to formal art objects to satisfy our 
innate aesthetic desires.  Colman then proceeds to the problem of inverse proportion, that 
is, to the view that both historically and presently those nations most revered for their 
artistic achievements are those in which Christianity is most superficial.  France and 
Italy, Colman believes, excel in art, but “Is the Christianity of these nations deeper than 
the skin of a political name?”  After cataloguing the many difficulties which plague the 
thesis that Christian cultures consistently enable the fine arts to thrive, Colman next 
inquires whether history provides any evidence which supports this idea.  He admits that 
Christianity has had some influence on music, oratory, poetry, and perhaps painting, but 
he denies that in the case of poetry and painting modern Christian art has truly surpassed 
the Ancients, and in the case of sculpture he declares that “Christian sculpture has never 
approached the ancient.”135 
In the end, Colman arrives at a conclusion remarkable for its ambivalence: “While 
 315 
by developing civilization Christianity indirectly gives powerful aid to fine art, it has not 
greatly inspired it, has not stimulated it to the highest development known to history.”  
The ambiguity of this statement reveals a first significant crack in the foundation of the 
nineteenth-century evangelical religio-aesthetic synthesis.  Missing from Colman’s 
equation is any faith in inevitability.  He remains quite sure that good art will not flourish 
without Christianity – “The fine arts and barbarism have only the relation of antagonism, 
while the Christian sun daguerreotypes fine art on the impressible human soul” – but he 
can offer no firm guarantee that good art will assuredly flourish with Christianity.136  
Uncertainty has entered the picture.  Oddly, though, it appears that Colman has not yet 
relinquished his optimism completely.  Just as strangely ambiguous in this regard is 
Colman’s final paragraph, which it is worth quoting at length: 
 
The religion of the cross has not so purified the masses that they can revel 
in beauty without sinking in voluptuousness.  Rich ornament in chancel or 
garb, in music or sermon, still attracts the worshiper from the Creator to 
the creature, from things heavenly to things earthly.  The work is 
progressing; men are becoming holier; soon the energies now nobly spent 
in converting a world will make stepping-stones of perfected art, on which 
a pure worshiping spirit will ascend to the throne of God.  Then such 
grand structures as have never yet gladdened the earth, all adorned with 
brush and chisel, will invite men heavenward; then music, making the past 
tame, worthless; then oratory which shall cause Whitefield and Simpson, 
Beecher and Spurgeon, Cicero and Demosthenes, to be forgotten, shall 
entrance the multitudes, and lift them to the very gates of the New 
Jerusalem.137 
 
Colman has, in effect, relocated his optimism, as well as the religious-aesthetic-cultural 
synthesis, to the more distant future – perhaps, even, to eschatological time.  We are not, 
it turns out, nearly so far along the axis of progress as we may have thought.  Indeed, 
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though Colman makes no attempt to articulate explicitly his own eschatology, and though 
the above passage may still be read in a postmillennial sense, much of his logic 
throughout the article bears a resemblance to the sort of reasoning about culture typically 
associated with premillennialism and, ultimately, with fundamentalism.  It was during the 
1870s and 1880s, in fact, when conservative evangelicals in both the United States and 
England began turning in significant numbers to premillennialism, and, especially in the 
United States, to dispensational premillennialism in particular – a development that 
would prove to be a critical factor in the rise of fundamentalism.138  For Colman, many of 
the old Puritan fears about the “voluptuousness” of art have resurfaced.  Moreover, a new 
sense of urgency governs Colman’s reflections, for though in one sense he has extended 
his religio-aesthetic timetable, he has, in another important sense, shortened it.  The end 
is fast approaching, and “There are more urgent demands for Christian activity than the 
culture of art.”139  In a world awash with the disorienting effects of urbanization and 
industrialization, a cheery faith in postmillennial progress was growing less and less 
compelling, and for some conservative evangelicals, a sustained attention investment in 
“the culture of art” was growing less and less urgent.140 
Colman’s article, however, with all its strange tensions and uncertainties, 
illustrates the early stages of a transition in evangelical thinking.  Colman himself has not 
yet jettisoned completely the notion that Christianity is a critical source of cultural and 
even aesthetic renewal.  He has merely begun the process of disjoining what many 
evangelicals in the nineteenth century had worked so hard to suture.  Christianity has 
ceased to be a mighty agent of aesthetic empowerment and has been reduced instead to 
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little more than a minimal condition.  Colman’s position was still something of an 
anomaly in 1871, but one can nevertheless glimpse in this position the makings of a deep 
religio-aesthetic divide.  By the early decades of the twentieth century, liberal Protestants 
were no longer interested in the “limitations” which orthodox Christianity might impose 
on art.  Art had become one more manifestation of the evolution of divine consciousness 
in human culture and history.  For their part, fundamentalists were no longer interested in 
Christianity as a source of cultural and aesthetic renewal; indeed, they showed little 
interest in considering art’s relationship to Christianity in theoretical terms at all.  The 
Victorian evangelical synthesis of orthodox Christianity and romantic aesthetics had at 
last been torn asunder. 
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CHAPTER 5 
AESTHETIC MINISTRATIONS: ART, MORALITY, AND THE CHRISTIAN 
NATION 
 
The true vocation of the poet unquestionably is to animate the human race in its progress 
from barbarism towards virtue and greatness.  He is appointed by Providence to arouse to 
generous exertion, and to console in distress. 
 – “Recent Poetry,” Eclectic Review (1845) 
 
In 1835, the British Parliament selected fifteen of its members to form a special 
committee “to consider what measures ought to be adopted with regard to the native 
inhabitants of countries where British settlements are made … in order to secure to them 
the due observance of justice, and the protection of their rights; to promote the spread of 
civilization among them, and to lead to the peaceful and voluntary reception of the 
Christian religion.”  A brief account of some of these proceedings was later published in 
an American periodical, the Baptist Missionary Magazine.1  This published account, 
which provided an excerpt of the larger parliamentary dialogue, focused on the testimony 
of one Mr. Beecher, the Secretary of the Wesleyan Missionary Society.  At issue in Mr. 
Beecher’s statements before the committee, it seems, was a recurring question which had 
generated a good deal of debate among many nineteenth-century Protestants in both 
England and the United States.  Should Anglo-American colonization efforts direct their 
energies first and foremost to the spread of “civilization” or to the spread of Protestant 
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Christianity?  That is, must an indigenous population first be Christianized in order that it 
might subsequently be civilized, or vice versa?2  
In answering this question, the Rev. Secretary Beecher (along with the editor of 
the Baptist Missionary Magazine, who gives Beecher his implicit support) is 
unequivocal: 
 
 My attention has long been directed to this subject, and the firm 
conviction of my mind that Christianity must precede civilization, is the 
result of the inquiries and observations which I have made.  So far has my 
experience been from proving that civilization is necessary to prepare 
barbarous nations for the reception of the gospel, that is has led me to the 
conclusion that the only effectual way to civilize them is first to 
evangelize them.  I regard Christianity as the parent of civilization, and am 
persuaded that true civilization cannot be produced without it….   
 
The problem, according to Beecher, is that not even the mighty achievements of British 
culture are capable of convincing “savages” to abandon their “superstitions” and the 
natural freedoms of a life unburdened by the trappings of English social customs: 
“Civilized life is too tame, too insipid, to charm the roving barbarian, and his 
superstitions are generally found opposed to any change in his accustomed course of 
life.”  Yet if Beecher’s statement seems like a rather startling admission of British 
cultural impotence in the face of the raw energy of the “roving barbarian,” his belief in 
the moral and intellectual superiority of English civilization remains essentially 
undiminished.  For once “the higher motives of the gospel” are brought “to bear upon 
[the native] mind,” what Beecher calls “true civilization” will “invariably” follow.  When 
the motive power of Protestant Christianity is applied from within, then the indigenous 
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inhabitants of foreign lands will, so the logic goes, spontaneously acknowledge the 
benefits of an Anglo-American culture that has itself emerged organically from its 
Christian soil.  To further substantiate this conclusion, Beecher proceeded to read a letter 
to the parliamentary committee which he had received from another missionary by the 
name of John Evans.  In this letter, Evans describes how a band of drunken, polygamist, 
misogynist, and idolatrous Canadian Indians, when once converted to Christianity, had 
immediately begun to appreciate and live by the values of white Protestant culture.  
Among the wealth of other evidence which he cites, Evans observes how “Tables, chairs, 
bedsteads, bed and window-hangings, and other necessaries, together with their regular 
family worship established in every house, morning and evening, proclaim, in language 
too forcible to be misunderstood, ‘Christianity and civilization go hand in hand.’”3  
 During the very same year in which the British Parliament convened its special 
committee to consider the respective roles of Christianity and civilization in Britain’s 
many colonization projects across the globe, a young Methodist on the other side of the 
Atlantic delivered an address before the Boston Wesleyan Lyceum on “The Moral 
Influence of the Fine Arts.”  Edward Otheman, who had begun his studies at the 
Wesleyan Academy in Wilbraham, Massachusetts under the direction of Dr. Wilbur Fisk 
(an early champion of American Methodist higher education), had gone on to attend 
Brown University, from which he graduated in 1831 after delivering an oration on the 
topic of “Consecrated Talent.”  Upon returning to Massachusetts, Otheman had followed 
in the footsteps of his mentor, taking a position as Secretary of the Society for the 
Promotion of Common and Liberal Education and helping to found the Wesleyan 
 339 
Lyceum in the summer of 1833.  In a statement of purpose published in the Christian 
Advocate and Journal, he had described the Lyceum’s intention “to advance the cause of 
education, especially among the Methodist denomination,” for “Education and religion,” 
he went on to proclaim, “are destined to take the whole world as their rightful 
possession.”4  Now, a short two years later, he stood before a Lyceum audience, urging 
an increased attention to the fine arts in what was apparently intended as his own 
theoretical contribution to worldwide Christian progress.  In this lecture, which 
subsequently appeared in the Methodist Magazine and Quarterly Review, Otheman 
sought to demonstrate that the fine arts, “as a class of human pursuits, and a source of 
human enjoyment,” ought “to be either extensively or partially patronized and 
cultivated.”  Significantly, he intended to justify this thesis by showing that the “native 
tendency” of the fine arts “is favorable to morality,” both individual and social.  Otheman 
was careful to note that he did not believe that the arts were “any thing more than aids to 
morality” – by which he presumably meant that art could not, by itself, reveal the content 
of the good – but he did “contend that, other things being equal, where they are cultivated 
in a proper manner there will be a more elevated, refined, elegant state of society….”  
Indeed, as he later argued in the same lecture, “The fine arts always accompany 
civilization, and seem to be one of its essential, but, certainly, one of its universal 
elements, both in ancient and modern times.”5  If Secretary Beecher had glimpsed the 
intrinsic connections among Christianity, morality, and civilization, Secretary Otheman 
had ostensibly glimpsed similar connections among civilization, morality, and the fine 
arts. 
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 The interesting rhetorical and conceptual overlaps between Beecher’s testimony 
and Otheman’s lecture throw into relief the constituent elements – Christianity, morality, 
and “civilization” – of an identifiably Protestant ideology that permeated nearly every 
aspect of Anglo-American evangelical thought until at least the 1860s and in many cases 
beyond.6  Of course, the idea that a healthy civilization depended upon a broad-scale 
subscription to Protestant Christianity was hardly novel.  Victorian evangelicals had 
inherited this notion from the Puritans, and it proved an especially durable one.  What 
was novel among Victorian evangelicals, in contrast to the Puritans and to a number of 
eighteenth-century evangelicals, was the enhanced role which the fine arts came to play 
within the framework of this Protestant ideology.  As described in the last chapter, many 
evangelical critics had come to believe that art was both a beneficiary and a tangible 
manifestation of a Christianity-inspired process of cultural evolution.  Where Protestant 
religion established a sure foundation, the fine arts could, and would, flourish.   
 Yet the notion that a highly developed art world is a natural expression of a 
thoroughly Protestant culture represents but one dimension of the complex relationship 
that existed in the nineteenth-century evangelical mind among Christianity, 
“civilization,” and the fine arts.  As many theorists of the period argued, if Protestant 
Christianity as a superior faith produced a superior civilization which in turn produced a 
superior art, it was also true that this superior art, once produced, could both help to 
secure the foundations of Christian civilization and contribute to its ongoing 
development.  This contribution, furthermore, was understood primarily in terms of art’s 
perceived connection to that other pillar of the Protestant ideological edifice – “morality.”  
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As David Morgan has noted, it was during the “third and fourth decades of the nineteenth 
century that American artists, critics, and clergy came to regard the arts as fundamental to 
promoting national identity and assisting religion in fostering public manners and 
morals.”7  A similar idea existed in Britain as well.  Art, it was widely held, possessed a 
special capacity to shape the moral constitution of individuals – it exerted, in Otheman’s 
typical nineteenth-century parlance, a vital “moral influence” – and since morality, as the 
proper bodying forth of an authentic Christianity, was viewed as the grounds upon which 
social stability depended, art itself gradually assumed the role of guardian of, and 
minister to, Protestant civilization.  As the Eclectic Review proclaimed in 1845, “The true 
vocation of the poet unquestionably is to animate the human race in its progress from 
barbarism towards virtue and greatness.”8  The fate of Anglo-American civilization, and 
more narrowly of individual Protestant nations, was tied to a significant extent, and as 
never before, to the fate of art. 
While it seems clear enough that such high claims for the fine arts as a collective 
engine of moral and cultural progress would not have occurred to most Puritans, it is 
tempting nevertheless to read, as some late Victorians did, the evangelical insistence that 
art cater to the interests of morality and society as evidence of a protracted Puritan 
moralism.  In a general sense, this is true.  The Puritans had stressed the 
interconnectedness of Christianity, morality, and culture, and they had always been 
willing to grant the “utility” and instructional value of arts such as poetry.  But in fact, 
what drove the nineteenth-century evangelical discussion of art’s moral and social 
influence was not the Puritan conception of the didactic possibilities of art but rather, as 
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Morgan observes, the affective power of the arts to shape individual and national 
“character.”9  While this theory was well adapted to the socio-political needs of the 
period, it also exposed the shifting fault lines within the dominant Protestant ideology.  
Traditionally, Christianity proper had been carefully distinguished from both the morality 
and the civilization it was said to foster.  Growing evangelical claims for the relative 
autonomy of art’s moral influence, however, suggested a blurring of these longstanding 
distinctions as, over the course of the nineteenth century, religion was gradually equated 
with morality and the progress of Christianity, once the “parent of civilization,” was 
ignored in favor of the progress of civilization alone.  Indeed, already by the 1840s, 
evangelical critics, following in the footsteps of romantic poet-prophets, had begun to 
describe art in the evangelistic terms of “mission” and “ministry.”10  The liberal Gospel 
of Art was coming of age.     
 
“Occult Pathos”: Art and the Tradition of Anti-Didactic Moralism11 
Victorian evangelical critics returned frequently to the topic of art’s potential to shape the 
moral character of both individuals and societies.  A statement by an author in the 
Christian Spectator, for example, may substitute for numerous proclamations of a similar 
nature issued by evangelical writers throughout the nineteenth century.  “A book of 
poetry,” the author observed in a discussion of Wordsworth in 1827, “should furnish 
substantial nourishment.  It ought to enlighten us in our duty, and stimulate us to walk 
firmly in the path of virtue.  Harmonious versification and true taste may please us, but 
permanent benefit is the legitimate aim of poetry.”12  That countless evangelical critics 
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would espouse a moral-instrumental view of art is not, perhaps, especially surprising.  
Morality, after all, was one thing at which nineteenth-century evangelicals – like the 
Puritans before them – seemed to excel.  Whether their immediate goal was to abolish 
slavery, stamp out “popery,” preserve the Sabbath, or rid the world of the negative effects 
of hard drink, English and American evangelicals worked feverishly (often through a 
highly efficient network of voluntary societies) to cultivate personal purity, to “improve” 
the conduct of their fellow citizens, and to strengthen the social fabric of their respective 
nations.  Moreover, as we saw in chapter 3, arguing for the positive moral effects of art 
was also a useful strategy for persuading more puritanically-minded readers that art 
ought, in Otheman’s words, “to be either extensively or partially patronized and 
cultivated.”  As Otheman knew, if it could be shown not only that art posed no threat to 
morality but also that art was, in fact, conducive to morality, then fine art might be 
assured a permanent place among middle-class evangelicals. 
 For all of their insistence on the salutary moral effects of art, however, nineteenth-
century evangelical critics spent a remarkable amount of time attacking the “didactic.”  
This movement away from the didactic in art and poetry, moreover, began relatively 
early and continued through the end of the century.  In 1814, for example, a writer in the 
Eclectic Review was already questioning the merits of didactic (or “didascalic,” as the 
author under review would have it) poetry, suggesting that the very term “involves so 
apparent a contradiction (there being an obvious opposition between the demonstrations 
of reason applied to the reason, and the dreams of the imagination addressed to the 
imagination)….”13  In his Lectures on General Literature, Poetry, &c. (1830-31), James 
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Montgomery strongly criticized didactic poetry for its failure to equal prose as an 
effective mode of instruction, as well as for its cramped style: “It is the misfortune of 
didactic poetry, that for the purposes of teaching, it has not advantage over prose; and, in 
fact, from the difficulty of adapting the elegances of verse to commonplace details, it 
often falls lamentably short of common sense, in unnatural attempts to convey the 
simplest meanings in bloated verbiage.”  In short, “in a didactic poem, the finest passages 
are those which are not didactic.”14  The Eclectic Review echoed Montgomery’s 
sentiments in 1848 when it expressed skepticism as to “whether art advances itself or the 
world much, by … stepping forth as a professed schoolmistress.  The little good she is by 
these means enabled to effect, can be much more forcibly and adequately accomplished, 
and with infinitely less trouble in other more legitimate channels.”15  In 1859, a writer in 
the Mercersburg Review acknowledged the good intentions of so-called didactic poetry – 
poetry “so often recommended by those who have the interests of religion and morality at 
heart” – but denied that such productions qualified as genuine poetry: “Didactic poetry as 
such, that is poetry whose professed object is to teach or instruct … is not pure poetry, or 
at least not in its higher form.”16  Henry J. Van Dyke, Jr. summed up what was by then a 
well-established argument among many evangelical critics when, in 1883, he candidly 
declared: “Didacticism in art is false and impotent.”17  
Frequently, however, censures against the “didactic” in art were issued side by 
side with equally vehement statements defending the power (and the responsibility) of art 
to raise the moral consciousness of individuals and society.  Thus Montgomery, for 
example, although he harbored a certain disdain for the didactic, nevertheless contended 
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– without any apparent sense of contradiction – that moral “profit” was essential to 
poetry: “Nothing can endure, even in this ‘naughty world,’ but virtue.  To profit mankind 
a poet must please them; but unless he profits them, he will not please them long.”18  
Professor C.T. Winchester, writing in the Christian Advocate in 1882, agreed with 
Montgomery’s view, articulated fifty years earlier, that “Poetry … is not often didactic: 
the highest poetry never is.”  But like Montgomery, Winchester also denied that art and 
morality could be separated, as in fact Wilde – to whom Winchester was directly 
responding – believed: “Th[e] doctrine, that there may be a morality good for society but 
irrelevant in art, is as pernicious as it is false.  It is indeed, equally fatal to art and to 
morals.”19  For many nineteenth-century evangelical critics, therefore, the issue was not 
whether art was an instrument of moral suasion – the vast majority insisted it was – but 
rather how art functioned in this capacity.  Art, it seems, was required to exert a moral 
influence without at the same time being “didactic.” 
In repudiating the didactic in art while simultaneously upholding art’s role as a 
moralizing force, Victorian evangelical theorists were participating in what was, by the 
middle third of the nineteenth century, a well established tradition of thought concerning 
the manner by which art was believed to facilitate the ethical interests of individuals and 
society.  Broadly, this tradition of anti-didactic moralism held that art helps to strengthen 
morality not by way of a cognitive address to the intellect but rather through its ability to 
stretch the feelings of the percipient.  In appealing directly to the intellect, didactic art, it 
was believed, relied upon abstract concepts, which, in the empiricist tradition following 
Locke, were thought to lack the emotional intensity of concrete sensations.  Genuine art, 
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however, exercises our moral nature rather than instructs it; we are led to virtue by way 
of the feelings rather than the understanding.  “High efforts of painting or sculpture, like 
those of poetry,” observed the Eclectic Review in 1848, “are full of purpose and 
significance to those whose perceptions are fine enough to detect such.  But, those of the 
two former departments of universal art more especially; they are suggestive, not 
didactic, in their influence; their teaching rather to be felt, than expressed.”20  Art, that is, 
operates morally by way of what the Methodist painter James Smetham called, in a 
memorable phrase, an “occult pathos.”  The precise context of Smetham’s remark was a 
discussion of Pre-Raphaelite painting, and he did not have the specifically moral power 
of art directly in mind, but the term is as apt as any in capturing the nature of art’s moral 
effect as nineteenth-century evangelical critics conceived it.21 
What Smetham termed “occult pathos” was often referred to more simply in the 
nineteenth century as moral “influence.”  In her classic study The Feminization of 
American Culture, Ann Douglas notes the prominent place which theories of literature’s 
moral influence enjoyed among both American women and northeastern clergymen 
between 1820 and 1875.  Bound together socially by the fact that they “lacked power of 
any crudely tangible kind, … they were careful not to lay claim to it.  Instead they wished 
to exert ‘influence,’ which they eulogized as a religious force.”  For Douglas, this 
growing attention to influence was a consequence of “clerical” and “feminine 
disestablishment” – developments that forced both groups to compete anew in the 
marketplace of ideas, which they did by turning to the emerging “mass medium” of 
popular literature.22  Yet while disestablishment certainly supplied the socio-political 
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conditions in which theories of art and literature’s moral influence could thrive, it is 
important to note that disestablishment did not create such theories, nor did they flourish 
solely among the liberal clergymen and progressive women that Douglas describes.  For 
one thing, as Morgan notes, “influence” was a concept embraced by a broad range of 
nineteenth-century American Protestants.23  The notion that art exerts a moral force by its 
direct appeal to the passions was entertained by conservative evangelicals as well as by 
Unitarians and other proto-liberals.  At the same time, however, the theory of art’s moral 
influence was not simply an American phenomenon.  The idea was just as prevalent in 
Britain, where a somewhat different set of political variables existed, as it was in post-
disestablishment America.   
Most importantly, though, the theory itself was originally a product of the high 
cultural environment of the Enlightenment, and in fact, it entered into the Anglo-
American evangelical bloodstream, at least in part, via the diffusion of Scottish thought 
and, later, through romantic appropriations of this thought (e.g., through the poetry of 
Wordsworth).  It is true, as Morgan has argued, that Bushnell’s ideas of “unconscious 
influence” and “nurture,” which Bushnell articulated in the late 1840s, helped to facilitate 
the American Protestant movement towards “the appreciation and use of fine art in 
religious character formation.”24  On the whole, his theory of nurture garnered much 
wider support from a cross-section of American evangelicals at mid-century than his 
more controversial musings on the poetic nature of theological language (though 
conservative writers did criticize certain aspects of Bushnell’s theory).  But the idea of 
the affective moral (as opposed to the cognitive or didactic) influence of the fine arts was 
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an old one dating back to a number of eighteenth-century theories with whose work many 
educated evangelicals were conversant.  Indeed, we have already seen the rudiments of 
this view in the writings of both Edwards and Wesley.  It is worth noting, too, that the 
impact of Bushnell’s theory of nurture was severely limited in Britain until the early 
1860s, when a reprint of Christian Nurture finally appeared.25  Yet nevertheless, British 
evangelicals had already begun to see the fine arts as agents of socio-moral development, 
not in didactic terms but in the terms of affective influence.  Already in 1836, the 
Wesleyan-Methodist Magazine had published an excerpt from Bernard and Lucy Barton’s 
The Reliquary, which included “An Appeal for Poetry and Poets” composed by Bernard.  
In this appeal, Barton argued that poetry, as the language of feeling, contains “much that 
tends to soften and humanize, and not less to elevate and spiritualize, our imperfect and 
fallen nature, much to check and counteract the deadening influence of a worldly 
spirit….”26  Consequently, without wishing to downplay either the socio-political factors 
that contributed to the increased desire for “influence” among nineteenth-century 
evangelicals or the importance of Christian “nurture,” I want to emphasize in the account 
which follows how evangelicals inherited this idea, and in particular its applicability to 
the fine arts, from the aesthetic thought of the eighteenth century. 
The theory of anti-didactic moralism, of course, could be found in much of the 
poetry and criticism of the romantics.  Wordsworth, Hazlitt, Hunt, and DeQuincey, for 
instance, all subscribed to some version of this tradition,27 as did Shelley, whose 
expression of this idea in his Defense of Poetry (originally drafted in 1821 but not 
published until 1840) may be taken as a representative romantic example: “The great 
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instrument of moral good is the imagination; and poetry administers to the effect by 
acting upon the cause….  Poetry strengthens that faculty which is the organ of the moral 
nature of man, in the same manner as exercise strengthens a limb.”  When, according to 
Shelley, poets abandon their high calling to act “upon the cause” and instead focus on 
producing a particular moral effect – when, in other words, poets assume “a moral aim” 
by turning to the overtly didactic – “the effect of their poetry is diminished in exact 
proportion to the degree in which they compel us to advert to this purpose.”28  It appears, 
then, that there is an inverse relationship between the didactic and the moral: the more 
didactic a poem is, the less morally efficacious it is.    
Romantic writers like Shelley, however, were themselves extending a line of 
argument that had grown out of the aesthetic thought of the Enlightenment, and 
ultimately, out of the empiricist mental and moral philosophy to which this aesthetics was 
closely related.  In his highly influential Elements of Criticism (1762), for example, 
Henry Home, Lord Kames had laid out a detailed psycho-affective theory of art’s moral 
influence, arguing “with entire satisfaction, that no occupation attaches a man more to his 
duty, than that of cultivating a taste in the fine arts.”29  Kames was not the sole originator 
of what I am calling, with reference to the fine arts, anti-didactic moralism – this honor 
must go to the traditions of British empiricism and benevolist ethics more generally – nor 
were the idiosyncrasies of Kames’s particular theory shared by all, but his Elements of 
Criticism did offer a relatively precise psychological formulation of the way in which art 
was thought to act as a moral agent.  His attempt at a comprehensive account of the 
principles underlying the science of criticism also made the Elements a popular choice in 
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college classrooms, especially in the United States, where it continued to appear in the 
curriculums of some smaller institutions until the time of the Civil War (in general, the 
text had disappeared from the standard reading lists of major universities by the fourth 
decade of the nineteenth century).  When, for example, evangelical Wheaton College 
opened its doors in 1860, Kames’s text was still assigned reading for male 
undergraduates.30  There were, in fact, some thirty-one editions of the Elements published 
in the United States between 1796 and 1883.  The library at Andover Seminary held five 
copies of its own.31  Thus Kames’s arguments had a widespread, and in many cases a 
direct, impact on evangelical understandings of the way in which art exerted a moral 
influence, and for this reason, it is worth examining his arguments in some detail.   
Kames’s theory is rooted in the benevolist ethical tradition of Shaftesbury and 
Hutcheson, which held that the springs of moral action are located in the emotional 
constitution of human beings.  “It is a law in our nature,” Kames observes, “that we never 
act but by the impulse of desire; which in other words is saying, that passion, by the 
desire included in it, is what determines the will” (1:131; cf. 1:37).  The word “passion” 
is important here, for Kames makes a technical distinction between passion and emotion, 
the latter being an “internal motion or agitation of the mind” that “passeth away without 
desire” (1:37).32  Passions, therefore, are those feelings which, accompanied by desire – 
to reward, to punish – motivate an individual to act.  At the same time, in keeping with 
his empiricist philosophy of mind Kames holds that objects perceived either visually or 
aurally (but not through the other senses) have the power to raise within us both passions 
and emotions.  Since, moreover, it is to the eye and ear that the fine arts predominantly 
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appeal, it seems that there exists an intimate connection between an appreciation for the 
fine arts and the moral action of the will.  “The principles of the fine arts,” argues Kames, 
“appear in this view to open a direct avenue to the heart of man” (1:32). 
This logic provides the basis for Kames’s more extended speculations on the 
moral power of the fine arts.  Indeed, when it comes to formulating the precise 
psychological dynamics of his theory, Kames suggests at least two ways (one negative, 
one positive) in which art – or perhaps more accurately, a taste for art – works on the 
feelings and thereby contributes to the moral formation of human beings.  First, Kames 
posits that a refined taste serves “to moderate the selfish affections: by sweetening and 
harmonizing the temper, it is a strong antidote to the turbulence of passion and violence 
of pursuit: it procures to a man so much mental enjoyment, that in order to be occupied, 
he is not tempted to deliver up his youth to hunting, gaming, drinking; nor his middle age 
to ambition; nor his old age to avarice” (1:16).  There is in this argument something of 
the old notion that healthy amusement can occupy one’s mind and thus help to prevent 
one from engaging in more illicit behaviors.  The same may be said of the related 
argument – one which the Puritans appreciated – that properly rational and intellectual 
pursuits can be a useful means of escaping the fleshly trap of sensual indulgence.  This 
line of thought certainly forms a portion of Kames’s argument.  Because of their unique 
position between the purely intellectual and the purely sensuous, “The pleasures of the 
eye and ear … are perfectly well qualified … to revive the spirits when sunk by sensual 
gratification” (1:12).   
But what the fine arts also do, according to Kames, is assist a person in combating 
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selfishness by cultivating in him or her a heightened appreciation for the “agreeable” in 
others: 
 
 Pride and envy, two disgustful passions, find in the constitution no enemy 
more formidable than a delicate and discerning taste: the man upon whom 
nature and culture have bestowed this blessing, delight in the virtuous 
dispositions and actions of others: he loves to cherish them, and to publish 
them to the world: faults and failings, it is true, are to him no less obvious; 
but these he avoids, or removes out of sight, because they give him pain.  
(1:16) 
 
Underlying this argument is the Hutchesonian premise that human beings possess an 
innate capacity for spontaneously valuing both the moral and the aesthetic – the good and 
the beautiful – and that a facility in one type of apprehension improves one’s facility in 
the other.  The arts enable a person to experience agreeable feelings firsthand, and once 
one has learned to appreciate these agreeable feelings, one will be less apt to relish the 
disagreeable ones.  The arts, then, regulate and harmonize the mind.  This tempered state 
of mind, furthermore, is advantageous insofar as it leads naturally to greater social 
interaction.  Gardening, for example, may become, on this score, an instrument of social 
benevolence: “The gaiety and harmony of mind it produceth, inclining the spectator to 
communicate his satisfaction to others, and to make them happy as he is himself, tend 
naturally to establish in him a habit of humanity and benevolence” (2:698-99).  Aesthetic 
pleasure is therefore a propaedeutic to positive moral action. 
   For Kames, however, the moral influence of art goes beyond art’s capacity to 
keep bad passions at bay by replacing them with good ones; fine art also helps to develop 
what Kames refers to as “the sympathetic emotion of virtue” (1:50).  This sympathetic 
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emotion of virtue holds a unique place in the affective economy of the Elements, and 
indeed, it is difficult to see how one could hold to a theory of art’s moral influence 
without some version of such a theory.  According to Kames, it is virtually impossible to 
determine whether the sympathetic emotion of virtue is, technically speaking, an emotion 
or a passion.  Kames is reluctant to call it an emotion “because it involves desire,” though 
he is equally reluctant to designate it a passion since it also “has no object” (1:48).  It is, 
in short, a feeling which gives rise to an objectless desire.  This formulation is in fact a 
rather ingenious solution to a problem that lies at the heart of any moral-instrumental 
conception of art that is at the same time anti-didactic, namely, how it is that the 
perception of a representation can lead to practical moral action on the part of the 
percipient.  What is it that allows us to transmute our admiration for, say, a virtuous act 
represented in a painting into our own concrete acts of goodness in real-world contexts?   
Kames’s answer is the sympathetic emotion of virtue.  When, for instance, a 
spectator observes the virtuous performance of another person, two feelings arise 
spontaneously: first, the spectator experiences esteem for the noble individual who 
performed the virtuous act, and secondly, the spectator also experiences the sympathetic 
emotion of virtue.  “We approve every virtuous action, and bestow our affection on the 
author,” posits Kames, “but if virtuous actions produced no other effect upon us, good 
example would not have great influence.”  If, that is, virtuous action prompted in us no 
other affection but gratitude or respect for the virtuous action itself, then ethical examples 
(whether in art or life) would have little consequence.  However, “the sympathetic 
emotion under consideration bestows upon good example the utmost influence, by 
 354 
prompting us to imitate what we admire” (1:49).  Hence, the sympathetic emotion of 
virtue appears to consist, at least in part, in an intrinsic desire to reproduce in different 
contexts those actions which we perceive as ethically valuable.  For Kames, moreover, 
the very objectlessness of the emotion of sympathetic virtue allows it a remarkable 
flexibility of application.  We turn from our encounter with a virtuous representation or 
virtuous action charged with a heightened (if somewhat diffuse) sense of sympathetic 
emotion that drives us to locate a fit object for the further bestowal of our benevolence.  
Under the influence of the sympathetic emotion of virtue, the spectator “longs for proper 
objects upon which to exert this emotion,” and, Kames assures us, “This singular emotion 
will readily find an object to exert itself upon” (1:49, 51).33 
Perhaps most importantly, however, Kames indicates that the sympathetic 
emotion of virtue is also itself a kind of exercise of virtue, the repeated experience of 
which can lead to virtuous habits.  The sympathetic emotion of virtue, argues Kames, 
 
 never exists without producing some effect; because virtuous emotions of 
that sort, are in some degree an exercise of virtue; they are a mental 
exercise at least, if they appear not externally.  And every exercise of 
virtue, internal and external, leads to habit; for a disposition or propensity 
of the mind, like a limb of the body, becomes stronger by exercise.  Proper 
means, at the same time, being ever at hand to raise this sympathetic 
emotion, its frequent reiteration may, in a good measure, supply the want 
of a more complete exercise.  Thus, by proper discipline, every person 
may acquire a settled habit of virtue ….  (1:51; italics mine) 
 
Thus, even when the sympathetic emotion of virtue does not lead immediately to concrete 
action of some kind, the sensation itself may be considered an internal act of virtue.  
Consequently, the more habitual this experience becomes through constant repetition, the 
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more virtuous one actually becomes.  Indeed, Milton’s anxiety about the scant merits of a 
“fugitive and cloistered virtue”34 seems not to concern Kames much, and in fact, his 
whole theory suggests, at least hypothetically, that private aesthetic experience may 
constitute a more or less sufficient program for improving one’s morals.35 
As alluded to earlier, Kames’s particular theory of art’s moral influence was not 
the only one in circulation during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  Like 
Kames’s, though, most of these theories stressed the moral role of “sympathy” and the 
imagination, as well as the ability of the arts to appeal to, and therefore to strengthen, 
these aspects of the human constitution.36  It was from these kinds of theories and from 
romantic offshoots of such theories, rather than from older, more “didactic” conceptions 
of art as an instrument of moral instruction, that many Victorian evangelical discussions 
of the moral influence of the fine arts took their cue.  The genealogy of this line of 
thought was suggested in 1847 by a critic in the Methodist Quarterly Review who, in 
describing the psychology at play when a great poet arouses the passions of a reader, 
cited both Hazlitt and Wordsworth for support: 
 
 It is not the mere ability to recapitulate numerous beauties that give rank 
to the poet; it is not a solitary enthusiasm which enrages his own bosom 
that measures his genius; but, superadded to all this, the power of 
expression, whereby he warms the fancy and arouses the faculties of the 
reader.  Not mere fluency of expression, but the “power of moving and 
infusing the warmth of his own rapt mind into that of his reader;” 
(Hazlitt;) the ability to conjure up in the minds of men “passions, which 
are, indeed, far from being the same as those produced by real events, but 
which yet do more strongly resemble those passions, than anything which, 
from the motions of their own minds merely , other men are accustomed to 
find in themselves;” (Wordsworth;) the faculty of awakening, by his 
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descriptions of nature or of man, sensations nearly similar to those 
produced by the real object.37 
 
For many nineteenth-century evangelical critics, art was not primarily a vehicle of 
instruction or the presentation of Truth in a pleasing manner (as it had been for the 
Puritans), though of course it might involve this; rather, art was believed to condition 
morality by touching the springs of action – the feelings.  Good art need not, indeed 
ought not, preach, for it had at its disposal a more subtle magic.  In fact, the distinction 
between the duties of the preacher and the duties of the poet appeared in the pages of the 
Christian Spectator as early as 1825.  In the second of three articles on “Lyric Poetry” – a 
genre which is also intended to include “psalmody” – the anonymous author notes the 
distinct spheres of influence held by the sermon and the poem: “The cultivation of that 
understanding and belief is exclusively the business of the preacher; after his duties are 
performed, it is within the province of psalmody to excite and animate the feelings and 
emotions which such doctrines are calculated to produce.  Hence, a mere allusion to them 
is sufficient to answer the purpose of musical expression.”38  In this particular case, the 
emotional power of poetry – a power the writer elsewhere describes as “calculated to 
move and purify our feelings and affections”39 – has not yet been severed completely 
from doctrinal formulae, for the excitement of psalmody still depends in some measure 
on the prior work of the preacher; but the necessity for religious poetry to deliver any 
kind of firm statement of doctrine has clearly been diminished.  A “mere allusion” to 
such doctrine is enough, and while the author does “not say that instruction is entirely 
foreign to the object of psalmody,” neither does he “hesitate to say that it does not 
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constitute its chief design.”40  
One of the more comprehensive attempts by a nineteenth-century evangelical 
writer to articulate a theory of art’s ethical power in the tradition of anti-didactic 
moralism was Edward Otheman’s lecture, cited earlier, on “The Moral Influence of the 
Fine Arts.”  It is not unlikely that Otheman, who matriculated at Brown during the early 
years of Francis Wayland’s presidency, would have encountered Kames’s Elements 
directly as part of the usual course of study,41 and in fact his argument shows a decidedly 
Kamesian bent.  Otheman’s central purpose is to justify patronage of the fine arts, as the 
title of his lecture makes clear, on the basis of the powerful moral influence they are 
capable of wielding.  Far from advocating art as a tool for instruction, however, Otheman 
grounds his case almost entirely on the Kamesian premise that art exercises the emotional 
nature of individuals: 
 
 That department of the mind over which the fine arts peculiarly and 
immediately preside, is an important one, and is, in fact, that over which 
morality and religion exercise their greatest control.  It is the sensitive part 
of our nature – the passions and the emotions.  And here we see the grand 
reason why their moral influence should be seriously considered, because 
they touch the springs of action …. (320)  
 
Indeed, this particular passage is so deeply indebted to Kames in both content and 
rhetoric that it would no doubt qualify as plagiarism by modern standards.  Like Kames, 
Otheman suggests that the fine arts bear a natural affinity to morality and religion since 
all three are rooted in the emotional constitution of human beings.  The phrase “the 
sensitive part of our nature,” moreover, is lifted directly from the introduction to the 
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Elements (1:18), while the implicit distinction between the passions and the emotions 
betrays a further indebtedness to Kames.  And though Kames receives no credit for 
having supplied the main outlines of Otheman’s arguments, it is precisely the Kamesian 
proposition that art operates directly on the human emotions – a proposition that is as 
potentially dangerous as it is promising – that leads Otheman to declare that art “is 
certainly a proper subject for the scrutiny and guardianship of the Christian and the 
philanthropist” (321). 
 In turning to the specifics of his case, Otheman differentiates two kinds of moral 
influence brought about by art – what he calls “original, native or inherent, and relative or 
derived” (321).  Otheman’s choice of terminology here is interesting, for it parallels 
another common division found in Kames, Hutcheson, Hume, Smith, and others between 
“intrinsic” and “relative” beauty.  According to these writers, intrinsic beauty was that 
which an object was thought to possess in itself by virtue of its formal properties.  
Relative beauty, by contrast, was seen as a function of an object’s perceived relationship 
to some end or purpose.  Otheman’s slight innovation, then, is to speak in terms of 
inherent and relative moral influence rather than in terms of the intrinsic and relative 
beauty of conventional eighteenth-century discourse (he never explicitly refers to beauty 
in this particular context).  It is clear, however, that the traditional distinction continues to 
underwrite his own system in various ways.42  Original and relative influence, Otheman 
notes, generally operate within the same art object, though “the latter influence must be, 
or may be made, far greater than the former, since into the latter can be thrown all the 
incentives to vice or virtue, all the elements of moral purity or corruption” (322).  Despite 
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the typically superior power of relative influence, however, the bulk of the lecture is 
actually devoted to demonstrating the “native influence [of the fine arts] on individual 
and social morality” (323).  His objective, therefore, is to establish the moral import of 
purely aesthetic experience.  To this end, Otheman advances several arguments, three of 
which we will notice briefly here. 
 First, Otheman contends that the main object of the fine arts “is consistent with, 
and promotive of morality.  This object is, in general, to please; in particular, to please by 
exciting the emotions of beauty and sublimity” (323).  The primary purpose of art is 
pleasure, and Otheman suggests that this pleasure not only conduces to human happiness 
but also that pleasure itself is “a purpose not unworthy of, nor neglected by the Deity” 
(323).  Following Kames once again, Otheman also sees aesthetic pleasure as preparing 
the way for morality and religion: 
 
 The mind, under the benignant influence of the charms of nature, is either 
softened or elevated, and is thus better prepared to attend to the lessons of 
religion, and, indeed, to be affected by the moral reflections which come 
from every point of the universe.  And the same effect do the beauties of 
the fine arts produce on those who contemplate and admire them.  (323-
24) 
 
In moderating and balancing our affections, aesthetic pleasure gives birth to a mental 
state that makes us better able to attend to truth and goodness.  What’s more, beauty and 
sublimity – the particular feeling-states in which aesthetic pleasure is said to consist – 
have themselves been designed by God to contribute to moral improvement by way of 
their peculiar effects on the mind.  As Otheman declares, “The moral effect of these 
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emotions is always good.”  Drawing upon Kames, who had noted “that many emotions 
have some resemblance to their causes” (1:129), and the eighteenth-century aesthetic 
tradition generally, Otheman argues that internal mental states reflect external objects of 
perception.  Beautiful objects cause “an expansion and complacence of mind,” while 
sublime objects lead to “mental elevation and vigor.”  In either case, these mental 
agitations “are very far removed from the low and grovelling dispositions of vice.  
Indeed, a vicious man cannot have a full impression of the pure beauties of nature or of 
art.”  As with Kames (not to mention Kames’s foremost disciple, Wordsworth), beauty 
and sublimity “insinuate themselves … in an agreeable, undefinable manner, into [one’s] 
heart, and insensibly mould [one’s] character.”  Momentarily at least, art enables one to 
rise above the selfishness of “sensual gratification” in the interests of purer pleasures 
(324). 
 Otheman’s second point, as he himself observes, is really an extension of his first, 
for it amounts to a lengthier meditation on “the susceptibility of the human mind to 
imbibe the spirit of the scenes and circumstances by which it is employed and interested” 
(324).  Otheman, in fact, is so empiricist in his psychology as to verge on absolute 
determinism.  He does, it is true, allow room for the creative function of the imagination 
– which, as we will see shortly, he grants pride of place among the human faculties, 
following the romantics – but on the whole, 
 
 Most men are what they are more from the ideas which they receive from 
the world around them, than from those which they originate.  Indeed, by 
far the greater number of our first ideas are suggested by surrounding 
persons and objects; and, excepting the faculties, by which we receive, 
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combine, and employ these ideas, and which, in some instances, create a 
world of their own, we grow up mere copies or imitations of what has 
already been.   
 
Since the fine arts are marked by a singular vividness and intensity of presentation, it is 
therefore only natural to assume that they would have a powerful effect on our “character 
and deportment”: “How then is it possible for us to be unaffected by the fine arts, 
whenever seen, which appeal so powerfully and triumphantly to our taste and 
sentiments?” (325).  What follows from this empiricist model of mind is a doctrine of 
sympathetic identification, again descended from eighteenth-century theories of 
sympathy,43 in which the passions represented in art are recreated in the minds of the 
beholder.  “When art is thus successful,” writes Otheman, “we seem, sometimes, by 
beholding to become the beings which it represents.  We feel the inspiration which they 
are made to feel, the same emotions and passions agitate our breast … till we are as wise 
as the wisest, good as the best” (326).   Art enables us to experience vicariously what it 
feels like to be virtuous and in doing so allows us to become more virtuous in the process. 
 Central to this process, Otheman argues, is the imagination – a faculty which, 
beyond basic sensory perception, “has the widest and strongest control over men in 
general.”  In fact, the imagination “is one of the chief instruments of the happiness or 
misery of man” (326).  In these exalted claims for the centrality of the imagination in 
human life, Otheman is at one with the romantics, and indeed one recognizes in his 
conception of the imagination something very much akin to Wordsworth’s.  For 
Otheman, the imagination is an organ of both creation and perception – or, as he puts it, 
of “genius” and “taste.”  Its main value seems to lie in its ability to receive and store the 
 362 
stimuli of perception (as presented by the fine arts) and to re-present these images to the 
mind once the original stimuli have faded: “Now the employment of either genius or taste 
in the fine arts rouses and stimulates the imagination, so that, even after this enjoyment, it 
is apt to form combinations of thought and sentiment similar to those on which it has 
been exercised through the senses” (326-27).  It is through the imagination, therefore, that 
“the mind receive[s] a lasting impression – a fadeless hue, from those qualities which are 
presented to its perception.  These ideas of the imagination have a powerful influence on 
all the character, and give their peculiar expression to the conduct” (327).  Like 
Wordsworth’s “beauteous forms,” which he suggests have had “no slight or trivial 
influence/ On that best portion of a good man’s life,/ His little, nameless, unremembered, 
acts/ Of kindness and of love,”44 Otheman insists that “The forming of mental images of 
rare and exquisite natural or moral grace … always produces a good effect upon the 
character and manners” (327).  Though such a development would no doubt have vexed a 
good many Puritans, both the fine arts and the imagination have assumed a prominent 
place in nineteenth-century theories of moral action. 
 A third argument for the original moral influence of the fine arts, and the final one 
we will examine here, concerns art’s purported ability to heighten our sensitivity to, and 
thus our concern for, the world around us.  “The exercise or cultivation,” he writes, 
“which the study and examination of works of art give to the sensitive part of our nature, 
refines and improves our sensibilities, and thus renders us more easily and deeply 
affected by the scenes of real life.”  Underwriting this notion of the transferability of 
feeling from aesthetic engagement to “real life” is a general conception of mental 
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sensitivity, also evident in Kames, that is applicable to a diverse range of experiences – 
moral, aesthetic, and religious.  Otheman states this principle openly: “the cultivation of 
any power of the mind on a given subject prepares that power to be used more easily on 
every other subject; so, by a proper employment of our taste or sensibility in the fine arts, 
it becomes more readily excited in the common affairs of life” (327).  Art helps to 
calibrate our emotional receptivity, and once calibrated, our finely tuned emotional 
constitution will naturally repel the immoral as distasteful.  As Otheman observes, 
“persons of refined taste and genius abhor every thing vulgar and mean” (328).  
Otheman’s lecture, though notable among evangelical writers for its 
comprehensiveness and for the relative philosophical precision with which its case for 
art’s moral influence is stated, was hardly unique in its general orientation.  An ever 
increasing number of nineteenth-century evangelicals across the denominational and 
theological spectrum followed suit in arguing for the ethical significance of art in the 
language of anti-didactic moralism.  Henry Drummond, for example, observed in his 
Letter to Thomas Phillips (1840) that “an increased feeling for the fine arts can really 
contribute to elevate the minds and characters of man….”45  P. Wells, writing for the 
Christian Advocate and Journal in 1849, urged that poetry might be “the means of 
effecting much real and practical good” precisely because “The mass of men decide, and 
act, from the impulse of the heart, rather than from the convictions of the head.”46  In a 
similar fashion, the Christian Observer pointed out that “There is, in fact, a humanising 
power in all true poetry …. As the nourisher of all human and sacred sympathies, the poet 
becomes a teacher of morality by being an inspirer of right feeling.”47  Such rhetoric, in 
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fact, could at times reach an astonishing pitch.  No doubt one of the more extravagant 
claims on behalf of the moral power of poetry came from the pen of the Rev. S.D. 
Burchard, who accorded poetry, because of its direct appeal to the emotions, the honor of 
having sparked many of the greatest moral revolutions in history: “Our moral sensibilities 
are so arranged and attuned that true poetry will find its way to the heart and leave its 
impress there.  Hence its influence, during all time, over the moral feelings and habits of 
men.  Some of the grandest revolutions and changes that have signalized the world’s 
history have been effected through the instrumentality of poetry.”48  This kind of claim, 
however, as bold as it was, was not without precedent.  Dugald Stewart, for one, had 
speculated that “in … earlier periods of society, the rude compositions of the bard and the 
minstrel may have been instrumental in humanizing the minds of savage warriors, and 
accelerating the growth of cultivated manners.”49 
 The logic of anti-didactic moralism also informed some evangelical discussions of 
the aesthetics of nature.  Reflecting on “The Advantages of a Taste for the Beauties of 
Nature” in the pages of the Christian Advocate and Journal, one Dr. Percival observed 
how, “By a sweet contagion, the soul catches the harmony which it contemplates....  In 
this state we become susceptible of virtuous impressions from every surrounding object; 
[and] an equal and extensive benevolence is called forth into exertion.”  Evangelical 
writers, especially when nature was the aesthetic object of choice, tended to move 
through nature to the Creator, just as the Puritans had.  A “taste for natural beauty … 
elevates [us] to the love and admiration of that Being who is the author of all that is fair, 
sublime, and good in the creation.”  In calling attention to the personal character of God, 
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evangelical writers like Percival also resisted the monistic tendencies which lay behind 
more radical romantic or transcendentalist conceptions of nature.50  But unlike the 
Puritans, the moral encounter with nature was more affective than rational: natural beauty 
“not only refines and humanizes, but dignifies and exalts the affections.”51  The 
appreciation of natural beauty was not simply an occasion for meditating upon the 
superior merits of heavenly beauty, nor was it, at least for Dr. Percival, a chance to read 
natural objects typologically as “images of divine things” in the manner of Edwards.  
One’s confrontation with beauty was instead a moment of transport in which a person 
was able to feel God and, at the same time, to feel morally empowered.52  
This clear articulation of art’s (and nature’s) moral influence in terms of an anti-
didactic moralism drawn from the romantics and from Enlightenment writers like Kames 
highlights the distance, with regard to both ethics and aesthetics, which some evangelical 
cultural elites had traveled in less than a century.  In the wake of the widespread 
dissemination of the benevolist tradition of Hutcheson, evangelicals had come to embrace 
an ethico-aesthetic theory that included both a more positive view of human nature (for 
his part, Kames was candid in declaring that “no man hath a propensity to vice as such” 
[1:51]) and a model of moral progress dependent on the power of a naturalistic, 
subterranean “influence” emanating from aesthetic experience.  For Jonathan Edwards, 
the exercise of true virtue and the perception of primary beauty – as well as whatever 
moral or spiritual improvement might be derived from secondary beauty – were possible 
only for those who had been regenerated by the power of the Holy Spirit; for a theorist 
like Otheman, by contrast, virtue appears to be, at least in part, a natural product of 
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ordinary aesthetic exposure and education.53  In fact, John Foster’s reflections on the 
theory of anti-didactic moralism – in this case in relation to the aesthetic experience of 
nature – published only two decades earlier, are especially instructive here: 
 
 It would be a matter of very great interest to determine, under what 
conditions this influence of nature, where it does actually operate on the 
taste and imagination, shall also be salutary in a moral respect.  It has been 
a favourite doctrine with many men of sensibility and genius, that these 
captivations of nature are absolutely and almost necessarily conducive to 
the moral rectitude of the mind; that they unconditionally tend to purify, to 
harmonize, and to exalt, the principles and affections.  If the maintainers 
of this opinion, so kind to our nature, had not examined the human mind 
enough to know, from its very constitution, that in some modes and 
degrees of its depravity, it not only may fail to be corrected by the 
perception of these charms of nature, but may receive their influence so 
that it shall augment the depravity – it is strange that their faith was not 
shaken by the notorious fact, that many fine geniuses of the very class 
most alive to beauty and sublimity of nature, poets and painters, have been 
among the most profligate of men; – not to notice that the inhabitants of 
some of the most paradisiacal and romantic sections of the earth, are 
among the most basely corrupt of the whole human race.54  
  
Foster pinpoints the potential theological difficulty with the theory of anti-didacticism 
exactly.  The Enlightenment proponents of this theory had been “so kind” – indeed, too 
kind – in their estimation of human nature.   
What makes Otheman’s case in particular so revealing, however, is that such 
principles – which would eventually assume a far more controversial guise in the thought 
of liberal Protestants  – appear to have co-existed, albeit tenuously and not altogether 
successfully, with an otherwise solid theological conservatism.55  Otheman was not, it 
seems, entirely unaware that on some level the anti-didactic moralism he so passionately 
advocated conceivably stood at odds, at least in its unqualified form, with the traditional 
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doctrine of depravity.  In fact, his efforts to introduce conventional evangelical 
theological concerns into his basically Kamesian paradigm constitute some of the more 
illuminating, because ultimately ineffectual, moments in his lecture.  At one point, for 
example, Otheman makes a suggestive reference to two types of genius – types which 
indicate a lingering consciousness of the Puritan distinction between the regenerate and 
unregenerate.  With reference to his two kinds of relative influence, he writes: “Subjects 
and emotions are … the instruments which both depraved and consecrated genius 
employs to effect its purposes” (322).  This passing distinction, however, remains 
undeveloped.  Later on he raises the problem of the Fall explicitly as he formulates his 
principle of sympathetic identification.  Our ability “to become the beings which [art] 
represents” also indicates within us a “desire of improving our condition, … that 
undefinable longing after something great and glorious, which, though perverted by the 
fall, still clings to our nature” (326).  Once again, though, Otheman does not explore the 
possible consequences of this doctrine at any length, and in fact, his emphasis is primarily 
on that part of human nature which, he argues, remains untouched by the Fall.  Perhaps 
his most concerted attempt to give due weight to the doctrine of depravity, however, 
arises during his treatment of the imagination.  Otheman allows that “Under the influence 
of a depraved heart, this faculty is apt to be disordered in its aims and operations.”  Yet 
even here he is quick to explain this problem away: “but God has wisely so ordained that 
it can be, and ordinarily is gratified with the exhibition of those qualities which are 
harmless, if they are not as holy, and contain as much earthly, if not as much heavenly 
purity, as the sublimer attributes of religion” (326; italics mine).  That Otheman was a 
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Methodist (and therefore most likely an Arminian in theology) may help to explain his 
more positive view of human nature, but even conservative Arminians affirmed the 
reality of the Fall and acknowledged the extensive effects of depravity on the human 
personality.  On the whole, then, Otheman is unwilling, or unable, to explore in any detail 
the underlying tensions between the moral implications of his aesthetics and his theology.   
There were those evangelical writers who refused to accept casually the 
benevolist premises underlying the tradition of anti-didactic moralism; nor were they 
content to remain in Otheman’s state of unresolved tension, which seemed only to pay 
lip-service to important theological concerns.  These writers continued to call attention to 
the potential incompatibility between an ethico-aesthetic system founded on a belief in 
the inherent goodness of human nature and an explicitly Christian system which, they 
argued, rightly confronted the implications of human depravity, and which located 
morality and moral action not in “sensibility” or “sentimentalism” alone but in the laws 
of God and the enabling power of grace.  “Young persons,” noted an author in the 
Christian Advocate and Journal in 1836, “are too apt to think that sensibility of heart is 
in itself a meritorious trait of moral character.  This I consider a serious misconception.  
In itself it is possessed of neither a virtuous nor reprehensible quality.”56  T.L., writing in 
the Mercersburg Review in 1857, blasted Dickens and Thackeray for belonging to that 
school of sentimental novelists whose character depictions are the result solely of the 
whims of the author – that is, whose “good men and women are good on no principle of 
goodness recognized by Christianity, or even in any sound ethical system” and whose 
“bad men are bad with an equal absence of all reason for being such, except the fancy of 
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the writer.”  The problem, according to T.L., is that the characters of these novelists are 
the product not of a sober theological appraisal of reality, nor even a carefully reasoned 
ethical theory, but rather of feeling alone: 
 
 Ethical systems recognize a difference of culture and education.  The 
Scriptures make a difference of faith, of discipleship, and, above all, of 
grace.  Men may dislike the word and the idea.  A difference of grace! 
they cannot bear the sound or the thought of it.  But surely it is more 
rational than no ground of difference at all.  With this school there is no 
such rational, to say nothing of any Scriptural ground.  In fact, there is no 
reason in it; it is all feeling; good feeling on the one side, and bad feeling 
on the other.  This difference, too, of goodness and badness, as thus 
presented, is simply another matter of feeling…. 
 
Such novelists, moreover, have no place for the doctrine of Original Sin, “for all writers 
of this school, with hardly an exception, reject it as a most atrocious and man-libelling 
tenet.”57  Still others reiterated the Edwardsean premise that nature alone lacks the power 
of moral purification.  To reap its spiritual rewards requires a preceding act of grace.  “O, 
why is it,” asked the Rev. J. Wesley Horne in the Christian Advocate in 1872, “that so 
many of the sons of God – for whom all these things were made, that they might ‘ascend 
through nature up to nature’s God,’ their own heavenly Father and friend – see not, know 
not, commune not with these handiworks of His, though glowing all around them?  Is it 
because ‘of the darkness that is in them?’”  The only course of action, Horne counseled, 
was to “go to the good Physician, that he ‘may anoint their eyes with eye-salve that they 
may see….’”58 
 Theological critiques of this sort, however, became increasingly rare among 
evangelical aestheticians as the century progressed.  Even before the 1870s and 1880s 
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when liberalism began to have a marked impact on evangelicalism, evangelicals of all 
varieties were quite prepared to grant art a significant share of power in shaping people’s 
morality – not by virtue of its ability to transmit doctrine or communicate propositional 
truth but rather by virtue of its ability to elevate the feelings.  By the end of the century, 
this theory would assume a prominent role in both liberal Protestant aesthetics and liberal 
Protestant theology through the influence of such figures as Bushnell and Henry Ward 
Beecher.  It is evident, for example, in Beecher’s conception of the rapturous aesthetic 
gaze – formulated in his Star Papers; or, Experiences of Art and Nature (1855) – in 
which union with an aesthetic object yields a blessed, though unconscious, moral harvest: 
 
 The first merit of pictures is the effect which they can produce upon the 
mind; – and the first step of a sensible man should be to receive 
involuntary effects from them.  Pleasure and inspiration first, analysis 
afterward.  The more perfectly one can abandon himself, the more true he 
can be to his real feelings and impressions, the wiser he is.  It is a glorious 
thing to have a freshet in the soul!  To have the better feelings overflow 
their banks and carry out of the channel all the dull obstructions of 
ordinary life.  It reveals us to ourselves.  It augments the sense of being.  
In these higher moods of feeling there is intuitional moral instruction, to 
the analysis of which the intellect comes afterward with slow steps.  
Therefore, I said to the pictures, “I am here; I am yours; do what you will 
with me; I am here to be intoxicated.”  My feelings opened out to them as 
flowers upon a southward slope would open to the morning sun, letting its 
stimulation develop whatever was in them to be developed.  They took me 
at my word, and such another revel – such an ethereal intoxication, drunk 
from the cup of heavenly beauty, I shall not have again, until I drink that 
new wine of the Kingdom of Heaven!59 
 
Such romantic reverie, of course, was increasingly becoming the stock-and-trade of 
incipient liberals like Beecher; yet behind such reverie and the ethico-aesthetic theory on 
which it was based stood, oddly enough, the likes of Edward Otheman, a conservative 
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Methodist.  And alongside Beecher stood a whole body of evangelical romantic critics 
who, though they may have disagreed with Beecher’s evolving theological liberalism, 
would surely have recognized, and affirmed, his claims for the “intuitional moral 
instruction” afforded by art. 
 
“Occult Pathos” Gone Wrong: Negative Influence, Sentimentality, and the Novel 
While not all Victorian evangelicals theorized the ethical power of art in terms of anti-
didactic moralism, the notion that art operated morally by way of some “occult pathos” 
seems to have dominated evangelical accounts of the matter for much of the nineteenth 
century.  Such a theory of occult pathos, however, was not without its dangers, and 
consequently this notion, predictably perhaps, also engendered a substantial body of 
counter-discourse among some evangelical writers who, following in the footsteps of 
Hannah More’s “Preface to the Tragedies,” expressed concerns about the negative effects 
of art precisely because they had already internalized the psycho-aesthetic principle that 
art has direct access to the emotions and thus to the well-springs of human behavior.  Put 
simply, the basic dilemma is that if one accepts the premise that art is capable of exerting 
an influence on the emotions in the interests of morality, then what is to stop it in 
particular cases from exerting an influence on the emotions in the interests of immorality?  
Writing on “Music and Poetry” in the London Quarterly Review in 1872, the critic H. 
Buxton Forman captured this logic clearly.  “[M]usic, poetry, and the rest of the fine 
arts,” he observed, possess “the power of importuning us with more or less definite 
influences for good.”  The influence of music in particular is “vague, subtle, and 
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indirect,” and “It is thus a tremendous humanising agent in its possibilities.”  Yet it is the 
very “fact that it can be abused as frightfully as other humanising agents can” which 
“adds importance to this function.”60  The power of music to humanize is also, 
paradoxically, its power to dehumanize.  The possible extent of this dehumanizing 
influence was depicted graphically by another writer in the Christian Advocate in 1882: 
“The impure thoughts and images infused into the moral being by … unhallowed poetry, 
like certain poisons taken into the blood, may remain there for life ….”  The only antidote 
to this pernicious “Influence of Demoralizing Art and Literature,” as the title of the 
article had it, was a “continual resort to Divine grace.”61  Broadly, of course, the dual 
potential of art for both good and evil is yet another incarnation of the paradox that 
prompted Plato to deny poets a place in the Republic: if poets weren’t so powerful, they 
wouldn’t need banishing.  The same may be said about similar Puritan fears regarding the 
overactive imagination.  But nevertheless, what sometimes appears on the surface to have 
been little more than a manifestation of the puritanical anxieties of a Victorian 
evangelical critic takes on a decidedly different valence when one recognizes in such a 
complaint a thoroughgoing acceptance of both contemporary aesthetics and the mental 
philosophy on which it was based.  The well-known evangelical reluctance, for example, 
to sanction the novel – a reluctance that held on in some circles until the 1890s, if not 
longer – could lay claim, at least in part, to a respectable Enlightenment pedigree. 
 In fact, it is in nineteenth-century evangelical discussions of the novel that the 
dark side of anti-didactic moralism – the threat of negative influence – is perhaps most 
evident.  Evangelical writers did at times include other art forms in their discussions of 
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negative influence, but more often than not the “fine arts” (a category to which the novel 
had to struggle, even among evangelical writers, to gain access62) were imagined in 
positive terms, whereas the novel was seen as an aberration of sorts, both morally and 
aesthetically.  “Novels,” as one critic put it in the Baptist Quarterly Review in 1890, “are 
the weeds in Literature’s garden.”63  Indeed, as Terence Martin has pointed out, it was the 
novel as a genre – rather than individual novels – which often attracted the criticism of 
evangelicals and non-evangelicals alike, and common nineteenth-century arguments 
against the genre ranged from doubts about the metaphysical status of fiction (an 
argument with Enlightenment roots in the Scottish philosophy but which also echoed 
earlier Puritan forms of epistemological realism) to doubts about whether the habit of 
novel-reading was consistent with the time constraints of those charged with the 
evangelization of the earth (another argument with Puritan roots).64  A thorough account 
of the way in which Victorian evangelicals gradually moved from a position of staunch 
resistance to the novel to one of acceptance – in which the novel was viewed not only as 
an admissible form of recreation but also, by some, as a species of genuine “Art” and by 
others as an evangelistic tool – would require a small volume of its own.65  Yet a brief 
examination of one line of critique in particular may serve to illustrate how evangelical 
fears about the immoral influence of art objects were in fact the natural corollary of a 
faith in art’s occult pathos.  
In many cases, the alleged problem with the novel was one of emotional excess, 
coupled with a belief in the propensity of this excess to lead to both a diminished desire 
for moral action in the real world and an increased desire for further emotional 
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stimulation – a set of ideas that came to be encapsulated in the term “sentimentality,” or 
what the Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review labeled “the Gospel of 
Sentimentalism.”66  The novel’s ability to stimulate the emotions could, if not properly 
checked, lead quite easily to over-stimulation; this over-stimulation, in turn, was believed 
to initiate a process of desensitization that terminated in a general apathy for actual 
suffering.  Sentimentality, in short, meant the relishing of feeling for its own sake.  This 
sort of logic is evident, for example, in the arguments of one “Miranda,” who enumerated 
the risks of novel reading in the Christian Advocate and Journal in 1828: 
 
 Houses of distress, poverty, sickness, and death diversify the scenery of 
the moral world, calculated to touch the finer feelings of our natures, and 
cause the tear of sympathy to fill the eye.  All these circumstances come 
within our daily observation; yet they are overlooked by those who feed 
their imaginations with fictitious woe, and cherish that luxury of grief 
which blunts the keenest sensibilities of the heart, and raises an 
insuperable barrier to moral excellences.  Theatrical and novel characters 
shed an abundance of tears, yet they seldom fall upon the couch of distress 
to soothe the agonies of a heart riven from earth by affliction, or mingle 
with those which drop from the eye of the widow and the orphan, to 
mitigate their woes.67     
 
An author in the Record made a similar case in 1862, though with considerably greater 
vitriol.  Describing the mental condition of those he referred to as “slave[s] of 
imaginative literature,” the author lamented that “The toil that yields him no profit will 
continue to absorb his energies; and the mind, wearied with its shallow pursuits, and 
sickened with its own folly, will yet be cursed with a keener appetite for the garbage it 
feeds upon.”68  Tellingly, the anti-sentimentalist argument that novels deaden the moral 
sensibility by repeated over-stimulation of the emotions was still being cited in 1882 in 
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the pages of the Christian Index.  In this latter case, the author did express some doubts 
about the merits of the argument, explaining that it seemed to him to be “rather 
theoretical,”69 but his clear need to speak to the argument nonetheless suggests the 
enduring popularity of this view among the novel’s evangelical detractors. 
 In reality, as a close reading of the foregoing examples would show, the case 
against sentimentality included many sub-varieties.  Philosophers and critics, that is, 
delineated different means by which desensitization and moral dullness were said to 
occur.  So, for example, it was sometimes posited that an indulgence in fictitious 
suffering weakened, through repeated exposure, human beings’ intrinsic sense of 
discomfort at the distresses of others.  In other instances, the problem was said to lie in 
fiction’s tendency to idealize suffering – in its refusal to depict the harsh realities of the 
world.  The natural effect of this romanticized outlook on readers was thought to be a 
maladjusted taste which, because of its acquired hyper-sensitivity, turned from the 
horrors of genuine suffering in its preference for the elegant and stylized presentations of 
literature.  (This latter argument seems to have been designed with a certain sort of 
aesthete in mind, and it is therefore little wonder that when, in the 1880s, aestheticism 
grew in popularity, some critics viewed it as but the latest species of sentimentality.70)  
Yet whatever the exact details of these various philosophical accounts, it is clear that 
much of the anti-sentimentalist/anti-fictional discourse of nineteenth-century 
evangelicals, while by no means inconsistent with earlier Puritan anxieties concerning the 
wayward imagination, was not, as one might suppose, the sole product of a diffuse, 
vestigial Puritanism; rather, its immediate progenitor was the moral and mental 
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philosophy of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.  It was, after all, Dugald 
Stewart, the great codifier of Scottish common sense realism, who had explained with 
careful rigor the psychological principles that rendered the novel a deadly weapon, 
determining that “an habitual attention to exhibitions of fictitious distress, is in every 
view calculated to check our moral improvement.”71  Ironically (and for reasons that are 
beyond the scope of this study), the novel was thus initially a victim of the very 
psychology that had served to invest other types of art objects with a transformative 
moral power. 
The anti-sentimentalist discourse which appeared in the pages of numerous 
nineteenth-century evangelical periodicals was in many cases a protest against what was 
perceived as an overextension or abuse of the established psycho-aesthetic system – 
because, as Kames had said, the fine arts “open a direct avenue to the heart of man” 
(1:32), one had to take care that this avenue was kept under strict surveillance – but it was 
a critique that nevertheless left the basic principles of this system intact.72  This stance 
was evident, for example, in one evangelical writer’s efforts in the Christian Advocate 
and Journal to introduce a new category into the discussion by differentiating between 
ordinary “sensibility” and the more menacing “super-sensibility”: “there is, perhaps, 
some danger lest we should substitute effeminacy of manners and sickly sentimentality 
for plain integrity and genuine sensibility.  Our excessive fondness for novels and works 
of romance betrays vitiated feelings, as well as vitiated taste.”  Such vitiated feelings 
could be classified as a form of “super-sensibility,” and novels and romances were 
particularly to blame for cultivating this super-sensibility, especially in unsuspecting 
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youth.  Still, this same critic heartily supported the cultivation of what he called “genuine 
sensibility,” for “Such sensibility is the key-stone of all our social affections, the very 
cement of society, the well-spring of beneficence, and the true genius of poetry, painting, 
sculpture, and all the graces of the fine arts.”73  Thus, “sentimentality” (and those objects 
like the novel which were believed to excite it) was morally dangerous because it 
threatened to disrupt the equilibrium of the reigning Hutchesonian ethico-aesthetic 
paradigm.  “[M]ost books of fiction,” argued a writer in the Christian Index in 1885, 
“appeal almost exclusively to the emotional nature – to the feelings and passions – and 
these, in their turn, react upon the body, mind and morals, inducing courses of action 
which entail disease and ruin.”74  Sentimentality was, in effect, occult pathos gone 
berserk.   
The specters of immoral influence and of sentimentalism, therefore, were perhaps 
the inevitable byproducts of an ethico-aesthetic theory that so closely linked moral action 
to the feelings and, in turn, saw in the fine arts a special means of tapping into these 
feelings directly.  Yet as critics have long recognized, the complex rhetoric of nineteenth-
century anti-sentimentalism was also a politically charged one, whether articulated by 
evangelicals or non-evangelicals.  Anti-sentimentalism, for instance, was frequently a 
gendered discourse – one that was quick to equate sentimentalization with the feminine, 
or rather, with the “effeminate.”75  The Christian Advocate and Journal contributor 
quoted above who associated sentimentality with an “effeminacy of manners” was thus 
hardly atypical in his choice of verbiage.  Sentimentality, furthermore, was often 
implicitly identified as an attribute of the “low” or “popular.”  Fiction – the primary 
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offender – was regularly contrasted unfavorably with the superior art of poetry, and in 
fact, even evangelical critics sometimes rejected fiction on the basis of “aesthetic” 
considerations rather than, or in addition to, strictly moral ones.76  Such realities, 
however, merely help to underscore the fact that both anti-didactic moralism and the anti-
sentimentalism it eventually spawned were predominantly the discourses of an educated 
elite.  The same holds true for a significant portion of the anti-novel rhetoric propagated 
by nineteenth-century evangelical writers – rhetoric that has at various times been viewed 
as evidence of evangelicalism’s puritanical, anti-aesthetic, or anti-intellectual bias.  In 
reality, however, the evangelical campaigns against sentimentalism and the novel suggest 
quite the opposite, namely, the existence of a privileged class of intellectuals and critics 
committed to both the emerging Anglo-American institution of high art and the 
maintenance of a specific type of Protestant society.77     
Thanks to the principles of anti-didactic moralism, such mental faculties as the 
taste and the imagination had acquired for many educated Victorian evangelicals tensions 
analogous to those surrounding a present-day nuclear reactor.  When utilized properly, 
such faculties could quite literally determine the fate of a nation.  Taste, as one 
evangelical put it, “is susceptible of very high culture, – much higher than any of our 
external senses, and it exerts a strong and very direct influence on the rest of our being…. 
If our taste could thus be elevated, how elevated would become our entire nature; mind, 
heart, and soul would all turn from the things of the earth to dwell on purer and higher 
things.”78  As we will see momentarily, it was this sort of religio-moral rectitude that 
many evangelicals believed was the key to a healthy Christian nation.  When used 
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improperly, however, the results could be disastrous, both individually and socially.  
Sentimental fiction, for instance, was not merely a personal vice; it threatened to subvert 
the entire social structure.  “What in time,” asked a critic in the Baptist Quarterly Review, 
who was deeply troubled by the widespread popularity of the novel, “must be the effect 
upon the national character of so much pollution passing into the minds and souls, the 
hearts and consciences of our people, and filling them with false impressions and false 
sentiments?”  Interestingly, this critic offered a characteristically evangelical response to 
his nightmarish vision of social collapse at the feet of the novel: he called for the 
founding of Novel Societies which, like the Temperance Society, could help to alleviate 
the social effects of rampant, fiction-induced intoxication.  Given the psychological 
premises of many arguments against the novel, such a suggestion was not nearly as far-
fetched as it may seem to many modern readers.  As the writer himself put it, “The novel 
is to the mind what strong drink is to the body”79 – a warning that was as applicable to 
the body politic as it was to the individual reader. 
 
“A mighty engine … for the elevation of the nation”: The Moral Influence of the 
Fine Arts in the Service of the Christian Nation 
Evangelical thinking about aesthetics during the nineteenth century was profoundly 
implicated in the discourses of British and American nationalism, as well as in the still 
broader discourse of “civilization” – a term which often referred to the collective culture 
of Anglo-Saxon countries but which could also include more narrowly the values and 
institutions of a particular nation.  Surveying the “Prospects of British Art” for the British 
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Quarterly Review in 1845, one optimistic reviewer noted how art “is now for the first 
time becoming a thing for the people; not an object of worth to a fortunate few, but a 
mighty engine, if it shall yet be carried out in all its capabilities, for the elevation of the 
nation.”  Whereas the fine arts had once been the province of wealthy aristocrats, they 
were at long last, in this democratic age, available for the benefit of the masses – an 
observation the accuracy of which found extensive confirmation in the growing number 
of museums, national galleries, and mass-produced prints available to the public over the 
course of the nineteenth century.  This democratization of the fine arts, the reviewer 
believed, ought also to bring with it a new sense of obligation for the poet, musician, or 
painter, for if anything could inspire the British artist to reach beyond the “noblest efforts 
of bygone times,” it was “surely the consciousness that he is painting – not for a patron, 
but for a people – not as a mere higher-class decorator, adorning the mansions of the 
wealthy, but rather as a priest, ministering to the national mind.”80  Once art has ceased to 
be a mere “plaything” of the privileged upper-classes and has become an object for the 
“people,” its social importance expands dramatically.  Accordingly, art’s mission – on 
which it was to embark with an almost religious solemnity (the nineteenth-century 
spiritualization of art was closely related to its democratization) – was to advance the 
interests of the nation; its objective, in short, was the securement of a stable society. 
 The nature and ramifications of the evangelical argument for art’s contribution to 
national stability and betterment, however, can only be fully understood within the 
context of evangelical conceptions of the “nation” itself.  For evangelicals, and indeed 
even for many non-evangelicals, the “nation” and the “national mind” were far more than 
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merely secular political, ethnic, or geographical constructs, though of course they 
involved these.  “Nation” was also an inherently spiritual and moral category, for Great 
Britain and the United States, many Victorians believed, were “Christian nations” (a 
designation which, to evangelicals, always meant “Protestant”).  As a substantial body of 
scholarship has shown, Protestant Christianity was a key element in the national identities 
of both the United States and Britain well into the nineteenth century.81  To be “English” 
or to be “American” meant, on some level, to be Protestant.  This idea had been handed 
down to Victorian evangelicals via the Puritans, and it survived in the popular 
imagination even after developments in the 1820s and 1830s (e.g., Catholic Emancipation 
in Britain in 1829 or disestablishment in America) had begun to erode the legal structures 
that lent political support to such an idea.  As the Biblical Repertory and Princeton 
Review could still declare in 1852, “The most important element of national, as of 
individual character, is Christianity.”82  Protestantism, of course, was but one thread in 
the complex fabrics of these respective nationalisms, for as Tony Claydon and Ian 
McBride have cautioned with reference to Britain, “protestantism… always interacted 
with beliefs about the constitution, race, language, and relations between local and 
European culture.”83  But it was nevertheless a widely held belief that the United States 
and Britain were Protestant nations – a conviction which carried with it a common set of 
suppositions and implications in both countries.  To be sure, important differences 
remained.  Contrasting opinions about the value of religious establishment, for example, 
not only implied divergent conceptions of how best to safeguard the “Protestant 
character” of the two nations but also led to slightly different notions of exactly what that 
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character was.84  Yet such differences notwithstanding, both British and American 
Protestants shared the common conviction that the nations in which they lived were 
Christian nations, and they understood this concept in remarkably similar ways.85  
 The concept of the Christian nation embodied a network of fundamental 
assumptions about the role of both Protestant religion and morality in national life.  As 
described in the last chapter, a majority of evangelical writers prior to the 1870s – as well 
as a significant number thereafter – saw Protestant Christianity not only as the revelation 
of God in Christ by which human beings could understand God’s plan for personal 
salvation but also as a powerful initiator of cultural development.  “[T]he progress of 
Christianity,” wrote Otheman in the American Baptist Magazine in 1833, “is identified 
with the progress of political enjoyment and prosperity….”86  Christianity was thought to 
provide the necessary cultural conditions for material, social, and intellectual progress; it 
was, as Secretary Beecher put it in his testimony before the British Parliament in 1835, 
the “parent of civilization.”  Without Protestantism, a nation would be incapable of 
thriving.  “There are two pillars on which a nation’s strength and security rest,” declared 
the Rev. John Baker in 1856: “1. The possession and maintenance of the true religion.  2.  
The diffusion of that religion.”87  At the same time, however, the continued relationship 
between Christianity and culture, according to many Protestant thinkers, depended upon 
the work of a specially appointed intermediary.  This intermediary was “morality.”  As 
Robert Handy has observed, throughout much of the nineteenth century there “was 
virtually universal and consistent emphasis among Protestants,” evangelical or otherwise, 
that morality was “the all-important link between religion and civilization.”88   
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Proper moral behavior, as the fruit of an authentic Christianity, was seen as the crux of 
social stability, without which a culture or nation would inevitably crumble.  Jesse 
Appleton, the Congregationalist president of Bowdoin College, captured this nineteenth-
century Protestant emphasis on the interconnectedness of Christianity, morality, and 
civilization in an 1814 election sermon on the “True Sources of National Prosperity”: 
 
 Do you believe, that any State, community, or nation can be powerful, 
tranquil, and permanently happy, if their morals are extensively depraved?  
Would not the most alarming depravation of morals result from a general 
disbelief in the Christian religion?  Would the happiness of families, 
would property or life be secure in a nation of deists?  If Christianity is the 
most powerful guardian of morals, are you not, as civilians, bound to give 
your support and patronage?89 
 
In theory at least, morality was distinguishable from Christianity itself: it was the 
practical expression of a personal faith and, traditionally, of a regenerate heart.  Similarly, 
Christianity, too, was distinguishable from the civilization it was said to engender.  
Traditional and progressive evangelicals would at last part ways over what may be seen 
as the collapse of these carefully drawn distinctions, but until the end of the nineteenth 
century nearly all evangelicals embraced the twin beliefs that Christianity was the 
“guardian of morals” and that morality was in turn the guardian of society.         
In one sense, the idea that morality served the interests of social and national 
stability was understood simply in terms of the minimal ethical conditions requisite for 
the smooth functioning of human communities.  One cannot reasonably expect to conduct 
business or live at peace with one’s neighbor for any length of time in an environment in 
which dishonesty and selfishness are the rule of thumb.  In another sense, however, many 
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evangelicals believed that the stability, and indeed the very existence, of a nation was 
spiritually contingent upon a strict adherence to the Judeo-Christian moral code.  Quite 
simply, if a nation did not abide by God’s laws, then it would face God’s judgment.  This 
idea was yet another legacy of the Puritans, who had viewed the modern nation as 
existing in a covenant with God just as the Old Testament nation of Israel had.  American 
Puritans, in particular, had frequently drawn parallels between their new American 
colony and the ancient Jewish nation.90  Yet the belief that God judges nations, not just 
individuals, for their moral behavior was alive and well in the mid-nineteenth century in 
both the United States and England.  The Rev. George Cubitt, for example, stated this 
principle concisely in a sermon entitled “National Prosperity Dependent on the Divine 
Blessing,” published in the Wesleyan-Methodist Magazine in 1831: “The favour and 
blessing of God can only be secured by national righteousness; while their forfeiture is 
the appointed penalty of obstinate national transgression.”91  More than fifty years later, 
H.C. Westwood, writing in the Christian Advocate, could still attribute the national 
successes of England and the United States to Protestantism and morality: “These nations 
have reached their present important place in civilization and in virtue because they have 
fostered the religion of Jesus Christ, whose transcendent moral power is daily shown in 
the national life and government.”92  Neither was it unusual for the abstract principle 
stated here by Cubitt and Westwood to find more concrete applications as well, as when 
Hugh MacNeile, an Irish Protestant and an early associate of Henry Drummond and 
Edward Irving, interpreted the outbreak of cholera in England in 1849 as God’s 
punishment for the Maynooth Act of 1845: “Against remonstrances, against the light of 
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revealed truth, in defiance of the plainest language of God’s law, England has persevered, 
‘in a friendly and liberal spirit’, to encourage idolatry; and now in 1849, England stands 
aghast at a second visitation of the cholera.  God is not mocked, whatsoever a nation 
soweth, that it shall reap.”93  The maintenance of both Protestant Christianity and Judeo-
Christian morality, therefore, was quite literally a matter of national security, not to 
mention national prosperity and progress.  
In an era in which national stability was believed to rest upon a strong national 
morality – whether viewed socially, spiritually, or both – the theory of art’s moral 
influence must have seemed a welcome ally to many evangelicals in both the United 
States and England.  Indeed, the real endgame of the occult pathos theory was not the 
isolated moral benefits acquired by an individual as the result of a localized aesthetic 
experience but rather the collective benefits to the nation and to western civilization 
which the growing availability of such aesthetic experiences seemed to offer.  This 
national impulse behind the philosophy of art’s moral influence had in fact been present 
from the beginning, occupying a prominent place in Kames’s Elements.  “The Fine Arts,” 
he argued in his preface “To the King,” “have ever been encouraged by wise Princes, not 
singly for private amusement, but for their beneficial influence in society…. To promote 
the Fine Arts in Britain, has become of greater importance than is generally imagined” 
(1:3).  Nineteenth-century evangelicals readily echoed Kames’s sentiments.  Already in 
1812, for example, in his Lectures … on the Subjects of Moral and Political Philosophy, 
Samuel Stanhope Smith, president of the College of New Jersey and a strong proponent 
of the Scottish philosophy, had encouraged the cultivation of the fine arts for national 
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reasons.  Discussing the human countenance as the highest expression of both beauty and 
goodness, Smith drew a parallel between the individual face and the face of the nation: 
“As the studies and pursuits of men have an influence on that character of soul which is 
transfused on the countenance by the habits of life, it is not unimportant to observe that 
the national physiognomy of any people may be greatly improved by the cultivation of 
the arts, and by the refinement of the manners of society.”94  By the 1840s, this idea had 
taken a firm hold on the evangelical imagination.  As Henry N. Day declared in 1847 in a 
quite sophisticated exploration of “The Necessity of Æsthetic Culture to the Highest 
Moral Excellence,” “The æsthetic element of our nature, that element which finds its 
employment and its gratification in the forms of things, as distinguished from their 
essences, is working in society now, with a force and prevalence that are giving character 
to the age, and are moulding the destiny of coming generations.”  Whether this aesthetic 
element would, in the end, be a force for good or evil would depend on the concerted 
efforts of “the wise and good,” but for Day there was no denying that the fate of the 
nation was intimately linked to the fate of aesthetics.95  In 1880, a writer in the British 
Quarterly Review continued to insist that “there must be some attempt to carry artistic 
beauty … into our homes, and knead its impressions into our daily life”: “By communing 
with the loftier types of excellence, nations as well as individuals are stimulated to 
constant efforts in the paths of social as well as moral regeneration.”96  Renewal might 
come about one person at a time – a theme that was typical of the evangelical emphasis 
on the transformation of the individual – but the final objective was the moral 
improvement of the nation. 
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When it came to singling out specific national vices that the fine arts were 
believed to be especially suited to combating, evangelical critics could, and did, sound 
very much like many of their non-evangelical contemporaries.  Various forms of 
materialism, utilitarianism, commercialism, sensualism, and “worldliness,” topped the list 
– ideas, in short, which the proponents of Victorian high culture like Matthew Arnold 
classified as “Philistinism.”  Day, for example, summarized what he called the “grosser 
tendencies and characteristics” of the age as follows: “…the prevalent disposition to 
subordinate the inward and spiritual to the outward and sensual; the enduring and 
changeless, to the immediate and transient; fixed rational principles living deep in the 
soul, to superficial impulsive and therefore vapid, spiritless feeling; [and] a subordination 
of spirit to sense….”97  In fact, art was frequently depicted as being locked in a life-and-
death struggle with these social vices for the heart of the people.  On the one hand, such 
tendencies were thought to herald the swift decline of the nation, of Anglo-American 
civilization, and even of art itself.  Henry Drummond, for instance, lamented in 1840 
what he saw as the English habit of judging all things by the standard of wealth, an 
observation which led him to conclude: “For the most part the English in these days seem 
totally incapable of estimating or of understanding the highest branches of the fine 
arts.”98  In 1854, the editors of the Christian Advocate and Journal called upon none 
other than John Ruskin to serve as a mouthpiece for the condemnation of what they saw 
as the dominant utilitarian spirit of the period.  In a passage from volume two of his 
Modern Painters, which the editors of the Advocate entitled “The Useful and the 
Beautiful,” Ruskin describes how “people speak, in this working age … as if houses, and 
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lands, and food, and raiment, were alone useful, and as if sight, and thought, and 
admiration, were all profitless; so that men insolently call themselves utilitarians, who 
would turn if they had their way, themselves and their race into vegetables….”99  In a 
similar vein, Eugene Parsons, taking stock in 1889 of Tennyson’s poetry and of the 
nineteenth century as a whole, noted in the Baptist Quarterly Review that “The period to 
which Tennyson belongs is not an age calculated to foster in a high degree poetic 
greatness.”  According to Parsons, Tennyson had done an admirable job (though not a 
perfect one) in an age that was too given over to commercial, scientific, technological, 
and material interests.100 
On the other hand, art was also seen as a potent antidote to these woes.  The 
nineteenth century may have been too commercial for Parsons, but he could nevertheless 
take comfort in the observation that there existed a “growing appreciation for the 
beautiful in our age.”101  Specifically, art seemed to offer possibilities for social and 
national renewal precisely because it appealed to the emotional, intellectual, and moral – 
or what gradually came to be encapsulated in that vague catch-all term, “spiritual” – 
dimensions of human beings over and against the crudely material.  “It is a great thing in 
the nineteenth century,” wrote Adeline E.H. Slicer, an art student who recorded her 
European travels for the Christian Advocate in 1876, “to be able to love a picture – to be 
so unworldly as to speak of a work of art with tears in the eyes.  In this practical age to 
bow reverently to a sentiment is part of the old world culture.”102  Slicer’s general 
criticism of “this practical age” could at times find more pointed expression in a critic’s 
concerns about the perceived character flaws of his or her individual nation, as when an 
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author in the Methodist Quarterly Review, writing in the early years of the Gilded Age, 
suggested that Americans “are one of the most thoroughly realistic and materialistic 
peoples of all history.”  It was time, however, that Americans understood “that 
civilization is not wholly material and mechanical.”  What the United States needed most 
was a vibrant art culture: “There is nothing which the intellectual life of America so 
needs, and begins to feel its need of, as an aesthetic inspiration.  Nothing else of human 
origin can so smooth out the hard lines of our national character, and refine our national 
thought.”103  Yet while British and American evangelicals at times expressed their 
respective versions of aesthetic and national exceptionalism, the belief that art served as 
an effective counterpoint to a variety of social and national vices was part of a mindset 
that spanned the Atlantic.104  The longstanding Protestant ideology, which linked 
Protestant Christianity, morality, and civilization, had found a new partner in the fine 
arts. 
Viewed from the broad perspective of western social and intellectual history, it 
may be said that nineteenth-century Anglo-American evangelicals were therefore active 
participants in that process of social evolution described in different ways by Raymond 
Williams and Lawrence W. Levine, which saw the emergence of the modern conceptions 
of “culture” and “art” as responses to the demands of industrialized (and for Williams, 
democratic) life.105  Art, as an emotional and intellectual pursuit, seemed to offer a way 
out of the materialism and commercialism of contemporary industrialism.  As one author 
stated at the end of the nineteenth century in an essay entitled “The Ministry of Art”: 
“Any influence, whether in art or life, that leads men away from the merely material, 
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from the mere facts of existence, should be commended.”106  It is important not to 
overlook the sweeping nature of this statement.  The threat of materialism loomed so 
large that any non-material influence would suffice to counter its ill effects.  Christianity, 
of course, had always denounced the extremes of materialism and sensualism, in 
principle if not always in practice, but after the 1820s and 1830s evangelicals had 
increasingly come to regard the fine arts as another influence capable of routing such 
evils.  While the Puritans had not been unaware of the notion that the intellectual pursuit 
of an art like poetry could assist one in keeping the desires of the flesh at bay, to the 
Puritan mind “art” in general had more often represented the worldly, the sensual, and the 
material.  The romantics, however, had succeeded in shifting the balance of the material 
and intellectual in art.  Art was an expression of the infinite in the finite, the eternal in the 
temporal, and as such, it had become the solution to the very problems represented by its 
former self.  Indeed, if the belief that the religio-moral pitfalls of sensualism and 
materialism can in fact be transcended by the sensual and material medium of art 
constitutes one of the more interesting paradoxes in western intellectual history, the 
nineteenth-century evangelical acceptance of this idea represents one of the most 
significant developments in the history of evangelical aesthetics more narrowly.  “[W]e 
are to bear in mind,” wrote Henry N. Day, 
  
that the moral influence of æsthetic culture reaches men in their own 
sphere of sense.  Imprisoned, as he is, in the flesh, it visits him in his 
prison, and with a gentle hand unrivets his fetters.  It takes the wise in 
their own craftiness, and with the weapons of sense destroys the dominion 
of sense.  The elevation and purification of men, instrumentally through 
their aesthetic culture, is thus a process fitted to their condition; adapted to 
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reach the soul without awakening its prejudices or its apprehensions; 
inviting and attracting in its outward character, and drawing under its 
influence, and effecting its work before the subject is hardly aware of its 
design.  
 
Day was still theologically conservative enough to temper his faith in aesthetic culture 
with the insistence that “the only effectual cure” for a “depraved heart” is “the gospel,”107 
but the religious, and more precisely the incarnational, language in this passage indicates 
that the evangelical romantic spiritualization of art was well underway.  It was in part the 
desire to drive away the shared moral enemies of materialism, sensualism, and 
commercialism – enemies that threatened the stability of society and the nation – that led 
to the gradual fusion of art and religion among many liberals.108       
Thus for nineteenth-century evangelical critics, art’s influence acted as a “mighty 
engine … for the elevation of the nation,” serving to strengthen the moral fabric of 
society.  But art, these same critics believed, was also a product of that society.  It was, as 
a critic in the Eclectic Review put it in 1855, both “the means of mental advancement” 
and “the measure,” both “the agent of civilization” and its “product.”109  Art objects, 
suggested the article in the Methodist Quarterly Review which had pointed to the need for 
aesthetic inspiration in America, “are … expressions of the state of life and grade of 
development enjoyed by their creators.  Hence comes the power of fine art as an 
expression and record of civilization…. The art-life of a people records and perpetuates 
their most secret thoughts, their sublimest aspirations.”110  As this writer’s use of the term 
“expression” suggests, such a theory was really a version of romantic expressivism 
extrapolated to the national level – an extrapolation made possible by the further 
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assumption that nations behave fundamentally like individuals.  Just as people are said to 
possess unique personalities, so nations are said to possess unique characters of their 
own: “To pass from the proposition that the writings of an individual indicate his 
individual character, to the position that the literature of a nation is the exponent of the 
nation’s character,” explained the Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review in 1852, “is 
only to pass from a lower and more limited generalization to one higher and larger…. 
The literature of a nation is the purest expression of the nation’s life.”111   
The premise that art and literature are an expression of the life of a nation has 
roots in both Enlightenment and romantic thought, though it is typically associated in its 
nineteenth-century form with the writings of A.W. Pugin, John Ruskin, and William 
Morris.112  In a general way, this proposition could be interpreted to mean that, as the 
handiwork of a specific people group residing in a given geographical region and climate, 
speaking a particular language, and governing itself by a distinctive set of principles, art 
was somehow capable of embodying the unique identity that resulted from these singular 
characteristics and institutions.  “The literature of a particular period is the reflex of the 
agencies at work,” noted the Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review.  “It is the general 
resultant of the forces, operating on the nation’s mind at the time.”113  More specifically, 
however, as Ruskin argued, art was also an expression of the moral spirit of a nation: 
“The art of any country is the exponent of its social and political virtues.  The art, or 
general productive and formative energy, of any country, is an exact exponent of its 
ethical life.  You can have noble art only from noble persons, associated under laws fitted 
to their time and circumstances.”114  Ruskin’s theories in particular were well known 
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among Victorian evangelical critics, and these critics often spoke in markedly Ruskinian 
terms when considering art’s relationship to the nation.  Yet while Ruskin’s ideas may 
have directly affected any number of mid-nineteenth-century evangelical writers, his 
theories were as much a symptom as they were the cause of a larger intellectual trend.  
For although Pugin, Ruskin, and Morris are the best-known proponents of this theory, it 
was already appearing – albeit in a form that tended to focus on what was still the rather 
loose category of “literature” – in the pages of some evangelical periodicals by the 1820s.  
“The literary character of a people is their character as rational and reflective beings,” 
suggested the Christian Spectator in 1825.115  The Christian Observer echoed this 
sentiment four years later: “the character of a nation will always be found strictly 
analogous to the character of its popular floating literature….”116  The art and literature of 
a particular nation were thus seen as the natural outgrowths of that nation’s, and not 
simply the individual artist’s, moral ethos. 
A major consequence of this idea, of course, was that art and literature could 
theoretically be utilized as reliable indexes to the moral health of a nation.  If one needed 
an accurate measurement of a given society’s moral well-being – and it is worth 
reiterating here that moral well-being was understood to be an essential component in the 
stability of the Christian nation – one only needed to examine that society’s artistic 
output.  “The advance of civilization is marked by the improvement of taste....,” observed 
the Baptist Quarterly in 1881.  “As mind improves, the love of the beautiful 
increases.”117  By implication, then, the absence of, or a decline in, a love for the 
beautiful would suggest a civilization in a state of moral and cultural disrepair.  “There is 
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no surer index of the moral health of any society,” contended C.T. Winchester the 
following year, “than the imaginative literature it craves and produces.”118  J.S. White, 
who knew Ruskin’s writings and quoted them in support of his own arguments, likewise 
concluded in the Primitive Methodist Quarterly and Christian Ambassador that “art is the 
principal key to the history of nations, to their prevailing characteristics, to their 
sentiments and beliefs, to their mental and moral conditions generally.”119  No matter 
which cultures one examines, one will “find their art forever indicating their mental and 
moral, and even their social and political, tendencies as clearly and positively as do their 
science, their laws, and their letters.”120  Consequently, the state of a nation’s art and 
literature was a measuring-stick for the state of a nation’s morality and of its “progress” 
more generally: “The character of the national literature…,” the Biblical Repertory and 
Princeton Review charged, “must of necessity vary, at the different periods of the 
nation’s progress or decline….  Thus the actual progress of a people may be inferred 
from the species of literature which it has produced, as well as from the success with 
which it has been cultivated.”121  A vibrant art culture suggested a vibrant moral life, 
which in turn suggested the continuation of God’s blessing on the nation; a diseased art, 
on the other hand, was evidence of a Christian nation on the decline.      
Hence many Victorian evangelicals envisioned, in theory, a kind of repeating 
religious/moral/aesthetic circuit at work during the healthy periods of a nation – periods, 
that is, in which a nation’s people were firmly committed to both Protestant Christianity 
and Judeo-Christian morality.  An environment suffused with Protestantism and morality 
would give birth to an art and literature that expressed the Protestant character of a 
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people.  This art would, in return, help to nourish and invigorate the morality of the 
people, thereby helping to reinforce and perpetuate the social stability of the Christian 
nation.  “The art of every country,” asserted an author in the Eclectic Review in 1848, “in 
all its developments, in painting as in poetry, should be the expression of national 
character, should take its form from the soil whence it springs, should reflect and develop 
the feelings of its own time, in order to lead and advance them.”122  F.K. Levan, 
discussing “National Literature” in the Mercersburg Review in 1867, saw this “apparent 
paradox” clearly in the history of Greek literature and civilization: “Though an apparent 
paradox it is notwithstanding true, that as Hellenic civilization produced the literature we 
have been sketching, so this literature produced Hellenic civilization.”  Yet this paradox 
was just as true for modern nations like Germany, Great Britain, and the United States – 
nations “united … in closer bonds” than were ancient nations by “[t]he spread of 
civilization and Christianity” – as it was for the Greeks.  For the literature of modern 
nations, Germany and Britain especially, had “not only kept pace with their growth, but 
ha[d] also been a main cause of it.”123  It is true, argued Yale’s president, Noah Porter, in 
1873, that “The character and influence of a literature” depend in part on “the community 
whose opinions and culture it reflects.”  It is also true, however, that “great writers do 
much more than reflect an age.  They reach upon it and mold it by their individual 
influence and energy, as they instruct and elevate it, or delude or debase it.”124  Art and 
literature, evangelical critics believed, were both produced by, and producers of, the 
morality and mind of the Protestant Christian nation. 
In one sense, then, art was for nineteenth-century evangelicals a conservative 
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social force.  By exercising the moral feelings and sympathies of individual members of 
society, it helped to establish and maintain social intercourse and harmony.  This moral 
stability was both a sign of divine favor and a hope of future blessings.  Furthermore, 
since art was seen as an “expression” of the “national mind” and character, its 
development and the development of an accompanying aesthetic discourse helped to 
define and enforce this identity.  In another sense, however, art was also a “progressive” 
force in that it represented the triumphant evolution of Anglo-American civilization.  
Before the 1860s, this progress was, as we saw in chapter 4, viewed in postmillennial 
terms.  Even after the 1860s, however, the narrative of postmillennial progress persisted 
among some conservative evangelicals and, in an increasingly secularized sense,125 
among most liberals.  Art, then, was both conservative and progressive at the same time, 
for, paradoxically, the idea of progress was often rooted in a fundamental conservatism.  
True progress was founded on social stability.  At the same time, however, the occult 
pathos theory of art’s moral influence was implicated in a benevolist ethical theory that 
was odds with traditional evangelical doctrine.  Ethico-aesthetic “sympathy” had come to 
replace the Puritan concept of the covenant as the binding agent of society.   
 
Defending the Moral Influence Theory amid Growing Doubts: Challenges in the 
1880s and 1890s 
Evangelical support for the theory of art’s moral influence and for the role of the fine arts 
in the health and growth of the Christian nation continued in some quarters through the 
end of the nineteenth century and even into the early years of the twentieth.  Beginning in 
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the late 1870s and early 1880s, however, the dominant Protestant ideology faced a new 
set of challenges that threatened to sever the bonds of art, morality, and society.  The first 
of these challenges was the rise of aestheticism, which rapidly gained in popularity 
throughout the Anglo-American world in the early 1880s thanks to persuasive advocates 
such as Walter Pater, James Abbott McNeill Whistler, and Oscar Wilde.  Wilde, in 
particular, whose irreverent personal behavior and whimsical style attracted widespread 
fascination, became the main representative of aestheticism in the minds of many, and his 
lecture tour of the United States in 1882 did much to raise the movement’s transatlantic 
profile.  The popular dictum “art for art’s sake” claimed for the aesthetic a radical 
autonomy – “An ethical sympathy in an artist is an unpardonable mannerism of style,” 
mused Wilde in his famous preface to The Picture of Dorian Gray (1891)126 – and in 
doing so, it targeted the very heart of the Protestant ideology that had so long held sway 
over the Anglo-American evangelical mind and had presided over, and even facilitated, 
the rising interest in the fine arts among diverse segments of the evangelical population 
over the course of the nineteenth century.  Not surprisingly, therefore, many evangelicals 
reacted vehemently to the doctrines of aestheticism.  This was true for both conservative 
evangelicals and the growing number of liberals that had begun to make themselves 
heard in the last decades of the century.  A second challenge, however, came from within 
evangelicalism itself.  This challenge was the dawning awareness among some critics that 
for the nearly century’s-worth of theoretical support which art had been given in its role 
as a moral and social reformer, neither art nor society appeared to have much to show for 
it.  Some evangelical theorists had begun to ask for tangible evidence of art’s moral 
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influence in society, and they increasingly found it wanting.  Together, these two 
challenges, though radically different in origin and intent, called into question art’s status 
as an instrument of socio-moral improvement.  Those evangelical critics who clung to a 
belief in the moral benefits of aesthetic appreciation fought hard to shore up the theory 
that had prevailed for much of the nineteenth century, but whether due to the alleged 
purity of the aesthetic or to rising anxieties about art’s actual moral record, art was 
progressively in danger of becoming, as Wilde liked to put it, “quite useless.”127  
 History is often the story of unintended consequences.  This is no less true in the 
case of aestheticism, which was in many ways a product of the very critical establishment 
it meant to subvert.  Drawing on certain concepts in the Enlightenment and romantic 
aesthetic traditions (e.g., Kant’s disinterestedness, Shelley’s poet who “sings to cheer [his 
or her] own solitude”128) and pressing them to their extremes, aestheticism preached the 
ideal of “pure art” and the absolute freedom of the artist.  In fact, some of the major 
emphases within nineteenth-century aesthetics – emphases which evangelicals 
themselves had been championing for a half-century or more – had helped to lay the 
groundwork for the fashionable aestheticism that peaked in the 1880s and 1890s.  
Evangelicals’ willingness, for example, to join Edgar Allan Poe in castigating what he 
called “the heresy of The Didactic” helped pave the way for the aestheticist notion of 
art’s essential amorality.129  In addition, evangelical support for the belief in the anti-
commercialist potential of art, which had initially invested art with its prophetic moral 
power, eventually contributed (paradoxically) to the complete withdrawal of art and artist 
from any meaningful contact with the ordinary, workaday world.  At least one 
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evangelical critic, to his credit, seemed to grasp this intellectual twist of fate:  
 
We hear a great deal in these days about “art for art’s sake”…. Doubtless 
the phrase was first used as a protest against the degradation of art from 
the position of the beautiful mistress of genius to that of the slave of greed; 
but in the latter half of the nineteenth century “art for art’s sake” is used as 
a protest against the pure motive [i.e., morality] without which art is not 
art, but only the ghastly simulacrum of a living thing from which the vital 
principle has fled.130 
 
For this critic in the Wesleyan-Methodist Magazine, aestheticism was not so much a 
wrong impulse in any absolute sense as an impulse which, in the course of aesthetic 
history, had gone wrong.  He clearly held firm to the romantic conviction that art must 
transcend base materialism, and insofar as the conception of a pure art may act as an ideal 
corrective to more mercenary conceptions of art (e.g., those associated with the sort of 
“kitsch” turned out for the sole purpose of financial profit), it may have originally served 
a useful purpose.  Yet this passage, though the author may have realized it only dimly, 
also underscores the irony at work in late-nineteenth-century evangelical repudiations of 
aestheticism: evangelicals were in fact battling a monster that they had in some measure 
helped to create. 
 For the most part, however, evangelicals’ complicity in the rise of aestheticism 
was indirect – a result of their general backing and propagation of the romantic tradition 
of aesthetics.  Yet aestheticist sentiments – or something like them – were not wholly 
alien even to the pages of evangelical periodicals.  As early as 1845, an author reviewing 
Leigh Hunt’s Imagination and Fancy for the British Quarterly Review found himself 
grappling with the logic of decadence that was later to be popularized in the 1880s and 
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1890s.  The reviewer wrestles with two distinct, though not unrelated, questions 
concerning the relationship between art and morality, both of which were to become 
talking-points for fin-de-siècle aesthetes.  The first question, which can itself be broken 
down into two parts, is how, if at all, the personal morality of the artist relates to the 
creative process and how this creative process, in turn, relates to the artist’s obligations as 
an individual to society.  In the context of the article, this question arises necessarily as a 
corollary to Hunt’s expressivist definition of poetry as “‘the utterance of a passion,’” to 
which the reviewer heartily subscribes.  According to Hunt, passio may be defined as 
“‘suffering in a good sense,’” or the “‘ardent subjection of oneself to emotion.’”  Thus it 
seems to follow that for a poet to express genuine emotion in his or her poetry, the poet 
must first experience things deeply.  The difficulty, of course, is that there exist a great 
many morally dubious experiences.  In a series of rhetorical questions, the author wryly 
parodies the decadent reasoning (perhaps best embodied more than forty years later in the 
figure of Dorian Gray131) that seeks to rationalize illicit pursuits in the interests of 
almighty art: 
 
 How far is the poet entitled to claim exemption from the ordinary rules of 
citizenship and decorum?  If a man frequents profligate society, and you 
take him to task for doing so, and he answers, ‘O, I am a poet, and I wish 
to understand this particular phase of human nature,’ ought you to answer, 
‘That quite alters the case, sir; I did not know you were a poet?’  If a man 
in your presence takes up his hat, and is for going out into a forest during a 
thunderstorm at night, telling you that he is a poet wishing to embrace the 
opportunity of understanding a thunderstorm, are you to sit still, and let 
the idiot go? 
 
As a follower of Hunt’s expressivism and an evangelical romantic, the author by no 
 401 
means denies that personal experience can provide a powerful incentive to great poetry: 
“It is questionable if passages written from poetical intuition [i.e., from imagining 
situations not rooted in direct experience] can ever affect the heart so deeply as those 
written from personal experience.”132  Clearly, though, the author does not take the ideal 
of experience in service to art as a license for immoral or anti-social behavior on the part 
of the artist.   
Yet this reviewer’s answer to the first question concerning art’s relationship to 
morality – namely, that the claims of art do not exempt the artist from the claims of 
personal morality – renders his answer to a second question all the more interesting.  This 
second question is whether art has any obligation to act as a moral instrument within 
society.  Later aesthetes like Wilde thought not, and, somewhat surprisingly perhaps, the 
author in the British Quarterly Review seems to agree.  Unlike “most authors,” whose 
business it is “to produce the maximum of good effect upon society” – a responsibility 
which requires them to engage in the controversies of the moment – artists are above the 
fray and are therefore beholden to an ideal that transcends the vicissitudes of the moment.  
“Art does not vary, like opinion,” claims the reviewer, “nor can a poem ever be 
superseded, like a system of philosophy.  Hence the poet ought to take delight in 
perfecting his productions for their own sake, without condescending to think of them as 
instruments for producing social effect.”133  Art exists for its own sake, and to imagine 
otherwise would require the artist to descend from his or her exalted status in order to 
mingle with the masses.  Although this critic in the British Quarterly Review is unwilling 
to suspend the Judeo-Christian moral code for individual artists, he is quite willing to 
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allow that art is under no immediate obligation to serve the moral interests of society.134 
 Such aestheticist, or quasi-aestheticist, declarations, however, constituted a 
minority tradition within nineteenth-century evangelical aesthetics.  The typical reaction 
to the aestheticism of the 1880s and 1890s was rather one of horror and disdain, and 
evangelical writers of all sorts were quick to sound the alarm.  Already in 1878, J.C. 
Shairp was observing in the pages of the Princeton Review that “The great poet, we are 
sometimes nowadays told, must be free from all moral prepossessions,” a position which 
he went on to counter at some length.135  By 1883, W.J. Dawson was reminding readers 
of the Wesleyan-Methodist Magazine “how often of late years we have heard high critical 
authorities insisting that art must be loved for art’s sake, and that our common notions of 
morality are wholly opposed to art.”136  Other critics turned to more vivid language to 
describe the fast-growing phenomenon.  It was not unusual, for example, for critics to 
employ the rhetoric of mental pathology or contagion to characterize the spread of 
aestheticism.  “The word ‘aestheticism’ is one of the most prominent words of the hour,” 
wrote Theodore W. Hunt, Professor of Rhetoric and English Language at Princeton, in 
1882.  “The American nation, practical as it is, is for the time partially bewitched, and the 
craze must have its natural course.”137  Edwin Mims noted in the mid-90s how trendy – 
and, as a result, how potentially dangerous – l’art pour l’art had become: “The 
expression, ‘Art for art’s sake,’ has become a proverbial one in our day….”  Were the 
impact of this line of thought confined to “the circles of dilettante artists who gather in 
the various Bohemian resorts, the evil might not be so far-reaching; but through 
magazines and books and papers the idea has spread….”138  Evangelical critics were 
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united in the belief that the aestheticism which had rapidly infected the populations of 
Britain and America was in dire need of purging. 
 When it came to specifics, writers in evangelical periodicals attacked the notion 
of art’s autonomy on a number of fronts.  A fairly common line of argument, for 
example, taking its cues from anti-fiction discourse, denounced aestheticism as a form of 
“sentimentality” or “sentimentalism.”  In the case of Hunt, what characterized “the school 
of Wilde” was the total “absence of the intellectual element.”  The sentimentalism of 
Wilde’s school represented the perversion of certain elements in the romantic aesthetic 
tradition which, if properly controlled, were good in their place, but if uncontrolled, led 
simply to nonsense.  Thus romanticism had stressed the “emotive element” in the creative 
process, but what Hunt wanted was a renewed attention to the intellect and to truth:   
 
 It is true that the poetic art has to do largely with the imagination and the 
feelings, but these are the media only through which the thought of the 
poet expresses itself; and tho [sic] pleasure is said to be its final end, it is 
that kind of pleasure which arises from the reception of the truth in 
attractive forms.  In all genuine poetry, as in the more substantial form of 
prose, truth is the subject matter, the love of the truth is the inspiring 
principle, and its expression to the world for the worthiest ends its final 
purpose.139 
 
Hunt was by no means proposing a simple didactic conception of art, in which “intellect” 
and “truth” are synonymous with propositional content and art is judged by its ability to 
deliver this content successfully; nor was he rejecting the whole of the romantic tradition.  
He was, in fact – as other portions of his article make clear – a dedicated idealist, whose 
aesthetic heroes were Plato and Cousin (“Beauty centres in God and is worshipped in 
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him.  Art is the representation of the infinite…”; “There is an ideal as well as a visible 
beauty filling the soul of him who contemplates it, and to the ever nearer realization of 
which the soul seeks to come”).  Too great an emphasis on poetry as a species of feeling, 
however, leads, as Wilde well knew, to the idea of poetry’s near-total irrelevance, except 
as an occasion for raw pleasure.  Mims articulated this same logic in his own critique of 
aestheticism: “It may be said that the popular conception of poetry [i.e., the aestheticist 
conception] is that it is characterized by a ‘poetic prettiness,’ nicety of phrase, jingle, 
sentimentality – a pretty good thing ‘to while away the tedium of a railway journey or to 
amuse a period of rest or convalescence’; it is ‘mere byplay.’”140  Just as some critics 
condemned the novel for the inaction to which it supposedly led, so evangelical critics of 
aestheticism rejected the movement for its lack of practical application. 
 As Hunt’s article in particular suggests, however, sentimentalism was also a sign 
of psychological excess: it was the emotional dimension of the human personality 
stretched to a point that excluded all others.  Aestheticism seemed bent on making a 
virtue of the very kind of psychic one-dimensionality that the time-tested whole-person 
argument had at one time helped evangelicals to overcome.  It is not surprising, therefore, 
to find Shairp recommending the psychological wholeness of Shakespeare as a 
counteractant to the splintering effects of aestheticism: “Shakespeare, … being a whole 
natural man, ‘the moral, imaginative, and intellectual parts of him did not lie separate,’ 
but move at once and all together.  Being wholly unembarrassed with aesthetic theories, 
‘his poetical impulse and his moral feelings were one.’”141  The great irony, of course, is 
that the argument which had once enabled evangelicals to temper what was seen as the 
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moral exclusivity of the Puritans, thus gaining for art a seat at the evangelical intellectual 
table, was now being forced to defend morality against the aesthetic exclusivity of Wilde 
and his followers.   
 Ultimately, however, the threat of fragmentation was not restricted to the 
individual psyche; rather, the real problem with aestheticism was the menace it posed to 
social stability.  In tugging at one thread of the Protestant ideology – the link between art 
and morality – aestheticism threatened to unravel the entire Anglo-American social 
fabric.  “[H]ere is the point at which the great danger of modern æstheticism lies,” wrote 
Hunt.  “Pitiable as is its want of mental stamina, this is incidental in comparison with the 
untold harm that may accrue to the rising authors of a nation and to the people at 
large.”142  The Christian Advocate concurred: “Aestheticism is part of the great wave of 
sentimentality which has swept over the country of late years; and not whether a thing is 
best, most useful, most profitable to the race at large, but whether it is prettiest to look at 
according to the present taste, is the central canon of the aesthete’s religion.”143  For 
Mims, too, the great poets throughout history had always had “the self-consciousness of 
prophets, and to them their mission was apostolic”: “When we read the truly great poets 
we feel that poetry is no longer a mere plaything, it is not a self-indulgence; it is a 
challenge to man’s higher spirit; it is the expression of life, and it speaks to life.  Poetry 
has no excuse for being unless it does contribute to the life of man.”144  In praising the 
essential uselessness of art, Wilde the provocateur knew quite well what he was 
attacking, just as evangelical members of the Victorian critical establishment knew quite 
well that they were being attacked.   
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Indeed, from the late eighteenth century onwards evangelicals had fought hard to 
justify art largely on the basis of its moral and social relevance, just as they had battled 
against the puritanical elements at work in their own tradition.  It is little wonder, then, 
that evangelical critics reacted so strongly to an aestheticism that was threatening to 
disrupt the delicate balance which they had worked so long to achieve.  This reaction, 
moreover, bridged the conservative/liberal theological divide that had begun to open up 
among evangelicals in the 1870s.  If anything, the growing liberal faction within 
evangelicalism was even more outspoken in its defense of art’s intrinsic connection to 
morality than was the conservative.  Increasingly, liberal Protestants had begun to see 
religion almost completely in terms of morality rather than in the traditional terms of 
doctrine or piety, while at the same time “civilization” was in the process of displacing 
orthodox Christianity as a locus of primary concern.  Along with these developments 
came the gradual abandonment of the traditional understanding of the supernatural, which 
further contributed to an increased emphasis on this-worldly affairs.145  Morality and 
civilization, in short, were the centerpieces of the liberal agenda, and liberals were not 
about to relinquish the moral assistance that a long tradition of aesthetics had convinced 
them that art could provide.  One of the staunchest critiques of aestheticism, in fact, came 
from the pen of Washington Gladden, who has earned a reputation as the father of the 
Social Gospel.  Describing the conflict that inevitably arises between art and morality in 
advanced civilizations, Gladden concluded: 
 
 All men can then perceive that these two are rival kingdoms, and that each 
makes exclusive claims; that no man can make the one supreme without 
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rejecting the supremacy of the other.  To be a Christian disciple, it is not 
necessary that one should abjure the pleasures of a refined taste, but it is 
necessary that he should make these pleasures subordinate and tributary to 
the service of God and men.  The love of beauty is not denied to the 
Christian, but the love of righteousness and of humanity is with him the 
master passion. 
 
Such a statement would no doubt have resonated with evangelicals of all kinds, 
conservatives as well as liberals (not to mention a broad swath of the Victorian 
population at large).  Yet Gladden’s “Christianity” began and ended with a hearty dose of 
liberal morality, as he clarified elsewhere in the same article: 
 
 It is true that the supremacy of the ethical has not always been well 
understood by the professors of Christianity; its ritual and dogmatic 
elements have sometimes been unduly exalted, but the fact is there in the 
documents, and it has not been possible for the most perverse 
interpretation wholly to conceal it.  At the end of nineteen Christian 
centuries we find this truth generally recognized among Christians, that 
the end of religion is right character; that no philosophy of Christianity 
will stand that does not make character the supreme thing.146 
 
If character is “the supreme thing” – indeed, if a naturalistic understanding of morality 
and civilization is all there is – then liberals like Gladden could not afford to allow 
aestheticism to trample it down. 
Evangelicals, of course, were by no means lone warriors in their campaign against 
the fashionable aestheticism of the 1880s and 1890s.  Diverse figures ranging from 
Tennyson and Ruskin to Gilbert and Sullivan joined forces to condemn what was rightly 
perceived as an assault on the Victorian critical establishment.  Mainstream Victorians, 
evangelical or otherwise, sensed the danger in Wilde’s new-fangled apologia for art, 
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which suggested that art’s sheer existence was its own justification.  Thus the evangelical 
denunciation of aestheticism in the 1880s was also part of what can be seen as the last 
concerted effort by the Victorian critical establishment to defend its longstanding vision 
of art’s social obligation.  By the same token, however, the evangelical backlash against 
the notion of “pure art” serves to confirm not only evangelicals’ status as card-carrying 
members of this critical establishment but also the establishment’s role as a longtime 
servant to the Protestant ideology.  This ideology, which saw Christianity, morality, art, 
and civilization as functioning in intricate and mutually supportive ways, would never 
wholly die out, at least in certain circles, but the increasing vogue of aestheticism in the 
1880s and 1890s signaled nonetheless that this ideology was in fact beginning to exhaust 
itself. 
Another sign of this exhaustion, however, came from a small band of critics who 
began to ask tough questions about art’s real-world performance as a source of moral 
influence.  Interestingly, this fresh critical approach to the conventional wisdom also 
emerged in the 1880s.  “What is the true way to determine the influence of art upon 
morals?” asked Dr. Buckley in the Christian Advocate in 1885.  Dr. Buckley, who had 
traveled through Europe in search of an answer, went on to relate his decision to use 
Germany as a test case: “In Germany, music, painting, sculpture, architecture, the 
ornamentation of parks and gardens, and the drama, reach an unsurpassed modern 
development, and there moral and social conditions must throw light upon the relation of 
art to morals.”  Unfortunately, however, “It is here that perplexing questions spring up.”  
For according to Dr. Buckley, late-nineteenth-century Germany was a country enslaved 
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to sensualism.  In particular, he cited the prevalent public display of the “Nude in Art,” 
which he linked to all sorts of debauched behavior, including “unchastity” leading to a 
high percentage of out-of-wedlock births, the poor treatment of women, and a general 
“licentiousness.”  Furthermore, in Germany, he continued, “Art and amusements are, 
practically, substitutes for religion to a large extent” – so much so that any preacher who 
speaks out against this is like “the voice of one crying in the wilderness.”  In the end, Dr. 
Buckley strongly disavowed art’s capacity to exert any kind of meaningful moral 
influence in society: 
 
 The conclusions compelled by these facts are that art cannot be relied on 
as a moral force.  It does not instruct the conscience nor strengthen its 
foundations.  It educates, refines, it may raise a people from barbarism, but 
it cannot be depended on to prevent or diminish immorality.  The extremes 
of refinement and coarseness may exist in the same person or the same 
nation.  When the mind is drawn toward the contemplation of art it is 
elevated; but when it is turned toward the gratification of passion it may 
and will yield unless the conscience, instructed and sanctioned by religion, 
restrains it.   
 
Though Buckley was far from denying that art may exercise some kind of positive 
influence in certain cases (a fine taste may certainly be counted upon to raise one above 
the “barbaric”), his article in general constituted a profound reappraisal of nearly a half-
century of evangelical thinking about the morality of art.  Art had been virtually stripped 
of its paradoxical power to transcend sensualism, and it had become instead, in Buckley’s 
view, a major source of this sensualism.  At the same time, the pervasive art-worship he 
perceived all around him did nothing to heighten morality but only served to “weaken the 
springs of morality.”147   
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For better or worse, art was, for some evangelicals, no longer a dependable ally in 
the quest to nourish morality and, through this, to insure the security and progress of the 
Christian nation.  This change coincided with a period of growing detachment from social 
and political concerns among conservative evangelicals – a development that eventually 
led to what has been called the “Great Reversal” of the early decades of the twentieth 
century, in which fundamentalists abandoned social concerns almost completely.148  
Others would continue to advocate the socio-moral “mission” of art – a mission so 
thoroughly articulated by the young Methodist, Edward Otheman, back in 1835 – well 
into the twentieth century.  These “others” were increasingly to be found in the liberal 
wing of evangelicalism.149  Between the 1820s and the 1880s, however, the theory of 
art’s moral influence was the province of a wide range of evangelicals, all of whom 
would have subscribed heartily to the aesthetic creed of W.J. Dawson in the Wesleyan-
Methodist Magazine: “The world asks that its poets shall be prophets; that its singers 
shall be believers; that their inspiration shall be drawn from above, else it were better that 
their gift died with them, and their song were never sung.”150 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
THE RELIGIO-AESTHETIC DIVIDE OF THE 1890s AND BEYOND: ART, 
AESTHETICS, AND THE FUNDAMENTALIST-MODERNIST CONTROVERSY 
 
It is not the character of Christ that is the revelation of God; that is too aesthetic a 
position for the final and requisite religion…. 
          – P.T. Forsyth, “The Need for a Positive Gospel,” London Quarterly Review (1904) 
 
By the last decade of the nineteenth century, evangelical Protestantism, which had helped 
to shape the religious and cultural landscapes of both the United States and Britain since 
the eighteenth century, found itself on shaky ground.1  To the casual observer, 
evangelicalism no doubt looked much as it always had.  Evangelicals continued to extol 
the virtues of the “Christian nation,” and their missionary efforts both at home and abroad 
remained largely undaunted.  To many onlookers, in fact, it must have seemed like 
business as usual, for in the period between 1860 and 1900, Protestant churches in the 
United States actually witnessed a threefold increase in membership.  Behind this gilded 
façade, however, evangelicals were struggling to make sense of the new social and 
intellectual challenges of modernity, which, since the 1860s and 1870s, had been 
chipping away at the foundations of the evangelical edifice.  Darwin’s theory of evolution 
and German Higher Criticism had combined to cast doubt on the historicity and inerrancy 
of Scripture; rapid urbanization had led to the erosion of rural networks that had long 
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provided social support for traditional religious values; and a general process of 
secularization had begun to transform institutions (e.g., the university) that had once 
maintained close ties to orthodox Protestant Christianity.2  As the turn of the twentieth 
century approached, there emerged among evangelicals increasingly fierce disagreement 
about the most effective means of addressing these challenges.  For some, the appropriate 
strategy was to defend “traditional” values, even if this meant separating from 
“mainstream” culture;3 for others, the most reasonable response to modernity was not 
rejection but accommodation.  What became known as the “Fundamentalist-Modernist 
Controversy,” which reached its height of conflict in the 1920s, resulted in a radical 
reconfiguration of Anglo-American evangelicalism – intellectually, socially, and 
theologically – the impact of which continues to this day. 
 Disputes between fundamentalist and modernist factions were not distributed 
evenly across the many subgroups that comprised Anglo-American evangelicalism in the 
early decades of the twentieth century.  Fundamentalism, for example, as David 
Bebbington has observed, was more pronounced among American evangelicals than it 
was among the British, who often responded differently to perceived religio-cultural 
threats such as Darwinism.4  In America, moreover, the controversy affected some 
denominations more than others.  Its effects were strongest among Northern Baptists, 
who lacked a central governing authority with the power to enforce a particular 
theological viewpoint, and Northern Presbyterians, whose ranks included a number of 
high profile advocates for fundamentalist causes (e.g., William Jennings Bryan).  In 
general, the controversy was less heated, though not entirely absent, among Northern 
 437 
Methodists, while it had little to no impact on the majority of Congregationalists, many of 
whom had embraced theological liberalism long before.  Southern evangelicalism was, 
for the most part, a stronghold of theological conservatism, and consequently, most 
denominations were quick to sympathize with the fundamentalist position.5  At the same 
time, the influence of modernism was, in the first few decades of the twentieth century, 
confined largely to the universities, its appeal being predominantly to elite northern 
intellectuals.  Fundamentalism, by contrast, had a more populist orientation and therefore 
made notable inroads among local congregations.6  Despite such differences, however, 
the effects of the controversy were felt across a wide cross-section of evangelicalism.  As 
James Davison Hunter writes, “[I]t is now clear that the period from just before the turn 
of the century through the end of World War I was a most decisive one for American 
Protestantism.  By 1919, it was clear even to the man on the street that a bifurcation had 
emerged within American Protestantism.”7  Even in England, where evangelicals 
sometimes expressed confusion over the struggles of their American counterparts, the 
battle between conservatives and liberals was real enough.  Noting the rise of 
fundamentalism in America, one Scottish writer conceded in 1924 that “fundamentalism” 
was not a word widely used in Britain, though nevertheless, “the thing which the 
uncomely word describes is not unfamiliar to us here.”  By 1927, one British periodical 
had renamed itself The Fundamentalist.8     
Though they quickly came to anathematize one another, fundamentalists and 
modernists were in fact cut from the same evangelical cloth.  Both parties believed 
strongly that they were preserving the truths of Christianity in the face of new threats.  
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Each group, however, tended to emphasize different aspects of the nineteenth-century 
evangelical tradition.  Fundamentalism, which George Marsden has defined as “militantly 
anti-modernist Protestant evangelicalism,”9 brought together aspects of revivalism, 
common sense realism, traditional Judeo-Christian morality, and biblical literalism.  
Added to these elements were two other late-nineteenth-century theological 
developments: dispensational premillennialism and holiness teachings (particularly of the 
Keswick variety).  Both of these developments stressed, in different ways, a kind of 
otherworldly perspective and as a result encouraged a retreat from the sort of cultural 
engagement that had characterized nineteenth-century evangelicalism.  While 
fundamentalists did not abandon all concern for social and national welfare – in fact, their 
attitudes towards the nation were at times rather ambiguous – they tended to accentuate 
the individual, the supernatural, and the ahistorical.  Modernism, on the other hand, 
perpetuated the social and ethical consciousness of the nineteenth-century evangelical 
tradition.  What modernists emphasized, following early liberalizers like Horace 
Bushnell, was the immanence of God in the progress of human culture.  The most 
effective response to the crises that modernity posed was not simply to rehash what were 
seen as tired and powerless dogmas but rather to translate the essential truths of 
Christianity into a more contemporary idiom (which for modernists almost always meant 
a socio-ethical one).  Mocking what he took to be the shortcomings of the fundamentalist 
solution to the social woes of the twentieth century, Shailer Mathews, a prominent 
defender of liberal Protestantism and dean of the University of Chicago Divinity School, 
wrote in The Faith of Modernism (1924): “The world needs new control of nature and 
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society and is told that the Bible is verbally inerrant.  It needs a means of composing class 
strife, and is told to believe in the substitutionary atonement....  It needs faith in the divine 
presence in human affairs and is told it must accept the virgin birth of Jesus Christ.”10  
For modernists, Christianity’s potential resided primarily in its ethical contribution to 
social transformation, and indeed modernists were instrumental in advancing the Social 
Gospel in the closing decades of the nineteenth and early decades of the twentieth 
centuries – a movement which fundamentalists, for their part, prided themselves on 
rejecting.  Ultimately, the fundamentalist-modernist controversy marked the collapse of 
the relative unity and cooperation that had typified nineteenth-century evangelicalism.  
Modernists accused fundamentalists of sticking their heads in the sand, while 
fundamentalists accused modernists of distorting the faith beyond all recognition.11  In 
the end, the social and theological rift that developed had serious implications for the 
ways in which evangelicals approached a range of cultural and intellectual activities, 
including science, politics, and the fine arts.12 
In this concluding chapter, I would like to examine the relationship between the 
evangelical aesthetic tradition that we have been tracing throughout this study and the 
fundamentalist-modernist controversy of the early twentieth century.  Historians and 
scholars have frequently discussed the effects of this controversy on different aspects of 
evangelical thought, including science, politics, and “culture” in general; however, the 
impact of this debate on the tradition of evangelical aesthetics in particular has received 
far less attention.13  Yet the struggle between liberals and conservatives marked a 
significant turning-point in the history of evangelical aesthetics, as it did for evangelical 
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thought in general.  Specifically, the fundamentalist-modernist controversy signaled a 
breakdown of the evangelical romantic consensus regarding art and aesthetics, and the 
Protestant ideology as a whole, which had prevailed since at least the 1830s.  No longer 
did a broad coalition of Anglo-American evangelicals agree on the value of the fine arts, 
either for their own sake or for their service to Protestant culture, nor could evangelicals 
agree on the importance of thinking philosophically about aesthetics.  The widespread 
interest in the arts and in aesthetic theory that had been a hallmark of nineteenth-century 
evangelicalism became, in many quarters, a thing of the past.  An ideological chasm – a 
chasm not only religious but also aesthetic in nature – had begun to open up between 
fundamentalists and modernists; the evangelical pax aesthetica of the nineteenth century 
was at its end. 
 
Liberal Protestants, Evangelical Romanticism, and the Protestant Ideology 
From one perspective, liberal Protestants were more obviously the torchbearers of both 
the Protestant ideology and the aesthetic tradition of evangelical romanticism.  Art and 
culture remained an important part of their agenda.  In an address delivered in 1912 on 
the topic of “Gospel and Culture,” J.R. Darbyshire, vice-principal of Ridley Hall, 
bemoaned the fact that evangelicals, in his view, were still far too preoccupied with 
preaching a “traditional” gospel to the detriment of cultural pursuits: “We must be for 
ever so presenting the Gospel to the unlearned in terms of a traditional phraseology if we 
are to be recognized as Evangelical, that we have not time to feed the thoughtful, inspires 
the ambitious, and shew the glory of consecrating the secular.”  Accordingly, Darbyshire 
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called for greater evangelical attention to arts and letters.14  In particular, liberal 
Protestants continued to emphasize many of the key themes of nineteenth-century 
evangelical aesthetics, including art’s essential connection to religion, its capacity for 
moral influence, and its role in the progress of Protestant civilization.  In fact, the 
aesthetics of liberal Protestantism represented the final triumph of the romanticizing trend 
in evangelical aesthetics that we have traced throughout this study.  Whereas mid-
nineteenth-century evangelical aesthetics had been marked by various attempts to 
negotiate, sometimes explicitly and sometimes implicitly, between the principles of 
romantic aesthetic theory (which were themselves grounded on romantic views of the 
world, the human personality, etc.) and the claims of orthodox Christianity, liberal 
aesthetics escaped this tension by denying or adjusting the claims of traditional Protestant 
faith.  This is not especially surprising given the fact that theological liberalism was itself 
an outgrowth of the romantic impulse in Anglo-American Protestantism.  Often taking its 
inspiration from such thinkers as Hegel, Schleiermacher, Coleridge, and Bushnell, 
liberalism tended to stress the presence of God in all things, the union of the subjective 
and the objective, and “consubstantiality” of the natural and supernatural.15  “God” was 
no longer the personal deity of orthodox Christian theology but the “force” or, to borrow 
Thomas Hardy’s terminology, the “Immanent Will” at work in the universe and in human 
culture, while the essence of religion was to be found in “religious experience” or in 
fidelity to an ethical ideal (e.g., sacrificial love) rather than in the revealed truths of 
Scripture or an established system of doctrines.  Since, moreover, the “divine” was 
present in all human beings, people could access this divinity or aspire to a high moral 
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standard on their own.  Individual conversion or regeneration by the Holy Spirit were no 
longer prerequisites for holy living or authentic spiritual experience.  Working within this 
sort of theological and philosophical context, liberal Protestants were free to embrace the 
full romantic potential of art – spiritually, morally, and socially. 
   One of the most important aspects of liberal thought in the early twentieth 
century was the close relationship that a number of writers perceived between aesthetic 
and religious experience.  Indeed, many thinkers had come to see aesthetic and religious 
experience as virtually identical.  This notion had gradually evolved over the course of 
the nineteenth century from its origins in German idealism, though, as we saw in chapter 
4, many Victorian evangelical critics had strongly resisted it, especially before the 1870s 
and 1880s, favoring instead a subordinationist model that held Christianity and art in a 
hierarchical tension and kept religious and aesthetic experience phenomenologically 
distinct.  Now, however, the seeds planted by early innovators like Bushnell and H.W. 
Beecher had fully matured, and many liberal Protestants accepted the fusion of the 
aesthetic and religious as a mere matter of course.   
Commentators have often discussed this fusion as a single phenomenon, but for 
the sake of precision, it may be helpful to distinguish two ways in which this 
phenomenon manifested itself, both of which found liberal Protestant advocates.  The 
first of these was the spiritualization of art, which held that aesthetic appreciation 
constitutes a form of religious experience and/or that art objects can serve as a 
manifestation of, or a point of contact with, the divine.  “Something like a Religion of 
Culture,” writes James Turner, “flourished [near the end of the nineteenth century] on 
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both sides of the Atlantic, without much regard to traditional religious beliefs.  Art 
museums and concert halls became, in the then-current phrase, temples of culture.”  As 
Turner points out, progressive evangelicals like Beecher and Bushnell had contributed to 
the rise of this Religion of Culture, as had the revivalist tradition’s emphasis on “feeling” 
generally.16  But a wide range of evangelicals – not only controversial figures like 
Beecher and Bushnell – had also contributed to this development more specifically.  
There were, as we have seen, antecedents within nineteenth-century evangelical aesthetic 
discourse, such as, among others, the idealist philosophies of art sketched in chapter 3.  
The second way was the aestheticization of religion.17  This aestheticization took a 
number of forms, ranging from the Christ-as-Artist cult that was popular around the turn 
of the century to revised understandings of biblical inspiration.  The British Methodist, 
J.A. Chapman, for instance, compared biblical to aesthetic inspiration, formulating it as 
“that which yields insight into beauty, truth, goodness, and God.”  The effects of the 
Bible differed little, if at all, from the effects of good music or poetry.18  Its most 
important manifestation, however, concerned the nature of religion itself.  Religion was 
believed to be essentially “aesthetic” – that is, religious doctrines, for instance, were best 
understood not as fixed propositional formulas that appeal to the intellect but rather as 
suggestive “poetic” utterances that appeal to the emotions and to intuition.  Behind this 
view stood a long line of writers, most notably Coleridge and Bushnell.  These two 
varieties of religio-aesthetic fusion, of course, were closely related to one another – what 
they held in common was the assumption that the “aesthetic” (and hence the “religious”) 
is primarily affective rather than cognitive – and twentieth-century liberals to some extent 
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embraced both. 
 When it came to the spiritualization of art, liberals were at times careful to avoid 
the notion that they were “worshiping” art or culture themselves, though an increasing 
number of turn-of-the-century liberals did counsel an enhanced attention to the aesthetic 
within worship.19  Longstanding Puritan-evangelical concerns about the idolatry of art 
and the supremacy of God exerted enough of a residual pressure to prevent such art-
worship, at least in theory.  For this reason, some liberal Protestants also stopped short of 
the position taken by Matthew Arnold and by other late-Victorian agnostics, namely, that 
art can serve as a valid substitute for religion.  Most liberals did not advocate the erection 
of a Church of Art to replace institutional Protestantism (though many believed that 
existing church buildings ought to be more artistic); rather, liberals emphasized, 
following some mid-nineteenth-century evangelical idealists, that art is an expression of 
the divine mind, a manifestation of the “ideal.”  In The Evolution of Christianity (1892), 
Lyman Abbot, the influential preacher and writer who succeeded H.W. Beecher at the 
Plymouth Church in Brooklyn, described art, and in fact all human activity, as an 
expression of both the “divine artist” and the universal human search for the “Infinite”: 
 
 The cry of the human being from the earliest age – the cry of Job, “Oh that 
I knew where I might find him!” – is still the cry of humanity.  All history 
is the search after God.  All science, whether the scientist knows it or not, 
is the thinking of the thoughts of God after him, the trying to find him.  All 
art is the search after the ideal art as it exists in some true, divine artist…. 
All men have at the hearts of them more or less of this hunger and desire 
to know the Infinite and the Eternal.20 
 
For Abbot, artistic creation is a search for God, while art is a record of the religious 
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consciousness of humanity and thus, by extension, a reflection of Infinite Consciousness 
itself.  Viewed against the backdrop of evangelical aesthetic history, this suggestion that 
there exists in art objects a divine plenitude represented a complete reversal of the Puritan 
position.  The problem of presence, which the Reformers and Puritans had bequeathed to 
Protestant aesthetics, was no more.  The cost of resolving the “problem,” however, was 
the Puritan conception of the radical transcendence of God. 
 Perhaps even more central to the liberal Protestant worldview than the 
spiritualization of art, however, was the aestheticization of religion.  It is worth reiterating 
that aestheticization was for the most part a defensive measure undertaken in an effort to 
protect Christianity from the onslaught of modern science.  Whereas many 
fundamentalists, as we will see, opted to defend Christianity by meeting science on its 
own ground, many liberals turned to inherited aesthetic concepts in an attempt to place 
religion beyond the reach of science.  As the tradition of western aesthetics had long held, 
art and science offer distinct approaches to the world, and as a result, art is immune to 
scientific analysis.  Religious experience, many liberals argued, is like aesthetic 
experience, and therefore religion, too, is immune to the assaults of modern science.  In 
an article published in the Biblical World in 1913, Walter Sargent, a Professor of Fine 
and Industrial Art at the University of Chicago, advanced a slightly different, but 
complementary, version of this argument.  Sargent takes as his operating assumption the 
idea that religion and science constitute two different modes of apprehending reality.  
Whereas science “regards as knowledge only those matters which have been conclusively 
demonstrated by an impartial analysis of all the available facts,” religion relies on “an 
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immediate sympathetic response between the individual and his surroundings.”  Sargent 
was keenly aware that intuitive claims of the religious sort are not easily verifiable 
according to scientific standards.  If, however, one could point to another, widely 
accepted example “where ranges of experience apparently closed to scientific approach 
had been opened up by immediate emotional response,” then such an example “would 
help to authenticate the kind of experience which religion claims.”  This other range of 
experience, of course, was the fine arts: “The fine arts also tend to quicken a highly 
complex type of emotional life and thus to refine those powers of sympathetic response 
which alone are capable of knowing God….”21  For Sargent, the phenomenology of 
aesthetic experience lent credence to the phenomenology of religious experience. 
 It is important to note that it was not the intent of most liberals to reduce religion 
entirely to the subjective, or to what Paul Tillich later called the “emotionalistic 
distortion” of faith,22 though conservatives often accused them of doing so.  Most liberals 
believed they were making epistemological claims about how one encounters the divine – 
e.g., through feeling or sympathy – claims which already assumed the objective reality of 
the divine object.  Hence liberals were at times sensitive to the dangers of hyper-
subjectivism, much as some mid-nineteenth-century aesthetic idealists had been.  This 
sensitivity is evident, for example, in an article written by the liberal Baptist minister, 
Harry Emerson Fosdick.  Entitled “Yes, But Religion Is an Art!,” the essay appeared in 
Harper’s Monthly Magazine in January of 1931.  Interestingly, Fosdick rehearses, almost 
as if he had been the first to do so, many of the themes that had been a mainstay of 
evangelical aesthetics since the nineteenth century.  He laments the aesthetic vacuity of 
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the Protestant tradition, warns against the dangers of trying to address this lack by flying 
to Rome, and calls for greater attention among contemporary Protestants to art and 
beauty.  His central concern, however, is with the faith-killing effects of modern science.  
Fosdick’s prescribed antidote to the poison of science is, rather predictably, to recognize 
religion as an “art.”  “No folly of religion…,” he claims, “could be more ruinous than the 
endeavor to jam itself within the categories and vocabulary of contemporary science.  
What religion most wants to say must be put into artistic vehicles.”  Fosdick is conscious, 
however, that this view is particularly susceptible to the critique that “religion is 
altogether subjective, that no objective cosmic reality corresponds with our similes….”  
To this, he replies that there are other kinds of “truth” than the scientific: “it seems clear 
that a scientific description never tells the whole truth about anything.”  Science does not 
exhaust reality.  One must also cultivate religio-aesthetic “truth” – or an objective truth 
subjectively apprehended.23  In spite of Fosdick’s efforts to ward off accusations of 
solipsism and subjectivism, however, there is no denying that in the end liberal 
epistemological claims were not really separable from liberal theological claims 
regarding the nature of God’s self-revelation and therefore of God himself.  In theological 
terms, the crucial question is not simply whether a metaphysical object exists really and 
absolutely but also what the nature of this object is.  Claims about epistemology were 
(and are) inextricably linked to claims about ontology, so while Fosdick and some other 
liberals may have wished to avoid the pitfall of a thoroughgoing monism, most were far 
from maintaining anything like a traditional conception of the personhood of God.24   
 Turn-of-the-century liberal Protestants also continued to insist on the essential 
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connection between art and morality that had been a key feature of nineteenth-century 
evangelical aesthetics.  Over the course of the nineteenth century, many Anglo-
Americans had come to understand “religion” in terms of morality rather than in terms of 
doctrine or traditional forms of piety, and liberalism represented a culmination of this 
evolution.  Nineteenth-century theories of art’s moral influence had played a role in this 
evolution by reinforcing the belief that moral cultivation was a function not of a 
supernatural process of regeneration and sanctification but of “natural” psychological, 
aesthetic, and moral laws.  It is not surprising, therefore, given the stress which they 
placed on morality and social progress, that liberal Protestants would continue to 
propagate such theories.  In his Protestants & Pictures, David Morgan offers a detailed 
account of early-twentieth-century American liberal Protestantism’s emphasis on 
“character formation” and the role of the fine arts in such formation.  As Morgan 
explains, turn-of-the-century liberals perpetuated a belief in social and national progress, 
at the center of which was a vision of “character” cultivation and personal and collective 
“self-realization.”  Drawing on older Bushnellian ideas of nurture, as well as 
contemporary theories in the fields of religious psychology and pedagogy which 
“stressed the developmental structure of character formation and the emergence of 
personal identity,” liberals argued for the importance of developing strong moral 
character as a way of ensuring the stability and progress of society.  This liberal 
Protestant emphasis on morality and character formation also led to a renewed 
commitment to religious education and educational reform, and liberals introduced a 
number of important changes to the established system of religious education.  Among 
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liberal Protestants, there was a “shift … from teaching the Bible to forming ‘religious 
persons,’” and along with this shift came an increased attention to the fine arts.  Whereas 
older Sunday School curriculums had utilized visual imagery primarily as a means of 
illustrating a lesson, new liberal curriculums encouraged appreciation of the fine arts as a 
means of promoting the development of “religious persons.”  The introduction of new 
technologies of visual reproduction near the end of the nineteenth century – in particular, 
the “halftone” – provided material support for such policies by enabling greater public 
exposure to the fine arts.25 
Yet while liberals availed themselves of new technologies and turn-of-the-century 
theories, and while they advocated a heightened attention to art within both the sanctuary 
and the classroom, they were at the same time playing variations on themes inherited 
from nineteenth-century evangelical aesthetic discourse.  In suggesting that fine art hones 
the moral character and that it does so not didactically but affectively, liberal Protestants 
were more or less extending the tradition of anti-didactic moralism that had dominated 
Victorian evangelical aesthetic thought.  Writing in the Christian Century in 1909 on the 
topic of “the Religious Significance of Poetry,” Marietta Neff employed terminology that 
would not have been unfamiliar to Edward Otheman, nor to countless other nineteenth-
century evangelical critics: 
 
 But if the function of poetry be after all the religious function of stirring 
high passion, of making the heart sensitive to the finer issues of life, of 
speaking to the listening soul with voices that are not heard on earth 
forever save in dreams – if these appeals constitute the function of poetry, 
then indeed its essence must be not a ponderous didacticism, but even so 
frail and fleeting a thing as beauty like the poignant fairness of moonlight 
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waters, or of silvery pools under the sun of early winter, or of blue lakes at 
peace with the blue sky; even, moreover, beauty as vast and terrible as the 
surge and thunder of multitudinous seas.26 
 
If Neff’s understanding of the non-didactic function of poetry differed at all from some of 
its nineteenth-century evangelical predecessors, it did so by virtue of the fact that is was 
underwritten by a comprehensive ontological diagnosis of the final impenetrability of 
reality.  “The fundamental objection to didacticism in literature,” noted Neff in the 
opening line of her article, “is not … any subjective criterion of taste, but the simplest of 
logical principles – that life is larger than anything one can say about it, experience more 
complex than any formula ….”  Thus, Neff concluded, “Things that are generally 
accepted are generally wrong; truths that can be reduced to a proposition have lost their 
vitality.”  Such ideas were by no means foreign to certain strands of the romantic 
tradition of philosophy and aesthetics, and many nineteenth-century evangelicals would 
certainly have supported on some level the notion of extra-propositional truths, but a 
significant number would also have shied away from accepting this kind of statement as 
an exhaustive account of reality.  It was simply not consistent with the common sense 
epistemological tradition within which many evangelicals had operated since the 
eighteenth century.  Twentieth-century liberals such as Neff, however, were pressing the 
legacy of anti-didactic moralism to its romantic extreme. 
 Furthermore, the liberal Protestant ideal of character formation and the role of the 
aesthetic in this formation echoed aspects of the whole-person argument that had long 
served as the basis for a liberal arts model of education and had also been instrumental in 
drawing the attention of evangelicals to a more sustained consideration of the aesthetic 
 451 
dimension of life.  This is not to suggest that liberals were merely traversing old ground.  
Their real innovation was to make person-formation, rather than doctrinal instruction, the 
goal of religious education, though they also believed general education ought to be 
broadly “religious” as well.  In either case, they were nonetheless drawing upon a 
network of established assumptions that had long been a part of evangelical aesthetic 
discourse.  Writing on “The Religious Ideal in Education” for the liberal Protestant 
Outlook in 1911, Charles W. Eliot, President Emeritus of Harvard, pointed to the 
importance of beauty and the fine arts in fulfilling the religious ideal of his title:  
 
 The sense of the beautiful or the lovely is … something which should be 
developed and cultivated throughout all education.  Through all school life 
the utmost pains should be taken to stimulate in every child love of the 
beautiful, to keep the sentiment pure and noble, and to give the child 
through its gratification genuine joy and a satisfaction which will increase 
as the child’s whole nature develops, and will mount as life goes on.  This 
sentiment is an important element in the spirit of man.  Fed through the 
bodily senses, it is essentially an ethereal and religious delight.27 
 
Indeed, when liberal Protestants discussed the moral potential of art and the aesthetic, 
such discussions often appeared in an educational context.  Noting the growing public 
attendance at art galleries on Sundays, the Biblical World suggested in 1913 that “pastors 
and Sunday-school teachers would do well to make a study, not only of the picture 
galleries in great cities, but of the numerous prints which may represent these to those 
who are remote from them.”  The Biblical World did express a wish that “more could be 
done to make more effective in the inspiration of definite religious thought and ideal this 
Sunday afternoon ministry of art to the public,” but it ultimately commended the 
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educational value of this “ministry” nonetheless.  “Art has yet to make its strongest 
appeal in religious education….  It is our own fault if we do not make use of it.”28  Art as 
“ministry,” moreover, had been a common turn-of-phrase among evangelical critics since 
the 1840s. 
 Liberal Protestants, then, remained committed to a vision of art’s vital role within 
a broad Protestant ideology that linked religion, morality, and the progress of Anglo-
American civilization.  They were the spokespeople for an Arnoldian model of “culture,” 
which they saw as the key to social stability and evolution, and as a manifestation of the 
developing Kingdom of God.  To be sure, some liberals managed to refrain from 
following Arnold in completely overturning the hierarchical relationship between 
Christianity and culture that had prevailed, at least in theory, among many nineteenth-
century evangelicals.29  But it was nevertheless clear that culture had become the primary 
focal point for many Anglo-American liberals.  On the one hand, this ensured an ongoing 
interest in art and aesthetics among liberal Protestants since art continued to be seen as an 
index to cultural progress, which was itself an embodiment of the divine.  As Josiah 
Strong argued in The New Era; or, the Coming Kingdom (1893), artistic development 
(among other things) “helps to prepare the way for the full coming of the Kingdom”: 
“When men generally have risen to a consciousness of God, the discoveries of science, 
legislation, business, manufactures, agriculture, art – all human activities will enter into 
the harmony of the divine plans for perfecting the race, not because they are overruled by 
infinite wisdom, but because men consciously and intelligently co-labor with God to this 
glorious end.”30  On the other hand, this enduring esteem for art and aesthetics flourished 
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at the expense of Protestant orthodoxy.    
 
Conservative Evangelicals and the Return of Ambivalence 
In contrast to liberals, conservative evangelicals in the early decades of the twentieth 
century presented a somewhat more complex picture.  Viewed against the backdrop of 
the history of evangelical aesthetics that we have been tracing, fundamentalism marked, 
in one sense, a return to the ambivalence that had been a defining characteristic of the 
Puritan aesthetic tradition.  On the one hand, many conservatives withdrew from any 
active participation in the critical establishment of the early twentieth century.  The 
primary symptom of this withdrawal was the general abandonment by fundamentalists – 
and fundamentalist-run periodicals – of the sort of critical reflection on the arts that had 
been a perennial feature of the denominational journals and magazines published between 
the 1830s and 1890s.  We may recall Roger Lundin’s conclusion, based on an extensive 
survey of early American fundamentalist publications: “Fundamentalists of the first half 
of [the twentieth century] wrote almost no essays of significance on the arts.”31  On the 
other hand, at least some fundamentalists, it seems, also held on to a number of 
assumptions concerning art and the aesthetic, which they had inherited from the 
evangelical aesthetic tradition of the nineteenth century.  Paradoxically, then, even as 
early-twentieth-century conservatives pulled away from the Anglo-American “institution 
of high art” that Victorian evangelicals had helped to foster, they nevertheless continued 
to perpetuate – though in sometimes subtle ways and/or slightly altered forms – some of 
the aesthetic principles of their predecessors.  Both liberals and conservatives, therefore, 
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can be variously seen as the rightful heirs of the evangelical romantic tradition of 
aesthetics.  
The exodus of conservative evangelicals from the twentieth-century critical 
establishment and the corresponding decline of critical interest in the arts that followed 
were the result of several determinants working in tandem.  To an extent, this withdrawal 
may be attributed to many of the same factors that prompted conservative evangelicals to 
turn their backs on other sorts of cultural and intellectual pursuits – factors, that is, which 
had nothing directly to do with art or aesthetics per se.  Thus, for instance, the 
substitution of a premillennial eschatology during the end of the nineteenth and beginning 
of the twentieth centuries for the postmillennial eschatology that had dominated 
evangelical thought until the middle of the nineteenth century helped to promote among 
fundamentalists a heightened sense of social disillusionment.  As we saw in chapter 4, the 
master narrative of postmillennialism had been one of inexorable cultural progress; the 
master narrative of premillennialism, by contrast, was one of inexorable cultural decline.  
Society was speeding towards its God-appointed doom, and the only proper response was 
to step up evangelistic efforts in order that as many souls as possible might be saved.  
Art, whatever its intrinsic merits, could in this context amount to little more than a 
distraction.  The growing pessimism of some conservatives was reflected in late-
nineteenth-century evangelical doubts about the social potential of art (see chapters 4 and 
5).  Society was fast becoming a lost cause, and the only hope was individual salvation.  
What was needed for this kind of personal salvation was the Gospel of Christ, not the 
Gospel of Art. 
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 Aesthetic theorizing was also a victim of what can be seen as the critical 
narrowness of fundamentalism.  To some degree, aesthetics was simply a casualty of the 
shift in vision that occurred as fundamentalists restricted their attention to a limited 
number of pressing issues.  Most prominent among these issues was Darwin’s theory of 
evolution, which many fundamentalists viewed as a direct challenge to Christian 
orthodoxy.  The defense of biblical inerrancy was also high on the list of fundamentalist 
concerns, as was the preservation of a traditional, supernatural understanding of such 
Christian doctrines as the Incarnation and the Atonement.32  In concentrating their efforts 
almost exclusively on a handful of concerns, fundamentalists were in effect resurrecting 
the logic at the heart of the exigency argument.  Nineteenth-century evangelicals had 
identified the rationale behind this argument as a way to honor the Puritans while 
lobbying for their own departure from the Puritan aesthetic tradition.  Implicit in this 
argument, however, had always been, ironically, the dispensability of art; now, 
fundamentalists were putting this logic into practice as they suspended their interest in 
aesthetic theory to tend to the more urgent business of defending the faith against 
theological liberals.  Furthermore, in pursuing this line of thought, many fundamentalists 
were also effectively surrendering the ideal of wholeness that had characterized, and even 
helped to justify, the aesthetic thought of nineteenth-century evangelicals.  Gone was any 
widespread concern for the standard of balance and harmony that had informed Victorian 
evangelical conceptions of both the human personality and society, and which had 
stressed the importance of the aesthetic in attaining this standard.  Indeed, it is no small 
irony that fundamentalists and aesthetes could agree on one point: art and religion need 
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not associate with one another. 
 This narrowing of vision was also reflected in the content and outlook of many 
conservative evangelical periodicals during the early decades of the twentieth century.  
Though evangelicals had always sponsored a multitude of popular and narrowly focused 
periodicals devoted to various religious concerns – e.g., news from the mission field – a 
sizable company of nineteenth-century evangelical publications, as we have seen, had 
developed formats that encouraged thoughtful reflection on a range of cultural issues.  
This was in keeping with the Victorian evangelical vision of a thoroughly Christian 
civilization, and periodicals that surveyed a wide cultural terrain were instrumental in 
propagating this vision.  In some instances, periodicals that had long concentrated on 
specialized religious topics (the Baptist Magazine, for example) had gradually expanded 
their editorial policies to include topics of general cultural interest, while a number of 
other periodicals had been founded with the express purpose of educating and refining 
the intellects of their readers.  If, generally speaking, the nineteenth-century trend among 
evangelical periodicals had been toward cosmopolitanism and intellectual engagement, 
the trend among twentieth-century fundamentalists was in the opposite direction.  The 
content of many fundamentalist periodicals was devoted almost entirely to articles 
dealing with evolutionary theory, biblical criticism, and the interpretation of prophecy, 
along with other religious and devotional matter.  Such periodicals became, from one 
perspective, more and more esoteric and isolated from the concerns of mainstream 
culture.  Once again, the contrast with liberals here is instructive.  Not only did many 
liberal Protestant periodicals continue to publish articles on art and aesthetics but liberal 
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Protestants also remained actively engaged with the broader culture.  It is not 
insignificant that a liberal minister like Fosdick could find a hearing among the readers of 
a periodical such as Harper’s.  At the same time, as we have seen in various ways 
throughout this study, conservative voices were progressively marginalized even within 
some periodicals that had once served as a forum for conservative and moderate thought.  
Certain periodicals, that is to say, fostered and reflected the liberalization of 
evangelicalism during the early twentieth century.  The Methodist Review, for example, 
which published writers who entertained identifiably conservative viewpoints on various 
theological issues into the 1910s, thereafter increasingly reflected the influence of 
modernist thought until its eventual dissolution in 1931 (though writers sometimes tried 
to walk a fine line between the two).  One of its final issues contained an article by none 
other than Shailer Mathews.33  As conservatives gradually assumed the status of 
“cognitive minority” – to use James Davison Hunter’s phrase34 – in relation to Anglo-
American culture at large, they lost the ability, and sometimes the will, to speak 
authoritatively about cultural topics to a modern society with which they were 
increasingly at odds.   
 Closely related to this narrowing of interests was what many scholars have 
described as fundamentalism’s anti-intellectualism, which may also have contributed in a 
general way to a decline in aesthetic philosophizing among conservative evangelicals.  
Anti-intellectualism, of course, is a sticky term since it is always predicated to a greater 
or lesser degree on one’s ideological commitments regarding what counts as 
“intellectual.”  Many fundamentalists, for example, believed that they were merely being 
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intellectually honest in calling attention to what they took to be the flaws in evolutionary 
theory or the interpretive missteps of the Higher Criticism.  Often, in fact, as Marsden has 
argued, fundamentalists attempted to combat evolutionary theory not on the grounds of 
an uncritical acceptance of Genesis but rather on the grounds of science itself – or more 
precisely, on the grounds of the Baconian, common sense tradition of scientific inquiry to 
which fundamentalists remained committed.  They were convinced, that is, that evolution 
was simply bad science, just as many were also convinced that German biblical criticism 
was simply bad hermeneutics.  Still, if anti-intellectualism is understood in terms of a 
self-conscious opposition to the perspectives of a predominantly liberal intelligentsia or 
to the influential worldviews emanating from largely secularized universities, then many 
fundamentalists were certainly anti-intellectual in orientation.  As Marsden notes, 
fundamentalists frequently found humor in the “suggestion that the ancestors of Ph.D.s 
were monkeys and baboons” (for an extra laugh, they would sometimes list the initials 
associated with advanced degrees as “D.D., Ph.D., L.L.D., Litt.D., A.S.S.”).  To the 
intricate theories issuing from the universities concerning the origins of the earth or of the 
biblical records, fundamentalists opposed the time-tested canons of common sense 
reasoning, which stressed the ability of the common person to apprehend the facts.  The 
trouble, therefore, was not so much with education itself as it was with an education that 
taught one to overlook what fundamentalists claimed was simple data.35  Their loyal 
adherence to the epistemological claims of common sense realism consequently drove 
fundamentalists in an increasingly populist direction, while their repeated skirmishes with 
the modernist academics that were occupying seats of higher learning in ever greater 
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numbers further intensified their anti-intellectual stance.  This growing polarization 
between fundamentalists and modernist intellectual elites may have contributed, at least 
obliquely, to a diminution of interest among fundamentalists in aesthetics as a formal 
philosophical discourse. 
 Yet while these types of non-aesthetic factors exerted a kind of external pressure 
on fundamentalists that sped their withdrawal from the twentieth-century critical 
establishment and contributed to a decline in aesthetic theorizing, there were a number of 
internal developments at work within the aesthetic thought, and within the art world 
generally, of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries that may also have helped 
to raise suspicions among some fundamentalists about the relative value of art and 
aesthetics.  Most important was the near-fusion of aesthetic and religious experience that 
had followed in the wake of romanticism.  The majority of nineteenth-century 
evangelical critics, as we have seen throughout this study, had eagerly embraced romantic 
notions of art, which had variously emphasized the immanent “spirit” at work in the fine 
arts, whether this spirit was the spirit of the individual mind, the nation, God, Beauty, or 
simply the “age.”  The end result was a conflation of the religious and the aesthetic.  
Liberal Protestants, as we have seen, increasingly welcomed this union of art and 
religion, as did many late-Victorian and modernist artists and thinkers who claimed little 
or no allegiance to Christianity.36  To conservatives, however, either manifestation of this 
phenomenon – the spiritualization of art or the aestheticization of religion – seemed 
repulsive, for both trends threatened in their respective ways to substitute a bastardized 
form of Christianity for the Protestant orthodoxy of old.  Moderate and conservative 
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theorists had of course been struggling to resist these developments since the middle of 
the nineteenth century, but with little success.  By the dawn of the twentieth century, both 
the spiritualization of art and the aestheticization of Christianity had made considerable 
headway among Anglo-American evangelicals, and traditionalists, it seems, had had 
enough.   
A pair of articles published in the Methodist Review during the first two decades 
of the twentieth century serves to highlight the mounting frustration of conservatives with 
the spiritualization of art that was increasingly in vogue throughout the evangelical world 
at the turn of the century.  Writing in 1908, Peter Thompson betrayed signs of 
exasperation with those Beecheresque preachers who would replace a clear presentation 
of the Gospel with appeals to a congregation’s taste:  
 
 Ministers of other communions, not less devoted than we are, may think 
their commission is to reach the human heart through the medium of an 
ornate ritual, and by developing the holiest and best in humanity through 
aesthetic forms of worship; we feel that our high calling is to preach the 
Word; that our first business is to declare the unsearchable riches of 
Christ.  Our fundamental conception of a minister’s work is that of 
preaching.37 
 
In the same way, a 1917 article on the “Substitutes for Christianity” described the new 
“religious” spirit that seemed to be sweeping across Europe and America.  While this 
general tendency towards the “religious” was useful in counteracting “aggressive 
naturalism” and materialism, it was not to be confused with Christianity proper: “To be 
‘for religion,’” the author observed, “is not always to be for Christ.  Even Antichrist is 
not anti-religion.”  Among the many “religious” replacements for Christianity was “the 
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aesthetic substitute for religion”: “This idea is that the satisfaction and ennobling of life is 
to be sought not in the worship of a postulate Deity, but by means of the beautiful in 
nature and art.”  Such substitutes, however, “radically pervert biblical and historical 
Christianity.”38  In warning against the dangers of accepting art and aesthetic experience 
as substitutes for religion, conservatives were in one sense sounding a familiar Protestant 
alarm regarding the idolatrous potential of art – an alarm that had become much less 
clamorous over the course of the nineteenth century but which had never been fully 
suppressed.  What appeared to conservatives to be the growing “worship of art” at the 
turn of the century, however, prompted them to take up the old call with a renewed sense 
of urgency.    
 Yet if conservative evangelicals objected to the spiritualization of art, they reacted 
even more virulently to the aestheticization of Christianity because of the immediate 
challenge this aestheticization posed to orthodox understandings of Christian doctrine.  
For many liberal Protestants, who were working in the tradition of Bushnell, theology 
was best understood as a form of “poetic” language, not as scientific description.  A 
doctrine such as the Atonement, for instance, was not to be valued objectively for its 
alleged role in any literal redemption of humanity from the bondage of sin but rather 
subjectively (i.e., aesthetically) for its power as a moral example.  This view of the 
Atonement had come to be known – in what is perhaps the most poignant example of the 
way in which theology, morality, and aesthetics had commingled over the course of the 
nineteenth century – as the “moral-influence theory.”39  Tellingly, this moral-influence 
theory was the object of a direct attack in an essay on “The Atonement” published in the 
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third volume of The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth (1910-15), a collection of 
essays (written by both American and British evangelicals) that was eventually seen by 
many as a kind of fundamentalist manifesto.  Summarizing the moral-influence theory, 
Professor Franklin Johnson of Chicago wrote: “the sole mission of Christ was to reveal 
the love of God in a way so moving as to melt the heart and induce men to forsake sin.”  
The problem with this theory, argued Johnson, himself a proponent of a more traditional 
substitutionary view of the Atonement, is that it “makes the death of Christ 
predominantly scenic, spectacular, an effort to display the love of God rather than an 
offering to God in its nature necessary for the salvation of man” (italics mine).  The 
visual metaphors in this statement underscore the aesthetic dimension of the liberal 
position.  The chief power of the Atonement was thought to derive from its status as a 
species of the sublime or beautiful, and in fact, such a conception amounted to little more 
than Otheman’s Kamesian theory applied to the Crucifixion.  As long as the idea of 
ethico-aesthetic influence had been confined to the field of aesthetics proper, it had 
presented comparatively minor difficulties for evangelical orthodoxy; once this theory 
had seeped into the discipline of theology, however, it threatened to undermine 
everything which, according to fundamentalists, made Christianity uniquely what it was.  
Johnson did not wish to deny that the Crucifixion is worthy of imitation – that it does in 
fact possess a moral-aesthetic dimension – nor, for that matter, did he hold any grudge 
against the aesthetic per se.  Indeed, with no little irony, he ultimately suggested that the 
moral-influence theory of the Atonement was deficient not only on theological and 
scriptural grounds but also on aesthetic and moral ones: “The man who dies to rescue one 
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whom he loves from death is remembered with tears of reverence and gratitude; the man 
who puts himself to death to show that he loves is remembered with horror.”40  Even on 
its own terms, the moral-influence theory of the Atonement, Johnson implied, qualifies as 
bad theater.  Still, too much emphasis on the aesthetic aspect of the Atonement threatened 
to obscure its status as a real substitutionary transaction between God and Christ on 
behalf of human beings.  
 While Johnson was careful to avoid an indiscriminate attack on the “aesthetic,” it 
seems clear that the aesthetic did not escape the conservative opposition to the liberal 
aestheticization of religion entirely unscathed.  To a large extent what the fundamentalists 
were attempting to recoup was the cognitive, objective content of Christianity – a content 
that had arguably been on the run since the late eighteenth century.  The substance and 
style of the conservative arguments were themselves nothing new.  (Johnson’s criticism 
of the moral-influence theory sounded remarkably like Charles Hodge’s criticism of 
Bushnell.)  They were yet another legacy of the Baconian scientific tradition that had 
dominated evangelical thought at the turn of the nineteenth century.  Yet one, perhaps 
unintended, consequence of this attempt to defend the objectivity of Christian doctrine 
against the modernists’ aesthetic interpretation of the faith was that the word “aesthetic” 
itself became tarnished.  In certain contexts at least, “aesthetic” had begun to acquire 
pejorative connotations.  Something of this growing negativity towards the term can be 
glimpsed in P.T. Forsyth’s reaction, published in the London Quarterly Review in 1904 as 
“The Need for a Positive Gospel,” to a liberal creed adopted unanimously (and quite 
democratically) by the Bowdoin College Class of 1903.  Forsyth, once a rising star in the 
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liberal Congregationalist establishment of late-Victorian Britain, had gradually moved in 
the direction of a more traditional understanding of Christianity, and he was now taking 
aim at those liberals who had “nothing to say of sin, faith, or repentance; nothing of 
salvation, redemption, or reconciliation.”  What human beings are most in need of, 
insisted Forsyth, is the forgiveness of sin, a power that rests solely “in the revelation 
which forgives.  It resides in the gospel, in the act of deliverance, in the person of the 
Redeemer.”  Liberals, by contrast, made too much of the “character” of Christ at the 
expense of his “person”: “It is not the character of Christ that is the revelation of God; 
that is too aesthetic a position for the final and requisite religion…. Christ came not as a 
spectacle, ethical or spiritual, but as an agent and a power.”41  Clearly, “aesthetic” has 
here become a kind of shorthand for “heterodox.”  To conservatives, the Cross was more 
than a mere “spectacle,” and they repeatedly expressed consternation at the fact that, 
instead of claiming for themselves the power of the Cross, liberals seemed content merely 
to gaze at its beauty as they would a fine painting. 
 Yet while the “aesthetic” appears to have suffered in the minds of some 
conservatives as a result of its alleged theological misapplication by liberals, one must be 
wary of overstressing this point.  For one thing, modernists, too, were quite capable of 
using “aesthetic” as a negative term when it suited their agenda.  Describing (in what 
were by then rather conventional terms) the inability of an age given over to 
“commercialism” to comprehend Jesus’ ethic of love as manifested on the Cross, Shailer 
Mathews inquired: “For how is it possible for an age that honors the victories of force to 
appreciate, in anything more than an æsthetic way, the victories of the cross?”42  For 
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fundamentalists, it was the liberals who misguidedly approached the Cross in aesthetic 
terms; for Mathews, it was the robber barons and the captains of industry.  In both 
instances, however, “aesthetic” signified the opposite of some reality associated with the 
Cross – for conservatives, an act of atonement; for liberals, a moral example worthy of 
imitation.  At the same time, even for many fundamentalists the problem was not so 
much with the aesthetic taken on its own terms as it was with the aesthetic imported into 
the domain of theological reasoning – or more precisely, with the aesthetic imported 
carelessly into the domain of the theological.  For there was, it seems, a proper 
application of the aesthetic to the theological.  Forsyth, after criticizing a “too aesthetic” 
interpretation of the character of Christ – and Forsyth’s qualifying adverb is not irrelevant 
here – proceeded, much like Johnson, to draw upon an aesthetic analogy, the effect of 
which was to suggest once again that liberals were inept aestheticians as well as inept 
theologians (interestingly, for both Johnson and Forsyth the appropriate artistic genre for 
the Crucifixion seems to have been the drama): “A gospel is not a novel but a drama; it is 
not an exhibition of divine character or psychology, but the achievement of an act final 
for human destiny, central for human history, relevant to all thought, and exhaustive for 
God’s heart and will.”43  From one perspective, what fundamentalists were implicitly 
attempting to do was to protect the subordinationist model of the religious and the 
aesthetic that many nineteenth-century evangelical writers had proposed.  They were not 
denying that Christianity has an aesthetic dimension; they were merely protesting the 
notion that Christianity could be reduced to this dimension.  Art might serve Christianity, 
but it could never be Christianity.  Still, the constant need for conservatives to deflect 
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interpretations of Christianity that appeared to relish the Cross wholly for its “poetry” 
seems to have taken its toll on conservative attitudes towards the “aesthetic.” 
 Indeed, this toll on the aesthetic may also have been the result of conservatives’ 
growing discomfort with the unapologetically social focus of liberal Protestantism at the 
expense of doctrinal concerns.  Whereas nineteenth-century evangelicals had understood 
social activism to be the logical outworking of a converted heart, the Social Gospel of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries stressed the primacy of moral action apart 
from a strict adherence to traditional doctrinal formulae.  Social rather than salvific 
transformation was at the center of the Social Gospel.44  This emphasis on the here-and-
now seems to have rekindled longstanding anxieties among some conservatives regarding 
the dangers of being too earthly-minded (anxieties that were already acute among those 
committed to a premillennial eschatology).  “The adversary the Church has most to fear,” 
suggested the Watchman in 1896, “is worldliness.”  Worldliness was defined as anything 
that draws one’s attention away from the genuine spiritual truths of Christianity: “We do 
not use the term ‘worldliness’ in any cant sense.  We mean by it a complacent satisfaction 
in the pursuit of physical comfort and pleasure, a disposition that bounds the horizon of 
the spirit by the narrow arc of what appeals to the physical, the intellectual or aesthetic 
faculties.”  The aesthetic, which had been viewed by many nineteenth-century 
evangelical critics as a potential antidote to the commercialism and materialism so 
rampant in modern industrialized societies, was once more becoming an ally of 
“worldliness” rather than its sworn foe.  This reversal was due in part to the adamant 
refusal on the part of conservatives to entertain broad, and often ambiguous, conceptions 
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of the “spiritual” as referring to all-things-non-material.  If “spiritual” is interpreted 
generally to include “intellect,” “mind,” or “feeling,” then it is expansive enough to 
encompass the “aesthetic”; once it is limited to traditional Christian understandings of the 
supernatural, however, the “spiritual” becomes the transcendent category of the “wholly 
other” – a category that stands opposed to the earthly categories of “the physical, 
intellectual or aesthetic.”45  Most revealing, however, is the Watchman’s linking of this 
worldliness to those liberal Christians who seemed to prioritize the social over the 
spiritual: “The purely philanthropic, humanitarian directions in which so many of our 
churches are spending their most strenuous efforts are a witness to the truth of our 
observations.”  Attention to matters of salvation need not entail the neglect of the body, 
but “The [liberal] zeal for ameliorating untoward conditions of life far outruns the desire 
for winning men to a life of fellowship with God.”46  In defending orthodox 
understandings of the spiritual against liberal Protestantism’s putatively disproportionate 
concern for this world, some conservatives, it seems, may have been impelled to dwell 
anew on the dubious materiality of art. 
 In addition to the threats to orthodoxy posed by the “aesthetic,” certain features of 
the turn-of-the-century art world itself may also have helped to drive fundamentalists 
away from active involvement in the Anglo-American culture of high art.  Evidence 
suggests that many conservative evangelicals were coming more and more to view the art 
world of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a citadel of immorality.  
Wherever they looked, conservatives discovered the signs of moral degradation.  The 
popularity of the aesthetes and decadents, for example, had continued to swell, even in 
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spite (or perhaps in part because) of Wilde’s criminal trial and subsequent imprisonment 
in 1895.  Not surprisingly, evangelical periodicals were still publishing condemnations of 
aestheticism into the first decade of the twentieth century, and Wilde remained the poster-
child for the moral bankruptcy to which artists, as a class, seemed prone.  Criticizing 
aestheticism, however, had become a kind of rearguard action, and it was yet another sign 
that the modern world was beginning to pass conservatives by.  Progressive artists, 
moreover, had begun increasingly to pursue artistic subjects that stood at odds with the 
strict codes of Victorian morality to which conservatives adhered.  Conservative 
evangelical critics, to cite one prominent example, had been complaining since the 1870s 
about the growing number of “nudes” on display in galleries and museums throughout 
the United States and Europe.  As a British critic in the Baptist Magazine expressed it in 
1890: 
 
 The talk about “the exigencies of art” is sheer nonsense, and it is time we 
remembered the exigencies of religion and morality.  “Reverent gaze” 
there may be: “to the pure all things are pure”; but who that knows human 
nature can look without apprehension on the matter-of-course way in 
which it is taken for granted in artistic circles that these exhibitions of “the 
nude” are the highest form of art, and must be secured at all costs?  To us 
they are indicative of a corrupt taste, and of a degradation which cannot be 
too strenuously resisted.  The increase of pictures of this class in the Royal 
Academy is simply disgusting.47 
  
“Reverent gaze,” of course, was another (interestingly “religious”) term for the supposed 
“disinterestedness” of aesthetic contemplation.  Many conservative evangelicals, 
however, had little room for such theoretical constructs when it came to nudes, for the 
one “that knows human nature” knows the difficulty, if not the sheer impossibility, of a 
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depraved human being beholding the nakedness of another with anything approximating 
a “pure,” de-sexualized gaze.48  Disciples of Hegel, symbolists, and other early-twentieth-
century experimentalists might have seen “the nude” as the highest expression of the 
human form and spirit,49 but conservative evangelicals had a difficult time seeing the 
cultural prevalence of “the nude” as anything other than a deviant sexuality run amok.   
 As the early-twentieth-century art world did its best to cast off the last vestiges of 
its Victorian sensibilities, fundamentalists, who remained invested in these sensibilities, 
increasingly perceived the behavior and attitudes of artists as immoral, eccentric, and 
pretentious.  Many high modernist artists may have approached their Art with great 
seriousness, but such earnestness only helped to bring out the underlying populism of 
some fundamentalists.  Fundamentalist evangelicals were not above the use of sarcasm 
when it came to modern science’s suggestion that Ph.D.s were the sons and daughters of 
apes, and the same was true when it came to the ease with which much of the modern art 
world seemed prepared to flout the rules of common decency, whether the goal was High 
Art or the subversion of High Art.  An idea of just how irksome the art world and its 
values had become to some fundamentalists may be glimpsed in a rather humorous 
account of a band of nude female revelers who visited themselves upon the small town of 
Rock Island, Illinois one fateful night in 1919.  The account, which appeared in the 
American fundamentalist periodical the Searchlight, is worth quoting at length: 
 
 The good people of Rock Island are not especially “sot” against dancing, 
but they have not yet arrived at that plane of aesthetic culture which 
tolerates the gamboling of woodland nymphs, clad only in scintillating 
moonbeams, amid the town’s glades and dells. 
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     Recently, a number of young women here became inoculated with the 
craze for classic terpsichore distinguished from other forms of dancing 
chiefly by an absence of clothing and conventionalities. 
           All might have gone well had the young women confined their Grecian 
revels in a house, with the shades down, but this they would not do 
because they felt it did not coincide with the principles of true art.  Full 
expression of self they decided required that they go a-gamboling in Rock 
Island’s great out-of-doors. 
           Hence it was that a dignified deacon of one of the town’s leading 
churches had his sensibilities shocked severely last night when on 
chancing to look from his window, he observed three September Morns 
flitting about from bush to bush in what was afterward described as 
“Dancing to the Pipes of Pan.”  He promptly sent for a constable. 
           The constable ensconced from a point of vantage, is said to have taken 
considerable time in completing his observations in the interest of getting 
legal evidence, but no matter.  The upshot was that he rudely stepped into 
the classic tableau and pinched the dancers. 
           “Forty days in jail,” was the sentence of an unsympathetic judge this 
morning.  “We will have no shimmy shaking in Rock Island.”50 
 
The humor, of course, derives not so much from the event itself, which on its own is 
merely a pretty piece of juvenile stupidity, but rather from the reporter’s ironic narration, 
which through a series of metaphors and allusions links the dancing girls to the art culture 
of ancient Greece.  The girls, as a result, appear as a bunch of pagan sensualists, but just 
as much as the actions of the girls themselves, the target of the writer’s mockery is the 
kind of “aesthetic culture” and the sort of “principles of true art” that would presume to 
authorize such behavior.  The entire account is, in effect, a reductio ad absurdum.  If the 
highest value of modern aesthetic culture is the “full expression of self,” then it is not 
unreasonable to expect, so the writer suggests, that such bacchanalian displays – such 
“shimmy shaking” – may soon be the norm in small towns everywhere.  The implicit 
contrast between small-town rural America and high Hellenic culture is, in fact, part of 
the point.   
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 To be sure, the supposed moral laxity of art and of the modern art world was not a 
uniquely conservative dilemma.  Liberal Protestants also frowned upon any so-called 
“principles of true art” that sought to rationalize illicit behavior in the name of aesthetic 
inspiration.  Ethics were a crucial part of the modernist enterprise.  “I warn you,” wrote 
H.W. Beecher in his Addresses to Young Men, “with yet more solemn emphasis, against 
EVIL BOOKS and EVIL PICTURES.”51  A reviewer in Outlook (a periodical first edited by 
Beecher and later by Abbot) put it in more positive terms: “Art … can justify itself only 
so far as it promotes wholesome thought and conduct.”52  Unlike many conservatives, 
however, liberal Protestants also retained a more positive conception of art’s spiritual and 
social possibilities, as well as a higher degree of sympathy with intellectual and cultural 
elites, which together may have helped to militate against an overly narrow view of the 
art world as a bastion of immorality, idiosyncrasy, and condescension.   
Whatever the case, it appears to have been the cumulative effect of a variety of 
factors, both internal and external to the world of aesthetics, which drove a significant 
number of fundamentalists to retreat from the Anglo-American institution of high art and 
to abandon the critical thinking about aesthetics that had been an important feature of 
nineteenth-century evangelicalism.  Feeling increasingly alienated by the turn-of-the-
century art world, while at the same time feeling increasingly embattled by the claims of 
both modern scientists and liberal Christians, many conservatives gradually lost the will 
to spend whatever cultural and philosophical capital they possessed on behalf of art.  
Such capital, they believed, could be better spent in defending the doctrines of orthodox 
Protestantism against the scientific threats of Darwinism and Higher Criticism.  
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Significantly, it may actually have been fundamentalism’s affinity for Baconian science 
that helped to bring about the sort of critical myopia that, to a great extent, led to the 
exclusion of aesthetics.  Science, many conservatives believed, dealt with “facts,” and 
therefore bad science could be overcome with better science.  Once the true facts about 
the fossil record had been gathered, Darwinian evolution – which was, after all, only a 
theory – would be proven wrong.  Art, in contrast, as the nineteenth-century aesthetic 
tradition had repeatedly stressed, was subjective.  De gustibus non est disputandum.  
Many fundamentalists, therefore, may have chosen to concentrate their energies on an 
area of controversy purportedly governed by the rules of scientific “proof” and which 
therefore seemed to offer reasonable prospects for success.  The result, however, was that 
where aesthetic theory and the aesthetic establishment were concerned, many 
fundamentalist evangelicals looked more like the Puritans than like their immediate 
predecessors.53 
Yet this retreat from aesthetics on the part of many conservative evangelicals in 
the early decades of the twentieth century is only half the story.  No human community 
can be completely a-aesthetic in practice, nor is it possible for any subculture to be 
wholly devoid of some reflection on the arts, even if such “reflection” involves little 
more than thinking about why art is not worth thinking about.  This relative withdrawal 
by conservative evangelicals from the modernist critical establishment and from the 
questions of philosophical criticism, therefore, should not be misconstrued as evidence of 
an unqualified bias against the fine arts themselves or against the aesthetic dimension of 
life.  We have already observed, for example, how Johnson’s and Forsyth’s cases against 
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a “too aesthetic” interpretation of Christ and the Atonement were themselves grounded, 
in part, on aesthetic premises.  There were, moreover, some notable exceptions to the 
generalization that conservative evangelicals failed to endorse the arts.  Even among 
fundamentalists there remained a small contingent of thinkers who continued to press 
upon those who would listen the importance of a critical engagement with art and culture.   
One such thinker was J. Gresham Machen, a southern Presbyterian whose 
Christianity and Liberalism (1923) – in which he argued that liberal Christianity was in 
fact no Christianity at all insofar as it did violence to the historic faith – became a central 
document in the history of American fundamentalism.  Since his death in 1937, Machen 
has frequently been caricatured by friends and foes alike.  In reality, however, Machen 
was a complex figure who resists easy classification.  Though he was instrumental in 
articulating a rationale for the separatism that proved to be a key feature of 
fundamentalist churches, and though he felt it his duty to defend traditional Reformed 
Christianity against what he saw as modernist dilutions, Machen strongly opposed other 
aspects of the fundamentalist movement.  As George Marsden explains, “He did not like 
being called a fundamentalist, he was an intellectual, he was ill-at-ease with the 
emotionalism and oversimplifications of revival meetings, … and he declined to join the 
antievolution crusade.”54  In contrast to both those liberals who would make Christianity 
synonymous with the advancement of civilization and those fundamentalists who would 
spurn any interaction with mainstream culture in order to safeguard Christian orthodoxy, 
Machen fought to preserve the Reformed understanding of culture that had served as the 
foundation on which nineteenth-century evangelical aesthetics had been built.  
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Addressing the students at Princeton Seminary in the fall of 1912, Machen explicitly 
affirmed a subordinationist view of “Christianity and Culture,” which, as he made clear, 
must include the cultivation of the arts:   
 
 Are then Christianity and culture in a conflict that is to be settled only by 
the destruction of one or the other of the contending forces?  A third 
solution, fortunately, is possible – namely, consecration.  Instead of 
destroying the arts and sciences or being indifferent to them, let us 
cultivate them with all the enthusiasm of the veriest humanist, but at the 
same time consecrate them to the service of our God.  Instead of stifling 
the pleasures afforded by the acquisition of knowledge or by the 
appreciation of what is beautiful, let us accept these pleasures as the gifts 
of a heavenly Father.  Instead of obliterating the distinction between the 
kingdom and the world, or on the other hand withdrawing from the world 
into a sort of modernized intellectual monasticism, let us go forth joyfully, 
enthusiastically to make the world subject to God.55 
 
Machen’s overarching conception of the relationship between Christianity and culture is 
at least as old as Calvin, just as his willingness to see the “arts” and “the appreciation of 
what is beautiful” as indisputable components of this conception also reveal him to be a 
faithful recipient of the nineteenth-century evangelical aesthetic tradition.  He was 
perhaps the last great representative of the evangelical intellectual culture of the Victorian 
era, which had located art in the context of a holistic Protestant ideology and had argued 
for this ideology in a systematic fashion.  For Machen, too, as we will see in a moment, 
genuinely “high art” was not something to be scorned but something to be admired and 
protected.  Unlike some fundamentalists, he was no populist; rather, he was an 
intellectual who found a way to speak on behalf of “culture” even as he spoke on behalf 
of American fundamentalism.   
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Machen’s outspoken and carefully reasoned support for art and culture, however, 
was fast becoming atypical: it was the exception that proved the rule.56  A growing 
number of conservatives no longer shared Machen’s – and nineteenth-century 
evangelicalism’s – faith in the possibility of a healthy rapport between Christianity and 
culture, and art and aesthetics tended to be left by the wayside.  Even so, it is rare to meet 
with fundamentalists openly berating art per se, despite their sometimes disparaging 
references to the “aesthetic,” and though formal reflection on the fine arts declined 
relative to the high level of critical activity among evangelicals during the nineteenth 
century, many of the aesthetic suppositions of the evangelical romantic tradition 
nevertheless appear to have remained intact, even among fundamentalists.  Critical 
theorizing may have largely disappeared, but theory itself did not.  Indeed, on one level it 
is not particularly surprising that the evangelical romantic tradition would persist as a 
kind of undercurrent in fundamentalist thought since it is most often through participation 
in critical debate that ideas evolve and mature.  By ceasing to think consciously and 
systematically about the fine arts, fundamentalists were effectively putting the principles 
of a received tradition on ice.  Henceforth, the critical assumptions of this tradition were 
more likely to take the form of the casual reference or the short passage tucked neatly 
into a discussion of some other topic rather than the extended aesthetic treatise or review 
(though one still encounters more extended discussions on occasion), but even casual 
references – perhaps especially casual references – are themselves always already 
implicated in a network of theoretical assumptions.   
One can catch, for example, romantic expressivist assumptions at work in an 
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interesting discussion of John Henry Newman’s hymn “Lead Kindly Light,” published, 
oddly enough, in a conservative American periodical, the Bible Student and Teacher, in 
1908.  It is worth noting that the Bible Student and Teacher was in some ways a 
periodical in transition.  Affiliated with the Bible League of North America, it was 
initially run by Presbyterian academics, though the periodical’s makeup quickly 
expanded to include those of a dispensational persuasion from a variety of evangelical 
denominations.  In 1913, it was renamed the Bible Champion, and it accordingly adopted 
a somewhat more populist outlook.57  This periodical, however, provides an interesting 
glimpse of at least one branch of conservative evangelical thought during the early part of 
the twentieth century.  The article in question, entitled “‘Reading Into’ a Hymn: On a 
Recent Criticism of ‘Lead Kindly Light,’ was, as the author observed, occasioned by “a 
series of articles” recently published in the Sunday School Times.  This series of articles, 
the author alleged, had committed serious errors of interpretation in relation to Newman’s 
hymn, and it was the purpose of the present article to warn against the dangers of even 
the most well-intentioned eisegesis.  The article begins, however, with a revealing 
attempt to formulate the essence of hymns as aesthetic objects: 
 
 A hymn may or may not be poetry, judged by the strict canons of the 
poetic art.  But, to serve its purpose and justify its creation a hymn must 
have an indefinable something that throbs the heart, thrills the 
imagination, touches the longings, uplifts the soul.  Simplicity, nay even a 
certain naivété, in an attempt to express deep religious feelings; a reaching 
out and after God; a trustfulness in Him and His love; and an assured and 
buoyant belief in the immortality of the soul, – these are some of the 
essential expressings of hymns, keyed in their appropriate notes of joy or 
of sadness or of semi-tones.  How great an influence can a simple hymn 
exert!  It becomes a multum in parvo volume of emotion and aspiration, 
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resignation or self-sacrifice.  It is a world-long ejaculatory epitome of a 
lifetime’s experience.58  
 
Clearly, romantic notions of art as an expression of emotion, as well as of art’s capacity 
to exert an empowering “influence” by way of the feelings, were alive and well within 
the pages of at least some conservative periodicals during the early part of the twentieth 
century. 
A second article in the Bible Student and Teacher, published two years later, 
suggests that not all conservative evangelicals had yet relinquished the ideal of psychic 
wholeness either, nor the conviction that the aesthetic plays an indispensable part in 
achieving this wholeness.  (This article, in fact, might well be classed with Machen as 
another example of an attempt by an early-twentieth-century conservative evangelical to 
think explicitly and systematically about an aesthetic topic.)  In “The Beauty of Heaven,” 
the Rev. Horace C. Stanton described with great fervor the “aesthetic sense” and the 
intrinsic longing for beauty that all human beings are said to possess: “Beauty is a thing 
which the heart naturally craves.  As much as there is a mathematical faculty which 
desires accuracy in calculation and a moral instinct which appreciates the right, there is 
also an æsthetic sense which desires beauty.”  This is precisely the sort of Platonic-triad-
turned-faculty-psychology scheme that had been central to modern aesthetic thought 
since the eighteenth century, and it is therefore little wonder that both Plato and Edmund 
Burke, among others, receive mention.  To ignore any one of these cardinal values – 
truth, goodness, or beauty – is to fall short of being fully human; it is to lack “culture” in 
the Arnoldian sense.  “Any person who has not this love for beauty,” Stanton later writes, 
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“is regarded by us as deficient in an important element of mental culture.  But, if he 
possess [sic] this instinct in a high degree, we concede that he has at least a certain type 
of cultivation.”  As the title of the article makes clear, Stanton’s primary concern is with 
the perfect “beauties of Heaven” that “shall never be exhausted,” and to this end, his 
focus is more otherworldly than worldly – a theme that fit well perhaps with the sense of 
disenchantment that many conservatives had come to feel towards the modern world.  
Yet Stanton does not ignore worldly beauty entirely.  For him, as for Anne Bradstreet 
nearly three centuries earlier, the beauties of heaven do not efface the beauties of earth 
but rather give them meaning as a foretaste of what is to come.  It is true that the beauty 
of heaven “goes vastly beyond our fondest imaginations,” but Stanton also portrays this 
heavenly beauty as a fulfillment of our desire for earthly beauty.  In fact, the proper way 
to prepare for the beauties of heaven is to cultivate the beauties of earth: 
 
There are many ambitions of this world, that may be realized, or may not.  
The desire for high education, marriage, wealth, fame, health, social 
position, political success and things like these, may be gratified; or may 
not.  But we need never fail to reach the abode of beauty by and by, and to 
find satisfaction there.  How inspiring the thought, that, when these lower 
struggles and conflicts are overpast, we shall enter such an abode as that 
which awaits us!  Those whose environment on earth has most lacked for 
beauty, and those who have revelled in it most, may enjoy dreams 
unrestrained about the beauty that is to come.  And if, in the city where the 
ransomed dwell, there is such beauty, what a stimulus it should be to us to 
cultivate beauty in manners, in speech, in spirit, and in everything that 
pertains to our life!  What a failing in our duty, if we do not cultivate all 
beauty now!59       
 
Not unlike Keats, who compared the Imagination to “Adam’s dream” and speculated that 
“we shall enjoy ourselves here after by having what we called happiness on Earth 
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repeated in a finer tone,”60 Stanton saw the beauty of heaven as an intensification and 
culmination of the beauty of earth.  Furthermore, Stanton’s argument for the present 
vitality of the aesthetic (rather than simply its eventual eschatological completion) and his 
continued fidelity to the ideal of the “cultured” individual point to the enduring influence 
of the evangelical aesthetic tradition of the nineteenth century on some fundamentalists. 
 Another important idea that some fundamentalists carried over from the 
evangelical romantic tradition was the notion that art is an expression of the moral health 
of an age or civilization.  Now, however, when conservatives gazed into their aesthetic 
crystal balls, they were more likely to see an age of moral ruin rather than one of splendor 
and progress.  In 1919, the Searchlight quoted approvingly a Roman Catholic bishop who 
had glimpsed in the state of America’s art the seeds of national destruction: “‘We are 
living in a decadent age, our music, literature and poetry, theaters and art all bear the 
stigma of degeneracy.  The world is rushing back to paganism, divorcing itself from 
Christ more each day.’”  As if to impress upon its readers the gravity of this verdict, the 
Searchlight added: “When a Roman Catholic Bishop condemns public amusements, it is 
time the rest of the folks were sitting up and taking notice.”61  Machen, writing in 1931, 
also saw the art of the twentieth century as clear evidence of the “appalling spiritual 
decline which has come over the world within the last fifty years”: “High poetry, for the 
most part, is silent; art is either imitative or bizarre.  There is advance in material things, 
but in the higher ranges of the human mind an amazing sterility has fallen on the 
world.”62  It was this very principle that helped, in part, to fuel the conservative criticisms 
of the modernist art world described earlier.  If the perceived moral and spiritual 
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corruption of the art world had been taken simply as an indication of the devolution of art 
itself, this devolution, though regrettable, may have seemed manageable.  The corruption 
of the art world and of art, however, was seen by some fundamentalists as symptomatic 
of a much broader social and moral decline.  The state of the nation’s art became yet one 
more confirmation of the coming apocalypse, though ironically, it was the aesthetic 
theory of the nineteenth century that in some measure enabled fundamentalists to draw 
this conclusion.    
 Probably the greatest legacy, however, which the nineteenth-century evangelical 
aesthetic tradition bestowed upon at least some fundamentalists – a legacy that surfaces, 
for example, in Machen’s reference to “high poetry” – was the concept of “high art.”  
Admittedly, as observed above, fundamentalist evangelicals at times expressed their 
mounting displeasure with the twentieth-century art world and its products in decidedly 
populist terms – terms that could sound very much like a blanket condemnation of the 
whole notion of high art.  Yet in some cases it was the ideal of high art itself that drove 
conservative critiques of late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century art.  Some 
conservatives, that is, criticized progressive art not only for its moral turpitude but also 
for the way in which it seemed to fall short of what were believed to be the highest 
aesthetic standards.  One relatively early example of this attitude can be seen in 
evangelical censures of those artistic movements near the turn of the century – the 
Expressionists in painting or the literary naturalists, for example – that seemed bent on 
tracking down the “real” in all of its shocking ugliness.  Robert Waters, lambasting the 
“so-called Realists” in the Christian Advocate in 1888 for being a “contagious disease,” 
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described them as follows: 
 
 Not a taste for the good and the pure; not an eye for the beautiful, the 
noble, and the sublime; but a nose for the foul, the hateful, and the mean – 
that is their characteristic.  Prowling around among degraded men and still 
more degraded women, the residuum of humanity, they rake up a mass of 
maggoty, foul, and putrid matter, stir it up with a spice of sugar and salt, 
dub it with a fair name, and send it out to the world as a work of art!63  
 
This passage is itself a marvelous specimen of grotesque description, but Waters’s 
indignation here, it is important to observe, is aimed at both the moral and the aesthetic.  
It is not only the conscience that ought to be offended by the “prowling” naturalists who 
offer up images of a “degraded” humanity for ordinary, middle-class consumption but 
also the aesthetic sense.  The productions of the naturalists – their “mass of maggoty, 
foul, and putrid matter” – are, by Waters’s standards, nothing but pseudo-art.  Merely 
giving one’s creation “a fair name” does not automatically convert it into “a work of art.”  
Of course, the negative response to such turn-of-the-century movements – not to mention 
to later “extremist movements” like the Dadaists, for example – was hardly confined to 
evangelicals.  In a broad sense, the growth of these movements, a number of which set 
out consciously to subvert the very notion of “high art,” marked the dissolution of the 
Romantic-Victorian concept of the “ideal” – both of beauty and of morality – and public 
resistance was therefore widespread.64  But recognizing this point only underscores the 
fact that the conservative evangelical reaction to some of the artistic innovations of the 
early twentieth century cannot be attributed to mere prudishness; rather, it was the result 
of a keen sense of aesthetic dissatisfaction and a growing consciousness that so-called 
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high art was not quite high enough.65 
 That this sort of aesthetic critique persisted among some conservative 
evangelicals well into the twentieth century is made clear in yet another passage from one 
of Machen’s essays, “The Responsibility of the Church in Our New Age,” first published 
in 1933.  In this essay, Machen argues that while the “new age” mistakenly believes that 
whatever it “favors is always really new,” there are, in fact, “old things which ought to 
remain.”  Among these old things, he believes, are “the literary and artistic achievements 
of past generations”: 
 
 Those are things which the new age ought to retain, at least until the new 
age can produce something to put in their place, and that it has signally 
failed to do.  I am well aware that when I say to the new age that Homer is 
still worth reading, or that the Cathedral of Amiens is superior to any of 
the achievements of the art nouveau, I am making assertions which it 
would be difficult for me to prove.  There is no disputing about tastes.  
Yet, after all, until the artistic impulse is eradicated more thoroughly from 
human life than has so far been done even by the best efforts of the 
metallic civilization of our day, we cannot get rid of the categories of good 
and bad or high and low in the field of art.  But when we pay attention to 
those categories, it becomes evident at once that we are living today in a 
drab and decadent age, and that a really new impulse will probably come, 
as it has come so many times before, only through a rediscovery of the 
glories of the past.66 
 
One could, from a theoretical standpoint, quarrel with any number of ideas in this 
passage, just as one could quarrel with the very notion of “high art” itself.  The point, 
however, is that the concept of high art – a concept evangelical critics and periodicals had 
helped to foster over the course of the nineteenth century – remained for some 
fundamentalists an important criterion for evaluating the art objects of the twentieth 
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century.  Indeed, from one perspective, the idea that fundamentalists would embrace and 
perpetuate the distinction between high and low art – even when they themselves rarely 
produced art objects that most observers would want to locate on the former side of this 
divide – is not terribly surprising.  For the category of “high art,” insofar as it looks 
paradoxically to the past to substantiate its own supposedly transhistorical character, is an 
inherently “conservative” category socially.  It suggests, theoretically, the existence of an 
axiological absolute, however difficult it may be to substantiate this absolute in reality 
(interestingly, Machen’s position is almost Kantian in its suggestion of something like 
“subjective universality”67).  Thus, it always remains, at least potentially, a means of 
passing judgment on the “new” and innovative.  Yet however one ultimately reads the 
fundamentalist affinity for the concept of high art, it points to the fact that even twentieth-
century fundamentalist evangelicals were in various ways the heirs of the evangelical 
romantic tradition. 
 The preceding analysis obviously fails to do full justice to the complexities of 
fundamentalism’s ongoing relationship to the evangelical aesthetic tradition, and I have 
had to settle here for being suggestive rather than exhaustive.  Much work remains to be 
done on the nuances of fundamentalist aesthetics.  In the broadest of terms, however, I 
have attempted to argue both that specific aesthetic concepts (e.g., expressivism, 
influence, the aesthetic as a necessary component of psychological wholeness, art as a 
social index) were carried over to fundamentalism, albeit in a loose and unsystematic 
fashion, from the tradition of evangelical romanticism and that there remained as well, 
even among fundamentalists, a crucial divide between the “high” and the “low” when it 
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came to art.  This last claim would become even clearer – though it might also prove 
subject to further qualification – were one to undertake an extensive study of the various 
art objects actually produced by fundamentalists, for what one would discover, I think, is 
that many of the poems, hymns, novels, and paintings created by fundamentalist artists 
throughout the twentieth century in fact bear the marks of the sentimentalist tradition of 
the nineteenth century.  (The well-known paintings of Jesus by Warner Sallman come 
immediately to mind, as do the evangelical romance novels discussed at length in Lynn S. 
Neal’s recent book, Romancing God.)  In a way, acknowledging the sentimentalist bent 
of much fundamentalist “art” only confirms in yet another way the romantic lineage of 
fundamentalist aesthetics, for sentimentalism was to some extent an outgrowth of the 
moral-aesthetic theories of the Enlightenment and romanticism,68 though it was, as we 
have seen, a development which a large body of nineteenth-century critics, evangelical 
and otherwise, had tried to prevent.  Yet sentimentalism, with all of its ties to the 
“popular” and the “low,” was only one outgrowth of the romantic tradition, for while this 
tradition led on the one hand to the “sentimental” and “low,” it led on the other to the 
“serious” and “high.”  And just as a large body of late-nineteenth and early-twentieth-
century artists and critics became heirs to this latter half of the romantic tradition, so too 
did some fundamentalists.69  Indeed, it is this latter side, and the philosophical aesthetics 
that were generated in support of this side, that I have consistently tried to emphasize 
throughout this study since it this side that has most often been overlooked in the history 
of evangelical aesthetics. 
At the same time, recognizing the continuing influence of the “high” side of the 
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nineteenth-century evangelical romantic tradition even among some fundamentalists may 
help to explain more thoroughly the prevalence of the “high romantic” views of art which 
Roger Lundin has noticed among many contemporary, post-fundamentalist evangelicals.  
In explaining this phenomenon, Lundin points to the nineteenth-century shift in 
evangelical attitudes towards culture (from a position of early engagement to one of 
fundamentalist suspicion), but he ultimately stops short of offering a thoroughgoing 
historical account of modern evangelicalism’s attraction to romantic aesthetics.  His 
explanation for the romantic character of much present-day evangelical thinking about 
the arts seems to turn largely on a set of ahistorical (though certainly correct) 
commonalities between fundamentalism and romanticism.  There was, for instance, a 
“distinctly Protestant tone” to “a great deal of romanticism.”  Moreover, both romantics 
and fundamentalists held similar “perceptions of culture,” viewing “themselves as the 
rightful proprietors of a world from which they had been displaced.”  Thus, concludes 
Lundin, “In retrospect, it seems quite logical that when we as evangelical students of 
culture began to emerge from the dusky passageways of fundamentalism, our eyes would 
be dazzled by the enchanting romantic tradition …. [R]omantic theory has offered an 
appealing sight to those of us whose aesthetic lenses have been ground … in the shop of 
American fundamentalism.”70  If the above analysis is correct, however, then it points to 
the existence of a more direct line of influence extending from the romantic evangelical 
aesthetics of the nineteenth century to the romantically-inclined aesthetics of 
contemporary evangelicalism observed by Lundin.  Though fundamentalists did turn 
away from the kind of explicit aesthetic theorizing promoted by nineteenth-century 
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evangelicals in order to defend what they saw as an endangered Gospel, they also carried 
over some of the less obviously threatening romantic assumptions about art (e.g., 
expressivism) propagated by their predecessors.  Yet however one finally understands the 
aesthetic posture of fundamentalism, it remains true that evangelicals on both sides of the 
fundamentalist divide have interacted in complex ways, either consciously or 
unconsciously, for better or for worse, with the heart of the romantic aesthetic tradition. 
 
Concluding Unscientific Postscript: Theology, Aesthetics, and Secularization 
As stated at the outset, my objective throughout this study has been twofold: 1) to chart 
the evolution of a critical aesthetic discourse among Anglo-American evangelicals as it 
emerged from the religio-aesthetic tradition of the Puritans in the eighteenth century until 
its eventual fracturing during the fundamentalist-modernist controversy of the early 
twentieth century; and 2) to describe in detail how evangelicals conceived of art and its 
relationship to other facets of the Protestant ideology during what I have argued was the 
“high point” of the evangelical aesthetic tradition prior to the late twentieth century.  This 
high point, gauged roughly by the twin variables of critical sophistication and a sustained 
level of interest within a significant cross-section of the Anglo-American evangelical 
population, occurred between 1830 and 1900.  Before this period, some evangelicals 
were already engaging various developments in the modern aesthetic thought that had 
grown out of the Enlightenment, but it was not until the nineteenth century, when aspects 
of the Enlightenment aesthetic tradition evolved into the aesthetics of romanticism that 
evangelicals became full and active participants in the growing critical establishment.  
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The evangelical aesthetic discourse that appeared in the pages of numerous nineteenth-
century denominational periodicals was characterized by a prolonged engagement with 
the aesthetic theories of romanticism.  Evangelical critics accepted many of the basic 
premises of these theories, in spite of the fact that some of these premises, as I have 
suggested, posed subtle difficulties for traditional Protestant doctrines.  When, at the 
conclusion of the nineteenth-century, Anglo-American evangelicalism splintered into 
conservative and liberal factions, the nineteenth-century evangelical consensus regarding 
the value of art and of aesthetic philosophizing effectively came to an end, though both 
liberals and conservatives perpetuated elements of the nineteenth-century tradition. 
 It remains, I think, to say a brief word about the shape of the preceding narrative 
and about the potential implications of this narrative for contemporary evangelical 
thinking about the fine arts.  Though I have tried to provide as neutral an account of the 
evolution of evangelical aesthetic thought as is humanly possible, I am nevertheless 
conscious of the fact that I have not perhaps been entirely successful in doing so.  What 
from one perspective is an evolution is from another perspective a devolution.  This 
tension is evident to some degree in the two ways that I have tended to describe the 
intellectual movement in evangelical aesthetics throughout the time period covered by 
this study, and in particular, during the period from 1830-1900: romanticization (which 
suggests a movement towards something) and de-puritanization (which suggests a 
movement away from something).  There is another term, however, which, though I have 
used it sparingly, has in many ways been at the very heart of the foregoing narrative.  
This term is secularization. 
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 Just how to define secularization is a matter of ongoing debate.  Charles Taylor, 
for example, in his voluminous book A Secular Age, has recently identified three 
possibilities for understanding “secularization.”71  The sense in which I want to use 
secularization here, however, is a rather mundane and frankly conservative one, namely, 
as a term that describes the gradual departure of a given faith community from a body of 
doctrinal convictions that were embraced (at least outwardly, if not always inwardly) by 
the vast majority of the earlier members of this community.  The process of 
secularization I have in mind could be articulated in traditional terms as a movement 
from theological “orthodoxy” to “heterodoxy.”  Sometimes, as in the case of liberal 
Protestants, this movement towards “heterodoxy” may really amount to a kind of anti-
doctrinalism, or a distaste or discomfort with doctrine qua doctrine (though, as 
conservatives would no doubt point out, this is itself a kind of doctrine).  Yet whatever 
the case, if we adopt this definition of secularization, it is obvious that the changes in 
evangelical aesthetic discourse described in this study took place against the backdrop of 
a steady process of theological drift among Anglo-American evangelicals.  Of course, the 
observation that the nineteenth century was a period of profound theological changes is 
nothing to write home about, but it may be worth considering for a moment the 
relationship between this process of secularization and the development of an aesthetic 
discourse by evangelicals. 
To begin with, we might ask to what extent nineteenth-century evangelical 
aesthetic discourse contributed to secularization.  Did thinking about art advance the sort 
of doctrinal drift that was characteristic of Victorian theological history?  It is clear, I 
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think, that aesthetics did not cause this drift.  The cultural and theological transition to 
modernism was not driven by any single factor, much less by aesthetics itself.  
Nevertheless, nineteenth-century evangelical aesthetic discourse may be seen as yet 
another locus of dispute, as an influential space in which “heterodox” ideas could be 
broadcast and played out.  Widespread notions of art’s ordinary moral influence, for 
example, continued to chip away slowly at theological ideas about depravity and the need 
for a supernatural act of intervention by the Holy Spirit.  Conversion, many came to 
believe, was simply too unreliable as a social stabilizer, and although critics frequently 
noted that not all people are capable of achieving the same level of taste, the idea that 
aesthetic appreciation could foster morality at least seemed to place a solution to the 
problem of social stability within reach.  Taste, after all, could always be “cultivated” by 
education.  To take one more example, the aesthetic thought of the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries had helped to drive home a divide between the intellectual and the 
affective, between reason and feeling.  When orthodox doctrines came under scientific 
attack in the mid-to-late nineteenth century, an apparent solution to the dilemma was 
therefore ready and waiting.  Aesthetic theory was able to provide, at least in part, an 
answer to the ostensible conflict between religious faith and modern science.   
In writing about history, however, one is not infrequently confronted with the 
classic conundrum of the chicken and the egg, and it is no different in this case.  For 
while nineteenth-century evangelical thinking about the arts may have helped to nudge 
forward the process of theological drift, it was at the same time symptomatic of this drift.  
That is, Victorian evangelical aesthetics was to some extent enabled by certain 
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theological changes, which it then helped to reinforce.  As I have tried to suggest 
throughout this study, nineteenth-century evangelical aesthetics was made possible in 
part by the disintegration of the Reformed theological tradition.  Of course, the Puritans 
also bequeathed to their evangelical descendants some key elements – most notably, a 
positive view of “culture” – without which Victorian evangelical thinking about the arts 
could not have evolved.  At the same time, though, the romantic character of evangelical 
aesthetics was enabled by a turn away from the theology of the Puritans, which had 
stressed the total depravity of humankind, the radical transcendence of God, the 
impossibility of communing with the divine apart from grace, the importance of carefully 
formulated doctrine, and the reliability of a theological language that corresponded 
closely with the transcendent reality it sought to describe.72  The ideas that dominated the 
evangelical aesthetics of the nineteenth century – ideas of art’s “natural” moral influence, 
of human art objects as a (possible) expression of the divine mind, of the transcendental 
potential of the Imagination, of the new authority ascribed to the subjective mediation of 
the world – could never have flourished among the Puritans.  To be sure, certain 
emphases in Puritan theology continued to influence evangelical aesthetics in various 
ways throughout the nineteenth century – many evangelicals, as we have seen, continued 
to defend a more traditional view of God’s personhood and transcendence, as well as a 
subordinationist conception of Christianity and art – but on the whole evangelical 
aesthetics was built on the ruins of Puritan orthodoxy.  In this instance, Wallace Stevens’s 
famous line, “Death is the mother of beauty,” was quite literally the case. 
For those in the liberal tradition of evangelicalism or for other “neutral 
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observers,” this narrative may not raise any special difficulties; however, for those of us 
who would associate ourselves with the theologically conservative wing of 
evangelicalism (though not necessarily with either Puritanism or fundamentalism), this 
narrative seems to present a rather grim picture.  In chapter 4, I discussed what I referred 
to as the problem of inverse proportion, which some evangelical critics believed they had 
seen at work throughout the history of Christianity and art, and which some claimed to 
see anew during the decadent years of the fin-de-siècle.  T. Harwood Pattison, writing in 
the Baptist Quarterly Review in 1887, stated this problem succinctly: “As Christianity 
became artistic, it became corrupt.”73  Looking back over the shape of the preceding 
narrative, it seems to me that in many ways this story confirms Pattison’s anxieties.  As 
evangelical interest in aesthetics grew, evangelicalism, like much of the rest of western 
culture, was undergoing a steady process of secularization.74  This secularization did not 
always affect evangelicals in the same way everywhere, of course, just as not all 
evangelicals were equally interested in aesthetics, but in general, the observation remains 
true.   
The question, then, is whether the problem of inverse proportion ought to be 
accepted, perhaps reluctantly, as some kind of “law” – as evangelical Christianity 
becomes artistic, it becomes corrupt – in which case the lesson of this study for 
contemporary evangelical aestheticians is to pack up their bags and go home, or whether 
the problem of inverse proportion is merely an unfortunate feature of evangelical 
aesthetic history before the twentieth century.  Given the way I have posed this question, 
it is no doubt evident that I lean towards the latter.  In this case, however, we are 
 492 
immediately faced with a new sort of question.  Recently, as I was nearing the 
completion of this study, I was privileged to speak briefly about some aspects of this 
project with Professor Roger Lundin, who gave pointed expression to this new sort of 
question.  What, if anything, he asked (and here I’m paraphrasing), could have prevented 
the kind of aesthetic collapse among conservative evangelicals that both he and I have 
described? 
Such a question, though obviously speculative, is crucial.  One way to approach 
this question is to ask what those nineteenth-century evangelicals who sought to think 
deeply and critically about art did “wrong.”  The answer, I think, at least in part, is that 
they failed to bring the disciplines of systematic theology and aesthetics into meaningful 
conversation with one another in a consistent way.  This may seem a strange diagnosis, 
especially after I have tried to emphasize the theological context of evangelical aesthetic 
thought.  Have I not argued, for example, that evangelicals posited a subordinationist 
relationship between Christianity and art?  I have, moreover, suggested throughout that 
systematicity, or a certain philosophical self-consciousness, was what helped to 
distinguish the evangelical aesthetics of the nineteenth century from most of what came 
before.  But of course one can be dead wrong in a quite systematic fashion, and this, I 
submit, was a large part of the problem with the evangelical aesthetics of the Victorian 
period.  Indeed, when I first began work on this project, I had a vague expectation that I 
would discover in the pages of nineteenth-century evangelical periodicals a precursor to 
the contemporary discipline of “theological aesthetics.”  Surely if anyone was thinking 
about art from the perspective of traditional doctrine it would be the evangelicals, or so I 
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thought.  Such an expectation may reveal as much about my woeful lack of knowledge 
regarding my own tradition as anything, but it quickly became apparent that “theological 
aesthetics” was not an accurate description of much of what evangelicals were writing 
when it came to the fine arts.  Certainly, as I have stressed throughout, there were 
evangelical writers who “pushed back,” at least for a time, against the more extreme 
implications of the romantic principles that were underwriting much nineteenth-century 
aesthetic thought.  There were also some writers, such as E.E. Higbee in the Mercersburg 
Review, who approached the topic of aesthetics from a specifically Christological 
vantage-point and were thus closer to the kind of theological aesthetics I have in mind.  
But much of the pushing back which nineteenth-century evangelicals did tended to bring 
theology in primarily by way of qualification, not as a necessary starting-point for 
positive, constructive thinking.  In short, too few evangelical writers were beginning with 
theological categories and then asking what kind of theory of art might be derived from 
these categories – they were not, as a colleague once put it, “letting theology ask the 
questions”75 – rather, they were drawing uncritically on Enlightenment and romantic 
theories and then, sometimes, noting that theological concerns might alter these theories 
to a degree.  As with any generalization, there were notable exceptions, to be sure, but 
such exceptions were rarer than I, for one, would have hoped.  Furthermore, on some 
level we are back to the proverbial chicken and egg, for certain social and theological 
changes were already afoot in the early nineteenth century which had fostered an Anglo-
American evangelicalism that was consciously non-sectarian and increasingly non-
dogmatic (“the Bible alone” was the rallying cry of a large segment of nineteenth-century 
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evangelicalism, especially in America76).  Consequently, it is not surprising that 
nineteenth-century evangelicals would have failed to be rigorously theological in their 
approach to art since they were in effect becoming less theologically rigorous in general.   
To be clear, I am speaking here primarily about method, not about substance.  I 
am not prepared at this point to suggest what kind of aesthetic theory a rigorous 
theological attention to art might yield.  I suspect it could yield many plausible theories, 
as in fact it has already begun to do.  Evangelicals have once again returned to a 
systematic investigation of the arts, and unlike the explorations of many nineteenth-
century evangelicals, this investigation is in many cases proceeding along distinctly 
theological lines.  I would also add here that I should not be misunderstood to mean that 
something like a romantic view of art is incompatible a priori with orthodox evangelical 
Protestantism.  Any serious attention to the aesthetics of Jonathan Edwards, or to certain 
iterations of the “Mercersburg aesthetic,” would suggest the fallacy of this idea.  To be 
sure, one might find good reason to reject Edwards’s aesthetic on any number of 
philosophical or theological grounds (not to mention the heavily Hegelian inflections of 
the Mercersburg aesthetic).  Not even Edwards’s immediate theological heirs were 
willing to follow him either in his aesthetic musings or in his peculiar system of theistic 
idealism.  But the very existence of a theory like Edwards’s is enough to demonstrate that 
orthodox Christianity and certain kinds of “romantic” thought are not always necessarily 
at odds.  Yet however one judges the content of Edwards’s aesthetics, it is precisely an 
Edwardsean-style methodology that I am here commending.  Indeed, with the recent 
resurgence of Calvinism in many evangelical circles, Edwards is once again being looked 
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at with fresh eyes, and evangelical aesthetic thought can only stand to benefit from his 
example.  As Mark A. Noll opines near the conclusion of his book America’s God, a 
book that has appeared and reappeared throughout this study, if he “had to recommend 
only one American theologian for the purposes of understanding God, the self, and the 
world as they really are,” that theologian would be Edwards.  To this I would add that if 
one wants to understand not only how the history of evangelical aesthetics went “wrong” 
but also how it might once again go “right,” one could do far worse than to look to 
Edwards.  For this reason, I find that I cannot resist the urge to conclude this study by 
citing a remark – a remark Noll also cites – by the Rev. Israel Holly, who, during a period 
of heated theological dispute in 1770, proclaimed: “Sir, if I was to engage with you in 
controversy, I would say, Read Edwards!  And if you wrote again, I would tell you to 
Read Edwards!  And if you wrote again, I would still tell you to Read Edwards!”77 
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APPENDIX A 
A NOTE ON PERIODICAL CITATIONS 
 
The development of electronic databases has made locating and accessing the periodical 
material used for this study much easier than it would have been even ten or twenty years 
ago, and I have benefited greatly from the availability of such databases through the 
O’Neill Library, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA.  Two databases in particular, the 
American Periodicals Series (published by ProQuest Information and Learning 
Company) and the British Periodicals Online (Collections I and II, published by ProQuest 
Chadwyck-Healey), were invaluable to me throughout this project.  Given the number of 
periodical articles cited, however, identifying the requisite database information for 
individual citations would have proven too cumbersome and distracting.  For this reason, 
I have cited all periodical material in a conventional format without reference to its 
digital or non-digital origins; however, please see Appendix B for a select list of 
periodicals used for this study, many of which may be accessed through the two 
databases noted above.  In addition, I have opted in most instances to cite reviews using 
the short titles often found at the tops of consecutive pages in many periodicals.  In a 
number of cases, these short titles (or some variation thereof) are also those listed in 
major periodical indexes, whether traditional or electronic.  In the notes and in the Works 
Cited, I have therefore avoided using the format “Rev. of …” except in those cases in 
which no short titles exist.  Finally, I have adopted a uniform system of citation for all 
periodical material: Author Name, Title, Periodical Name Vol. # (Date), Pg. #s.
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APPENDIX B 
SELECTED PERIODICAL SOURCES CONSULTED* 
 
Title 
American Baptist Magazine† 
 
Baptist Magazine 
 
Baptist Quarterly (also Baptist Quarterly† 
Review and Baptist Review) 
 
Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review† 
(also Presbyterian Quarterly and 
Princeton Review, Princeton Review, 
and New Princeton Review) 
 
Biblical World† 
 
British Quarterly Review‡ 
 
Christian Advocate† 
 
Christian Advocate† (also Christian 
Advocate and Journal, Christian 
Advocate and Journal and Zion’s 
Herald) 
 
Christian Index† 
 
Christian Observer† 
 
Christian Spectator† (also Quarterly 
Christian Spectator and later American 
Biblical Repository and Classical 
Review) 
 
Eclectic Review‡ 
 
London Quarterly Review‡ (also London 
Review and London Quarterly and 
Holborn Review) 
Denomination/Country 
Baptist/US 
 
Baptist/GB 
 
Baptist/US 
 
 
Presbyterian (Old School)/US 
 
 
 
 
Baptist/US 
 
Congregationalist/GB 
 
Presbyterian/US 
 
Methodist/US 
 
 
 
 
Southern Baptist/US 
 
Anglican/GB (also US) 
 
Congregationalist/ 
    Presbyterian/US 
 
 
 
Congregationalist/GB 
 
Methodist/GB 
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Mercersburg Review† (also Reformed 
Quarterly Review) 
 
Methodist Magazine† (also Methodist 
Magazine and Quarterly Review, 
Methodist Quarterly Review, and 
Methodist Review) 
 
Methodist Review [South] 
 
Presbyterian Quarterly Review  (also later 
American Presbyterian and 
Theological Review and American 
Presbyterian Review) 
 
Primitive Methodist Quarterly Review (also 
Christian Ambassador and Primitive 
Methodist Quarterly Review and 
Christian Ambassador) 
 
Record 
 
Southern Presbyterian Review 
 
Wesleyan-Methodist Magazine‡ (also 
Arminian Magazine) 
 
 
German Reformed/US 
 
 
Methodist/US 
 
 
 
 
Southern Methodist/US 
 
Presbyterian/US 
 
 
 
 
Primitive Methodist/GB 
 
 
 
 
Anglican/GB 
 
Presbyterian/US 
 
Methodist/GB 
 
 
*  This is a representative list.  For other periodicals cited in this study, please consult the 
notes and/or the Works Cited page. 
 
† Available in whole or in part in the American Periodicals Series Database, published by 
ProQuest Information and Learning Company. 
 
‡ Available in whole or in part in the British Periodicals Online Database, Collections I 
and II, published by ProQuest Chadwyck-Healey.
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